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ABSTRACT 
According to business and military researchers, the world within which today’s organisations operate is 
more technologically advanced than a decade ago, with globalisation making businesses and supply 
chains more interdependent. The impacts of disruptive events are increasingly felt across operational, 
tactical and strategic operating levels and in some cases, they can cause national and international crises. 
Simultaneously, organisations are being forced to diversify and innovate to maintain their share of global 
or local markets, thus importing risk into the daily operating model. These organisations maintain the 
foundation of society by building the economy; they provide employment, wealth generation, material 
goods, services and a spirit of community. If a large organisation collapses, invariably the community within 
which it operates will also feel the impact. 
It is impossible for any organisation to build a framework to protect it from all disruptive events. Such 
capability is not possible, no matter the size or resources of the organisation and, therefore, it is also 
impossible to plan for every eventuality. The skill is having the ability to develop the capability to adaptively 
think, understand the root causes of the disruptive event and dynamically plan accordingly. This allows the 
utilisation of the resources, finances and time available to minimise the impact and maximise the 
opportunity as competitors struggle to recover. This is the concept of Organisational Resilience; delivering 
a holistic approach to enable an organisation to dynamically respond, recover and grow in the face of 
disruption. Organisations with a higher level of internal resilience are better poised to mobilise resources, 
allocate personnel and prioritise key functions, with leadership teams unafraid to make difficult decisions 
based on intelligence and evidence-based analysis. However, organisations also struggle to fully 
understand, appreciate and demonstrate the need for resilience until faced with the disruptive event. There 
is still a limited understanding of how a resilience framework can benefit the bottom line. 
This thesis is a study of the UK military which, by default, must demonstrate a high level of resilience and 
the ability to adaptively plan in a dynamically changing and hostile environment, in order to develop a 
framework to develop and manage organisational resilience.. Research identified that effective leadership, 
evidence-based decision-making and business intelligence collection and dissemination are critical to 
success, which informed the development of the Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model 
(ORM3). Organisational Resilience in this thesis is defined as a people focussed event, with case studies, 
interviews and observations of military units in preparation for deployment on operations being used to 
support this research. These lessons are then applied to the railway industry, in a bid to improve current 
resilience capabilities. Future work is likely to continue to develop the ORM3 framework, supported through 
the development of a cross industry learning methodology to continue to build capability. This research 
has already contributed to the development of resilience within the UK, having been consulted in the 
development of the UK national standard on resilience (BS65000: Organisational Resilience) and the UK 
Defence Contribution to Resilience Operations doctrine for government and local councils. It has also been 
used in the development of tools that can be used by organisations to develop their own awareness and 
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4 GW Fourth Generation Warfare – terminology for asymmetric warfare in the 
21st Century where enemy seeks to minimise effectiveness of military 
capability. 4GW is the situation where a large, technically focussed 
military power is fighting a conflict against an enemy who is 
implementing insurgency techniques and practices, while 
simultaneously implementing psychological warfare against the 
population, turning the population into a weapon. It has also been 
called "War Among the People", "3 Block War" and "Hybrid Warfare". 
5 GW Fifth Generation Warfare – terminology for describing activity by hostile 
forces to destabilise a nation through using its own population and 
infrastructure as the battleground. 5GW is a tempo change from 4GW. 
Whereas 4GW was situated within the host nation, 5GW sees the 
enemy targeting the home nation of the technologically superior force, 
using psychological and terrorist attacks to weaken the political resolve. 
More advanced application will see co-ordinated cyber-attacks on civil 
infrastructure, co-ordinated terrorist attacks and multiple avenues of 
psychological warfare targeted at the home nation population. 
 AAIB Air Accident Investigation Branch - Air industry specific body that 
investigates air accidents and distributes lessons identified from 
investigations. 
ACSC Advanced Command and Staff Course – UK military residential course 
for senior leadership personnel to develop operational planning 
capability. 
ADP Army Doctrine Publication 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Possible – a mechanism for risk management 
within military and industry 
ARAG Advanced Research and Assessment Group - A department of 
the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom concerned with long-term 
planning and threat assessment. It was closed down in 2010, removing 
the independent military research capability. 
ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies (now part of RDG) 
Battlegroup (BG) A grouping of mixed military units brought together to achieve a defined 
task. Normally between 600 - 800 personnel and a subunit of a brigade. 
BAU Business as Usual 
BCM Business Continuity Management - The holistic management process 




business operations those threats, if realized, might cause, and which 
provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the 
capability of an effective response that safeguards the interests of its 
key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities1. 
BCMS Business Continuity Management System. A collection of activities 
focussed on delivering a Business Continuity capability 
BGHQ Battle Group Headquarters – the smallest tactical deployable stand-
alone unit, consisting of several separate units to deliver a combined 
arms capability. 
Brigade (Bde) The smallest operational deployable unit, consisting of between 3 - 5 
Battlegroups. Mixed military units and self-sufficient for a limited period. 
Commanded by a brigadier and consists of approximately 1500 - 3000 
personnel, depending on the task. 
BSI British Standards Institute 
BSOS Building Stability Overseas Strategy – DfID strategy for UK investment 
overseas. 
Business Continuity Strategic and tactical capability of an organisation to plan for and 
respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue 
business operations at an acceptable predefined level.2 
CAST Command and Staff Trainer 
CATT Combined Arms Tactical Trainer 
CCS Civil Contingencies Secretariat – Branch of UK Government 
responsible for civil order and crisis management. 
CDG Competency Development Group – Group of training and industry 
specialists responsible for the quality assurance of training material. 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
Change Management A managerial practice within organisations comprising of several 
activities to implement change within an organisation. 
CMI Chartered Management Institute 
CNI Critical National Infrastructure 
CDS Chief of Defence Staff 
COBRA Cabinet Office Briefing Room Alpha - The priority briefing room for 
Government ministers to receive updates on strategic issues. 
COE Contemporary Operating Environment 
Company / Squadron 
Group 
A grouping of mixed military units brought together to achieve a defined 
task. Normally between 80 - 120 personnel and a sub-unit of a 
Battlegroup. 
 
1British Standards Institute, BS11200:2014: Crisis Management, BSI Standards Limited, London, 2014. 




Contingency Possible future emergency or risk which must be prepared for.3 
COIN Counterinsurgency. Activities conducted to defeat an insurgent force. 
Utilises all available Government levers of power to influence host 
population 
Crisis An inherently abnormal, unstable and complex situation that represents 
a threat to the strategic objectives, reputation or existence of an 
organisation.4 
CP Control Period – Allocated period of time normally five years, for 
Network Rail to conduct activity in, with an allocated budget for that 5 
year period. 
Crisis Management development and application of the organizational capability to deal 
with crises5. 
CSTTG Command Staff Tactical Training Group 
DCDC Defence Concept and Doctrine Centre. Military think tank for strategic 
analysis and doctrine development 
DefAc UK Defence Academy.  
DfID Department for International Development 
DfT Department for Transport 
Doctrine Originating from the Latin phrase doctrina, meaning `a body of 
teachings` or `instructions`, taught principles or positions, as the body 
of teachings in a branch of knowledge or belief system. Within the 
thesis, doctrine is a base layer of ingrained knowledge aligned to the 
organisation’s individual culture, that is clearly communicated, 
understood and applied by all, and is regularly reviewed and updated 
through organisational learning practices6.  
DRP Defence research Paper – equivalent to a Masters’ level thesis, 
submitted as part of the formal assessment process for ACSC. 
DSAT Defence Systems Approach to Training. Mechanism for the 
development of military individual and collective training events 
ECML East Coast Mainline 
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System 
EPC Emergency Planning College. Independent training facility aimed at 
developing resilience capability within the UK 
ESG Event Steering Group. Part of the railway strategic planning process. 
FCO UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
 
3Cabinet Office, EPRR, p.219 
4Cabinet Office, EPRR, p.219 
5BSI, BS11200:2014: Crisis Management, 2014. 
6 Hoiback, H., `What is Doctrine?` Journal of Strategic Studies, Routledge Group, Volume 34, Issue 6, 2011, pp 879 – 900; Harvey 
C., and Wilkinson M., `The Value of Doctrine,` The RUSI Journal, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, Volume 154, Number 6, 




FE@R Force Elements at Readiness. Mechanism for preparing military units 
for operations. 
IDES International Defence Engagement Strategy – The UK Government 
strategy for laying out how defence engagement contributes to 
delivering influence to further the UK interests across the world. 
Incident Event or situation that requires a response from the emergency 
services or other responders.7 
IED Improvised Explosive Device. 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
FOC Freight Operating Company – Freight operators contracted to haul 
freight across the Rail Network. 
Governance The system by which the organization is directed, controlled and held 
accountable to achieve its core purpose over the long term8. 
Hawthorne (observer) 
effect 
This is where the observed group react to the presence of the observer, 
modifying an aspect of their behaviour in response to their awareness 
of being observed. 
Hazard Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e., non-malicious) event or situation 
with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, 
damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment 
and/or to economic, social and political structures.9 
HIHP High Impact - High Probability risks; also known as “Red Risks” within 
business they are the risks known to the business that could cause 
critical damage to the business operations or reputation. 
HILP High Impact-Low Probability risks HILP. Sometimes called “Black 
Swan” or “Creeping Tide” risks, these are normally risks that although 
can cause extensive damage, are over-looked due to the unlikeliness 
of the event happening. 
HoCTSC House of Commons Transport Select Committee. 
HTA Human Terrain Analysis – process of mapping out the social dynamics 
of a location or region. 
Hybrid Warfare A term based upon the work of senior military officers and theorists who 
proposed that in the 21st Century conflict would be less state on state 
and instead be a blend of high intensity warfare, low level asymmetric 
warfare and peace support operations, all occurring within a similar 
location. 
Hyogo Framework A United Nations initiative for a global blueprint for disaster risk 
reduction efforts between 2005 and 2015. Its goal was to substantially 
 
7Cabinet Office, EPRR, p.223 
8British Standards Institute, British Standard 13500:2013 Code of Practice for Delivering Effective Governance of Organisations, 
British Standards Institute, London, UK, 2013, p.5. 




reduce disaster losses by 2015 - in lives, and in the social, economic, 
and environmental assets of communities and countries. 
ICSC Intermediate Command and Staff Course. Residential military course to 
develop operational thinking within the middle management of the 
military. 
 JESIP Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme - A programme 
to develop joint operational doctrine, practices and procedures across 
the emergency services, aiming to maximise capability and resources. 
JNCO Junior Non-Commissioned Officer. Junior frontline management roles 
of the military. 
Joint Doctrine Fundamental principles that guide the employment of UK military forces 
in co-ordinated action towards a common objective. 
 JDN Joint Doctrine Note - A pre-doctrinal publication that presents common 
fundamental guidance and is part of the initiation stage of the joint 
doctrine development process. 
JDP Joint Doctrine Publication - A publication that introduces fundamental 
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of 
objectives It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. 
JSP Joint Service Publication is a UK military doctrine publication used for 
the purpose of developing Joint operational capability within the UK 
military. 
Leadership Leadership is the successful projection of one’s personality, spirit, 
vision and purpose onto a collective of individuals, tailored to the 
situation and the specific moment in time, in order to obtain success in 
the most prevailing of circumstances, in an acceptable moral, just and 
authentic manner. Unlike management, leadership can be displayed by 
any individual within the organisation and may be either an innate or 
specifically cultured quality within that individual. Effective leadership is 
dependent on the individual within the leadership role, and those within 
the group that give the individual the authority to lead.10 
LWC Land Warfare Centre 
Mission Command Mission Command is a philosophy of command, with centralised intent 
and decentralised execution, that is particularly suitable for complex, 
dynamic and adversarial situations. The Manoeuvrist Approach 
demands a philosophy of command that promotes freedom of action 
and initiative. Mission Command focuses on outcomes, as it stresses 
 
10Slim, W, `Leadership in Management`, British Army Review: Leadership: A Special Report, Land Warfare Centre, Ministry of 
Defence, Warminster, 2013, pp 08 – 13;  British Army Director Leadership, The Army Leadership Code: an Introductory Guide, 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Leadership Group, Camberley, Surrey, 2012; Jefferies, G., `Authentic Leadership in 
Professional Services Organisations,` MBA dissertation, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, 2009; Marquet, L.D., Turn the Ship 




the importance of understanding what effect is to be achieved, rather 
than 
specifying the ways by which it should be achieved. 
MoD Ministry of Defence. 
NDM National Decision-making Model. A police framework that is meant to 
make the decision-making process easier and more uniform. 
Net Ops 
 
Network Operations is the department within Network Rail responsible 
for delivering the daily operations of running the railway and 
maintenance activities. 
NGO Non-Government Organisation - Normally a charity or other body 
delivering disaster support to populations or nations that isn't managed 
by a government. 
NSS National Security Strategy A periodic document written by the UK 
Government which outlines the major national security concerns and 
mechanisms to manage them. 
OED Oxford English Dictionary 
OGD Other Government Department - A body that belongs to another 
government body working in support of the organisation. 
ORM3 Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model – A framework, 
based on this research, for assessing and benchmarking the resilience 
of an organisation. 
ORR Office of Rail and Road - The UK regulation body for the roads and 
railways within the UK. 
Operational (Bronze) The level (below tactical level) at which the management of “hands-on” 
work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas, equating 
for single agencies to Bronze level.11 
Operation Banner Military codename for operations in support of local Police within 
Northern Ireland during the Troubles. 
Operation Herrick Military codename for operations in Afghanistan since 2006. 
Operation Telic Military codename for operations in Iraq between 2003 – 2009. 
PAR Participatory Action Research is a mechanism of research in certain 
communities that emphasises participation and action, seeking to 
understand the research topic through change and reflection. 
PDSW Planning and Delivery of Safe Work – A programme of works within the 
rail industry to embed a safety focussed culture into the planning of 
engineering works on the railway. 
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army was a paramilitary organisation 
operating within the UK seeking to force a United Ireland. 
 




PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters – Strategic Command Centre for UK 
Joint Services Operations.  
PMO Programme Management Office an internal organisation for a specific 
business that provides a variety of support to a single programme or 
multiple programmes. 
PSO Peace Support Operations are operations that makes use of diplomatic, 
civil and military activities to bring stability to the affected region.  
PWC Price Waterhouse Cooper – An international consulting firm heavily 
involved in risk management, assurance and the development of 
Organisational Resilience 
RAF Royal Air Force. 
RAIB Rail Accident Investigation Branch - rail industry specific body that 
investigates rail-based accidents and distributes lessons identified from 
investigations. 
RCDS Royal College of Defence Studies is the senior college of the defence 
Academy of the UK 
RDG The Rail Delivery Group (RDG) is the British rail industry membership 
body that brings together passenger and freight rail 
companies, Network Rail and High Speed 2. It provides a cross 
industry group to discuss and act on strategic issues that may impact 
the Rail industry. 
Red Team The name given to a team that is assigned to subject an organisation’s 
plans and assumptions to rigorous analysis and challenge. 
Red teaming The activity conducted by the Red team within the organisation. Red 
Teaming is a systematic test and evaluation of offered solutions to test 
the resilience of the plan.12 
Res Orgs Resilient Organisations is a research and consulting 
group focused on helping organisations,  
Risk The effect of uncertainty on objectives13. 
RIO Rail Incident Officer 
Risk Awareness The coordinated activities to direct and control an organization 
regarding risk14. 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs – a military-theoretical hypothesis about 
the future of warfare. 
RN Royal Navy. 
 
12Ministry of Defence, The Staff Standard for the Army, 1st Edition, British Army Publications, Ministry of Defence, London, 2016. 
13British Standards Institute, BS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines, First edition, British Standards 





RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst - Initial Officer Training 
establishment for the British Army. 
RSA Royal School of Artillery – Location of the Royal Artillery Training 
School, based near Salisbury. 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute is a think tank for Defence matters for 
the UK, founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington. 
SAORF Systems Approach to Organisational Resilience Framework 
SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review is a periodic review of key 
defence matters and funding to national defence organisations. 
Sendai Framework A United Nations initiative that is the successor agreement to 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015), which had been the 
most encompassing international accord to date on disaster risk 
reduction. 
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. was an independent 
government agency created by the US Congress to provide oversight 
of the use (or misuse) of the $52 billion U.S. reconstruction program 
in Iraq. 
SIO Station Incident Officer 
Situational Awareness The state of individual and/or collective knowledge relating to past and 
current events, their implications and potential future development15. 
SNCO Senior Non-Commissioned Officer is a junior command role within the 
UK military. 
SoAR Sale of Access Rights is a strategic process of allocating access to the 
rail network to Train Operators  
SRA Strategic Rail Authority - A former Government directed rail industry 
body responsible for determining the rail budget, setting the strategy 
and the leasing of the passenger rail franchises 
Strategy Originating from the Greek word strategia the original concept was the 
“science of the strategos (general)”.16 Within the 20th Century, the focus 
of strategy has also been mapped into the business world. Within the 
military, the concept of Strategy is the alignment of tasks, resources, 
capabilities and planning activities to achieve the required outcomes. 
Within business, strategy focuses on large-scale problem solving 
through the identification of issues, developing a guiding policy and then 
aligning required resources to defined actions to deliver successful 
outcomes. Both concepts seek to deliver successful outcomes through 
 
15BSI, BS11200:2014: Crisis Management, 2014.  
16Royal College of Defence Studies, Thinking Strategically, 3rd Edition, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 




the effective planning and alignment of several activities against a 
guiding policy to achieve the desired end-state.  
Strategic (Gold) The level (above tactical level and operational level) at which policy, 




The lead military Headquarters for responding to UK Resilience crises 
in response to Government direction. 
Supply Chain The network of organisations that are involved, through upstream and 
downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that 
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the 
ultimate consumer.18 
SWOT analysis Organisational assessment tool. Stands for Strengths Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats analysis. 
Tactical (Silver) Level (below strategic level and above operational level) at which the 
response to an emergency is managed.19 
TfL Transport for London 
Threat Intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse 
consequences to human welfare (including property and the supply of 
essential services and commodities), the environment or security.20 
TOC Train operating Companies -Passenger train service organisations 
which have a granted franchise from a funder body. 
TSGN Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern (TSGN) franchise is a 
management contract for the provision of train passenger services 
on the Thameslink and Great Northern routes for the south of the 
UK. 
UAV / UAS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - An unmanned aerial vehicle, is an aircraft 
without a human pilot aboard. UAVs are a component of an unmanned 
aircraft system; which include a UAV, a ground-based controller, and a 
system of communications between the two. The flight of UAVs may 
operate with various degrees of autonomy: either under remote control 
by a human operator or autonomously by onboard computers. 
UK Military Within this thesis, the term UK military is deemed to represent a heavily 
armed, highly organised force primarily intended for warfare, This term 
is applied when referring to the UK Armed Forces, which are known 
collectively in the modern day as the `military’, and which may consist 
of one or more branches of the Armed Forces. 
 
17 Cabinet Office, EPRR, p.231 
18 Christopher M and Peck, H., `Building the Resilient Supply Chain,’ International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol 15, No.2, 
2004, pp 1-13. P.4 
19 Cabinet Office, EPRR, p.231 




This approach follows the similar approach taken in recent publications 
by senior UK military authors and academics21. 
VUCA Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous. A term, derived from the 
US military, to describe the complexity of the business and military 
environments of the 21st Century. 




21Elliott, C. L., High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Hurst and Company, London, 2015; 
Johnson, A.L., (ed), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies, Whitehall, London, 2014; Ledwidge,F., Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, Yale University 
Press, London, 2012;  Snedden, S E, `Northern Ireland, a British Military Success or a Purely Political Outcome’, Defence 
Research Paper, Advanced Command and Staff College number 10, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, UK, 
2010.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The UK landscape provides multiple challenges for the rail industry, which manages a complex 
operation within a highly dynamic environment. This severely impacts on the strategic rail network that 
was constructed in the Victorian era, and limited knowledge of the construction methodologies used in 
the 19th Century at numerous infrastructure sites imports a significant level of risk to the resilience of 
the network. On the wider scale, several natural monopolies manage, such as National Grid and Royal 
Mail, maintain and operate supporting elements for the rail industry, which contributes to the strategic 
running of the UK society. 23 The ability of any one of these organisations to respond, recover and adapt 
to a major disruptive event is vital to the successful management of essential services which provide 
power, manpower or capability to the GB rail industry, demonstrated in January 2018 by the collapse 
of Carillion. Enhancing the level of Organisational Resilience within the rail industry, and its disparate 
supply chain, is a critical step in the move to develop greater resilience within the wider community and 
the UK as a nation, in line with the National Security Strategy.24 
 
It is important that the concept of Organisational Resilience does not follow the route of Business 
Continuity and becomes a specialism within the business sphere. Ideally the practice of building 
Organisational Resilience is regarded as a blend of good management and leadership practices, which 
are easy to embed, manage and enhance. A reliance on bespoke specialists within an organisation 
creates a resilience paradox, with the risk of losing the capability if your specialists are unavailable. As 
part of the initial research into the rail industry to set the context, the analysis of business practices 
identified a lack of forward planning or a holistic approach to building resilience across many levels. 
Documents and research theses also identified that military examples were used to develop high level 
thinking within business, with several being referenced within the bibliographies.25 Within these works 
there was discussion around the capability of military planning, leadership and culture that enabled 
successful resilience in difficult situations, but there was little documentation on the topic of 
Organisational Resilience and capability, which was a key element of enabling the military to function 
under difficult situations.  
 
Within this thesis, the term UK military is deemed to represent a heavily armed, highly organised force 
primarily intended for warfare, also known collectively as the UK military, which may consist of one or 
more branches of the Armed Forces. For this thesis, the branches are the British Army, Royal Navy and 
the Royal Air Force. A military is typically officially authorised and maintained by a sovereign state, with 
 
23A natural monopoly occurs when a business or industry, due to the economy of scale, resources or technical expertise, 
dominates the landscape to the point where it is too expensive for another organisation to attempt to challenge it. 
24Cameron, D., National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015, Government, Open 
Government Licence (OGL), London, 2015, p.5. 
25See Gray, C. S., The Strategy Bridge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010; Heuser, B., The Strategy Makers – Thoughts on 
War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz, Praeger Security International, California, 2010; Yardley, I., Kakabadse, A. 
and Neal, D., From Battlefield to Boardroom, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012; Jermy,S., Strategy for Action – Using 




its members identifiable by distinct military uniforms. The main task of the UK military is usually defined 
as defence of the state and its interests against external armed threats, internal security crises or a 
focussed response to UK resilience situations. These strategic tasks are laid out in government policy 
and form the military strategy of the UK. 
 
Building upon the above observation, the military are used by the UK Government, due to their level of 
crisis management capability and strategic agility, to respond to UK resilience threat situations. Under 
the direction of Strategic Joint Command (SJC), the military are deployed across the UK when the 
Government requires bespoke resilience activities to minimise the impact of natural or man-made 
crises. The military also possess their own strategic resilience doctrine and guidance frameworks, 
written by resilience and security specialists at the UK Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Thus, if 
the UK military are the key organisation used by Government to respond to national resilience threats, 
the question as to whether the business sphere could learn from the military on the development of 
Organisational Resilience against disruptive events began to emerge and take shape. 
 
The military, particularly the British Army, also have a sustained period of having to manage its ability 
to learn from previous campaigns and prepare for other substantial challenges. It has managed 
disruptive change effectively while maintaining strategic and operational effectiveness, operated as a 
multi-national organisation utilising decentralised nodes and managed massive staff and materiel 
expansion and contraction, often while involved in at least one conflict. Recent work by Fox on how the 
British Army functioned as a learning organisation during the First World War identified several of these 
factors, which are discussed in Chapter 2. She noted that even before the First World War, parallels 
were being drawn between the management of the Army and large organisations, with both facing 
similar issues.26 Yardley, in his PhD thesis and his subsequent book, also notes that businesses can 
learn several lessons in adaptive leadership and managing change effectively from the military.27 
 
The lack of literature on the topic of Organisational Resilience or research connected with the analysis 
of transference of military practice led the researcher to approach the UK Defence Academy (DefAc), 
located near Swindon. Within its halls reside over 2000 Masters’ level research papers written by senior 
military commanders as part of the year-long Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC), preparing 
them for strategic command. Authorisation was approved by the Academy for these documents to be 
reviewed. To support this publicly unseen research, extensive reviews of international associated 
literature was also undertaken to help inform the Organisational Resilience debate, which is discussed 
in Chapter 2. Another area examined was Change Management. Any act of responding to a disruptive 
event will require the management of the change caused by the impact, both to the infrastructure and 
personnel. An increased understanding of Organisational Resilience, supported by a greater awareness 
 
26Fox, A., Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2018, p.249. 
27Yardley, I., 2010, `The Wider Utility of Mission Command’, PhD Thesis, Cranfield Defence and Security Department of 




of Change Management practices and procedures, will enable an organisation to become more flexible 
in its initial response and ongoing adaptation to the unfolding dynamic environment. Heavily linked is 
the effectiveness of the leadership to respond, guide and direct the actions of the organisation during 
the transitional phases from impact to getting back to the new state of normal. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH AIM 
The thesis aim was the development of an Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model 
(ORM3) framework to unite various operational functions within the business, creating an internal 
resilience against potential threats and crises which can be implemented through strategic leadership. 
By analysing organisational structures, leadership and management training and education within the 
UK military, emergency services and current governmental work within the Resilience domain, this 
thesis identified lessons, management hierarchies and practices to assist in the development of a 
Resilience Management System for the future Railway industry.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH CONCEPT 
As the military provide the UK Government’s resilience strategic response capability, this thesis is 
targeted at what lessons can be learned from the various activities that they have been involved in. 
Following the Learning Organisation approach, this thesis aims to look outwards from the rail industry 
towards other organisations to identify how to build and sustain its resilience through a decentralised 
leadership framework, maintaining a capability to respond to crises and remain focussed on the day 
job. The military, viewed as a complex, multi-functional organisation operating through a decentralised 
leadership framework and running internationally focussed operations, provides a good case study to 
understand how it develops and sustains resilience capability. 
 
This research is therefore focussed on what lessons industry can learn from observing and analysing 
how the military operates. It is important to note that lessons can be learned from both positive and 
negative experiences, and this thesis utilises that approach. Organisational learning and knowledge 
transfer can happen both ways; this thesis focuses only on the lessons that industry can obtain from 
the military. The topic of what the military can learn from industry activities, practices and procedures is 
the topic for another research project. However, for lessons to be applied, they must be relevant. 
Senge’s work in the 1990s on Organisational Learning was viewed as a paradigm shift in organisational 
culture.28 As organisations sought to embrace this new way of thinking Simon Sinek changed the 
concept of organisational culture and leadership, dispelling the “Great Man”, task orientated and 
directive style of the 20th Century to a more facilitative, people focussed, empathetic individual to enable 
the development of a Learning Organisation.29 Matthews, an international learning consultant who has 
worked with industry globally and the UK military, notes that the learning methods of the 20th Century 
are ineffective, proposing the need to radically rethink how organisations and academic institutions 
 
28Matthews P., Learning Transfer at Work, Three Faces Publishing, Milton Keynes, 2018, p.6. 
29Sinek S., Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action, Portfolio Penguin Books, London, 2009; Sinek 
S., Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t, Penguin Books, London, 2017 
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assist individuals to learn effectively. The art of learning has changed with the arrival of the agile learning 
organisation, utilising informal learning techniques and learning transfer to obtain market position.30 
Matthews notes that for the learning organisation to work, the leadership must become part of it; a 
learner and a sponsor. The leadership styles of the 20th Century do not sit comfortably with effective 
learning; leaders need to engage, encourage, support and empathise with the learners.31  
 
King posits that the heroic leadership of the Second World War is not compatible with today’s 
stabilisation and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with instant media coverage, instantaneous 
information and immediate political scrutiny.32 Sinek supports this notion, using US Special Forces and 
their support elements, rather than traditional military structures, as the template for the leadership 
model of the 21st Century. Technologically aware, empowered and collaborative, Special Forces 
leaders work with their members, rather than directing them. Individuals within the team are specialists, 
empowered to raise concerns based on their knowledge, experience and training.33 This level of 
capability on the modern battlefield is critical, as the level of information available and the almost 
instantaneous ability for it to be transmitted globally provides a challenge not witnessed in the early 
1990s. By the turn of the century, any individual with a smartphone or a video camera could report the 
news, changing the strategic situation. The ability to utilise this new phenomenon has altered the 
balance of power on the battlefield to the force that maximises the airwaves. Mackay and Tatham, 
pioneers of the population focussed operations in Afghanistan, note that: 
 
`Research by Ivan Ameguin-Toft identified that since 1800, the stronger force defeated the weaker 
force on a ratio of 2:1. However, since 1950, the weaker forces have improved considerably, and 
in several conflicts at the end of the 20th Century, the larger force was actually in trouble.’34  
 
This research project is not a detailed review of the history or the development of the culture of the 
military; military historians would be quick to highlight that to do this effectively, the researcher would 
need to look back to the English Civil War to start exploring the beginnings of the culture of today’s 
military. Rather, it will examine how the modern military conducts its activities, including warfighting and 
operations in support of UK national resilience, to identify key lessons that can be adapted into industry 
to build and enhance industry resilience capability.  
 
As the focus of this thesis is the lessons modern industry can learn in building resilience from the 
military, much of the research is focussed on the post-conscript UK military organisation. By reviewing 
the military prior to the cessation of National Service, there is a risk that this may impact on the effective 
lessons being identified. Likewise, reviewing a European military may develop the wrong cultural 
 
30Matthews P., Informal Learning at Work, Three Faces Publishing, Milton Keynes, 2013; Matthews P., Learning Transfer at 
Work, 2018, 
31Matthews P., Informal Learning at Work, 2013, pp 31-35. 
32King A., Command: The Twenty-first Century General, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp 214-281. 
33Sinek S., Leaders Eat Last, 2017, pp. 4-9. 
34Mackay A and Tatham S, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Wil Prove Decisive in 
Future Conflict, Military Studies Press, Essex, 2011, pp.14-15. 
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understanding, given the uniqueness of the UK as an Island nation. The culture of today’s business is 
focussed on individuals who have chosen to work and remain with that organisation, and reviewing a 
military that is based on a similar construct of being fully professional and comprised of a volunteer 
force is better suited to the context of this research, as identifying lessons from a conscripted military 
may not clearly obtain applicable lessons for today’s business.  
 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE RESILIENCE ISSUE 
The world within which the UK operates has become more contested, complex and congested,35 with 
the UK’s military and commercial organisations facing a myriad of ongoing disruptive complex threats 
which have become blurred through globalisation.36 The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, greater 
instability in the Middle East, the Ukraine crisis, ongoing cyber-attacks and risk of pandemics has made 
the world more unstable.37 Despite progress at the global level for greater commitment for more holistic 
ways of working,38 there are still considerable gaps between what has been agreed in principle and how 
policies can be mainstreamed into government practice.39 Research in the first decade of the 21st 
Century identified serious concerns over the resilience capability of the UK at a strategic level, with 
government and industry organisations failing to respond effectively to natural and man-made crises.40 
Learning from establishments developed to have a high level of self-resiliency, such as military forces, 
civilian organisations could develop a culture of organisational resilience to maintain stability, 
successfully recover from and adapt to major disruptive events. This approach would enable the 
development of one of the Hyogo Framework’s strategic objectives within the UK: `The development 
and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels, particularly the community 
level, can systematically contribute to building resilience to hazards.41 
 
Development of resilience within organisations will build strength within communities. Organisations 
that provide employment and purpose to communities can add to catalysts to address the negative 
downturn of the local community. The social decline of the communities built around the UK coal mines 
provide recent evidence of the impact of poor organisational resilience and the community impact. More 
recently, the collapse of large retail and department stores, also demonstrate the social impact of poor 
organisational resilience, poor management of strategic risk and a failure at the strategic leadership 





35Ministry of Defence, Army Doctrine Publication: Operations, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, 2010.  
36Gustafson K., `Complex threats: The Globalisation of Domestic and Foreign Security’, The RUSI Journal, The Royal United 
Services Institute, Routledge, London, Volume 155 Issue 1, 2010, pp 72-78. 
37Cameron, D., NSS and SDSR 2015, Government, OGL, London, 2015, p.5. 
38UNISDR Hyogo (2005 – 2015) and Sendai (2015 – 2030) frameworks. See www.unisdr.org for more details.  
39Thompson, E., Smart Power, Kokoda Papers Number 12, April 2010, Kokoda Foundation, Kingston, p.2. 
40Cole, J., Securing Our future: Resilience in the Twenty-First Century, The RUSI Journal, The Royal United Services Institute, 
Routledge, London, Volume 155 Issue 2, 2010, pp 46-51. 
41United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005 – 2015, Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, United Nations, 2005,p.4, 
downloaded from www.unisdr.org. 
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Serial Organisation Social Impact – Job losses 
1 Blockbusters42 2000 jobs 
2 British Home Stores43 11000 jobs 
3 Austin Reed44 1000 jobs 
4 Woolworths45 30000 jobs 
5 Carillion46 20000 jobs 
 
Table 1: Organisation Collapses and Social Impact. 
The collapse of Carillion highlighted the predatory aspect of the financial assurance community, with 
the Government investigation singling out the large firms of KPMG, Deloitte, EY and PwC as having 
created a monopoly and not providing an effective assurance framework for UK industry. The report 
highlighted that the drive for profits had impacted negatively on the ability for the companies to act 
independently of its customers, calling into question the reliability of the accounting and assurance 
industry and the fact that "The Big Four" had set out to create a natural monopoly, barring access to 
competitors47. This raises concerns for the quality of support and guidance given to the rail industry by 
the same "Big Four" agencies, as these agencies advise and are woven into several large rail industry 
programmes and projects. The government report has raised serious issues around the quality and 
performance around the business models and advice that these organisations have delivered to multiple 
companies, as well as their operating methodologies to maintain a closed market to competition. The 
work for this research thesis has been conducted in three distinct phases; 
 
Serial Phase Activity 
1 Phase 1 
Detailed study of the concept of organisational resilience, utilising expertise from 
across the globe from industry, military, government and academic specialists. 
2 Phase 2 
Detailed study of the GB rail industry to identify the current situation and issues it 
faces, along with potential root causes and management mechanisms. 
3 Phase 3 
Detailed analysis of the military during its recent period of operations in fragile or 
failing states as it sought to support the development of resilience within the 
national framework of the relevant nation, and how the staff within the command 
centres contributed to this. These military operations were conducted as the 
organisation maintained a business as usual image within the UK. 
Table 2: Research Phases 
 
 
42Ruddick, G., `Blockbuster Collapse to Cost Taxpayer £7m`, The Telegraph, reported 21 Dec 2013, available from accessed 
10 Mar 2016). 
43Sheffield, H., `BHS Collapse: Sir Philip Green Called to answer Questions`, The Independent, reported 26 April 2016, 
available from www.independent.co.uk. (accessed 10 Mar 2016). 
44BBC Business, `Austin Reed Collapse to Cost 1000 jobs`, reported 31 May 2016, available from 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business (accessed 10 Mar 2016).  
45Hall, J., `Woolworths: The Failed Struggle to Save a Retail Giant`, The Telegraph, reported 14 Nov 2009, available from 
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance (accessed 8 Mar 2016). 
46Mor F., Conway L., Thurley D. and Booth L., `The Collapse of Carillion', House of Commons Briefing Paper Series, Number 
8206, House of Commons Library, Whitehall, London, 2018.  
47House of Commons, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Carillion, Joint report 
(Second Joint report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees of Session 2017–
19), Government, Open Government Licence, London, 2018, p.79; HoC, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work 
and Pensions Committees, Carillion, Joint report, Government, OGL, London, 2018, pp.79 - 86. 
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The research was conducted through the learning of lessons from the experience of the UK military, 
focussing on the period of 2003 – 2014 when the UK military faced multiple serious resilience draining 
factors and attempted to implement the Comprehensive Approach doctrine model. 48 These were:  
 
▪ The organisation was involved in two protracted campaigns;  
 
▪ The military services experienced severe manpower reductions;  
 
▪ The MoD was conducting counterterrorism and national resilience tasks; 
 
▪ The military were required to maintain the capability to support UK Defence Diplomacy tasks; 
Emergency deployments in support of National and Local governments; and 
 
▪ The organisational structural change through the drawdown of military forces within Northern 
Ireland and Northwest Germany.  
 
During this period, UK industry suffered several extreme weather events and international events which 
had the potential to cause serious reputational damage if not properly managed. These events forced 
the formation of the COBRA decision group, resulting in the military being tasked to support the 
collective response. Section 1.6 gives an overview of the issues within the GB rail industry to assist in 
understanding the current problem and what lessons may be transferable from the military. 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis explores the complicated, connected and complex environment of resilience management, 
particularly focussing on the preparation, response and recovery to incidents within the railway sector. 
It looks at how to increase operational performance and effectiveness within the senior elements of 
managerial leadership, who are accountable for the successful management of the national railway 
infrastructure, and critical to the industrial and commercial aspects of the UK. The following chapters 
have been organised to enable the reader to easily follow the line of analysis, the presentations of the 
primary and secondary data and to establish an academic argument for the need to develop the 









48Ministry of Defence, Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4/05 The Comprehensive Approach, Development, Concepts and Doctrine 









1. Thesis Introduction 
Introduction to the thesis and overview of the document. Clearly sets out the 
problem statement, research approach and methods to be applied. 
2. Literature Review 
This discusses the literature that was reviewed, in conjunction with that which was 
reviewed in the previous chapter on organisational resilience. It looks at the impact 
of culture, risk and situational awareness, key areas to assist in building resilience 




This discusses the research methodology utilised during the investigative element of 
the thesis. It explains the various approaches taken to obtain primary evidence and 
the methods for analysis. It also sets out how the results would be utilised to develop 





This section discusses the business case for resilience, reasons for components, 
proposed mechanisms, testing assumptions, evaluating what benefits an 
Organisational Resilience framework would bring to a business, and how the 




This section analyses the approaches used within the Military and the rail industry. 
Using government reports, objective strategic analysis and questionnaire results 
from the research, this chapter helps set the context for the thesis by bringing to life 
the current challenges and issues both organisations face when it comes to building 
resilience and the framework to embed it into the organisation.  
6. Research Findings 
The findings from the research into the organisations is discussed in Chapter 5, 
building upon the observations in the previous chapter and supported with the 
analysis of the key components that have been identified within the research which 
organisations require to develop internal resilience to manage the impact of 
disruptive events.  
7. 
Understanding the 





Using the outcomes of the research, this chapter discusses how the rail industry can 
build organisational resilience within the industry, through the utilisation of the 
Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model (ORM3). This chapter also 
discusses key elements organisations require to be in place to develop or improve 
its resilience capability to manage disruptive incidents effectively. 
8. Building ORM3 





The final chapter reviews the findings, the process and lessons learnt during the 
project, as well as how it has been already applied to elements of the rail industry. It 
also highlights other areas the research has been used within the duration of the 
project. 
Table 3: Thesis Structure 
 
1.6 UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM - CONCERNS WITHIN THE RAIL INDUSTRY 
The rail industry is managed by the Department for Transport (DfT), a government department 
accountable for the wider transport sector, which is the lead authority on the management of the 
strategy for the rail industry. The rail industry faces several situations which, when reviewed together, 




▪ There has been a history of under investment in the 20th century within transport49;  
 
▪ A skills shortage within critical railway professions will result in wage inflation by up to 40% 
over the next 5 years50; 
 
▪ Staff turnover across the rail sector is 3%, compared to the UK median rate of 13.6%. This 
has resulted in less than one-fifth of employees being under 30, while nearly 50% are over 
4551;  
 
▪ Ongoing disputes between parties within the rail industry over certain working conditions 
has resulted in an economic impact of potentially £300m to the UK’s GDP. Research by the 
University of Chichester estimated that £11m a day was lost to the economy through the 
impact on commuters and productivity52. And 
 
▪ The strategic framework that is used to develop the Timetable (The Network Code) has 
been identified as having several weaknesses, including poor risk management and ability 
to respond effectively to change. 
 
In addition to these issues, recent reviews by Passenger Focus, Network Rail CEO and the Office of 
Rail and Road (ORR) identified that there were concerns around the resilience management of 
engineering works planning and management by Network Rail.53 This was after a large amount of best 
practice work effort, co-ordination and planning had been conducted by the rail industry, Transport for 
London, the Emergency Services and the military in preparation for the 2012 Olympics. Recently the 
rail industry has incurred multiple high-profile fines due to the failure of elements of the industry to meet 
contractual agreements. Recent examples are the failure to mitigate the engineering over-runs at King’s 
Cross and London Bridge during Winter 2014/15, which subsequently resulted in a fine of £2m by the 
ORR for the impact and failure to meet its contractual obligations.54 This topic is explored further in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Recent reviews into incident management have indicated that there was no evidence of central 
management ownership or business governance of the relevant procedures across the industry at a 
strategic level, with the operational elements (Train Operating Companies, Freight Operating 
 
49Department for Transport, `Transport Infrastructure Skills Strategy: Building Sustainable Skills', Department for Transport, 
Open Government Licence, London, 2016. 
50Ibid, p.16. 
51Ibid, p.19. 
52http://www.chi.ac.uk/news/southern-rail-strikes-cost-uk-ps300million-reveals-university-study, accessed 26 Dec 2016. 
53Passenger Focus, ORR investigation into Network Rail’s New Year engineering overruns, Passenger Focus, Feb 2008; Office 
of Rail and Road. Network Rail Monitor, Quarters 2,3 and 4 of Year 5, 2013 – 2014, Office of Rail and Road, London, available 
at https://orr.gov.uk/rail/publications/economic-regulation-publications/network-rail-monitor, accessed 10 Jul 2017; Paonessa, 
F., A review into the causes of passenger disruption affecting King’s Cross and Paddington station services on 27 December 
2014, Network Rail Report, Network Rail 12 Jan 2015. 
54Farrell, S., `Rail watchdog fines Network Rail £2m for London Bridge delays`, The Guardian, reported on 10 August 2015, 
available from www.theguardian.com (accessed 12 Nov 2015). 
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Companies, Contracted services and Network Rail) each exclusively managing their own areas.55 In 
2018 there was also no business continuity framework in place, despite the DfT directing departments 
to implement a strategic business continuity framework in 2011. This made Network Rail non-compliant 
with the Civil Contingencies Act. Subsequently Network Rail’s resilience group have begun analysing 
the proposed resilience framework as a means to address this failing. 
 
While the Highways Agency had developed guidance documents around the Civil Contingencies Act, 
neither Network Rail nor TfL had an equivalent.56 Further research identified that this is present in many 
large organisations, with many senior members of the management failing to show an understanding 
of the link that exists between business continuity, incident management and strategic business 
success57. Based on the lessons from the 2013/14 storms, there was specific direction given to Network 
Rail and the Highways Agency to engage fully with the Local Resilience Fora to develop better 
information sharing and operational planning.58 It was concerning, given the strategic responsibility that 
Network Rail has for the rail network, that this engagement was not already operating effectively in line 
with the direction given by the government within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004) 
framework.59 In 2017 a strategic Business Continuity Management policy was written, with an 
organisation concept put in place. However, in 2018 this had still not been converted into a framework 
across the organisation, resulting in the organisation still failing to deliver its requirements under the 
CCA 2004.  
 
Key to an effective crisis response is a co-ordinated and well-managed use of resources to deliver 
mutually supporting activities with the aim to complete the task as effectively, safely and timely as 
possible. Within a complex disruptive event, this role is conducted by a control room. Within the rail 
industry, the role of the control room is performed by the Route Control Centre, which is tasked with the 
daily running of the operations of the railway, co-ordination of response, recovery, maintenance and 
inspection of assets, and the liaison with higher and lower command and control staff within a certain 
region of the country. In times of incident, it will also act as the focal point for the immediate co-ordination 
and information gathering, reacting to the situation and seeking to rectify it as soon as physically 
possible. In both the military and railway operations, the Operations Room, and the Command and 
Control staff within it, are critical to the resilience of the respective organisation. While the military has 
bespoke training and regular testing and re-evaluation of practices and personnel at all levels, with 




55Office of Rail and Road, `Review of Network Rail’s Performance Delivery to South Western Railway Services’, Office of Rail 
and Road, London, 2018; Office of Rail and Road, `Independent Inquiry into the Timetable Disruption in May 2018’, Office of 
Rail and Road, London, 2018 
56Department for Transport `Transport Resilience Review: A Review of the Resilience of the Transport Network to Extreme 
Weather Events,’ Secretary of State for Transport Office, Williams Lea Group, London, 2014, p.53 
57Lindstrom, J., `A Model to Explain a Business Contingency Process,’ Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol 21, No2, 
TVM/DMK, Lulea University of Technology, Lulea, Sweden, 2012, Pp 269-281. 
58Department for Transport, 2014, p.53 
59Under the CCA, Network Rail is a Category 2 responder. 
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1.7 SHAPING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The military states that “effective decision-making relies on thorough understanding of the environment, 
circumstances and situations within which we may find ourselves operating or interacting”.60 Education, 
training and lessons learnt procedures are vital to developing the understanding required to create a 
successful response to the next major disruption. This is supported by the action of the military, which 
has invested heavily in physical and virtual training packages for all levels of personnel. In 2011 General 
Paul Newton challenged the establishment to invest more in the conceptual development of people as 
at the centre of successes and failures sat the capability of individuals.61  
 
Within the rail industry there was a reluctance to use the phrase “Command and Control”, as it indicated 
a formalised approach to the decision-making. It was deemed preferable to use phrases such as 
“expectation management; liaison; communicate; and impart and empower.” It was thought that 
Command and Control gave too much of a militarised feel for a commercial business, with the 
suggestion that a decision was made and enforced by a single individual. Though the former approach 
may work well within commercial business, where there is time to conduct long-term analysis, factor 
evaluation and observe the current and predicted trends, within the area of Incident Management the 
requirement is for a single individual to take “Command and Control” of the complete situation, setting 
direction, goals, targets and assisting with the availability of assets through regular liaison with senior 
stakeholders. Conversely, there are areas where the military could learn from the rail industry when it 
comes to developing the capability of its project, programme and senior leaders in defence. Personnel 
in these areas need to apply less “Command and Control” approaches to business, and more 
facilitative, collaborative and management approaches. This can be developed through better education 
and understanding of management tools, practices and procedures, enabling the organisation to 
maximise the key areas of human and material resource management. Drawing on current research 
and from ACSC theses, observations on the current state of military education for senior level officers 
indicated a critical level of failure in their preparation for business-critical roles62, which in turn impacts 
on the level of capability and resilience of the military to support the transition of individuals into the 
civilian sector. 
 
Utilising research conducted by candidates on the DefAc ACSC, supported by numerous publicly 
available reports, this area will be studied in more depth further in this thesis. Network Rail and the 
military are currently struggling with making the transition from being training organisations to learning 
organisations, developing lessons learnt initiatives and adapted practices, building individual and 
business capability. This aspect is key as a dynamic learning process is critical to the creation and 
implementation of credible incident management practice and procedures within the relevant 
 
60Ministry of Defence, Joint Defence Publication (JDP) 04 Understanding, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
Shrivenham, 2010, p 2-1. 
61Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-11 Decision Making, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
Shrivenham, 2011, p.iii. 
62Lucas, C. I., `Reflection in the Development of Professional Military Leadership’, Defence Research Paper, Advanced 
Command and Staff Course Number 14, United Kingdom Defence Academy, 2011. 
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establishment, which in turn enhances the organisation’s resilience. Based on initial points raised 
above, the research question posed was: 
 
"What lessons can be identified, learned and applied by the civilian business sector from the UK 
Military on Stabilisation and National Resilience Operations."  
 
The key objective of this study was to identify key lessons that the rail industry can learn from the military 
on operations and how to apply them. To enable the successful answering of this question, there are 
several questions, or hypotheses, that require investigation to answer the research question: 
 
▪ H1: Within a dynamically changing situation with limited situational knowledge, the military 
develops its resilience capability through the application of adaptive planning and the re-
shaping of its organisational culture. 
 
▪ H2: Within a hostile environment, the military has developed the capability to successfully plan, 
respond and recover from a disruptive event through effective preparation, education and 
training of its personnel. 
 
▪ H3: In order to successfully manage a complex, dynamically changing problem, the military 
develops and maintains an effective multi-agency approach, employing systems-thinking. 
 
▪ H4: To remain effective when managing the response to a disruptive event, the military develops 
and maintains a shared organisational ethos and culture across all the departments.  
 
▪ H5: To support the implementation of tactical operations, the military develops and maintains a 
clear strategic direction and end-state that is shared across all affected departments. 
 
▪ H6: Organisations without a clear understanding of resilience and the supporting activities fail 
to improve their resilience levels after reviewing previous events and impacts. 
 
▪ H7: The GB rail industry, through a lack of clear understanding of the importance of 
Organisational Resilience and the supporting activities, delivers a limited level of capability and 
performance. 
 
Initial investigations identified that the military had realised the physical and cognitive benefit of utilising 
a blended approach to training and education to develop understanding, establish the context and 
deliver insight and foresight to a crisis, though at times it has failed to invest in the dominant factor to 
building a successful response to the complexity of the modern battlefield, the human dimension.63 To 
enable an effective investigation of the hypotheses, a questionnaire was distributed to officers of units 
 
63MoD, JDP 04 Understanding, 2010; MoD, JDN 3-11 Decision Making, 2011, p.iii. 
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within the military going through operational training at the Command and Staff Training (CAST) units 
located in Southern England, Northern England and Germany, as well as those on training courses at 
the Land Warfare Centre (LWC). The questionnaire was applied over a three-year period, seeking to 
capture as many replies as possible, and explained in detail in Chapter 5. The questionnaire aimed to 
target four primary areas to support the main research questions: 
 
▪ The level of education support given to individuals through time, cost and management support; 
 
▪ The level of training support given to individuals through time, cost and management support 
to prepare them for roles; 
 
▪ The level of preparation for their role on operations working within a multi-agency, multi-national 
environment; and 
 
▪ The level of leadership development and implementation within the organisation. 
 
Lessons learnt in both the contemporary operating environment and the current economic climate may 
assist the growth of both organisations in the future, creating a better understanding of the needs of the 
business. This area is critical as the government continues to push private sector companies to support 
the newly formed Military Reserves.  
 
The complexity of the rail industry and the role that Network Rail has within the railway infrastructure 
management in times of emergency, the diversity of the organic elements of the company, as well as 
the size of the workforce and its supply chain is such that a comparison with the UK’s military seemed 
a reasonable approach to explore. The dynamic environments that both the military and Network Rail 
operate in, whether it is the battlefields of Iraq, or the ever-changing demands placed on the rail industry, 
require a strategic capability to react quickly, effectively and in the constant glare of the public media 
when faced with a major disruptive event. In the last decade, the public image of both brands has 
suffered damage, with belief having been shaken due to both the situation of Britain’s over worked and 
over stretched Victorian network,64, and the poor results of the Iraq campaign.65 The ability of both 
organisations to manage the effective delivery of change, as well as managing organisational learning 
and development of capability are areas that this research also analyses. 
 
1.8 THE NEED FOR ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
The benefits of the integration of a resilience culture within an organisation cannot be overstated. The 
examples previously raised in section 1.4 demonstrate the outcome if resilience is not developed 
effectively. This was reinforced in early 2018 through the collapse of Carillion Group and the 40% drop 
 
64A report released by the Office of Rail Regulatory indicated that customer faith in Network Rail had dropped – the rail industry 
blamed this on the poor winter weather it had faced in the 2012 – 2013 winter period. 
65Reports released by the Houses of Parliament Defence Select Committee in 2010 identified extreme concerns over the 
handling of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, and the lack of support from the British public. 
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in Capita share prices due to severe profit warnings. Both these organisations provided critical key 
support services to the rail industry and the military and their underlying failings created risks to the 
capability of military and rail operations. It is also important to understand the wider threats to 
organisations that exist within the UK. Though it is impossible to predict the future, one must anticipate 
the threats that they could face to enable effective planning; Professor Sir Michael Howard warns:  
 
“No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future 
conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that 
character is revealed.”66 
 
In 2002 the UK suffered from the Foot and Mouth epidemic, which forced the culling of thousands of 
heads of livestock. In 2003 the government was faced with a national fire-service industrial action. Both 
events forced the deployment of the military to manage the situation and support the continued running 
of services. In the winter of 2015 – 2016 extensive storms over the Christmas period resulted in extreme 
weather conditions in the North of England, resulting in the deployment of over 2000 military personnel 
to support overstretched civilian response agencies. As the Organisational Resilience profession seeks 
to gain ground, building upon the foundations created by the development of Business Continuity and 
Crisis Management frameworks, research has shown that the requirement to understand how to build 
and manage resilience has become a priority within the business world.67  
 
Resilience also provides a level of security against disruptive change, with robust communications, 
Change Management, risk and assurance activities assisting the organisation to mitigate the impact of 
such events. As the resilience concept matures and establishes itself as an increasingly necessary and 
critical discipline within industry, there is a requirement for strategic leadership personnel to become 
aware of how to resource and support a resilience culture within their workforce. Pressures on 
organisations in all the UK sectors during the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, with the UK GDP falling 
by 1.5% in the 4th quarter of 2008 and the nation officially falling into recession,68 have forced the 
implementation of systems that require businesses to evidence performance, manage risks and 
implement controls to mitigate the impact of these potentially disruptive events.69 Performance 
pressures, poor incident response and strategic decision-making errors may help to explain why there 
is a drive to identify a strategic approach to managing resilience. While processes such as Business 
Continuity, Incident Response, Emergency Planning and Crisis Management enable a company to 
recover from a potentially disruptive event, they are tactical processes which do not promote a strategic 
 
66Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme – Future Character of Conflict, Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
Shrivenham, Swindon, 2010, p.2. 
67Cerullo, V. and Cerullo, M., `Business Continuity Planning: A Comprehensive Approach’, Information Systems Management, 
Summer 2004, available at www.infosectoday.com (accessed on 12 May 2014); Atkins, D. A. et al, Roads to Ruin The 
Analysis; A Study of Major Risk Events, Cass Business School, AIRMIC, 2011. Available from www.reputability.co.uk 
(accessed 10 Sep 2015); SteelHenge Crisis Management Conference: Post Conference Report (2013), downloaded from 
www.steelhenge.co.uk (accessed 27 Sept 2013); Hamel, G. and Valikangas, L., `The Quest for Resilience’, Harvard Business 
Review, 2003. Available from www.hbr.org/2003/09/the-quest-for-resilience, (accessed on 15 October 2013); 
68University of Liverpool, `The Financial Crisis of 2007 / 2008 and its impact on the UK and other Economies`, University of 
Liverpool Information Guide, available from at www.higherlearning.ac.uk (accessed on 04 Sept 2015). 
69BSI, `BS11200:2014: Crisis Management’, 2014, p.10. 
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proactive capability development, as each operates within a distinct environment. Organisational 
Resilience involves dealing with disruption with a clear intent, coherence and resourcing. It requires a 
combination of maintaining continuity, building long-term viability against strategic change and 
understanding the changing external environment.70 The concept of building organisational resilience 
and the underlying benefits of putting it in place are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This study follows the guidelines that were laid down by Wolverhampton University Ethics Committee 
at the beginning of the research journey in 2013 and reviewed in 2014 on release of the University’s 
Ethics Handbook.71 As this research thesis is a study of the military as an organisation, the initial review 
of the Ethical risk was deemed to be low. The methods of primary research gathering within the military, 
through questionnaires, live case studies and informal interviews, were all conducted within military 
establishments and no identifying personal information was taken. All participants were briefed prior to 
the events and made aware of the reason for the research. The research into the interactions of staff 
within the case study exercise was also utilised by the MoD to help develop best practice. 
 
The questionnaire carried a written brief detailing the reason for the capturing of information around the 
level of training, development and the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach on operational 
deployment. Military observers working with the researcher during the live case study exercise were 
briefed on how to capture data and what to identify. Due to all these procedures, plus the fact that the 
hard copy data is held by the researcher in secure premises, with the soft data held on an isolated 
computer system, or a password protected server, places the research as a Category A project. Further 
guidelines that were followed were: 
 




consent of all 
participant 
The selection of the participants was conducted by the primary contact of each 
training element attending the CAST centre. All Commanding Officers were 
approached initially to obtain their consent for the research to be collected. The 
researcher highlighted that no individual was compelled to complete the 
questionnaire or participate in interviews. Within the industry context, all members 
of the Operations and Strategic Planning departments were invited, via an external 






All interviewees were asked if they were comfortable and had volunteered for the 
interview. All personnel were briefed that they could give as much or as little 




Each interviewee was asked to read over the notes taken to ensure what was 
captured was correct. Questionnaires were either captured through written format 
and handed directly to the researcher or typed directly into the online survey tool. 
 
70British Standards Institute, `BS65000:2014: Organisational Resilience`, BSI Standards Limited, London, 2014, p.3. 
71Wolverhampton University Handbook for Ethical Approval and Practice Procedures, Wolverhampton University, March 2014, 






Between the researcher and the University, supported with regular correspondence 




As an instructor in Gunnery and having conducted three previous Masters’ research 
programmes, the researcher was trained in conducting investigative work within the 





There is no collection of sensitive personal data or information that would be classed 
as restricted under the DPA 1998 or GDPR 2016. 
 
Table 4: Research Ethical Considerations 
 
1.10 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The key output from this research was the development of the ORM3, which enables an organisation, 
through engagement with its workforce, to clearly assess and benchmark its resilience capability. In 
previous discussions and communications this was known as the Systems Approach to Organisational 
Resilience framework (SAORF) tool, though this has been subsequently revised, as the newer version 




Figure 1: Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model (ORM3) Source: Author 
 
The ORM3 framework (Figure 1) has been converted into a business application, enabling the 
conceptual considerations of this thesis to be converted into a system of systems business tool. This 
provides an organisation the ability to assess its current resilience, map its improvement approach and 
conduct an internal audit of relevant practices and procedures across its various departments or 
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Chapter 7 will explore the key components of the framework identified by the research, while Chapter 
8 explores the detailed development of the framework to enable it to be utilised by industry. This 
research has identified several key areas, such as Change Management, Crisis Communications and 
effective Business Continuity Management where organisations have struggled to implement effective 
frameworks and, through a process of organisational learning, may utilise practices and procedures 
from the military to enhance their approach. 
 
The research findings have been utilised by the military, rail industry and the wider business community, 
with the possibility of it also being extended to other members of the Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI). This will enable the development of resilience management-based training and education events 
to increase resilience capability within these organisations. Key to this thesis was the identification of 
the knowledge gap within the rail industry, and how lessons from the military on operations could assist 
in developing organisational resilience within the GB railway industry. To enable this research to 
contribute to the rail industry, the research approach was practically based, focussing on the “real life 
issues” for the rail industry as a member of the UK CNI group. During the period of research, elements 
of the findings of the research, particularly around the impact of culture within the business sector, was 
used to assist in the development of the first British Standard in Organisational Resilience, BS65000, 
with the researcher presenting on behalf of the Cabinet Office team at the Business Continuity Institute 
International conference in 2014. This research has also been used to help develop greater resilience 
within London based organisations, with the researcher presenting at the Corporate Security and 
Resilient Networks (CSARN) conference in 2015.  
 
The research findings around the concerns of leadership, collaborative working and resilience 
preparation of teams within the rail industry were used to design and develop the strategic incident 
management training framework for Network Rail, which is discussed in Chapter 9. Within the military 
sphere, the case study review of the Iraq campaign was peer reviewed and published as part of a 
lessons learnt from conflict by the British Army Review, as well as the researcher being part of the 
Doctrine Writing Team for the development of the revised Joint Defence Publication 02 - Defence 
Contribution to UK Operations. As part of the wider development of strategic capability, the researcher 
was also asked to lead the Learning Needs Analysis to create a programme to develop the first Doctrine 
Writing education course for senior military officers, thus embedding the importance of strategic 
leadership in building capability and resilience within the organisation.  
 
Within the education sphere this research has also been used to develop part of the Railway Risk and 
Safety Management MSc programme at the University of Birmingham, delivering the lessons of incident 
response and management to future rail industry managers. The findings around the limited level of 
understanding of organisational resilience and effective business continuity and crisis management at 
a strategic level within industry has resulted in the researcher developing and delivering Masters’ level 
education programmes at the UK Resilience Centre. The research findings, and the development of the 
ORM3 model, has also been recently published in an international Crisis Management and Emergency 
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Planning Journal, assisting senior business managers on how to find ways to develop their 
organisational resilience, based on observations from the UK military72.  
 
The research findings clearly identified, through primary and secondary sources, a level of concern and 
limited capability around the organisational resilience capability within industry. The next section looks 
at this at a higher level, while Chapter 4 discusses the business benefit of Organisational Resilience 
management. The research findings, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, pull out these concerns and the 
impact that they had on the resilience and capability of the Infrastructure Manager  
 
1.10 WHY DEVELOP ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE? 
In recent years organisations have become increasingly focused on their ability to identify and react to 
emerging crises73, either through slow-burning performance issues, “creeping crises”74 or large-scale 
shocks through market forces, man-made events or environmental impacts. Being able to react 
effectively to unfolding crises is complex as planning is based on initial assumptions that are often 
aligned to historical evidence, limited information and personal experience. The UK Government’s view 
in 2010 was that resilience encompassed activities that aimed to prevent, protect and prepare for natural 
hazards, but there was no mention of man-made events.75 Given the increased threat of malicious 
events, this raises concerns regarding the analyses conducted within the interdependencies of 
communities and organisations and the ensuing impact of a man-made crisis such as the 2005 
Buncefield oil depot explosion76, the 2008 financial meltdown77 or the more recent strategic shock 
caused by the UK European Referendum on the 24 June 2016. Initial financial reviews of the 
referendum disruption indicated that $2tn had been lost off global markets, with the UK pound plunging 
to a thirty-one-year low overnight, while politically there was a forced change of prime minister and 
numerous senior government members.78 Socially the UK fractured along political, race, social, age 
and voting lines. Though the vote was taken as a nation, data demonstrated that while Northern Ireland 
and Scotland voted to stay within the EU, England and Wales voted to leave. As more of the population 
 
72Gracey, A., `Building an Organisational Resilience Maturity Framework` Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency 
Planning, Henry Stewart Publications, Vol 13, No.4, 2020. Avaliable at 
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hsp/jbcep/2020/00000013/00000004/art00003  
73Stephenson, A., Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations, PhD Thesis, Canterbury University, New Zealand, 2010, p.5. 
Available at www.resorgs.org.nz (accessed 15 Sep 2014). 
74Rusaw, A.C. and Rusaw, F., `The Role of HRD in Integrated Crisis Management: A Public Sector Approach’, Advances in 
Developing Human Resources Journal, April 2008, 10:380. Available at www.adh.sagepub.com/content/10/3/380 (accessed on 
15 Dec 2014). 
75Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption 
from Natural Hazards, Natural Hazards Team, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2010, p.7. 
76Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH), Buncefield: Why did it happen? Health and Safety Executive Report, 2008. 
Available at www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf (accessed 10 Feb 2016). The Buncefield explosion, which 
occurred on 11 December 2005, resulted in multiple explosions which devastated the site, destroying 23 fuel storage tanks, 
injured 43 individuals, and forced the evacuation of 2000 people. The resulting fire burned for 5 days, emitting a large amount 
of smoke and pollution into the atmosphere over southern England. 
77Fraser, S., The impact of the financial crisis on bank lending to SMEs, Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 2012. 
Available from www.gov.uk/government (accessed 10 Mar 2016); The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The financial crisis 
inquiry report, United States Government, 2011.  Available at www.gpo.gov (accessed 19 Jan 2015). 
78Allen, K. and Monaghan, A., `How the shock referendum result has affected sterling, stocks and shares.’ The Guardian, 
reported on 8 Jul 2016. Available at www.theguardian.com (accessed 18 Jul 2016); Elliott, L., Allen, K. and Treanor, J., `Brexit 
wipes $2tn off markets as Moody's lowers UK credit rating outlook.’ The Guardian, reported on 25 Jun 2016. Available at 
www.theguardian.com (accessed 10 Jul 2016); Cunningham, T., Brexit vote wipes $2 trillion off global stocks and knocks 
pound to 31-year low.’ The Telegraph, reported 24 Jun 2016. Available at www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed 16 Jul 2016); 
Carney, M., `Statement from the Governor of the Bank of England following the EU referendum result.’ Bank of England 
Governor’s Public Statement, released 24 Jun 2016. Available at www.bankofengland.co.uk (accessed 18 Jul 2016). 
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sat within the nations that sought to leave, the UK was deemed to vote to extract itself from the EU. 
This resulted in the re-emergence of the call for Scottish Independence and a united Ireland debate as 
both nations sought to remain within the EU, changing the landscape for British and European based 
organisations. 
 
1.11 DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH METHOD 
Resilience management has attracted researchers seeking to develop the area, especially within the 
commercial or industrial sectors, as it becomes a critical area of knowledge required to maintain 
corporate capability in times of crisis.79 The researcher initially approached this topic using a ’grounded 
theory’ approach. This offered the ability to “avoid rigid, preconceived hypotheses and attempt to focus 
on relevant theories as he or she becomes more sensitised to the area.”80 By approaching the subject 
with an open mind and no preconceived ideas regarding what should or would be proven, a grounded 
theory approach would enable the use of the data captured in the process of the research to support 
the development of the theory through thorough analysis during the actual research81. As this research 
is also examining the resilience management approach within the military, an event which heavily 
involves social action amongst tight knit teams often operating within a pressurised environment, 
grounded theory enabled the observation of the human behaviour within the confines of designed live 
case study events. To obtain accurate data, the researcher utilised a multi-tiered approach which is 
explained in Chapter 3.  
 
Each approach provided important insights and knowledge into the organisation thus providing a wealth 
of information that was analysed and coded.82 By using mixed methods to collect data it allowed the 
collection of qualitative and quantitative data to help understand the research problem.83 However, as 
the research developed and the findings were being used to define military strategic doctrine and 
training frameworks for the rail industry, the methodology was adapted to suit an Action Research 
approach. 
 
This change was a result of information on resilience management within the military and railway being 
scarce, due to a lack of maturity of the subject within the Railway Industry, and due to the military 
focusing on the development of resilience capability within a hostile environment. The British Standard 
on organisational resilience was still in development and the commercial sector was focused more on 
business continuity practices, through the application of the International Standard.84 This made the 
 
79Zebrowski, C., `The Nature of Resilience’, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, Routledge, 2013, 
available at www.tandtonline.com (accessed 10 May 2015); Davoudi, S., `Resilience: A Bridging Concept or a Dead End?’ 
Planning Theory and Practice, Routledge, 2012, available at www.tandtonline.com (accessed 02 July 2015).; Bhamra, R., Dani, 
S. and Burnard, K., `Resilience: the concept, a literature review and future directions,’ International Journal of Production 
Research, 2011, available at www.tandtonline.com (accessed 20 September 2015). 
80Hagan, F., Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology, 4th edition, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 1997. 
81Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., Grounded Theory – An Overview, 1994, p.273, published in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y.S., 
(Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, London, 1-18. Available at www.cms.educ.ttu.edu 
(accessed 10 Jan 2014). 
82Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (Eds); The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 4th Edition, 2011, p.6.  
83Ibid, p.7. 
84British Standards Institute, Societal security – Business Continuity Management Systems – Requirements (International 
Standard Order 22301:2012), BSI Standards Limited, London, 2014. 
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information gathered during interviews, case studies and questionnaires vital to the development of an 
understanding on how to create a Railway approach to Resilience Management and to inform the 
development of the strategic doctrine for the UK military. As Michael Patton indicates, these approaches 
enabled the generation of a substantial amount of raw information that required analysis and codifying 
exercises.85 The information was analysed to identify key findings within the resilience management 
domain, which is discussed in Chapter 6. This approach presented risks, as within the research 
approach the live case studies also bring into play personal history, biography, gender, social class and 
ethnicity issues that everyone within the live case studies may have.86  
 
Action research enables the qualitative researcher to get closer to the perspective of individuals through 
detailed interviewing and observation, an approach that quantitative research methods can seldom offer 
as they are more remote from the event, relying on empirical methods and materials. Qualitative 
research is also more likely to confront and experience the constraints of everyday social life, as it 
studies the subjects through an immersive approach, with the researcher becoming part of the event, 
interacting with the actors as the situation unfolds.87 While quantitative research sees the world through 
empirical evidence, mathematical models, statistical tables, graphs and impartial data, qualitative 
research sees the evidence of the social world, captured through historical narratives, still photographs 
and first-person accounts as a valuable input into the research process. 88  
 
Historical research into the military approach to leadership, incident management and training was also 
accessed, helping to identify certain trends or areas of analysis which could support the current project. 
Previous questionnaire results were compared to those of this research to identify if there is any uplift 
in any areas. The questionnaires for the military were developed on the Likert Scale89 implementing a 
five-point scale for the participants to respond to, using the Comprehensive Approach framework90 as 
the questionnaire basis. This presented a defined model to deliver resilience within a nation state and 
therefore offered an entity with which military personnel would be familiar. This questionnaire was then 
reviewed to analyse the perception of individuals involved in Resilience Management within the various 
military operational elements. 
 
1.12 INVESTIGATION OF MODELS 
Currently there are several models which study and propose the life cycle of an incident / crisis / 
emergency, with many authors proposing slightly differing characteristics.91 In 2010, in preparation for 
 
85Patton, M.Q., Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, Sage Publications, London, 2002, p.5. 
86Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (2011), p 5. 
87Ibid, p 9. 
88Ibid, p 10. 
89A Likert scale is a psychometric scale commonly involved in research that employs questionnaires. For this research it 
comprised of multiple statements, with individuals asked to grade the statement with a numeric value from 1 to 5. 
90The Comprehensive Approach was a NATO doctrinal initiative, which was also embedded into UK Government Policy and 
military doctrine, aimed and enabling a co-ordinated military-civil response to overseas campaigns in order to bring stability to a 
failed or failing state, utilising all levers of government. The Policy aimed to deliver an integrated approach with commonly 
understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a 
particular situation.  
91BSI BS11200:2014 (2014); Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 2nd Edition: Campaign Planning, 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham, 2013.; National College of Policing, National 
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the London Olympics, the UK emergency services, led by the police, created the National Decision-
making Model (NDM), to help co-ordinate the responses of the emergency services in the event of a 
major incident. The military also have a decision-making model aimed at the tactical level,92 or the 
operational level,93 depending on the situation and the level of response required.  
 
At the beginning of this research, there was a critical lack of understanding at the strategic and tactical 
level within Network Rail of the importance of incident management education and training among its 
frontline management staff, with many having reached a position of senior authority without having 
received any formal incident management training. The suggestion that individuals should have the 
cognitive flexibility and readiness to be able to ’think on their feet’ and react to the dynamic, unfolding 
situation in front of them resulted in individuals within the organisation challenging this proposal, with 
personnel stating that the current situation was working, so why should it be changed? There seemed 
to be little understanding that crisis management and leadership are intertwined and that both 
disciplines complement each other and thus affect business continuity and organisational resilience.94 
 
Discussions with senior members of Network Rail, supported by research findings, indicated that there 
had been a major failure to invest in incident management training, with a lack of engagement across 
the company to develop a corporate approach to the training. The research also highlighted a lack of a 
Business Continuity framework across the company, which, as Network Rail is classed as a category 2 
responder under the CCA 2004, resulted in it also being non-compliant with the Government directive. 
Furthermore, as seen in the research results in Chapter 5, there was confusion as regards the leader’s 
position and requirements and the fact that from the very beginning the leader should be responding to 
the immediate threats and uncertainties with the aim of initiating the planning to return the situation to 
normality as soon as effectively possible. While the team that is supporting them at the Tactical and 
Operational levels react to the immediate risks and situations, a Route Managing Director must seek 
options to return the Network to full running order swiftly, with minimum risk to the work force and 
customers. As the research was distilled into training courses, briefings and the integration of multi-
agency training events at the tactical and strategic levels, the desire to incorporate these lessons into 
the business obtained momentum and support within the higher echelons of the company leadership. 
These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
1.13 SUMMARY 
This chapter has laid out the thesis structure and has introduced the research topic and the research 
question that the thesis answers. It has raised the concerns around the current level of industry 
knowledge with regards to building and sustaining an effective level of organisational resilience, as well 
 
Decision-Making Model; Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) Decision Making Model downloaded 
from www.jesip.org.uk/joint-doctrine.  
92Known as the Combat Estimate. 
93Known as the Tactical Estimate. 
94Demiroz F. and Kapucu, N., `The Role of Leadership in Managing Emergencies and Disasters`, European Journal of 




as noting the challenges at the political level. It has noted the several strategic resilience challenges 
that the UK has had over the last two decades, and concerns over the financial costs experienced due 
to the limited capability to effectively respond to these threats. It has also raised the impact of poor 
resilience at the organisational level and the social and financial cost this has had on several major 
businesses. The following chapter discusses in detail the various texts, documents and articles that 
have been engaged with as part of the research, as well as setting out several terms that are key to 
developing an effective approach to building organisational resilience. This then leads onto Chapter 3, 
which discusses the research approach, before the thesis then explores the need for organisational 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINITIONS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews relevant literature that has been analysed in relation to the development of an 
Organisational Resilience management framework. It focuses on building a greater awareness for the 
reader of organisational resilience and previous research that has been conducted, prior to the 
discussion around research activities and findings. This chapter will first detail the methodology used 
before introducing literature and previous research around the concept of organisational resilience. This 
will lead on to the analysis of key components in building the capability, before looking at how 
organisations understand their environment, threats and benchmarking of their capabilities. 
 
Internationally the interest in organisational resilience has rapidly expanded as organisations seek to 
do more than just recover from disruptive events. They seek to learn, adapt and obtain a market 
advantage. Within the UK, organisational resilience has become an emerging discipline, though there 
is still confusion and little consensus as to its definition.95 Though there have been more than four 
decades of collective research on the concept of resilience globally, it still presents different aspects to 
individuals in different fields. Several discrepancies in the meaning of the concept arise from different 
epistemological angles and the associated methodological practices.96 Research conducted by Braes 
and Brooks in 2010 identified that the term resilience had been used with increasing popularity across 
many disciplines, though it is also used liberally in organisations. 97 In the last decade, resilience has 
attracted attention within organisational and business literature due to greater awareness of the 
vulnerabilities of organisations to major man-made and natural hazards. Although several academics 
have now begun to study the subject in detail, there is still a conflict between the academic and the 
practitioner. Academic research has mainly been focussed on legitimate large-scale businesses, 
disregarding Small to Medium sized Enterprises or Non-Government Agencies, or those organisations 
that are neither public nor private entities (3rd Sector organisations).98  
 
One group of organisations that are required to develop and maintain a strong resilience capability is 
the UK military. In response to the ever-increasing complexity of the operating environment, threats and 
potential crises, the military has sought to develop its internal capability to become self-sustainable in 
complex situations. Due to globalisation, similarly complex situations regularly impact on civilian 
businesses, which do not possess similarly robust practices and procedures. Risk analysis, traditionally 
 
95Newnham C., Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations: Predicting a leader’s propensity for behaviours that create 
organisational resilience, MSc Paper, Cranfield University, 2012, p.17 
96Zhou, H., Wang, J., Wan, J. and Jia, H., `Resilience to natural hazards: a geographic perspective’, Natural Hazards Journal, 
Vol 53, Issue 1, 2010, pp 21-41, downloaded from www.link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-009-9407-y on 03 December 
2014. 
97Braes B., and Brooks D., Organisational Resilience: A Propositional Study to Understand and Identify the Essential Concepts, 
Edith Cowan University, Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 2010, p.14, accessed online on 12 March 2014. 
98Ayling J., `Criminal Organisations and Resilience’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Science Direct, Elsevier, 
2009, Volume 37, pp182-196, downloaded 10 February 2018 from www.sciencedirect.com; Witmer H and Mellinger M.S., 
Organisational Resilience: Nonprofit organisations’ response to change, WORK: A Journal of Prevention, Assessment & 
Rehabilitation, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 255-265, 2016, downloaded from www.iospress.com on 12 Jan 2019. 
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used for threat identification, identifies system vulnerabilities and grades them by impact / probability. 
However, traditional methods rarely account for “black swan” (low probability, high impact) events, 
which can cause significant damage to an organisation. Although organisational resilience can provide 
a level of prevention and alerting, the implementation of these processes is not well understood or 
studied.99 Kayes notes the importance of organisations learning from past events, and from each other, 
in building their understanding of vulnerabilities and threats. Through learning, an organisation can 
improve its chances of survival, identifying and adapting good practice from previous disruptive 
events.100 While military language is prevalent within business publications, the availability of quality 
documentation on the military capability transference to the public sector was limited.  
 
A study in Australia in 2001 by Buckle, Marsh and Smale sought to examine how organisations, 
responding to disaster in the community, helped build local resilience quickly.101 The study looked at 
several major incidents that impacted on the Victoria region and how resilience was viewed traditionally, 
as the qualities that enabled the ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, 
prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.102 Resilience 
is used by other disciplines as well; engineers apply the concept to materials and technical systems, 
biologists study resilience in life systems and psychiatrists seek to understand the resilience of 
individuals and their interaction with social systems.103 In essence, it is broadly defined as the capacity 
to resist and recover from loss,104 though it was used by Holling in 1973 to describe an ecological 
concept.105 Resilience has since been adapted by several academics who have sought to apply it to 
organisations in an attempt to identify a means to create more sustainable business models and 
understand the capacity organisations and people have to manage their own support and how services 
can be matched to needs.106 
 
Buckle et al describe resilience as the capacity of a person, group or system to withstand loss or to 
recover from loss, similar to what Braes and Brooks posit.107 They support the definition of resilience 
as that of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED); the quality or fact of being able to recover quickly or 
easily from, or resist being affected by, a misfortune, shock, illness etc; robustness; adaptability.108 
Charlotte Newnham, from Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC), also utilises the OED definition a year later 
 
99Annarelli, A and Nonino, F., `Strategic and operational management of organizational resilience: Current state of research 
and future directions’, Omega, Vol. 62 pp 1-18, Jul 2016, downloaded 10 February 2018 from www.sciencedirect.com 
100Kayes, D.C, Organisational Resilience: how Learning Sustains Organisations in Crises, Disaster and Breakdown, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
101Buckle P, Marsh G and Smale S, Assessment of Personal and Community Resilience and Vulnerability, Report EMA Project 
15/2000, Emergency Management Australia, Attorney-General's Department, Government of Australia, 2001. 
102Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat Lexicon, Government, Whitehall, London 2013, p.66 
103Boin A, Comfort L. K., and Demchak C. C., (2010) Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events, University of 
Pittsburg Press, p.7.  
104Zhou, H. et al, `Resilience to natural hazards: a geographic perspective’, 2010, pp 21-41. 
105Holling, C. S., `Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems’, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics Journal, Vol 4: 1-
23, 1973. 
106Buckle P., Marsh G. and Smale S., `Assessment of Personal & Community Resilience and Vulnerability’, 2001. 
107Ibid, p.5. 
108Braes B., and Brooks D., `Organisational Resilience: A Propositional Study to Understand and Identify the Essential 
Concepts’, 2010, p.14. 
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in her MSc Paper which states that resilience is – “the ability of a substance or object to spring back 
into shape, or the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness”.109  
 
Within the civilian sector, research on resilience focuses on the qualities of an organisation, community 
or individual to cope with, manage, adapt and recover from a disruptive event through the application 
of certain processes; thereby it is the capability of the organisation to absorb change.110 While research 
in New Zealand on Organisational Resilience, through Canterbury University, started in earnest in 2007, 
Annarelli and Nonino note that most literature on organisational resilience is from 2012 onwards.111 This 
thesis reviewed literature from American, Australian or New Zealand as little existed in the UK, 
emphasising the lack of a body of understanding within this area of UK business management. Eve 
Coles also reflects on this during her review for the EPC in 2014 when seeking to promote the 
importance of sharing lessons from major incidents.112 In 2014 Skills for Justice released their formal 
review of the state of interoperability and resilience operations within the emergency services. This 
document supported the findings of Coles that lessons were not being shared.113 This is reflected by 
the fact that during the research phase of this thesis, the researcher was also involved in the 
development of the draft British Standard 65000: Organisational Resilience to raise awareness within 
the UK commercial and industry sectors. 114 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY AND FORMAT 
This thesis takes a systems approach towards the investigation of the topic of Organisational 
Resilience, critically evaluating published literature that exists around the topic. The thesis analyses 
literature published within the following areas: Research design and development; international and 
strategic relations; military contemporary history; the railway industry; organisational resilience, 
business continuity; organisational culture; decision-making and problem solving; strategic leadership 
and management in multi-agency environments; crisis management and risk awareness.115 
 
The unit of analysis was a single research paper, book or doctrine publication. The limitation of the 
research unit was that it had to be open access to the public via library databases or on the internet. 
For Defence Research Papers (DRPs), the documents had to be accessible if a request was made for 
them by a reviewing member. No restricted or sensitive documentation was used, due to issues this 
would have presented regarding accessibility to other researchers and the requirement to restrict the 
 
109Newnham C., `Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations: Predicting a leader’s propensity for behaviours that create 
organisational resilience’, 2012, p.18, 
110McManus, S. T., `Organisational Resilience in New Zealand', PhD Research Thesis, Canterbury University, New Zealand, 
2008. 
111Annarelli, A and Nonino, F,, `Strategic and operational management of organizational resilience’, 2016. 
112Coles, E., `Learning the Lessons from Major Incidents: A Short Review of the Literature’, EPC Occasional Papers, 
Emergency Planning College, Occasional Papers New Series, EPC, No 10, 2014. 
113Skills for Justice, Pathways to Interoperability and Resilience Across the Blue Light Services, Joint Emergency Services 
Interoperability Programme, Sector Skills Council, 2014, Executive Summary. 
114BSI, BS65000:2014 Guidance on Organisational Resilience, 2014.  
115Leigh M., MacFarlane R. and Williams D., Leadership in Multi-Agency Emergency Co-ordinating Groups, EPC Occasional 
Paper No.7, Emergency Planning College, Serco, 2013; UK Cabinet Office Civil Protection Lexicon, 2013, pp. 17, 67; Fox J., 
`Analysing Leadership Styles of Incident Commanders’, PhD thesis, Northcentral University, 2009.; Mendonca D., et al, 
`Decision Support for Improvisation during Emergency Response Operations’, 2000, downloaded from 
www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu on 12 December 2014; MoD, JDN 3-11, 2011.  
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publication of this thesis. The review begins with an analysis of crisis management literature and how 
the lessons identified can be used to build an understanding of the need for organisational resilience. It 
analyses how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) manage national and international crises in support of the 
wider Her Majesty’s (HM) Government political approach, and studies academic and professional 
articles on how crises emerge and how an organisation responds to the situation. Previous international 
research on the topic of organisational resilience is reviewed to examine how other nations are 
approaching the topic and what actions they have taken to address the concerns of organisations. A 
review of military documentation, UK and international standards, is conducted to help build a more 
informed picture. Benchmarking and proposed models are also reviewed as part of the methodology 
which has informed the creation of this thesis. 
 
2.3 INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
Within the last five decades, the term resilience has been used freely across a wide range of academic 
disciplines and in many contexts since it was mentioned by Holling.116 Originally used by engineers to 
describe the ability of a material to return to a pre-existing state after being stressed, the term resilience 
emerged within the ecological sciences, used to describe the capacity of an eco-system to return to its 
equilibrium after a disturbance.117 Subsequently researchers have sought to apply the concept to the 
social sciences to help identify how communities and organisations respond to disruptive events,118 
while recently they have also started exploring military practices such as war-gaming or red-teaming 
plans.119  
 
There has been a strong focus on resilience internationally since the United Nations (UN) launched 
initiatives under the Hyogo and Sendai frameworks.120 These frameworks sought to build greater 
resilience to natural and man-made disasters within communities. The Hyogo framework focussed on 
the development of communities and nations, while the Sendai agreement sought to set a more forward-
thinking attitude of “building back better”. Though the principles are aimed at nations, they also provide 
a strong framework that organisations may consider implementing to build their capability. While the 
Hyogo framework can be considered as the response and immediate action framework, the Sendai is 
the recovery and learn element. Together these two frameworks provide a strong template for nations, 
communities and organisations on how to build their resilience against disruptive events. 
 
 
116McManus S., Seville E., et al, `Resilience Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving the Resilience of 
Organisations’, Resilient Organisations, Research Report 2007/01, New Zealand, 2007, p.2. 
117Shaw, K., and Maythorn, L., `Managing for Local Resilience: Towards a Strategic Approach’, Public Policy and 
Administration, 2012, p.44 downloaded from http://ppa.sagepub.com/content/28/1/43 accessed 24 Oct 2014. 
118Braes, B. and Brooks, D., Organisational Resilience: 2010, p.14; Vogus, T. J. and Sutcliffe, K. M., `Organisational Resilience: 
Towards a Theory and Research Agenda’, IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics 2007 Conference Proceedings available from 
www.researchgate.net (accessed 22 Sep 2015); Newnham, C., `Gold Or Dust? `Creating Resilient Organisations’, 2012; Smith, 
D., Organisation Resilience: Business Continuity, Incident and Corporate Crisis Management, Institute of Business Continuity 
Management, 2012, downloaded from www.ibcm.sa.org (accessed on 12 Jan 2014); Boin A. et al, Designing Resilience: 
Preparing for Extreme Events, 2010; Chang-Richards A., Vargo J. and Seville E., `Organisational Resilience to Natural 
Disasters: New Zealand’s Experience,’ China Policy Review (English translation), Volume 10- 2013, pp 117 – 119, available 
from www.resorgs.org.nz (Accessed on 10 Sept 2014). 
119Ministry of Defence, Red Teaming Guide, 2nd Ed, Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, 2013, p.1-1. 
120UNISDR, `Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015, 2005; United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030, United Nations, 2015, 
downloaded from www.unisdr.org . 
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In 2004 McManus and Dalziell explored the concept of resilience through a more recognised framework 
within New Zealand, the 4R’s of emergency management; Reduction, Readiness, Response and 
Recovery. This is like the UK emergency response to disaster, which is based on Preparedness, 
Response and Recovery. Both approaches focus on resilience being something that occurs post event. 
While resilience capability is more prevalent during the initial response and ongoing recovery, the 
effectiveness of the response is based on how well the organisation is prepared, either through edu-
cation, training, planning, exercising or a combination of these activities. Resilience is a more holistic 
event than that which McManus and Dalziell initially suggested.  
 
They initially proposed resilience as 
being inversely proportional to the area 
’under the curve’ as shown in Figure 2, 
the ability of the organisation to rapidly 
reduce the impact of the vulnerability on 
the business KPIs. For an organisation 
to demonstrate a level of resilience, it 
needs to be able to function in the face 
of disruptive events. This is achieved by 
managing the size and frequency of 
the impact of disruptive events on the critical performance factors of the organisation, measured through 
its Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The lower the “peak” of the curve, the less the lost performance 
(area under the curve) the organisation experiences.  
 
This concept was further reviewed in 
2006 by Seville et al, who discussed 
that resilience can be the preparation 
element as well as the response and 
recovery.121 They position organi-
sational resilience as `a function of the 
overall vulnerability, situation aware-
ness and adaptive capacity of an orga-
nisation in a complex, dynamic and 
interdependent system.' The ability of 
an organisation to complete its core functions in the face of difficult situations is a measure of its 
resilience capability. They demonstrate the interactions of the various components in Figure 3, where 
the organisation, through building a greater understanding of its internal vulnerabilities, or risks and 
hazards that it faces, can develop an adaptive capacity through preparation activities, such as staff 
development, continuity planning and effective risk management. The investment in building situational 
 
121Seville, E., Brunsdon, D., Dantas, A., Le Masurier, J.,Wilkinson, S and Vargo, J., Building Organisational Resilience: A New 
Zealand Approach, Resorgs Research Paper, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New 
Zealand, 2010. Available from www.resorgs.org.nz, accessed 10 Sep 2014.  
Figure 2: The Resilience Curve. Source: McManus and Dalziell  
Figure 3: Building Resilience Capability Source: Seville et al 
  
28 
awareness to understand the organisation’s vulnerabilities and increased adaptive capacity enables the 
organisation to respond quicker, reducing the curve’s peak and length.  
 
McManus, Stephenson and Braes also explored the concept of organisational resilience factors.122 
McManus sought to identify how to build resilience within an organisation and quantify identifiable 
resilience indicators conducting research on businesses of various sizes within New Zealand. These 
indicators would provide organisational profile based on information captured and scored. McManus’ 
model, developed in 2008, of Relative Overall Resilience proposed that organisational resilience is 
comprised of three dimensions; Situational Awareness (SA), Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
(KV) and Adaptive Capacity (AC). Values were then determined for this model by asking a series of 49 
questions to help build an understanding of how the organisation was measured against the framework. 
Table 5 shows McManus’ resilience indicators. 
 
Situation Awareness Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Adaptive Capacity 
SA1 Roles & Responsibilities KV1 Planning Strategies AC1 Silo Mentality 
SA2 Understanding & analysis 
of Hazards and 
Consequences 
KV2 Participation in Exercises AC2 Communications & 
Relationships 
SA3 Connectivity Awareness KV3 Capability & Capacity of 
Internal Resources 
AC3 Strategic Vision & Outcome 
Expectancy 
SA4 Insurance Awareness KV4 Capability & Capacity of 
External Resources 
AC4 Information & Knowledge 
SA5 Recovery Priorities KV5 Organisational Connectivity AC5 Leadership, Management & 
Governance Strategies 
Table 5: McManus Resilience Indicators Framework: Source: McManus 
 
Building upon the work conducted by McManus, in 2010 Stephenson developed her model, based on 
McManus’ work, adding six components to the framework, creating the framework shown in Table 6: 
  
 
122McManus, S. T., `Organisational Resilience in New Zealand', 2008; Stephenson, A., Benchmarking the Resilience of 





RE1 Commitment to Resilience 
RE2 Network Perspective 
Situational Awareness Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Adaptive Capacity 
SA1 Roles & Responsibilities KV1 Planning Strategies AC1 Silo Mentality 
SA2 Understanding & analysis of 
hazards, & consequences 
KV2 Participation in Exercises AC2 Communications and 
Relationships 
SA3 Connectivity Awareness KV3 Capability and Capacity of 
Internal Resources 
AC3 Strategic Vision and Outcome 
Expectancy 
SA4 Insurance Awareness KV4 Capability & Capacity of 
Internal Resources 
AC4 Information & Knowledge 
SA5 Recovery Priorities KV5 Organisational Connectivity AC5 Leadership, Management & 
Governance Structures 
SA6 Internal & External Situation 
monitoring & Reporting 
KV6 Robust Processes for 
Identifying & Analysing 
Vulnerabilities 
AC6 Innovation & Creativity 
SA7 Informed Decision Making KV7 Staff Engagement and 
Involvement 
AC7 Devolved & Responsive 
Decision Making 
Table 6: Stephenson Organisational Resilience Framework Source Stephenson 
 
To develop her approach, Stephenson used the process shown below: 
 
The process above, supported by the critical analysis of McManus’ framework and recent events within 
New Zealand, resulted in Stephenson amending the work of McManus to reflect the impact of the 
importance of a strategic concept of an organisation having a “resilience ethos”. The revision of 
McManus’ work resulted in an improved approach to determining an overall measurement of 
Organisational Resilience, taking into consideration the additional elements identified by her research. 
This enabled Stephenson, through the revised framework, to build a mechanism capable of 
benchmarking the Organisational Resilience of organisation. Braes explored the concepts of resilience 
within individuals and how this can transfer to the organisation. He focussed on the fact that 
organisational resilience was more of a state of mind for the business, rather than an activity such as 
business continuity or incident response. Resilience capacity becomes embodied within an organi-
sation’s culture, through its routines and practices, providing a base level of capability to respond to a 
disruptive event. Figure 3 utilises this idea of the resilience curve, looking at it from a disruptive change 
Figure 4: Stephenson's Indicator Development Process Source: Stephenson 
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point of view, mapped against the New Zealand Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (The 
4 Rs – Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery). 
 
Figure 5 reflects the journey an organisation experiences when impacted by a disruptive event, based 
on the observations of military units in training, preparing for operational deployment. Prior to the impact, 
the organisation is operating in a Business as Usual (BAU) condition with a certain level of resilience, 
dependant on the proactiveness of the organisation. This is the resilience gap. When the disruptive 
event occurs, there is a rapid loss of performance as the organisation seeks to regain control and 
understand what is occurring. This is then addressed through the implementation of an immediate 
action, which starts to regain some performance. If the organisation has a business continuity plan, this 
will take-over, seeking to re-align key personnel to key processes to maintain performance and output. 
In time, the organisation then moves into the recovery phase, dependant on its own capability. This 
may mean replacing lost equipment, personnel and customer base, though it may never recover to the 
BAU levels due to missing capability or reputational damage.  
 
The definitions used by Buckle, Braes and Brooks and Newnham still adhere to the current thought 
process that an organisation can either recover from the impact of a disruptive event (recovery 
capability) or resists the impact of a shock or an event (defensive capability). Both these capabilities 
are of a reactive disposition which is also proposed in the business continuity management discipline 
when it refers to organisations bouncing back. Unfortunately, this concept is incorrect, as shown in 
Figure 5. Time has continued to pass, so the environment the organisation is returning to is no longer 
the same. The disruption will have had an impact on its reputation, financial standing, stakeholders and 
workforce, and the organisation needs to adjust to this `new normal.’ 
 
Figure 5: The Resilience Journey. Source: Author  
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In 2006, Briggs and Edwards discussed the increasing complexity of the security risks facing 
businesses and organisations as globalisation changed the structures and pace of corporate 
frameworks.123 As businesses are faced with situations of increasing complexity, one response has 
been to move from functional to matrix structures.124 Like the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
threats, such as terrorism, organised crime and information security, have become asymmetric and 
networked, making each threat more complex to manage.125 They identified that organisations which 
successfully build greater resilience to increasing threats focussed on a holistic approach across the 
business to enhance capability and awareness, which in turn developed competitive advantage.126 T D 
O’Rourke also highlights the importance of building awareness to increase resilience, using studies of 
Hurricane Katrina and the World Trade Center attack as examples of the importance of situational 
awareness and of understanding both the interdependencies and human aspects of situations.127 
O’Rourke raised the importance of leadership within the task of building organisational resilience. Sheffi 
examines the impact of failing to understand risks and issues within the supply chain and how the 
organisation and its suppliers are required to work collaboratively to survive. 128 Sheffi raised that just 
like military professionals, counter-terrorism agents were more concerned about not knowing their 
organisation was under attack, rather than a black swan event. This is due to the most successful way 
of retaining the organisation’s resilience is understanding the threat and responding quickly, with the 
right resources at the right locations. As well as leadership, the culture of the organisation and how it 
behaves is also critical to the development of resilience to disruptive events. 
 
In 2011 research by Bhama, Dani and Burnard identified that resilience based literature has been 
conceptual, focussing on developing a static knowledge base for the area through establishing the 
fundamental concepts.129 Further research also indicated that there is little consistency in its use in the 
terms of Organisational Resilience and a lack of common understanding as to the essential concepts 
prevail.130 This confusion is evident in David Smith’s paper for the Institute of Business Continuity 
Management, in which he seems to confuse Organisational Resilience with Corporate Security. His 
work indicates that to obtain Organisational Resilience, an organisation only needs to build a unified 
Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) to develop resilience, an approach which conflicts 
with that of the Resilient Organisations group based at Canterbury University, New Zealand.131 Braes 
and Brooks highlight the cause as: "Resilience has become a widely used term…(that) has resulted in 
some re-badging of ideas and claims of processes, management systems, computer software and 
measurement tools that will all create resilience."132  
 
123Briggs, R. and Edwards, C., The Business of Resilience, Corporate Security of the 21st Century, DEMOS, London, 2006. 
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Seeking to set the direction for the study and development of organisational resilience, in 2007 Vogus 
and Sutcliffe defined resilience as: “The maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging 
conditions such that the organisation emerges from those conditions strengthened and more 
resourceful.”133 Within the UK, the Department for International Development (DfID) indicated that in 
2011 the UK Government presented disaster resilience as a vital component of its humanitarian and 
development work.134 The 2011 paper also identified that the concept of resilience, either at community 
or national level, was a new area of development for the DfID and therefore it was required to develop 
the essential skills and frameworks to deliver the capability. Key components required for success were 
strategic leadership, embracing innovation, accepting accountability and collaborative working with 
other agencies. 
 
2.4 KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS  
Throughout this thesis, the core strategic components of organisational resilience are proposed to be 
culture, vision, strategy and leadership, underpinned by the ability for the organisation to learn and the 
development of doctrine. These core components support multiple tactical elements which, as a system 
of systems, delivers an Organisational Resilience management framework, previously referred to as 
the Systems Approach to Organisational Resilience Framework (SAORF). It is therefore important that 
these key elements are clearly defined within the thesis to provide a clear understanding of how these 
components interact within the framework. This part of the thesis will analyse relevant research in each 
of these areas. 
 
2.4.1 The Impact of Culture 
In 1990, Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders 
argued that Corporate culture was a “fad” among 
managers and consultants, seeking to denote and 
explain the corporate climate.135 However, the review 
of 100,000 questionnaires from IBM identified certain 
social traits within the organisation based on the 
location of the respondents. These manifested 
themselves into four categories (Figure 6). Yardley et 
al explore the importance of culture within business, 
noting that although culture is a critical element of 
business success, few professional organisations 
take the time and effort to fully understand the 
impact it can have on performance.136  
 
133Vogus, T. J. and Sutcliffe, K. M., 2007, p.3418. 
134Department for International Development (DfID), Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government Response, 
Department for International Development, Whitehall, London, 2011. 
135Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv D. D. and Sanders, G., `Measuring Organisational Culture: a Qualitative and Quantitative 
Study Across Twenty Cases’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 35 No.2, 1990, pp 286 – 316. 
136Yardley et al, From Battlefield to Boardroom, 2012, pp 97-99. 
Figure 6: Manifestations of Culture from Shallow to 




Figure 6 shows the importance of the values of an organisation, and how certain rituals, mythical 
organisational heroes and key symbols can arise around those values. These are physically 
represented and maintained through accepted business practices and activities, thus reinforcing the 
depth of certain values. While symbols are simple, shallow representations, the development of 
business rituals, based on certain cultural aspects, embed these aspects deep into the organisational 
psyche. 
 
King, in his book Command: The Twenty-First Century General, analyses how senior military 
commanders can influence the organisation they command through their personal style, mannerisms 
and rituals.137 He analyses successful and failed military leaders, the mechanisms they use to build a 
corporate identify in their command, and the impact on the soldiers that serve within. He discusses how 
certain commanders built ingrained values within their units, while others failed, and the reasons behind 
this. Writing in 2011, King notes the failure of the military strategic leadership culture during the Iraq 
(2003 – 2009) and Afghanistan (2001 – 2014) campaigns, with a poor understanding of policy, strategic 
decision-making and effective understanding of turning policy into a cohesive strategy with clearly 
defined objectives and activities.138  
 
British Defence Doctrine states that the most important element that needs to be understood within an 
operational area is the culture and the historical background.139 This is also supported by Sinek, whose 
work has focussed on assisting organisations to increase performance through enhancing the culture 
and the working environment of the organisation.140 All conflict, whether within an organisational 
business setting or on the battlefields of Afghanistan or Iraq, is about people. For the UK military, 
understanding culture is critical to its success on operations; not just the culture of the people they are 
fighting against, but also the culture of the local population and the culture of the military itself. In her 
book, Fox discusses the impact of the military culture during the First World War on the ability of the 
British Army to innovate and adapt quickly. She reflects that research has observed that the military in 
peacetime is seen as `rigid and inflexible’, yet in war it becomes `decentralised and agile’ in its 
approach.141 She also challenges the accepted thinking that the analysis of the Army culture against 
that of a “Learning Organisation” during the First World War is based on a flawed premise, when the 
focus was being targeted predominately at a single theatre, formation or branch. The analysis needs to 
be conducted on the organisation as a whole, operating as a multi-theatre, multi-disciplinary entity, and 
how it adapts and innovates.142  
 
 
137King A., Command: The Twenty-first Century General, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp 165-181. 
138King A., Military Command in the Last Decade, British Army Review, British Army, DSDS Bicester, number 151, 2011, pp20 
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139Ministry of Defence, Joint Defence Publication, (JDP) 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 4th edition, Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham, 2011. 
140Sinek S., Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull together and others Don’t, Penguin Books, London, 2017. 




Foley’s work on Verdun notes the clash in German High Command culture, with the Officer Corps not 
fully buying into the leadership, vision or strategy proposed, and how it impacted on post-war lesson 
identification. During the inter-War period, the reform theorists sought to return to the more attractive 
“von Schlieffen” doctrine, ignoring its short-comings and flaws. This is an important note, as it 
demonstrates the power of an organisation’s culture, even to over-write or ignore fundamental flaws in 
strategy, creating an organisational level groupthink. This reflects the cultural model at Figure 6, with 
“von Schlieffen” becoming a cult figure, a heroic leader.143 Foley also notes that even as early as the 
late 1800s, forward thinking military commanders were considering the genesis of the “Comprehensive 
Approach”, with Von Moltke being aware of the importance of politicians and diplomats in the New Age, 
showing a similar understanding to that of pre-Napoleonic theorists.144 Fox notes the importance of 
culture and the effect it can have on effective learning of lessons, as well as innovation and adaptation, 
commenting that in the First World War it depended more on the sponsoring senior officer, than the 
needs of the organisation. These observations highlight that in the militaries of the early 20th century, 
there was still a strong reliance on the culture of the individual, and the ‘Great Man’ or ‘Heroic Leader’ 
aspect of leadership, where empowered commanders could decide what occurred within their 
immediate area of responsibility, regardless of the needs of the organisation.  
 
Culture is also raised by Mansoor, Ledwidge and Tatham in various articles written in the British Army 
Review, with both Ledwidge and Tatham expanding on this topic in subsequent publications.145 
Mansoor notes that the lack of cultural understanding of Iraq by the UK political leadership, underpinned 
by a failing to grasp the difference between political strategic planning and operational activities, 
resulted in the incorrect mindset being applied for the Iraq conflict, with the focus being on rapid, 
kinetically focussed activities, with the absence of any Iraq focussed long-term rebuild and redevelop 
strategy. The political approach demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the root causes of an 
insurgency, the implication of culture, and a misunderstanding of what true COIN campaigns involve, 
as their reference base were recent benign campaigns such as Northern Ireland and Kosovo. At the 
operational level, the military campaign was hampered by a “Long screw-driver” culture, with the senior 
leadership seeking to control the campaign from Whitehall, rather than place the UK Force under direct 
control of a regional multi-national headquarters. This resulted in the UK Forces being incorrectly 
resourced, poorly managed and too slow to adapt to the unfolding situation on the ground.146 In his 
book Unwinnable, Farrell also supports these claims, noting the deployed British Forces in 2006 did not 
embrace the population centric reconstruction strategy; rather, the organisation went seeking the 
Taleban, focussed on the destruction of the enemy, rather than the long term vision.147 
 
 
143Foley, German Strategy and The Path to Verdun, Erich Von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870 – 1916, pp 
260 -263. 
144Ibid, p.265; Heuser, B., `Strategy Before the Word’, The RUSI Journal, 2010, pp. 39-41. 
145Mansoor, P., `The British Army and Lessons of the Iraq War’, British Army Review, British Army, DSDS Bicester, number 
147, 2019, pp11-15; Tatham S and Rowland L., `Influence Operations – Do We really Get It?’, British Army Review, British 
Army, DSDS Bicester, number 150, 2011, pp 31-37; Ledwidge F., `Missing a Trick – Justice and Insurgency’, British Army 
Review, British Army, DSDS Bicester, number 150, 2011, pp 38 – 43. 
146Mansoor P., `The British Army and Lessons of the Iraq War’, British Army Review, 2009, pp 13-14. 
147Farrell, T., Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, Penguin, Random House, London, 2017  
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Ledwidge raises the concept of justice, culture and legitimacy within the conflict zone, case studying 
events in Ireland in the early 20th century and in the Afghanistan campaign. He noted that the creation 
of a “Shadow State” supported by a deep understanding of the cultural framework and the creation of 
a “justice” system, seen to deliver “fair” sentences in line with the cultural framework, dispensed by the 
insurgents, obtained the support and respect of the local population.148 By aligning the need for justice 
to be seen to be done quickly, in line with the accepted culture of the population, the insurgent groups 
were obtaining legitimacy within the eyes of the population, while undermining the efforts of the COIN 
forces. By using cultural understanding, the insurgent is able to quickly communicate their intent and 
obtain the support needed to operate within the region; this ability to influence towns and regions at 
such a level makes it increasingly difficult for an external counterinsurgent force to operate effectively.  
 
Ledwidge expands on the issue of the immaturity of cultural understanding by the UK within in this 
context in his book, Losing Small Wars, noting that there was a level of cultural mistrust of Western 
forces, especially the British, in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to previous military campaigns.149 This was 
not fully understood or considered during the campaign planning phase of the Iraq conflict, with little 
consideration given to how to rebuild the nation’s political, technical and social infrastructure post 
conflict. The political leadership had failed to learn the lessons from previous campaigns on how to 
rebuild a nation after regime change; he uses a case study of post-war Germany as a clear example.150 
 
Tatham comments on the importance of culture and influence in building a successful platform to win 
the support of the population. Writing in 2011, he utilised his knowledge from Influence Operations  
(colloquially known as Hearts and Mind operations) to highlight the importance of understanding the 
population, their motivators, concerns and behaviours, and how this is affected by their cultural 
framework. He notes that this approach of engaging with the population on a cultural and psychological 
level, known as Target Audience Analysis, was not a recognised approach during the early stages of 
the Iraq or Afghanistan campaigns.151 Yet this concept of Target Audience Analysis is recognised in 
business, with organisations investing large quantities of funds to have feedback from customer groups 
on what really matters to them. The process, to a lesser degree, is also witnessed during the run up to 
political elections, with each political group seeking to understand what will influence various audience 
groups. Tatham recommended in 2008 the need to look at the importance of strategic communications 
in developing the correct cultural understanding when operating within COIN operations.152 In 2008 he 
noted that organisations that focussed on building effective strategic communication frameworks would 
often obtain the advantage; especially in an asymmetric campaign.153 Farrell comments on this, noting 
that while at the tactical level the military innovated or adapted quickly to build a cultural understanding, 
the gathered intelligence was rarely recognised at the operational or strategic levels, with the leadership 
supporting a corrupt government, despised by the population. At a strategic and political level there was 
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a significant failure of cultural understanding, which severely impacted on situational awareness of what 
the UK was entering into in 2006, emphasised by the government telling reported in 2006 “we would be 
perfectly happy to leave in three years not having fired a shot because our job is to protect the 
reconstruction.”154 According to the account of 16 Air Assault’s Brigade deployment after this statement, 
they fired half a million rounds of ammunition and 30,000 canon rounds.155 
 
At the tactical level, Simpson, having served within a frontline unit in 2010, discusses the initial absence 
of cultural understanding and tools to assist the deployed headquarters to obtain situational awareness 
of the population they were operating among.156 He noted that resources were regularly not being 
targeted to deliver the correct effect, usually caused by the military units not understanding what ’effect’ 
would best destabilise the local insurgent groups. There was limited thought or analysis given to the 
engagement, on a cultural level, with the population to help clearly identify the drivers for change. 
Though in 2008 Tatham had produced his work on Strategic Communications as part of the Advanced 
Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), there was little evidence of this practice being employed 
effectively. Simpson expands on the failings of understanding cultural frameworks in his book War From 
the Ground Up, where he discusses in detail the issues faced when operating within contemporary 
operating environments.157 Fox also notes that organisational culture can have a detrimental impact on 
the ability to manage change effectively, with individuals or collective groups being able to raise barriers 
to much needed advancement.158 King posits that in The First World War the British Army learned to 
innovate in spite of the culture of the British senior leadership; he remarks that most of the learning was 
from the bottom up, happening at the frontline of the conflicts, often independent of the central command 
structures. 
  
Hofstede describes culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members 
of one group or category of people from others.159” It is about their beliefs, fears, social structures, 
family, ideological ties and narratives.160 Elliott discusses the impact of organisational culture when 
analysing the decision-making process used by senior military commanders during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan campaigns. An attitude of carefree acceptance of facts without challenging the limited 
intelligence to gain greater clarification resulted in a groupthink decision to deploy into Afghanistan while 
committed in Iraq.161 Farrell, in his book Unwinnable, also discusses the issue of when organisations, 
and the population, start identifying individuals as heroic figures in their culture. In discussions with 
Taleban leaders, he highlights that many members, along with 1000 respected clerics, requested that 
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Bin Laden be asked to leave Afghanistan immediately after the World Trade Center attack; they were 
ignored, due to Bin Laden having become a cult figure within the nation, standing up against the 
oppressive West.162 By becoming captured by the culture, the Taleban leadership lost situational 
awareness of the wider picture, resulting in the Afghanistan War and the removal of the Taleban 
government. 
 
By understanding the impact of culture on an organisation’s strategy and objectives, the leadership 
team can utilise this beneficially. Farrell’s review of the British activity in Afghanistan, during operation 
Moshtarak,163 in 2010, demonstrated how the military commander understood the complexities of the 
cultural situation, particularly around the legitimacy of the local security forces.164 By replacing the local, 
corrupt forces with well trained, out of region trained troops, the risk was effectively mitigated, while 
maintaining an Afghan involvement in the campaign, key to building trust within the region. Culture can 
also impact the psyche of an organisation; the UK military headquarters for Moshtarak, was conceived 
solely for the purpose of managing a multi-national organisation, unlike the regular rotation of 
headquarters through different tasks. This created a certain cultural understanding of the situation within 
Afghanistan, with staff understanding their roles, expectations and building situational awareness.165 
This approach, though localised in its application, demonstrated that the concepts raised by Tatham 
and Simpson from previous campaign observations were now starting to be applied effectively and 
delivering tangible results. However, as discussed in several publications, the ability of the organisation 
to innovate and adapt at the tactical level was negated by the failure to embrace and support the 
learning at the strategic level. The strategic military/political leadership failed to grasp the situation and 
support accordingly.166 The lack of cultural understanding, joint vision, political guidance and strategic 
military leadership resulted in campaign failure for the UK; in 2013 the four districts in Helmand 
`secured’ by the British were ranked as the most violent in Afghanistan.167 
 
Culture also impacts on organisations through the creation of certain habits or traits that gradually 
become the norm. The British Army is a good example of cultures and sub-cultures and the intense 
rivalry that this can create. Fox notes that in 1910 -1914 the culture of the Army was focussed on the 
individual, with principles based on an Officer Corps that was heavily drawn from the landed gentry, an 
ineffective General Staff and highly distributed leadership, which impacted on its effectiveness to 
standardise protocols and circulate learning effectively; it was, in essence a collection of franchises 
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which operated depending on what the senior officer determined was correct.168 There also existed an 
inter-service rivalry with the Royal Navy for funding, which still exists today.169  
 
The awareness of the culture is critical within an organisation, whether it is on the battlefield, in the 
boardroom or on the shop floor. As the literature has shown, failing to understand the culture of the 
organisation, as witnessed in Foley’s work, can lead to a catastrophic dysfunctional leadership group. 
Investing in the wrong symbols, heroes or rituals can also damage an organisation. Culture is developed 
and maintained by the leadership group; if it is toxic, then it is the role of the leadership group to address 
it. By understanding the culture of the competition, a leader can identify competitors’ vulnerable points 
that can then be exploited; likewise, by understanding the vulnerable points of their organisation, it is 
possible to build mitigation mechanisms to protect them. As shown in the various examples above, 
individuals who embrace the organisation’s culture can quickly influence the decision-making and 
productivity of an organisation. The use of well-placed communication frameworks can build a positive 
environment, aligned to the vison of the organisation. However, failure to link tactical activities and 
successes to the strategy, and align it to the organisation’s culture, can rapidly result in reputational and 
/ or performance issues, as the British experienced in the recent operational deployments.  
 
2.4.2 The Importance of Vision and Strategy 
The importance of having a vision and a means to deliver the vision is critical to delivering success, 
either in business or in military operations. Research within the field of resilience has identified that a 
successful organisational response is critically reliant on the ability of the leadership team to understand 
the situation and respond accordingly, creating natural organisational agility.170 In today’s complex, 
globalised and increasingly inter-dependent environment, examples of ̀ effective strategy’ at the highest 
level have been hard to find.171 Simon Sinek comments on the importance of the vision of the 
organisation, or the “why” it is in existence. He uses several case studies to note the importance of 
developing the correct vision for the organisation, then building the culture to deliver the vision. This in 
turn enables the creation of and effective strategy for the leadership to deliver; the “why, how and 
what.”172 This is the equivalent of the military’s Ends (Vision), Ways (Method) and Means (Resources), 
noting the importance to have the vision (end-state) as the core element. 
 
The English word strategy is based on the Greek word strategia, which is based on the Greek word 
strategos, meaning “The General’s Way”. Strategia, which was translated into Latin as Belli (strategy) 
or ars Imperatoria (generalship), was the function and skill of the General, or by extension the art of 
war.173 Research by Heuser posited that the concept of strategy within the Western World had been 
 
168Fox, A., Learning to Fight, Military innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918, 2018, pp 20, 29, 47, 67,249  
169Ibid, p.31. 
170Newnham, C, `Why Resilience is not the Future Business Continuity’, Business Continuity Management Conference 2013, 
available from www.bcm2013.com/papers/StreamC/1CharleyNewnham.pdf, accessed on 20 Nov 2014; Zebrowsiki, C., The 
Nature of Resilience, 2013; Davoudi, S., `Resilience: A Bridging Concept or a Dead End?', 2012; Bhamra, Dani and Burnard, 
Resilience: the concept, a literature review and future directions, 2011. 
171Royal College of Defence Studies, Thinking Strategically, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, Ministry of 
Defence, 2012, p.1.  
172Sinek, S., Start With Why, Portoflio Penguin, London, 2009; Ibid, p.156. 
173Royal College of Defence Studies, Thinking Strategically, 3rd Edition, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 
2012 pp. 4 -10. 
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corrupted through the Napoleonic era. Prior to this age. the true concept of it having originally proposed 
as “the science of the general”, focussed on the individual knowing all the requirements of statecraft, 
including medicine, geography and fortifications.174 Only during the Napoleonic ages did it become 
distorted to focus solely on achieving a purely military victory, though post-1945 the concept has now 
again become broader and focussed on the utilisation of all tools available to the State to achieve 
success.175 She notes that texts of the pre-Napoleonic era that discussed strategy had obtaining and 
sustaining lasting peace as the focus, recognising that a military victory alone was unlikely to led to 
peace, rather that there needed to be extensive focus on post-conflict governance, justice and cultural 
understanding.176  
 
The research and interviews conducted by the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) identified a 
fundamental gap between strategy design and implementation to deliver results. The findings, sup-
ported in 2016 by a study by Barclays, identified that the complexity of the modern environment impacts 
on the ability to maintain a long-term view.177 The inclusion of the workforce to deliver the strategy also 
increases the difficulty. Across industry, though the initial focus of strategy was the delivery of an 
intellectual construct linking your current position, actions, resources and where you wanted to be 
tomorrow, recently the use of `strategy’ has becomes focussed on the delivery of short-term objectives, 
rather than the delivery of the bigger picture.178 Colin Gray proposes that the purpose of `Strategy’ is to 
convert policies into action through the effective alignment of Ends, Ways and Means. Those that do 
this are strategists, with those that are involved in delivering the implementation being the strategic 
leaders of the organisation, delivering the actions holistically across the organisation to achieve the 
desired outcome, in line with the political intent.179 The RCDS states that `Policy’ is “a course of action 
adapted and pursued by a government”.180 Gray supports this concept, though remarks that most 
governments tend to neglect giving the correct level of attention to its development.181  
 
Steven Jermy describes ̀ policy’ in greater detail, defining it as “a government (or organisation’s) formed 
position on an issue, situation or problem, including what political objective the government wishes to 
achieve, what resources it is prepared to commit to the pursuit of that objective and what course of 
action it seeks to follow.”182 Given that Organisational Resilience is both a political and institutional 
desired outcome, this thesis proposes to use Jermy’s description as it provides the best context for the 
analysis.  
 
Writing in 2010, Porter posits that Britain has lost the capability to deliver strategy coherently or 
effectively, with the ability to orchestrate the Ends, Ways and Means poorly taught or understood. He 
 
174Heuser, B., `Strategy Before the Word’, The RUSI Journal, Royal United Services Institute, Routledge, London, Volume 155 
Issue 1, 2010, pp. 36-43. 
175Ibid, p.38. 
176Ibid, pp 39-41. 
177The research involved 153 managers and 2055 employees between July – August 2016. 
178Royal College of Defence Studies, Thinking Strategically, 3rd Edition, 2012, p.8 
179Gray, C. S., The Strategy Bridge, 2010, p.15. 
180 Royal College of Defence Studies, Thinking Strategically, 2012, p.5 
181Gray, C. S., The Strategy Bridge, 2010, p.28.  
182Jermy, S., Strategy for Action – Using Force wisely in the 21st Century, 2011. 
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notes that the 2008 and 2009 National Security Strategies lacked any clear strategic direction; they 
were full of description of threats, issues and required responses, but limited in a coherent long-term 
approach. He noted there was a lack of strategic understanding at the Political level, and limited 
evidence of understanding of the concept within the senior military leadership.183 Both Porter and 
Heuser note that the study of Strategy within the 20th Century literature has become more abstract, with 
it being delivered more by business schools than by universities and military education 
establishments.184 
 
As part of delivering a strategy based on `Joint 
Action’ to deliver long-term effect, there needs to be 
the blending of activities to create the correct 
environment (Figure 7). By mixing the use of 
movement, kinetic activity and influence tasks to 
isolate the enemy from the population, in theory the 
counterinsurgent can then build engagement, 
support and legitimacy, enabling the implementation 
of post-conflict reconstruction. To do this effectively 
requires strategic leadership support, guidance and 
investment, as it will require both military and civilian 
organisations to deliver it effectively.  
 
King supports the concerns raised about the lack of strategic leadership at both the political and military 
command level when it comes to delivering effective strategic guidance. His posits that by 2010 the 
British Command system had become overloaded at the senior officer level, removing clear 
accountability for decisions. He highlights the strategic failure of the executive leadership of the military 
to clearly understand, or follow, the planning guidelines for the commitment of military to conflict, noting 
that the political decision to deploy military forces into Afghanistan was based on flawed military 
advice.185 Both North and Ledwidge also remark on the decline of effective military strategy, while 
Milevski, writing in 2011, posits that the Western governments as a collective had lost the ability to plan 
at the strategic level. He supports the observations made by King a year earlier that there was no 
coherent strategy in Iraq or Afghanistan, just a series of loosely linked operational or tactical activities.186  
 
The turbulent events occurring in the Middle East and the positions that the UK has taken towards the 
relevant actors involved in these situations has increased the threat of terrorism within the UK. The 
National Risk Register indicates that the home-grown threat and the potential for a “spectacular” attack 
continues to grow more ominous, including the possible use of chemical, biological or nuclear devices 
 
183Porter P., Why Britain Doesn’t Do Grand Strategy, The RUSI Journal, Royal United Services Institute, Routledge, London, 
Volume 155 Issue 4, pp. 6-12. 
184Ibid, p.7; Heuser B., `Strategy Before the Word’, The RUSI Journal, 2010, p.36. 
185King A., Military Command in the Last Decade, British Army Review, 2011, p.21. 
186North, R., Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003 – 2009, Continuum, London, 2009; Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 
2012; Milevski, L., `A Collective Failure of Grand Strategy – The West’s Unintended Wars of Choice’, RUSI Journal, Vol 156 
No.1, Routledge, London, 2011, pp 30 – 33. 
Figure 7: Joint Action Model Source: MoD 
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in crowded areas. 187 This placed several rail industry sites in the “At Risk” section. Other risks that 
could impact the railway are potential catastrophic natural weather events, similar to what the railway 
was forced to contend with in the winter of 2012 – 2013,188 as well as the potential events that could 
affect the rail network, such as bridge or tunnel collapse, rail crashes, train derailments, level crossing 
strikes, migrant ingress, debris on the track due to strong winds189 and suicides. To address these 
potential risks, there is the need for a robust incident management strategy to enable the military190, the 
emergency services and rail industry to work in a collaborative manner, to help ensure strong business 
resilience to the wider impact of the event. 
 
At the organisational level, there is need to possess a strategy, delivered through strategic leadership, 
to build and maintain the resilience of an organisation. Strategy is seen in business as a disciplined 
effort to produce fundamental decisions and 
actions to shape the direction of an 
organisation191, often conducted in a 
dynamically changing environment. Strategy 
often brings together information analysis, for-
ward planning, objective thinking and subjective 
evaluation of goals and direction of the 
organisation, aligned to the vision set by the 
leadership team (Figure 8). The strategy is the 
translation of the vision, the long-term outcome 
set into several interconnected activities across 
the organisation to ensure the delivery of the 
vision, and the allocation of available resources 
within the institution.  
 
The act of delivering the strategy is often termed Strategic Management, which encompasses the 
planning, implementation, evaluation, amendment and, if required, re-alignment of the activities against 
the strategy to deliver the vision. Therefore, strategy and strategic management are holistic activities 
spread across the organisation; just like organisational resilience. The 2016 Barclays research identified 
that an organisation would take three strategic decisions, on average, a year, with over 70% of 
interviewees noting that it was easier to make the decision than to implement it. This reflects Poister’s 
 
187Canton, L.G., Emergency Management Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
2007; Lindell, M. K., Prater C. and Perry, R. W., Introduction to emergency management, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2007. 
188During this period the weather contributed to the collapse of 144 earth works (ORR Report Monitor 2013), resulting in rail 
journey delays, long term disruption and train derailments. 
189The effect of the St Jude storm brought the railway to a virtual halt on the 28th Oct 2013. The debris across East Anglia took 
three days to clear of the track, forcing the running of the railway at a reduced level.  
190Though not tasked under the Civil Contingencies Act specifically, the military can, at times, move to deliver assistance in 
major incidents where there is risk of large loss of life, or threat of major damage to critical infrastructure. 
191Poister T.H. `Strategic Planning and Management in State Departments of Transportation’, Internal Journal of Public 
Administration, Volume 28, 2005, pp. 1035-1056. Available at www.tandfonline.com. Downloaded 12 May 2017.  
Figure 8: The Contents of Strategy. Source: Gray 
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research, which noted that in a Chief Executive workshop in 2000, there was a consensus that strategy 
breaks down at the delivery stage.192  
 
To enable the correct development of a coherent strategy, it is important to understand the 
differentiation of strategic action (implementing the strategy) and strategising (the planning, theorising 
of strategy). It is critical that an organisation can move freely from one to the other, enabling the 
organisation to be flexible when faced with a major disruptive event, moving between planning and 
action with minimal impact to its operational effectiveness. Based on the military’s Joint Action model,193 
strategy can therefore take place in several interacting domains, which together result in the effective 
delivery of strategic intent (Figure 9). It is important that the leadership would also accept and 
understand the impact of an organisation’s culture, as that will have a specific impact on the strategy 
created, therefore resulting in a unique approach for that specific organisation.  
 
For the strategic action model (Figure 9), structure 
implies not only the physical structure of the 
company, but also how information, management, 
leadership and the relevant functional departments 
interact. Structure also includes how the company 
develops and delivers strategy to enable it to move 
forward, while culture can be described as the 
perception of what the organisation classes as 
acceptable behaviours. Within the military and 
business, culture is also the history of the 
organisation and the various traditions, rituals and 
myths that have been built over time, which creates 
a legacy. For example, Network Rail’s history is the 
legacy that has been left behind from the British 
Rail and Railtrack days, and the myths of the 
organisation that have developed since its conception in 2003.  
 
It is important that, in a collaborative strategic environment, when reacting and recovering from a major 
disruptive incident, there is a thorough understanding of the components of the strategic action model 
and how they interact with each other. This understanding will then enable the organisation to respond 
more effectively, improving operational performance and reputational standing among its stakeholders. 
To enable this, senior military commanders must understand the strategic priorities of government in 
order to identify possible incidents, emergencies or crises. They then need to plan against the worst-
case situation and develop contingency plans to be able to implement, prior to such an event taking 
place. Regular strategic horizon scanning, with direction to the training and development of the military 
 
192Poister T.H. `Strategic Planning and Management in State Departments of Transportation’, 2005, p. 1037.  
193Ministry of Defence, Joint Defence Publication 3-00: Campaign Execution, 3rd edition, Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre, 2009, pp 3-1 – 3-6. 
Figure 9: Strategic Action Source: Author 
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capability, is critical to the defence of the UK and its borders. Although the UK’s geographical position 
is more physically remote than those of the other European states, allowing increased security through 
strict border controls, the UK is a prominent international player that has often been involved in critical 
decisions in the world arena, as well as involvement in the creation and management of international 
stability and law. 194 
 
In this context, the design, development, delivery 
and sustaining of Organisational Resilience is a 
strategic activity. Resilience is not simply about 
‘bouncing back’ or ’bouncing forward’”, rather it is 
about negotiating disruptive events and thriving on 
uncertainty, while focussing on the development of 
the entity against an infinite timeline.195 It is critical 
to be in place to enable an organisation to exist 
long enough, utilising all available options to deliver 
the strategic outcome that is required for success. 
At the strategic level, managed by the executive 
board, it is not just about the resources, the 
financial capability or the relevant structures being 
in place, though these all assist the process. 
Resilience is not something that can be achieved by a single organisation acting in isolation.196 There 
is a need to understand the supply chain and the customer focus. It needs to be dynamically aware of 
Porter’s five forces and adjust accordingly to maintain its survival (Figure 10). Porter’s model looks at 
the attractiveness of an organisation to the market against its rivals, then factors in the threats that the 
organisation may face to maintain its market position. This may be the threat of a new arrival, the threat 
of another organisation delivering their services, or the bargaining power of suppliers or buyers. These 
five forces create a strategic micro-environment that within which the organisation must operate to 
maintain market effectiveness.  
 
The consequences of getting resilience management wrong can have dramatic effects, especially at 
the strategic level. One area that is focused upon by strategy theorists is the ability of the individual to 
possess an independent, free and creative spirit that steps outside of regular routine and practices. The 
ability to identify and manage a complex problem or an unfolding crisis requires flexibility of mind, a 
systems-based approach to thinking, and the ability to see beyond processes and procedures. The 
strategic leader is also required to learn and apply knowledge and experience from previous events to 
a new strategic circumstance. Such capability sets them apart from others within the organisation. The 
importance of leadership within the organisation is discussed in the next section. 
 
194A few events which have caused security concerns were the support for the 1986 strike on Libya by US warplanes, the 
Falklands War, the support for action against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the support of US action against Afghanistan in 2001 and 
the push for the use of force against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1998/99.  
195Newnham, `Gold or Dust?’, 2012.  
196Seville, E. et al, Building Organisational Resilience: A New Zealand Approach, 2010, p.2.  




2.4.2 The Role of Leadership 
One aspect of military service that has been researched and investigated for centuries is the concept 
of leadership under pressure, with the belief that by understanding the impact the leader has, the 
organisation stands a greater chance of success. As mentioned earlier, Heuser notes that pre-
Napoleonic writers had a better understanding of the interaction of the leader (General) and the delivery 
of effective strategy. Recent authors have sought to deconstruct leadership to understand the 
fundamentals, observing how successful or failed leaders have utilised it.197 Leadership itself is an 
intangible, that cannot be replaced through a technological tool due to the impact that interpersonal 
activities, between the leader and the followers, can have on the morale of the group.198 Recent military 
campaigns within Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that even though the Western nations have 
the most technologically focused military, the campaigns still failed to deliver success due to serious 
leadership failures at multiple levels.199 General Omar Bradley noted that the successful leader does 
not need to force his presence; instead their influence is felt through actions and decisions. The 
assessment of a leader is through their ability to inspire their followers.200 In business, companies are 
considered on the quality of their leadership and direction.201 In his piece in the Parameters Journal, 
Bradley refers to the importance of leadership in business. A good leader is aware of the needs of the 
organisation without being a specialist; the skill of leadership is being able to identify and enable the 
specialists to carry out their respective roles.202  
 
Leadership is a concept that has exercised academics. They have sought to scientifically determine the 
process to better understand it, debating whether it is a skill or an innate behaviour.203 In the process 
they lose sight of the meaning, seeking to unpick the activities and create a narrow set of styles, rather 
than understand the impact as well as document the various styles used by successful and 
unsuccessful leaders. This is very similar to culture and charisma.204 Doh notes that research since 
2003 has identified that leadership has become a major focus within business schools, with many 
courses developed to promote leadership development and capability. Doh’s research indicated that 
leadership principles and application can be taught, though the research highlighted that good leaders 
have something else to add through personal interactions, inspiring others and the ability for effective 
decision-making. It noted that leadership is as much about processes and activity as well as emotions, 
 
197Adair J, Effective Strategic Leadership, Pan Books, London, 2010; Sinek S., Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire 
Everyone to Take Action, Portfolio Penguin Books, London, 2009; Sinek S., Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull together 
and others Don’t, Penguin Books, London, 2017; Grint K, Leadership - Limits and Possibilities, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2005; Elliott, C. L., High Command, London, 2015; King A., Command: The Twenty-first Century General, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp 165-181.  
198Bradley, O, `Leadership’, Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College, Volume 1, 1972, pp2 – 8. Available at 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters 
199Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 2012; King A., Command: The Twenty-first Century General, 2019; North, R., Ministry of 
Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003 – 2009, 2009. 
200King A., Command: The Twenty-first Century General, 2019, pp 165-181; Bradley, O, `Leadership’, Parameters, 1972, pp2 – 
8 
201Bradley, O, Leadership, Parameters, 1972, p. 2. 
202Bradley, O, Leadership, Parameters, 1972, p. 4. 
203Doh, J.P., `Can Leadership be Taught? Perspectives from Management Educators’, Academy of Management Learning and 
Education, 2003, Vol 2 No.1 pp. 54-67. 
204Westley F and Mintzberg H, `Visionary Leadership and Strategic Management’, Strategic Management Journal, John Wiley 
and Sons, 1989, Volume 10, pp. 17-32. Available at www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com 
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attitude and personality.205 Doh’s discussions also noted that successful leadership is hard to break 
down into specific elements, with it often being easier to deconstruct leadership failures and identify the 
types of failures and reasons why such failures occurred. 
 
A sub-set of leadership is the art of strategic leadership. Research has previously focused on the 
delivery of leadership at the senior level of an organisation, with conventional wisdom and business 
literature focussing on leadership delivered by senior leadership teams or chief executives. Shrivastava 
and Nachman challenged that belief, focusing on the act of strategic leadership within an organisation. 
The study identified that while senior managers are key to the decision-making processes, individual 
managers across the organisation’s hierarchy are also involved in the leadership of the organisation 
through their actions and activities.206 Their research identified that strategic leadership is a function of 
the organisation, with senior managers giving direction, but also understanding the impact of culture, 
organisational structure and the interplay with the various managerial levels across the organisation. 
Research by Dr Wong into strategic leadership within the US military sought to identify what 
competencies individuals required. He noted that there are three elements to a leader; business, 
leadership and personal effectiveness. Most of the research had focused on the `business’ dimension, 
while the leadership and personal effectiveness dimensions had been overlooked due to the belief that 
leadership cannot be taught or that personal issues and business need to be separated. Another key 
aspect is self-awareness; being able to understand your own capabilities and weaknesses within certain 
situations.207 Another key element identified was the level of cognitive complexity, the ability to manage 
the abstract, longer timeframes and align activities and actions to outcomes. Wong’s research 
suggested, similar to Westberg and Mintzberg, that by deconstructing strategic leadership it becomes 
difficult for an institution to identify what personal qualities to develop. Instead, he proposes a framework 
of six meta-competencies (Table 7).208 
Ser Meta Competency Descriptor 
1 Identity 
The ability to understand yourself, your strengths, weaknesses, own values and 
career development. 
2 Mental Agility 
The ability to scan their environment, apply a systems thinking approach, see the 
bigger picture and prioritise actions to mitigate risks. 
3 Cross-cultural savvy 
Identify perspectives beyond own boundaries, awareness of others, relationship 
building, influential and facilitator. 
4 Interpersonal Maturity 
Empowered decision-making, inspiring others, negotiating skills, collaborative 
approach and awareness of cultural framework impact on the organisation. 
5 World-class Warrior 
Demonstrate a clear understanding of activities at a strategic level, including 
strategy, multi-dimensional operations, cross-agency working, and effective 
decision-making based on intelligence. 
6 Professional Astuteness 
Understand the need to develop and coach future talent within the organisation 
through transformational leadership, coaching and mentoring in line with 
organisation’s values. 
 
Table 7: Strategic Leadership Competencies. Source: Wong. 
 
205Doh, J.P., `Can Leadership be Taught? Perspectives from Management Educators’, 2003, Vol 2 No.1 pp. 64. 
206Shrivastava P. and Nachman S.A., `Strategic Leadership Patterns’, Strategic Management Journal, John Wiley and Sons, 
Vol 10 51-66, 1989. Available at www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com 
207Wong L., Gerras S., Kidd W., Pricone R. and Swengros R., Strategic Leadership Competencies, Strategic Studies Institute 
Report, US War College, 2003, downloaded from US War College online library, 10 July 2008. 
208Wong L., et al, Strategic Leadership Competencies, 2008, p.11.  
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As Wong notes, managing the complexity of the battlefield or workplace requires clear objectives and 
the means by which to get there at a strategic level. Without a clear understanding of the risks, issues 
and potential threats that are present, there exists the possibility that the response implemented will not 
address the situation. This will limit the level of resilience that the organisation will display, which may 
result in a critical failure to manage the situation. Yardley comments on strategic leadership within the 
corporate world, raising concerns that it is focussed on the cult of the individual, driven by the desire to 
be measured by metrics and the financial bottom line.209 This transactional approach to corporate 
leadership, with individuals paid for delivering a service, fails to develop the social capital of an 
organisation as it focuses the impact not on the relationship between the individuals, but rather on the 
reward given for the service. This is in contradiction to King, Westley and Mintzberg, who promote the 
concept that leadership, especially at the strategic level, needs to be visionary and able to empower 
the leader’s audience through presence and action, which in turn enables the development of strategy 
to bring the vision into reality.210  
 
For organisations it is important to understand that leadership is an innate capability which is built upon 
relationships between individuals and can be improved through education, training and development. It 
relies on the traits of each individual and the interactions between them, rather than obtaining a certain 
skill set, which will automatically make a strong leader. This is especially critical in a crisis or a long-
term disruptive event, where there is the requirement for the staff within the organisation to believe in 
the capability of the leadership team to guide the organisation through the difficult period. Adair covers 
the requirements of the leader, highlighting five key elements not found in management. These are: 
Give direction; provide inspiration; build teams; set an example; and be accepted.211 Westley and 
Mintzberg highlight similar themes around inspiring others and setting the vision and direction for the 
organisation, while Wong’s meta-competencies also reflect these thoughts. King notes that in the period 
of stabilisation and COIN operations post 1990, the heroic leadership style seen in the Second World 
War and immediate COIN deployments was replaced with a more collaborative, politically aware, 
devolved and intelligence led.212 He notes that the impact of the Afghanistan campaign, particularly the 
fight for Kandahar, has had a lasting impression on the development of strategic leadership within the 
UK military.213  
 
 
209Yardley I. et al, From Battlefield to the Boardroom, 2011. 
210Westley F., and Mintzberg H., `Visionary Leadership and Strategic Management’, 1989; King A., Command: The Twenty-first 
Century General, 2019, pp 165-181. 
211Thomas N, ed., The John Adair Handbook of Management and Leadership, Thorogood, London, 2006, p.119. 




These traits align with the leadership 
behaviours that are enshrined within the Army 
Leadership Code. It focuses on the key traits 
identified and matured during recent cam-
paigns. The seven leadership behaviours are: 
lead by example; encourage thinking; apply 
reward and discipline; demand high perfor-
mance; encourage team confidence; recognise 
individual strengths and weaknesses; and 
strive for team goals.214 Though tailored for 
military operations, these seven key 
behaviours are transferable to the private 
sector. Leaders can target their efforts to 
create and build high performing teams, 
striving for best practice and achieving their team goals. As these behaviours are team focussed, they 
represent key elements of a core capability for a leader during a crisis, to build the response team, set 
the direction and enable adaptive leadership to maximise team capability while under pressure. The 
behaviours also sit within three distinct areas, as shown in Figure 11. 
 
Demiroz and Kapucu discuss the importance of leadership in managing crises and the ability to 
understand a complex situation, identify critical points and develop a means to help the organisation 
return to stability as quickly as possible, thereby managing the impact.215 Their thoughts are like those 
of others who have studied the phenomenon in the emergency services.216 They identified that positive 
leadership enables greater chances of a successful outcome. Adair, Grint and Fink note that successful 
leadership relies on effective interactions with others, strong communication skills, timely and accurate 
decision-making, negotiation skills and a willingness to work collaboratively at a strategic level.217 The 
capabilities of communication and decision-making are identified as the most important to the joint 
approach and to build relationships across the various individuals and teams involved in incidents.218 
The ability of an organisation to foster strategic leadership is fundamental to implementing the vision 
and strategy of the institution. The question around whether Defence and the rail industry are learning 
organisations is the topic of the next section, which is critical to the ability of an organisation to survive 
a major disruptive event. 
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216Fox J. C., `Analysing Leadership Styles of Incident Commanders’, 2009; Kavanagh G., `Defining the Role of the Fire Gold 
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2.4.4 Organisational Learning 
The phrase “Learning Organisation”, is a relatively new concept, having been created in the 1970s as 
one of the disciplines of the then new approach to organisation development.219 Recently it has also 
been recognised as a key component of effective Change Management as to how organisations 
manage the effect of change; Kotter notes that learning is fundamental in the development of success 
and building competitive capacity to manage change in rapidly shifting economic environments.220  
 
Figure 12 demonstrates the link, through the experiences of the 
leadership group, how they approach learning and how the skills 
that they possess enable them to identify mechanisms to build the 
capability to manage change. Organisational learning is an 
extensive and complex subject of much debate within business 
schools and the military in a bid to increase performance, reduce 
operating costs and build resilience. 
 
Organisational learning is categorised as neither beneficial nor 
detrimental within the various literature that was reviewed, though 
it is assumed that, by conducting effective organisational learning 
mechanisms, issues within the organisation that impact on 
performance capability will be identified and addressed. Toft and 
Reynolds note that several crisis events they researched were not 
so much unknown disasters, rather that the warning signs had been 
observed but not effectively dealt with, with similar behaviours being 
present. This identified a gap in learning within those organisations, 
which, if addressed, may lead to the better design of procedures 
that will reduce further losses.221 This can clearly be seen in high 
profile cases such as the loss of the Columbia Space shuttle, or the 
RAF Nimrod over Afghanistan.222  
 
Both detailed investigative reports noted that there were several major errors within the organisations 
that were left unchecked. There had been a lack of learning from near misses, cultural apathy to minor 
issues and a failure to address safety failings. In both the reports, the RAF and NASA were accused of 
”not functioning as a learning organisation”, and the need to adopt a `learning culture`.223 The executive 
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summary of the NASA report noted that early in the investigation it was identified that the event was not 
a random event, rather it was a symptom of NASA’s underlying organisational culture and a failure to 
fundamentally learn the lessons of the Challenger disaster in 1986 and a near miss to the Atlanta in 
1988, which suffered a very similar event.224 It was clear there had been a `loss in institutional memory` 
in managing critical safety concerns, discussion of professional differences, a lack of integrated 
management across the programme, and the creation of informal decision-making processes outside 
of organisational rules.225 
 
The works of several authors investigating how military organisations conduct organisational learning 
have identified lessons that can be transferred into industry. However, there is the requirement to 
approach lessons from history with caution.226 King challenges Fox’s proposition that the British Army 
was a learning organisation; he notes that learning and innovation was often stifled by senior officers, 
citing the refusal by Brigadier General Kiggell to accept the need to adopt skirmishing techniques and 
concentration of fire in place of mass bayonet charges prior to 1914, while in Germany military units 
were trialling these exact tactics, along with empowered frontline commanders, Mission Command227 
and Combined Arms groupings.228 The British focussed on using mass to bring success, ignoring 
lessons from the Boer War and instead learning the wrong lessons from the recent Russo-Japan 
conflict. Had they looked internally at their performance in the Boer War, they would have explored 
similar tactics to that of the Germans.229  
 
Research by TN Dupuy noted that the German military (Wehrmacht) consistently outfought the far more 
numerous allied armies that eventually defeated them. German soldiers consistently inflicted casualties 
on those that they fought. Dupuy noted that 100 German soldiers delivered a capability equivalent to 
120 British soldiers, such was their war-fighting capability.230 His work noted that a key component of 
this was the conceptual level of the German Forces, and their understanding of Combined Arms fighting 
and fast movement to build surprise. The doctrine and tactics seen in 1940 – 1945 by the Wehrmacht 
would not be out of place on today’s battlefield; concepts such as ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’ and ‘Mission 
Command’ which the UK military have built their doctrine on were well developed and well-practised 
throughout The Second World War by the Wehrmacht.  
 
David French notes that, by the end of the First World War, the British Army had secured victory through 
a manoeuvre involving proper combination of all arms at a tactical level of excellence.231 Yet while both 
the British and the Germans explored the lessons of the War, only the Germans invested in embracing 
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the Combined Arms tactics that had been explored from 1914 onwards. In the UK, “the nation 
dissociated itself from its army”.232 Furthermore, Britain had returned to the ’Colonial Policeman’ role, 
managing low intensity disputes, such as the Irish Civil War, and pursuing European stabilisation. 
Economic pressures at home also impacted on the capability of the military, and although the British 
Army demonstrated at the end of The First World War that it was able to learn, during the inter-war 
years a strong resistance to change within the organisation prevented it adapting and innovating. 
Murray notes that although a military learns quickly in war, it is slow to learn in peacetime, driven by its 
culture and leadership. On one side military organisations tend to be reluctant to change, whilst on the 
other, challenges at war require imagination and creativity. Eventually, “the less willing a culture is to 
display flexibility in peacetime, the more likely it is to have difficulty in adapting to the real conditions of 
war.”233 Subsequently, due to a reluctance to change and embrace the new technology and methods, 
the UK military found themselves hopelessly outclassed in the conceptual plane at the onset of The 
Second World War by the Wehrmacht.  
 
In recent conflict, Mackay and Tatham note the significant difference in the level and speed of 
information that was available in conflicts at the start of the 21st Century, and the impact it has had on 
the execution of conflict. They note that the character of war has fundamentally shifted from large 
pitched battles led by heroic leaders inspiring their forces, to small-scale operations where the actions 
of an individual, Krulak’s ‘Strategic Corporal’234, can have major impact to the success of the mission.235 
They observe that leadership, command and operational planning needs to change to keep pace with 
the changing character of war, and leaders need to be far more focussed on the population and 
influence effects; Western militaries need to learn the lessons of recent conflicts.236 State-on-State 
conflict, as seen in the 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 global conflicts are no longer the norm; conflict is 
multi-dimensional, with military forces potentially being defeated before they enter into conflict in today’s 
information rich, interconnected, globalised battlefield. They remark on the failure of the UK to invest in 
information exploitation and management training for the military, highlighting the failure to prepare for 
tomorrow’s conflict, and instead focussed on the previous conflict.237 While Fox may promote the 
military as being adaptive and innovative during 1914 - 1918, observations of the recent military conduct 
are not as supportive to depicting the military as an effective learning organisation.238 
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Organisational learning does not require an organisation to experience a crisis or disruptive event in 
order to learn. Steven Fink notes that the most effective way of learning is observing how others handle 
crises, what worked and what didn’t, and then for organisations to take away those lessons.239 By noting 
how and where competitors were vulnerable provides two options of learning; where an organisation 
may also be weak, and where it may be able to target its resources against its competitors to obtain 
part of their market share. This approach offers a double impact of greater awareness of potential 
vulnerabilities within the organisation, as well as potential areas of exploitation of the competition’s 
weaknesses. Lines notes that while learning is critical to how an organisation adapts to change, it is 
often a by-product of the performance tasks that are carried out for other purposes.240 Organisational 
learning is rarely a defined and bespoke programme, therefore understanding the relationship between 
the structures, processes and procedures is key to being able to understand how the organisation is 
identifying and absorbing lessons. Lines used strategic change as the concept of his research as 
multiple researchers had noted close links between strategy, change and the subsequent learning that 
occurs.  
 
Yadav and Agarwal identified the Organisational 
Leaning process (Figure 13), noting in their 
research that a learning organisation was one that 
could alter its very programming through how it 
captures and uses information.241 Research by 
Peter Senge in 1990 first explored the concept of 
Organisational Learning and how to move the 
institution from reactive thinking to becoming more 
adept at critical thinking and learning lessons to 
enhance performance and capability. Senge, 
Yadav and Agarwal comment on the need for the 
leadership group to develop the correct learning 
culture, helping to break down the barriers that 
prevent the engagement required to enable the process. This is discussed in detail in Yadev and 
Agarwal’s referenced research paper. 
 
The level and type of learning success is dependent on the participation of the workforce, and the level 
of communication within the organisation.242 If done through activities that are planned and managed 
by others, then known knowledge is moved from one group to another. If all parties participate in the 
learning journey, then new knowledge is brought into the organisation. Lines notes the importance of 
 
239Fink S, Crisis Management - Planning for the Inevitable, 2002, p.90. 
240 Lines R., `How Social Accounts and Participation During Change Affect Organisational Learning`, Journal of Workplace 
Learning, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Vol 17, No.3 2005, pp 157-177. 
241Yardev S. and Agarwal V., `Benefits and Barriers of Learning Organisation and its Five Discipline`, Journal of Business and 
Management, Volume 18, Issue 12, Version 1, 2016, pp. 18-24 
242Lines R., `How Social Accounts and Participation During Change Affect Organisational Learning`, 2005, p. 158; Yardev S. 
and Agarwal V., `Benefits and Barriers of Learning Organisation and its Five Discipline`, 2016. 
Figure 13: Organisational Learning Model Source: 
Yadav and Agarwal 
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this approach in developing organisational learning approaches as the intent of organisational learning 
is to obtain new knowledge, especially when managing disruptive events. The more diverse the 
audience involved in the learning process, the more effective it can be for the organisation, as 
participation enables contact across the organisational hierarchy, enabling preconceptions to be 
challenged using differing cultural lenses.  
 
However, if individuals feel that the organisation is not addressing their concerns, they may seek to act 
outside of the official channel and manage the problem themselves. During this period, individuals may 
identify a localised solution to a certain issue and implement it, despite organisational policy. This 
uncontrolled dynamic innovation within teams may result in a level of unknown capability being created. 
The need for this innovation had been driven by the organisational inertia, which had failed to identify 
the issue initially through entrenched communication channels and restrictive R&D practices.243 
However, the user group, through their persistence, become influential in forcing the need for the 
organisation to change.244 This style of innovation or learning, mentioned by Fox, King and Farrell, is 
sometimes known as “bottom up learning,” or, as it is more formally known by Eric von Hippel, “Free 
innovation” (Figure 14).  
 
In his work Von Hippel describes the process of free innovation as the situation where an individual, for 
the purpose of the greater good and without any formal initiative, seeks to develop a product to address 
a problem when the organisation (producer) fails to present a solution.245 Though there is a defined 
relationship between free and organisational (producer) innovation, there is limited control of the 
creativity of those with experience within the group experiencing the issue.  
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However, while the free innovation addresses the immediate localised issue; it creates a detrimental 
effect to the organisation as there is now a non-standardised solution in place. Von Hippel notes that 
while the producer engages in innovation due to extrinsic pressures, the free innovator is driven by an 
intrinsic desire.246 The organisation responds to the individual by seeking to take control of the 
innovation and assess its viability, bringing it under formal control through the R&D team. Meanwhile, 
the initial creator of the innovation continues to spread the knowledge freely, resulting in the solution 
migrating across the organisation through informal networks.  
 
Innovation and creation within organisations 
have been recognised as central to 
organisational performance, with creativity 
seen as the capability of the individual, while 
innovation is the ability of the organisation 
to successfully exploit the creativity of 
individuals.247 For organisations, innovation 
has been vigorously promoted for two 
generations, though little has been done to 
measure the impact of innovation and the 
importance of workforce creativity.248 
Teresa Amabile provided a comprehensive 
model for creativity within her research 
(Figure 15) into the topic and its importance for organisational development, through three intersecting 
components, with the creativity zone of individuals sitting at the intersection of all three components. 
Both Von Hippel’s and Amabile’s work reflect the importance creativity within the process of innovation 
and learning, which is further enhanced through the intrinsic motivation of the user community.249 
 
Using evidence from several authors, this thesis positions organisational learning as:  
 
an activity that identifies, analyses, develops and/or distributes knowledge that is considered 
beneficial to the performance of the organisation as an organic system.  
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This is important, as it reflects more than just 
commercial performance; it suggests that the organi-
sation is a system of systems which interact and learn 
from each other and that shared learning drives 
continuous improvement. Lukic, Margaryan and 
Littlejohn note that the need for organisations to learn 
from major incidents is critical to their success, either 
from their own crisis, or from detailed analysis of crises 
of other sector organisations.250 According to Yadav 
and Agarwal, a learning organisation actively pro-
motes, facilitates and rewards collective learning, 
supporting effective change and enriching the capacity of the leadership group (Figure 16). The key 
component of developing the required learning culture is the active pursuit of new knowledge, through 
cross-organisational engagement, by the leadership group, thus empowering the individuals to identify 
and discuss potential lessons. In their research they note several benefits from this approach.251  
 
In her work, Fox has highlighted how the British Army of 1914 -18 displayed the characteristics of a 
learning organisation at an institutional level. She noted that though the Army employed ad hoc methods 
initially, it quickly started to learn lessons through both internal and external reflection, it sponsored the 
design, development and implementation of new technology, methods and instruction, it shared 
knowledge and experience across different campaign areas, it developed its own assurance branch to 
ensure the standardisation of quality, it managed large scale change effectively, and it sought to utilise 
subject matter experts, either military or civilian, to enable it to deliver its end-state. In 1936 General 
Fuller, a leading theorist on Armoured Warfare and a senior British Officer during the inter-war years, 
noted: 
 
“Nothing is more dangerous than to rely on peace training; for in modern times, when 
war is declared, training has always been proved out of date. Consequently, the more 
elastic a man’s mind is, that is, the more it is able to receive and digest new impressions 
and experiences, the more common-sense will be the actions resulting.”252 
 
The work by Fox notes the importance of the ability of individuals to be able to apply experiences and 
innovate in order to obtain the advantage. Her research notes that the innovation at the individual and 
team level enabled the British Army to respond quickly to new threats and challenges. The process of 
free innovation allowed rapid development of capabilities at the tactical level, though it was not as 
obvious at the operational or strategic level, which impacted on the level of development within the 
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inter-war years. The UK military did not fully engage with the application of the process of identifying 
and implementing lessons it had learned in combat due to a culture created by years of relying on a 
system that produced an institutional way of thinking, which stifled innovation creativity and instead 
replaced it with a need for conforming and standardisation.  
 
This challenge has been levied against the UK military again at the start of the 21st Century. Recent 
authors, including senior military officers, politicians, academics and journalists, some which have been 
reviewed in this thesis, have questioned whether the military was correctly equipped, resourced and 
trained to meet the challenges of 21st Century conflict. The discussion about the level of cognitive 
capability, learning mechanisms and deference to command, especially at senior level, resulted in an 
organisation that failed to learn and adapt quickly at the operational and strategic level.  
 
To develop a Learning Organisation there is the requirement for the presence of these characteristics 
and the hierarchy possessing elastic minds, whilst also possessing an intellectual vitality that breeds 
tolerance of criticism and encouragement of debate. As far back as the 1914 – 1918 global conflict, 
there was the need to conform and standardise. Prior to 1914, during the conflict and within the interwar 
years, the military came under scrutiny from several controversial and disenfranchised individuals. This 
was particularly focussed on the quality of senior leadership, with the Staff College, in Fuller’s opinion, 
being “a machine that produced standardized thinking, and it was the wrong type of thinking.” He added: 
“at present we are controlled, through no fault of its individual members, by a hierarchy which, though 
autocratic, is sterile. It fears initiative; it is terrified at originality and suppresses criticism.”253 
 
The situation did not improve post First World War. Liddell Hart noted that there was still an obsession 
with technicality and detail to conform which suppressed the ability of the Officer Corps to explore 
disruptive thinking, mental agility and freedom of expression that was required to build the disruptive 
approach to learning needed within a Learning Organisation. He noted that the topics studied at UK 
Staff College were: 
 
“one of excessive concentration on detail rather an inquiry into the broad principles of the 
leader’s art and comparison with that of the great captains of all ages. To be able to 
enumerate the blades of grass in the Shenandoah Valley and the yards marched by 
Stonewall Jackson’s men is not an adequate foundation for leadership in a future war 
where conditions and armament have radically changed.”254 
 
Liddell Hart was not the only one to comment on this concern during this period. Sir Philip Gibbs, a 
respected war correspondent and author, who was able to operate outside of the military censorship, 
also noted the lack of broad thinking and willingness to challenge the establishment’s way of thinking. 
Having observed the output of UK Staff College, he recorded that: 
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“I met many generals who were men of ability, energy, high sense of duty, and strong 
personality. I found them intellectually, with few exceptions, narrowly moulded to the 
same type, strangely limited in their range of ideas and qualities of character.”255  
 
Gibbs was also concerned about the quality of the Staff College approach, noting that: 
 
“Our Staff College had been hopelessly inefficient in its system of training, if I am justified 
in forming such an opinion from specimens produced by it, who had the brains of canaries 
and the manners of Potsdam. There was close cooperation among the officers of the 
Regular Army, so that they took the lion’s share of Staff Appointments, thus keeping out 
brilliant men of the New Armies, whose brain power, to say the least of it, was on a higher 
standard than that of the Sandhurst standard.”256  
 
These comments are already identifying that in a bid to breed standardised thinking within the Officer 
Corps to enable an effective General Staff, the UK Staff College was removing the key capability 
required in conflict; the agility of mind and disruptive thinking to manage a dynamically changing 
environment. This approach greatly hindered the ability of the British Army in the inter-war years to 
prepare itself for the upcoming war with Germany; its command staff all thought alike, and the doctrine 
was based on how to fight the last war. This was also driven by the hierarchical regimental system that 
existed within the military and still exists, particularly in the Army. The ability to generate and sustain a 
disruptive thinking mentality within the organisation is frowned upon in peacetime; yet in conflict it is this 
exact approach that is required to help officers “think outside the box.”  
 
However, it is not only the British leadership that has received a level of criticism for being unable to 
learn and adapt to a changing situation and respond quickly. Foley’s review of Falkenhayn’s ability to 
operate effectively at the strategic level demonstrates similar flaws in German military leadership. 
Falkenhayn failed to identify that his strategy at Verdun was failing, resulting in him ignoring the 
collapsing Russian Front until too late. He also greatly underestimated the French political situation with 
regards to resolve around Verdun, or the ferocity and capability of the British assault at the Somme. 
Unfortunately for Falkenhayn, by the start of Jul 1916, the British had learnt the lesson of concentrating 
fire and weight of numbers, with 3,300 artillery pieces concentrating on the German lines; in response 
the Germans could only muster 844 artillery pieces.257 The Somme attack also cost the Germans far 
more casualties than planned for; in the first ten days they had lost over 40,000 troops; in a similar 
period at Verdun they had lost just under 26,000.258 Falkenhayn’s loss of situational awareness at the 
strategic level, failure to commit forces, and a paralysis of command decision-making resulted in 
strategic failure. 
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These similar traits are observed at the beginning of the 21st Century with King observing that the 
military that entered Iraq in was ”arrogant, complacent… unwilling to change and limited in putting 
together a coherent strategy.”259 Observations from Mackay and Tatham note that there was a failure 
of the UK to invest in much needed research and institutional learning around the subject of Influence 
Operations and understanding Strategic Communications, which were not part of the formal planning 
process, which resulted in campaign objective mis-alignment in Iraq and Afghanistan.260 
 
Argyris proposed that an organisation develops two approaches to learning; it can either attempt to 
address the surface issues, known as single loop learning, or address the root causes of the issues, 
referred to as double loop learning.261 Argyris identified two sets of variables that prevented effective 
organisational learning; the interactions between stakeholders and the bureaucratic processes that limit 
effective gathering of information; and the degree of willingness of the audience to accept the findings. 
Single loop learning only addresses the results of the incident, which can result in the reoccurrence of 
the incident elsewhere in the organisation. Double loop learning aims to identify and address the core 
issues, which may require a deep cultural aspect to the implemented changes, requiring a strong 
leadership component to integrate the findings into the organisation. Lukic et al noted that the approach 
taken towards learning is situationally focussed; the approach taken for a site failure compared to an 
isolated incident will be different. They proposed four key questions that needed to be asked to enable 
the correct lessons to be identified. These were: 
 
• Who is learning? 
• What kind of learning process is adopted? 
• What is the nature of problems causing the incident? 
• What type of knowledge is involved?262 
 
A critical component of the organisational learning process is how the shared or new knowledge that 
has been identified is subsequently captured to enable wider dissemination across the organisation. 
This is the process of the organisational doctrine framework, enabling the lessons that have been 
captured to be embedded within organisational thinking and shared across the institution. 
 
2.4.5 The Role of Doctrine 
In the military, the term `Doctrine` is regularly used to describe a framework of documents focussed on 
developing organisational capability. The phrase has been part of the military vernacular for at least a 
century, yet recent research into how well it was understood by the UK military identified a serious 
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disconnect between military and political understanding of the term.263 Harvey and Wilkinson’s report 
identified a number of fundamental issues with the culture and leadership of the military when it came 
to the effective application of its doctrinal framework. Doctrine is not designed to dictate all activity. 
NATO describes doctrine as `fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.’264 Doctrine is also not 
specific to the military. The UK Emergency Services possess a doctrinal framework; the Joint 
Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) being a prime example. Industry also 
possesses doctrine; Hofstede’s doctrine being just one example. Sport is another industry that has seen 
the rise of a doctrinal approach to develop capability. Teams are developed with a certain way of 
playing, with team structure set against it, players are purchased, trained and positioned to deliver the 
required outcome against the desired doctrinal framework. So, what is doctrine? 
 
General Sir Rupert Smith places the genesis of doctrine with Count Helmuth Von Moltke, who, through 
his strategic instructions created a framework that in 1869 reflected a concept that is now seen as 
doctrine.265 This is challenged by Hoiback. He proposes that while Von Moltke sought to deliver a 
framework for the military, there was a lack of desire to have a template with which to fight battles He 
proposes that the origin of doctrine belongs to the French as they sought to learn from the strategic 
failures against the Prussians in 1870. By reviewing lessons from failure, General Foch sought to 
develop a mechanism to inspire the military in the way of Napoleon. His methodology, like that of the 
Church, would provide the military officer a conviction of belief, similar to the Holy Gospel in religion.266 
Foch’s intent was for each officer to understand the spirit of the doctrine, allowing them to adapt it 
depending on the situation with which they were faced.267 During this period, the French military leader-
ship had applied the concepts of a learning organisation, developing a framework that was structured 
to provide guidance but flexible enough to enable individuals room to adapt it to specific situations. 
 
Multiple authors have noted the importance of not just identifying lessons, but also embedding them 
across the organisation to ensure they are adopted by the workforce.268 As the organisational learning 
process involves multiple stakeholders, the most effective method identified for sharing and embedding 
the required changes is through the updating / creation of doctrine publications to communicate and 
educate the various stakeholder groups. Lines notes that the successful support and adapting of 
changes is dependent on the consensus of the findings across the organisation.269 This can be 
developed through the inclusion of changes into the revised doctrine framework. Doctrine aims to 
deliver the base layer for an organisation to build on. It provides a level of stability in a dynamically 
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changing environment. Hoiback discusses that doctrine provides three mechanisms within an 
organisation, depending on the effectiveness of the leadership and the strength of organisational culture 
(Figure 17). If used properly by an organisation, doctrine will provide a conceptual map for its personnel, 
providing a mental anchor when faced with complex problems and dynamically changing environments. 
The leadership can use doctrine as a tool of command, providing an accepted direction, underpinned 
by theory, to push the organisation forward, 
provided they adhere to the fundamental 
concepts. Culturally, doctrine can be used as 
a vehicle for change, when allied with a 
learning approach, to identify the need for 
change and develop the urgency to prepare 
the organisation for that change, as 
demonstrated by Foch. Doctrine can also be 
used as a vehicle for education, providing a 
level of knowledge to provide a toolbox of 
concepts and mechanisms that can be 
tailored to the situation.  
 
The concepts shown in Figure 17 can be seen in military, industry and sporting organisations; the ability 
to have a base layer of knowledge that all members understand, coupled with the flexibility to adapt 
depending on the situation. In response to the question, the author of this thesis proposes that: 
 
Doctrine is a base layer of ingrained knowledge aligned to the organisation’s individual culture, that 
is clearly communicated, understood and applied by all, and is regularly reviewed and updated 
through organisational learning practices.  
 
The analysis has shown that the quality and effectiveness of how doctrine is applied within an 
organisation is reliant on the culture and leadership of the institution, aligned to its vision and purpose. 
 
Investigative work into the topic of Organisational Resilience has shown that though there are multiple 
publications at the strategic level, including the UN directives, the UK Resilience Standard and various 
discipline specific publications, there is no clear doctrine, cultural template or clear body of knowledge 
for the resilience professional. This situation is further exacerbated by organisations not being able to 
translate the strategic concept into actual activities.270 To enable this thesis to develop its approach to 
the research and the creation of an Organisational Resilience management framework, given the 
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Figure 17: Utility of Doctrine. Source: Hoiback 
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2.5 THE REVISED DEFINITION OF ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
Prior to developing the framework for managing Organisational Resilience, it is important that the 
concept of Organisational Resilience is defined; this will deliver the premise upon which the framework 
will be built upon. Based on analysed literature, supported by academic research and business manage-
ment professional studies, this thesis proposes that the current thought process on Organisational 
Resilience is too limited. The author proposes a new definition of Organisational Resilience: 
 
A people centric capability based on the strategic co-ordination of organisational 
resources, adaptive leadership, intelligence, communication and staff development which 
enables the identification and analysis of strategic threats through shared situational 
awareness. This enables the preparation, education and contingency planning to facilitate 
effective resistance to hazards, multi-level response, recovery and learning to maintain 
operational sustainability. 
 
British Standard BS65000, written in 2014, states that Organisational Resilience is the `ability of an 
organisation to anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to incremental change and sudden 
disruptions in order to survive and prosper.’271 This definition still focuses on the organisation and its 
ability to react, recover and adapt to the situation it encounters, but fails to discuss or identify the critical 
elements in enabling that adaptation and survival to exist. What is very apparent with both the British 
Standard, and the UK Government approach to building community resilience, is the focus on the 
organisation as an individual unit, unlike the direction given by Seville et al who state that “resilience is 
not something that can be achieved by any one organisation or infrastructure system acting in 
isolation.”272 Their paper discusses that an organisation will normally have incident and emergency 
plans in place for minor events, relying on the day-to-day experience and knowledge of the teams to 
respond. However, a crisis will stretch the capability of an organisation and will require specialised 
techniques, specially formed teams and the ability to work with other organisations. Work by McManus 
et al into community resilience identified that organisations needed to develop not only their immediate 
frontline resilience capability, but there was also a major gap in the longer-term sustainability to the 
work done within the observed organisations to develop their contribution to community resilience.273 
This was also very evident within organisations, with research by Amy Stephenson in benchmarking 
resilience in organisations in New Zealand in 2010 highlighting a failure to approach resilience 
holistically, with organisations failing to understand their vulnerabilities and having flawed assumptions 
and poor situational awareness.274 Understanding the threat to the organisation is a key area in 
developing a resilience strategy. 
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2.6 UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
2.6.1 Building Situational Awareness 
Understanding the threat picture is the first step in building an effective approach to resilience, either 
within a frontline unit, a strategic headquarters or an organisation. McManus el al note the failure of 
organisations to build their situational awareness during incidents, becoming focussed on the 
immediate issue. For resilience management to be successful, the organisation must build a clear 
understanding and awareness of issues.275 Cole notes that similar issues hampered the response of 
the UK government during various UK resilience issues at the beginning of the 21st Century, with various 
crises, both man-made and natural, requiring a higher level of co-ordinated response, relying on more 
than just the military and emergency services.276 
 
The UK military open their military doctrine on stabilisation with the criticality of understanding the 
situation they are entering.277 Elliott refers to the importance in building and maintaining situational 
awareness. Several failings made by the senior military commanders during the Iraq and Afghanistan 
campaigns can be attributed to a lack of situational awareness. Rather than focussing on the strategic 
implications, too many senior staff got absorbed in the day to day activities.278 North also refers to the 
importance of obtaining the wider understanding of the situation, enabling the decision maker to develop 
a better awareness of the impact of their immediate actions and the wider implications. 279 He explores 
in detail the decision to drawdown the capability of the UK military in Iraq shortly after the successful 
invasion. This resulted in the follow-on British forces being placed on the back foot, which, unforeseen 
by the initial campaign planners, resulted in the failure to have enough personnel available to maintain 
situational awareness of the actual situation. In June 2003, the lack of situational awareness within the 
area resulted in the death of six Royal Military Police personnel and the initial raising of an insurgency 
against the British. 280 In the UK, the senior leadership, rather than reacting accordingly, downplayed 
the events and the information from senior commanders in Iraq. This resulted in the political leadership 
not receiving the full picture of the deteriorating situation.281  
 
The work of Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, also identified how the application of home-
based threats and cultural schisms brought about by mobilised disaffected members of the population 
could be used to defeat enemies from distance. They explored the concept that the character of warfare 
had changed. It had moved from Clausewitz's definition of "using armed force to compel the enemy to 
submit to one's will" to "using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military or non-
military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."282 Therefore, 
warfare was now unrestricted, with all means available to bend the enemy to accept the interest of the 
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aggressor. Islamic fundamentalist groups are utilising 5GW techniques against states and global 
corporations, enhancing their reach through strategic communication frameworks, social media and the 
weaponising of home-grown activists. To defeat such a subversive and complex threat requires a 
comprehensive approach and integrated working models across all aspects of society to prevent, 
contain and respond to disruptive events. 
 
The British Army’s doctrine publication on COIN expressly indicates the importance of building an 
intelligence picture to aid decision making. It states that “Being able to make the right decision requires 
a high level of training, trust and discipline among the forces deployed, appropriate equipment and a 
high level of understanding and situational awareness.”283 It also dictates that a key component of the 
headquarters, at whatever level, is to assist in planning and provide situational awareness to home 
base.284 Stephenson noted that her review of 68 organisations in New Zealand and their resilience 
capability was dependent on their ability to build and maintain situational awareness and informed 
decision making, to assist in managing the risks, hazards and vulnerabilities.285  
 
Several authors have noted that the current military operating environment has forced today's military 
commander to become competent and experienced at functioning across a wide operational spectrum, 
from warfighting, peacekeeping, diplomacy and reconstruction of societies, infrastructure and 
international relations.286 The leadership demanded by the complex, vague and uncertain modern 
context is one of the contributory challenges confronting the modern military leader.287 Effective 
decision-making, problem-solving and strong communication skills are fundamental to the delivery of a 
successful outcome.288 The skills of the military commander on the battlefield can also be recognised 
within senior incident commanders of the fire service.289 For both the military and the fire service, though 
there is a reliance on the quality and capability of the equipment, the critical element is clearly the 
human factor represented by the commander and their crew.290 Thus, there is a need to ensure that the 
crew and their underlying culture is suited for the task at hand, through effective leadership, timely 
communication, situational awareness of the task at hand and regular professional development of the 
team; as individuals and collectively. 
 
As both North and Elliott indicated, this was not the case for the Iraq campaign, with loss of situational 
awareness, constrained decision-making, limited preparation for COIN operations and tailored 
messages being returned to the UK. The doctrine, which stated the requirement for clear situational 
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awareness when countering an insurgency, was not published until the withdrawal of the majority of 
troops from Iraq, resulting in the troops using incorrect lessons from previous campaigns and importing 
bias. Clearly the risks of managing a campaign in the Middle East with a COIN model based on 
operational models derived from within Northern Ireland, Bosnia and other semi-permissible 
environments were not considered when the deployment to Iraq was initiated. This resulted in the 
deployed organisation not being properly equipped, trained, informed or culturally aligned to the 
campaign they were engaged in. 
 
2.6.2 Managing the Risk 
Understanding what is meant by Risk and Risk Management terminology, two phrases that have 
become common language in the military and business today, is key to utilising the right skills to deliver 
success. Race, having investigated the behaviour of the military around the RAF Nimrod XV230 loss, 
highlights that while risk is regarded as a financial or corporate issue within business, quantifying risk 
through risk assessment, and risk management, is ingrained at all levels of the military decision-making 
process, especially for operations.291 ISO 31000: Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines 
Standard, states that risk is “The effect of uncertainty on objectives292,” while Axelos defines risk as “an 
uncertain event or set of events that, should it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of 
objectives.”293 Both these definitions echo how the military consider the concept and the uncertain 
situations that appear on the battlefield during the friction of war. 
 
The ability to manage risk is key to success in both the military and business environment. Activities, 
such as Business Continuity Management, seek to create an understanding of key risks during the 
Business Impact Analysis phase to build mitigation activities.294 As the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 states, “It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable the 
health, safety and welfare at work of an employee.”295 To ensure that this is achieved, organisations 
need to understand potential risks to their staff and how to mitigate against these risks. For an 
organisation, any activity that it conducts will impact on and be impacted upon by the external 
environment within which it is operating, whether it is within the business sphere or a failed or failing 
state. Jewell indicates that the environment that surrounds an organisation is not stable.296 It is 
increasingly turbulent due to the era of change and uncertainty that we currently operate within. The 
shape and size of these changes can vary, from strategic shocks to incremental impacts. Both can have 
a pervasive impact on society and the organisation.297 ADP Land Operations, the warfighting doctrine 
for the British Army, gives clear direction to military leaders on how to manage risk.298 It highlights that 
success comes from identifying when to take a decisive risk, not a mindset that is risk averse. This is 
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contrary to the rail industry, which has a very risk averse organisational culture. For the military 
commander, a key element of their role is to understand the pros and cons of a risk, weigh the balance 
and act decisively. This can only be obtained through good situational awareness and a strong 
intelligence gathering mechanism.  
 
Martin discusses the importance of situational awareness, intelligence, experience and training when 
he studies how professionals manage risk in extreme circumstances.299 His book discusses the aspects 
of risk management, understanding how to manage tolerances and the importance of knowing when to 
make a risk-based decision. Through the examination of extreme risks, focussing on Risk to Life, rather 
than corporate risk, Martin distils the key management processes that are practiced regularly by 
emergency personnel, military staff on operations and oil and gas experts dealing with critical events. 
He discusses the four key elements of understanding risk; frequency, severity, correlation and 
uncertainty.300 By improving situational awareness around these four components of a risk, it is possible 
to build an educated picture on the impact of that risk if and as it manifests itself. This is the concept of 
risk management; building the information picture to mitigate the risk, or to seize the opportunity, before 
it becomes an issue and impacts detrimentally on the organisation. Toft and Reynolds take this further 
in discussing the fact that due to several inputs, plus individual experiences and knowledge, the 
management of risk is a subjective action, based on the perception of the risk weighted against the 
experience, knowledge and situational awareness of the individual.301 This creates the risk of a heuristic 
approach within the decision-making cycle, especially if an individual has become accustomed to a 
certain way of thinking and acting in response to an event. The military, through the decision-making 
process of the combat or operational estimate, seeks to limit this risk by forcing individuals to present 
evidence-based analysis on which to make their judgement of risks and subsequent action plans. 
 
Race discusses the UK military’s approach, how it also focuses more on Risk to Life rather than financial 
risk and the need for the MoD, when deployed on operations, to operate at a minimum to UK national 
standards.302 Where there are gaps due to operational exceptions, it is the responsibility of the MoD 
and the senior commander present on the ground to reduce any risk to As Low as Reasonably Possible 
(ALARP). The MoD guidance document, states that “Defence is bound by UK health safety and 
environmental protection laws, which are appropriate and proportionate for managing risks in the 
workplace.”303 The document also accepts that at times the military will deploy to areas “where the well-
ordered UK statutory health and safety regime is both inadequate and inappropriate,”304 with the 
importance being incumbent on the commander’s ability to make a judgement call as to how to manage 
the risk, based on their knowledge, training, situational awareness and expertise. To build this 
capability, the military is required to include a level of acceptable risk within the training and 
 
299Martin, D., Managing Risk in Extreme Environments: Front-line Lessons for Corporates and Financial Institutions, Kogan 
Page, London, 2006. 
300Ibid, p.2. 
301Toft B. and Reynolds, S., Learning from Disasters: A Management Approach, 2005, p.2. 
302Race, S. C., `Defence Safety – Is it Just Risky Business’, 2012. 
303Ministry of Defence, DSA1.1 Defence Policy for Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, Defence Safety Authority, 




development of the workforce on pre-deployment operations, managing that risk safely, yet enabling 
the individual and team to enhance their capability to assess risk and react accordingly while under 
pressure. As Griffin indicates, the requirement to manage risk within an operational context requires a 
morally courageous commander; and the essence of the military leader is exactly that.305 The 
commander is trained from an early stage in their career to be able to make informed decisions, based 
on evidence-based analysis, to manage dynamic risks in a complex situation to maximise mission 
success. It is this ability, sometimes referred to as an art, that is the commander’s primary duty.306 
 
2.7 CRISES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
2.7.1 What is a Crisis? 
Within the UK, public organisations assume cross-sector roles in managing large scale crises. 
Government bodies such as the Cabinet Office, Home Office and local councils focus on predominately 
home-based issues while the MoD, DfID or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) focus further 
afield. Supporting the resilience of the UK are the organisations which manage the CNI which maintains 
the strategic functioning capability of the UK through the management of energy production, oil, major 
transport nodes and public health.307 For the Government, the MoD and its agents offer a very capable 
instrument to utilise during a crisis. Successful national interest is served by a secure and resilient UK 
and by the ability to shape a stable environment for UK industry and political interests.308 This was a 
key element within the 2015 National Security Strategy, with the direction to “invest more in our current 
domestic resilience against global challenges which increasingly affect our people, communities and 
businesses.”309 At the strategic level, there is an integrated approach to crisis management as there is 
“no purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue or of a purely military scheme to solve it.”310 This 
has been painfully demonstrated during the events of the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns where 
military action, without the correct political strategic vision and support, culminated in the failure to 
deliver success in either campaign. The crisis of political management and ineffective military leadership 
at the strategic level for the campaigns led to a crisis in confidence within the deployed military forces, 
which in turn emboldened the enemy that the UK were facing. This situation in Iraq was exacerbated 
by the failure of the UK political leadership to work their American equivalents, resulting in the US 
military losing confidence with the British forces by 2007.311  
 
At a national level there is a need for an integrated approach to develop resilience across all UK sectors 
to build the capability and adaptability to prepare for and recover from a major natural or man-made 
disruptive event. In complex multi-agency situations, military planning can only address one element of 
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the desired outcome, that of delivering security. The review of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns 
identify that on both campaigns, a failure to correctly design a cross-departmental approach at political 
level, further hampered by weak military leadership and consultation by senior military officers during 
the initial planning phases.312 When using the military in the UK, it is important, as demonstrated during 
the floods of 2015 – 2016 in the North West, that the requirement of the response is that of the local 
political leads and emergency services to direct the resilience activities. The military were there to 
support and provide niche capability to organisations affected by the events, rather than take the 
responsibility of the response. 
 
Stephenson and Doern remark that there are many definitions of what is termed a ’crisis’.313 The author 
uses the definition from the BSI British Standard, which defines it as an “abnormal and unstable situation 
that threatens the organisation’s strategic objectives, reputation or viability.”314 Though this is the 
definition within the industry standard, the Cabinet Office, the Civil Contingency Secretariat (CCS), Civil 
Protection Lexicon states that a crisis is an “emergency of magnitude and/or severity requiring the 
activation of central government response.”315 This difference can cause confusion as the BSI version 
details a potential issue, while the CCS version details an event which is happening. This changes the 
actual qualities of the definition. Steven Fink leans more towards the BSI definition, seeking to place a 
crisis as a moment in time, rather than an actual event.316 As a member of the Pennsylvania Governor’s 
Crisis Management Team during the 3-Mile Island Incident, he has a key understanding of how quickly 
a crisis can spiral out of control. Based on his experience and knowledge, he defines a crisis as “a 
turning point”, a prodromal situation that runs the risk of escalation; interfering with business as usual 
activities; external scrutiny; damage to company reputation; and damaging the revenue generation 
capability.317 The real damage that a crisis can cause is the impact on the reputation of the organisation 
and the loss of the goodwill (intangible capital) of stakeholders. In 2005 some 53% of the value of the 
Fortune 500 corporations was accounted for in intangible capital. This was estimated at $24.27 
trillion.318 
 
Jenkins and Gersten raised the issue that apart from the organisational and operational issues raised 
above, there are security threats to the infrastructure that exists within the rail industry.319 As a critical 
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strategic asset for freight320 and commuters321, the rail network offers a determined terrorist the 
opportunity to deliver a strategic impact with minimum effort. The public transport sector, rail bound 
traffic included, has become a theatre of operations for terrorists, aiming at causing mass-casualty 
events.322 An attack would have serious consequences to the UK economy due to its importance; in 
2019 there were over 1.8 billion journeys made on the network, while over 15 million tonnes where 
moved on the network in the 2019-20 Q3 period alone.323 
 
2.7.2 How Does a Crisis Develop? 
Shrivastava and Quarantelli create an image of chaos and disaster when a crisis point is reached, 
whereas Fink argues against the way that crises are portrayed in crisis research literature.324 Fink 
argues that a crisis is not necessarily a negative situation, rather it is a decision point in time 
characterised by a certain degree of risk and uncertainty.325 Fink also discusses that a crisis point is 
created by the effects of the organisation’s own activities, or the effect of environmental forces on its 
activities, which results in an increase in the level of potential risk to the organisation. Due to the manner 
of operations or the factors, there is not a full information picture available, creating the moment in time 
that can decide whether the venture is a success or failure. This point in time, the crisis point, requires 
a decision to be made and direction to be given to the organisation. An individual, team or organisational 
who can plan for a potential turning point has a far better chance of capitalising on this moment.326 
Building organisational resilience is enhanced by developing the skills within the organisation to enable 
multiple individuals the capability to identify turning points to prevent operational issues becoming 
strategic crises. 
 
Turner highlights the importance of situational awareness of the leadership to identify what problems 
the business faces at any given moment. 327 To manage the development of situational awareness, 
there is the need to utilise high-grade intelligence to build greater understanding of the operational 
environment. As in the way that the military utilises intelligence gathering agencies to build a commonly 
recognised integrated intelligence picture, businesses need to invest in information cross-referencing, 
asset sharing and detailed analysis to develop the intelligence to support evidence-based decision-
making. Turner’s investigation into three disasters identified similarities across the three events, 
namely, rigid organisational framework, loss of focus of the main issue, unwillingness to seek external 
advice, inadequate sharing of information and awareness of other issues.  
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Notionally normal starting point:  
(a) Initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards. 
(b) Associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, rules and folkways, 
2 
Incubation Period: The accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with 
the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance. 
3 
Precipitating event: Forces itself to the attention and transforms general perceptions of 
Stage 2. 
4 
Onset: The immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions became 
apparent. 
5 
Rescue and Salvage – First stage adjustment: The immediate post collapse situation is 
recognised in ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of rescue and salvage to be 
started. 
6 
Full cultural readjustment: An inquiry or assessment is carried out, and beliefs and 
precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of the world 
 
Table 8: Turner's Six Stages. Source: Turner 
 
These factors created situations which critically impacted on the capability of the leadership to manage 
the unfolding scenarios. Within his research, Turner created an early disaster sequence to describe the 
stages of crisis. Focussing on a failure of foresight, he discusses how organisations fail to act, even 
when faced with warning indicators (Table 8). 
 
In 1987 Mitroff, Shrivastava and Udwadia discussed how the culture of the organisational leadership is 
the most influential factor on how a crisis is managed.328 They argue that corporate culture has been 
more focussed on financial performance and growth, rather than crisis management, even though 
corporate crises are precipitated by people, organisational structures, economies and/or technologies 
that cause extensive damage to human life, natural and social environments.  
 
 
328Mitroff, I. J., Shrivastava, P. and Udwadia, E. E., `Effective Crisis Management’, Academy of Management Executive (1987 – 
1989), Volume 1, Number 4, 1987, pp 283 – 292. 
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Stephenson adapted Mitroff and Pauchant’s 
Crisis Management Onion Model (Figure 
18).329 When aligned against the cultural 
model at Figure 6 (p.32), similarities can be 
seen in how organisational culture can 
impact crisis management. This model 
allows an individual to examine how 
prepared the organisation is by studying the 
various structures that align to the four 
stages of the model. 
 
The art of crisis management became a very 
public issue with the rising trend of global 
terrorism, marked by the attack on the World 
Trade Center in 2001. The changing nature 
of the threat has resulted in the UK military to 
change how it managed its operational training, with units having to consider deploying to conflict zones 
where the civilian population was an active target for hostile forces. Examples are non-state actors and 
fundamentalist organisations targeting global companies to hurt the political framework and support 
from the population. The attacks on oil infrastructures within Nigeria,330 the bombing of the HSBC in 
Istanbul331 and the attack on the Marriott hotels within the Middle East332 are demonstrations of this 
phenomenon.  
 
2.7.3 What Does Good Crisis Management Look Like? 
McManus discusses how to improve organisational capability by learning how to deal with crises by 
understanding the types of emergency situations that may occur. 333 The situation that faces numerous 
corporations in the globalisation era sees corporate reputations becoming more fragile and open to risk 
and an increasing number of crises; events such as BP’s Deep Water Horizon, Shell’s over stating of 
its reserves and Railtrack’s and Carillion's collapse demonstrate the variety of crises that organisations 
face. Regester and Larkin discuss the importance of learning, though in their studies of business they 
identified that business has failed to learn from its past mistakes. 334 Leaders need to consider several 
dynamic forces that provide an external impact on their organisation. Political, regulatory, economic, 
 
329Stephenson, A., Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations, 2010, p.20; Mitroff I. J. and Pauchant,T., We Are So Big and 
Powerful Nothing Bad Can Happen To Us, Carol Publishing, New York, 1990. 
330Multiple attacks on the Nigerian infrastructure by the Niger Delta Avengers, seeking to force greater sharing of resources with 
the local population. The impact was the reduction of the daily output from 2.2 million barrels to 1.6 million barrels. 
331In November 2003 four bomb attacks were conducted in Istanbul, Turkey. The first two on 15 Nov were targeted against 
synagogues. On the 20 Nov two further bombs exploded outside the HSBC headquarters and the British Consulate. A total of 
57 were killed and 400 wounded in the attacks. 
332On 20 September 2008 a large vehicle borne bomb was detonated outside the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, killing 54 
individuals and wounding another 266. Evidence presented indicated it was detonated by a suicide bomber. 
333McManus, S. T., Organisational Resilience in New Zealand, 2012.  
334Regester M. and Larkin, J., Risk Issues and Crisis Management, 2005. 




social and technological factors shape how an organisation operates, as well as the behaviour and the 
culture of the employees within the business. 335 
 
Briggs argues that accurate information, corporate governance and the interdependence between 
security risks and operating procedures are key to building organisational resilience.336 Another key 
element of building sustained resilience is the integration of the entity into the community within which 
it operates. By becoming part of the community, the company changes from a target to a partner. Non-
government organisations (NGOs) manage their security in this way, seeking to become accepted by 
the wider community and reduce the threat of attack.337  
 
Lagadec notes that the first element of good crisis management is being able to identify an emerging 
crisis before working out how to manage the multiple components that then become involved.338 He 
discusses how well-trained and experienced organisations reflect military approaches, with control 
centres and `war-rooms’, trained personnel and multiple emergency plans. However, when faced with 
an actual crisis, they struggle to manage the situation. Unlike the military, which regularly test response 
plans, exercise and red-team key strategies, as well as the culture of being comfortable with uncertainty 
and the development of a risk aware culture, large organisations seek to revert to a status quo, to find 
a means of balance and remove the risks at hand. Underlying cultural beliefs, standardised processes, 
pre-defined operating rules and antagonistic working relationships all add to the impact that a crisis 
causes.339 Within the crisis management team there is a desire to do something to address the issue. 
The military however have learned that in complex crises, sometimes the best action is not to act, but 
to understand the dynamics of the crisis and the relevant network of actors and activities involved. 
Events such as the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, as well as humanitarian events which include the 
military response to the Ebola outbreak, have shown how there is a need to change the approach when 
dealing with `Wicked Problems’. Camillus describes a wicked problem as an issue that traditional 
problem-solving techniques or strategies are unable to address.340 
 
The military also refer to the future character of war as a `Wicked Problem’ as the impact of warfare 
amongst the population, with increasing asymmetrical actions by a fourth or fifth generation opponent 
results in each action causing additional problems and chain reactions. While complicated problems 
can be solved with strategies and problem-solving techniques, Wicked, or unbounded, problems are 
events where each action impacts on the situation, thus changing the shape of the problem that is being 
faced. Effective crisis management is required to address such problems. Adaptive thinking processes, 
devolved leadership, evidence-based decision-making and bespoke responses are key to managing 
 
335Ibid, p.7. 
336Briggs R. and Edwards, C., The Business of Resilience, 2006, p.33. 
337Ibid, p.38. 
338Lagadec, P., Learning Processes for Crisis Management in Complex Organisations, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, John Wiley and Son Ltd, Volume 5, Number 1, 1997, pp24 – 31. Available at www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com. 
Accessed on 10 January 2016. 
339Ibid, p.25. 




complex crises which present wicked problems to be managed. The critical acceptance of managing 
complex crises is the realisation that each event is unique, and therefore each response is also required 
to be unique. While it is possible to train and educate for potential events and actions, when faced with 
a wicked problem, the adaptive mental capacity of the leader is key to success. The creation of such 
an approach relies critically on the development of the leadership of the organisation, at all levels, to 
enable a holistic and adaptive approach to such complex situations.  
 
2.8 THE IMPORTANCE OF ADAPTABILITY AND CONTINUITY  
The initial exploration for information on the topic of Organisational Resilience in 2013 focussed on 
obtaining the relevant documentation that was used within the military around the subject of fighting 
capability, operational resilience and the management of risk and consequences on the battlefield. 
During this initial search, it was also identified that the military possessed a doctrine publication, Joint 
Service Publication (JSP) 503,341 which was first issued in 2000, pre-dating the UK national standard 
BS:25999342 by almost seven years. This reflects the awareness of Defence in building and maintaining 
capability, through the ability to adapt and build situational awareness during disruptive events; a 
situation that would be common on the battlefield and large-scale military operations. The MoD 
regarded Business Continuity as “the effective management of business risks and, as such, falls 
squarely within the realms of good Corporate Governance and Risk Management.”343 The revised JSP 
aligns itself against the principles of BS:25999, ensuring there is a common picture of Business 
Continuity across Defence and Government. The creation and subsequent presence of such a 
document within the MoD, along with its pragmatic approach to Business Continuity, indicates a culture 
of acceptance and awareness of risk management within the organisation. Unlike the British Standard, 
the JSP clearly states that the priority areas for the MoD BCM strategy were “People, Processes and 
Resources,” focussing on people as the primary element due to their ability to give the organisation the 
agile edge and function, even when systems are degraded. The UK Standard focuses more on the 
systems and placing the framework into organisations but does not articulate clear priorities of any BCM 
strategy as does the military publication. 
 
The military also possessed direction via their doctrine publications on managing crises and how to plan 
and execute campaigns to address them, though these were more aligned to strategic and operational 
warfighting events.344 Fundamental to its strategic approach was the creation of the Strategic Trends 
Programme to help inform military and government long term planning. It is managed by the 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and is created by a think tank group of military, 
political and academic specialists. It seeks to identify risks and possibilities in the near, mid and far 
regions, normally 30 years out from the time of writing. No such document was found within the 
government channels, with the Cabinet Office Insight Team using the DCDC document as the baseline 
 
341Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Publication (JSP) 503: MoD Business Continuity Management, 5th edition, Main Building, 
Whitehall, London, 2011. 
342British Standards Institution Standards Publication, BS25999: Business Continuity Management. The British Standards 
Institute, London, UK, 2007. Available at www.bsi.org.uk (accessed on 10 May 2016).. 
343MoD, JSP 503, 2011, p.2 
344MoD, JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning, 2013; MoD, JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution, 2009. 
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for long-term trends analysis. Research into the rail industry and DfT also indicate that no long-term 
strategic analysis existed, with limited industry direction on building resilience. As initially identified in 
Chapter 1 and further discussed in Chapter 5, documents from the Office of Rail and Road345 identified 
that there was a disconnect between franchise periods, Network Rail planning cycles and government 
strategies, which increase the complexity within the rail industry and drives the requirement for an 
adaptable planning capability by the strategic management of the rail industry to enable continued 
successful growth.  
 
As McManus and Stephenson have both identified, flexibility of leadership and processes, as well as 
integrated strategies, are key to the development of organisational resilience, enabling an organisation 
to adjust to the unfolding situation and share the workload across the various departments and teams.346 
The integrated approach seeks to implement a similar methodology, by pulling together the components 
of government, military and non-government organisations to deliver a focussed approach, to maximise 
the delivery of smart power, resourced effectively to deliver success. Critical to that success is the 
flexibility within the structure to adapt to the environment as it changes and ability to maintain the 
continuity of effort. The Army recognises this need, with ADP Land Operations promoting the need for 
flexibility as a key component of the plan, enabled by the adaptability of the forces and the 
commander.347 In contrast, the UK Government’s paper on the resilience of the transport sector does 
not promote either concept of adaptability or continuity for the rail industry.348  
 
2.9 SUMMARY 
This element of the thesis has explored the literature around understanding the key components of 
building the bedrock of organisational resilience. The review of the literature has identified a strategic 
core that is required to develop effective resilience. The effective development of the organisation’s 
vision and strategy, delivered through the leadership framework, taking into consideration the 
complexity and impact of its cultural web is critical to setting the basis for effective resilience. Evidence 
from the military through the review of the British Army in 1914 – 1918, and the contemporary situations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, has identified this importance within the military. Likewise, the evidence 
captured from the several industry examples have also reflected that through clearly understanding the 
importance of the strategic core activities and their interconnectivity, organisations can begin to 
appreciate the critical components of building resilience across the establishment. This is developed 
through the development and implementation of the required leadership style, endorsed through the 
executive team, mapped to the required strategic outcomes to deliver the organisation’s vision. This is 
promoted throughout the organisation by various activities aligned to the cultural framework. Failure to 
do this correctly can result in the creation of a disruptive resistance to change. 
 
 
345Office of Rail and Road, Costs and Revenues of Franchised Passenger Train Operators in the UK, Office of Rail and Road, 
Department for Transport, 2012, p.18. 
346McManus S.T., `Organisational Resilience in New Zealand' 2008; Stephenson A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of 
Organisations’, 2010, pp 71-73. 
347 MoD, ADP Land Operations, 2010, 2A-5. 
348Department for Transport, `Transport Resilience Review', 2014. 
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This section also reviewed the development of crises, how they are affected by the impact of 
organisational culture and how they are required to be managed. The review has discussed the impact 
of complexity within the management of business through globalisation and how it can impact on the 
decision-making process. By analysing how the military approaches the development of its leadership 
and management teams to understand and manage risk, through a risk aware mentality, along with the 
level of education and training around crisis management, businesses can begin to build their own 
understanding of the need to develop a culture of resilience that is developed from the frontline upwards 
throughout the organisation.  
 
Research within UK industry and the military have identified glaring differences in the understanding of 
resilience and the need for continuity. The presence of its own directive on risk management, business 
continuity, disaster relief and crisis management demonstrate the effort the military give to building 
resilience within the organisation at all levels. The culture is further enhanced by the promotion of an 
adaptive leadership framework, often referred to as “Mission Command”, to enable junior frontline 
commanders the ability to make decisions to maintain momentum and manage events before they 
become crises. Few examples of similar publications and directives existed within the rail industry, and, 
as the research findings will testify in Chapter 7, this was not unexpected. The lack of consideration in 
government reports for the need for flexibility and continuity within the rail industry when faced with 
disruptive events demonstrates a lack of understanding of the core components of building a resilience 
culture. Recent investigations by Government and independent research into the transport sector, 
particularly the rail sector, noted a lack of situational awareness and learning lessons from previous 
examples, like those observations identified by McManus and Stephenson in their work.  
 
The culture of the organisation and the ethos created by the senior leadership is critical to the building 
of organisational resilience. This is required to develop the organisation's capability to prepare, respond, 
adapt and to learn from disruptive events. The literature review has shown that while the military have 
sought to build a strong framework through strategic processes and analysis, supported by tactical 
practices and procedures captured in the doctrine publications, it still relies on the capability of the 
leadership to enable the organisation to deliver the right level of flexibility to adapt to a crisis. This level 
of detailed framework development was not present within the rail industry and government 
documentation reviewed, which has impacted on the resilience of the rail industry.  
 
At the operational (military) or function (industry) level, the review identified that there are also several 
clear frameworks required to turn strategy into effective activities to deliver resilience. The need for 
assuring the organisation there is a clear understanding of risk, issues, vulnerabilities and recovery 
priorities can develop a level of organisational assurance. There is a level of agility required, through 
effective incident response and management activities, supported through the correct organisational 
structures and governance frameworks. The development of the correct approach, either on the 
battlefield or in the boardroom requires effective planning, communication frameworks and regular 
engagement with key individual. Finally, in order to deliver the required effect, there is the need to 
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properly invest in the Social Capital of the organisation. These components, identified from the literature 
review, provide the skeleton of an Organisational Resilience management framework. The follow-on 







CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chaos of the Balkans in the middle of the 1990s resulted in the need for the military to adapt to a 
different method of delivering resilience on a very congested battlefield, changing its mentality from the 
large-scale Cold War manoeuvre-based warfare to cross-organisational, inter-agency operations, 
requiring a change in operating methodology, technology, training, development and education of its 
staff. The Comprehensive Approach required a holistic approach not just to its implementation, but also 
its preparation, an element that was overlooked during the initial periods of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
campaigns. A detailed analysis of the Comprehensive Approach demonstrated that lessons could be 
learned for building a framework for an organisation.349 This chapter identifies the methods used to 
analyse findings from the various research activities undertaken during the research period.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY 
This research identifies what factors are required to build organisational resilience, using the 
Comprehensive Approach as a model. If applied correctly, the Comprehensive Approach doctrine 
demonstrates strong potential to develop resilience within a shattered community, as it seeks to re-
establish the tenets of the society that previously existed prior to the conflict. This offers the capability 
to apply a similar approach to an organisation with the intent of building resilience at organisational 
level. Although the BS:65000 standard delivers the conceptual framework, an important factor of the 
concept of organisational resilience is moving it from being a theoretical concept captured in academic 
research to becoming an operational framework with an understanding of how organisations can deliver 
tangible outcomes. The development of the organisational resilience model in this research aims to 
deliver this, utilising the findings from the research to inform the development and creation of tangible 
products, enabling the building of resilience. To deliver the required level of research and analysis, 
several questions require addressing to identify the lessons from military units on operations and their 
capability to build and sustain organisational resilience that could be adapted for the rail industry. 350 To 
obtain the relevant information, the following activities were conducted: 
 
▪ Analysis of the current understanding and writings on organisational Resilience; 
▪ Analysis of the current organisational resilience situation within the GB rail industry; 
▪ Analysis of the Comprehensive Approach through military case studies; 
▪ Identification of methods the UK military employ to build Organisational Resilience; and 
▪ Observations of UK military organisation operating within complex situations and how they 
manage to maintain organisational resilience capability.351 
 
349 Gracey A., `Operationalising the Comprehensive Approach,’ Post Graduate Research Paper, MSc Leadership and 
Management Programme, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, 2013. 
350Gracey A., `The Application of Smart Power’, Post Graduate Research Paper, International Politics, strategic Relations and 
Modern Conflict Programme, King’s College London, London, 2012. 
351Gracey A., `Five Years On, Lessons From Iraq.` British Army Review Special Report: Lessons from Combat, Volume 3, 




The above tasks have been conducted as elements of the research for this thesis, with Chapter 2 
addressing the analysis of the current writings on Organisational Resilience and the core components 
required to develop Organisational Resilience. Chapter 4 analyses the case study organisations, setting 
the scene for the remainder of the thesis which develops the ORM3 framework. 
 
Two key research methodologies were identified that could best suit this thesis; Grounded Theory and 
Action Research. Grounded Theory is a research methodology associated with qualitative research,352 
with the researcher seeking to obtain the theory from empirical data collected in the field.353 It allows 
theories based on previous research to be carried into current research, provided said theories are 
relevant to the current research topic.354 One issue identified when researching this methodology was 
the difficulty of its application with regards to the review of current literature, an issue also identified by 
Ciaran Dunne.355 There is also the issue as to what is “classical Grounded Theory” with the split 
between the two originators over how it should be applied, which in turn has caused confusion regarding 
how to apply the methodology.356 
 
Due to concerns around potential applications of the Grounded Research theory, as well as the impact 
that this research was having on the understanding of resilience within the strategic circles of UK 
industry, it was decided to follow a more Action Research approach. While Grounded Theory seeks to 
develop a theoretical approach to research, there is concern regarding the fact that it is difficult to 
conduct definitive planning as it is difficult to predict in advance.357 Action Research seeks to solve an 
issue or problem that has been identified within the group. This methodology is seen as a more involved 
approach, focussed on solving practical issues.358 As discussed in Chapter 2, Organisational Resilience 
is a leadership / management construct, therefore Action Research is better suited as it enables the 
exploitation of the research to build a greater level of practical knowledge.  
 
The research approach, due to the dynamic environment within the business world, leant itself towards 
the applied nature of Action Research. Sampling audiences were identified from the military staff 
involved in the preparation for operational deployment while data collection and analysis methods were 
implemented. Unlike a grounded theory approach, each data collection was then analysed, lessons 
identified and applied. This enabled the lessons to be used to develop incident management training, 
advise on building Organisational Resilience and the consultation on the national standard during the 
research gathering phase. As the research created changes during the information gathering phase, 
the Action Research approach enabled the inclusion of this knowledge and impact caused by its 
application. This thesis has focussed on an Action Research approach to maximise the experience of 
 
352Dunne C., `The Place of the Literature Review in Grounded Theory Research', International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, Vol 14, No.2, 2011, p.111. 
353Ibid, p.111: Strauss A., and Corbin J., Grounded Theory – An overview, p 273. 
354Strauss A., and Corbin J., Grounded Theory – An overview, p 273 
355Dunne C., 2011, p.111. 
356Ibid., p.113. 




individuals involved in the research. Due to the organisations engaged, and the circumstances of the 
research, care was taken to ensure the research findings from the study of the military to develop 
resilience training for the business sector did not compromise security protocols for individuals or 
research units. In their book Becoming Critical. Education, knowledge and action research, Carr and 
Kemmis provide the following definition of the process: 
 
“Action research is simply a form of self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in 
social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own practices, their 
understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are carried 
out.”359 
 
Action research has an extensive history in many fields of social research practice with several 
approaches having been identified.360 The initial idea of action research is attributed to the social 
psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1946, when he was involved in community action programs within the United 
States.361 In their work, Kemmis and McTaggart identified that four distinct generations of action 
research had developed. The first was the original methodology as described by Lewin, the second 
building on a British tradition of action research in organisational development began in the UK. The 
third generation resulted in the adapting of the British model by Australian and European researchers, 
with the fourth generation emerging from the connections between critical emancipatory action research 
and participatory action research in social movements.362 
 
The fundamental idea behind action learning is to bring individuals together to learn from each other 
through a sharing of experiences. It is based on the early work of the advocate Reg Revans, who saw 
the current methods of management inquiry failing to solve the issues facing organisations.363 Prior to 
the beginning of primary research through engagement with the military personnel, a period of 
secondary research, utilising MoD publications, Government reports and discussions with members of 
the Cabinet Office and the EPC enabled identification of the level of knowledge around the subject of 
Organisational Resilience and the requirement for strategic leadership to develop the culture. This was 
supported by a review of literature from the US military, Australian Armed Forces and the governments 
of Australia and New Zealand to help build an understanding of the situation of Organisational 
Resilience within other Western cultures. 
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
Having decided to adopt an Action Research approach to the doctoral studies, there was a split between 
the availability of quality sources. For the review of military practices, procedures and performance, as 
well as leadership, material from the 1970s onwards was utilised. For the subject of Organisational 
 
359Carr, W. and Kemmis, S., Becoming Critical. Education, Knowledge and Action Research, Lewes: Falmer, 1986, p.162. 
360Kemmis S and McTaggart R., Participatory Action Research: Communicative Action and the Public Sphere,2007, p.271, 
downloaded from www.corwin.com.  
361Ibid., p.272; Action Research report, Infed, www.infed.org, accessed on 09 January 2014. 
362Ibid., p.272. 
363Ibid., p.274.  
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Resilience, military and government documentation of 2004 – 2016 was reviewed, with academic 
papers of 2009 onwards being identified, highlighting the emerging aspect of organisational resilience. 
Further quality papers and documents that pre-date the emergence of Organisational Resilience were 
included if they were deemed appropriate to this research, having been identified through online 
electronic searches and reviewing other professional and academic reports. Engagement with 
professionals within the New Zealand ResOrgs via internet and email also enabled a development of 
understanding, with identification of UK based researchers identifying a similar trend.364 This was 
supported by engagement with leading representatives of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat365, the 
EPC366 as well as discussions with consultant organisations such as Price Waterhouse Coopers367 and 
Ernst Young.368 
 
To enable the researcher to access the thoughts and opinions of other professionals and academics 
there was engagement with professionals such as Amy Stephenson369, Rob MacFarlane370 and Charlie 
Newnham371 who offered critical reviews of ideas and advice on literature to review. The researcher 
also engaged with the Office of the Mayor of London’s Resilience Team’s study into city resilience, 
under the ’Project Anytown’ title. This data was further enhanced through attendance at RUSI and EPC 
resilience focussed events and workshops.  
 
Linked to any literature review is the consideration that the selection and application of research 
methods within a project may often influence the collection and results obtained. It is also critical to 
accept that while a methodology refers to a description of methods utilised in the activities involved in 
the gathering of results, based on the research conducted, it may also refer to the concepts and 
principles that have been applied during the process of information gathering and review. These results 
can be further impacted by the preconceptions of the researcher, which can be strongly influenced by 
their own knowledge of the subject and the research techniques being used. This is key to under-
standing the presentation of the research findings as this could also reflect the view of the researcher 
and any researcher influenced bias. As this topic is heavily focused on the interaction of the organisation 
with others at the corporate and individual level, to successfully deliver resilience management it is 
appropriate to utilise social sciences research strategies. The topic of the research project, coupled with 
the current political and economic environment within which it is being conducted, dictates that this 
research should be conducted with a particular methodology.  
 
364Amy Lee 
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366Mark Taylor, William Baker (Incident Management) and Linda Vognyer (Business Continuity). 
367Robert Crask and Charlotte Newnham. 
368Robert Gaddum, Claudia Van Den Heuval and Joanna Collins. 
369Founder of Stephenson Resilience and author of the PhD “Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations” 2010. 
370Assistant Director, Resilience Training and Doctrine, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office, author of the BS 65000 
Organisational Resilience. 
371Author of MSc Report “Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations: Predicting a leader’s propensity for behaviours that 




3.4 RESEARCHER’S INFLUENCE 
To enable an understanding of the bias that the researcher may bring to the research, it is important for 
the reader to also understand the researcher’s role and focus within the research and the conducting 
of the research activities. The researcher was a member of the Military Reserve, having previously 
experienced the limited level of professional military training in delivering the Comprehensive Approach. 
In 2008 there seemed little importance given at the military Staff Colleges to the understanding and 
planning to embark on a COIN campaign against a 2nd Generation insurgency, which was capable of 
co-ordinating activities across the strategic spectrum utilising the many tools of globalisation. Post 
completion of the Staff College course, the researcher spent four years training teams for operational 
deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan at the tactical and operational level. In 2018 – 2019 the researcher 
was a member of the Army Headquarters’ Training Evaluation Branch, which conducted regular 
assurance reviews on military training and education establishments. 
 
As part of the lessons learnt and implemented framework of the military, there exists a training and 
development organisation that focuses on Collective Training and Learning, often used to prepare 
organisations for operational deployment. The Command and Staff Trainer (CAST) establishment 
consists of two locations, one in Warminster (south) and one in Catterick (north). CAST works in 
conjunction with the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) to develop, practice and enhance the 
capability of Tactical (Battlegroup) and Operational (Brigade) Headquarters staff. The CAST and CATT 
establishments sit under the command of the Command Staff Tactical Training Group (CSTTG) located 
at the Land Warfare Centre (LWC). This organisation was charged with the training of Tactical and 
Operational headquarters staff for the planning, execution and running of operation campaigns and 
tactical battles, and the Command and Staff Trainer (South) (CAST(S)) was the ultimate position for 
training staff. The researcher was stationed at CAST(S) from 2010 -2012, having previously been 
involved in training specialised personnel at the Royal School of Artillery (RSA) from 2008 - 2010. Each 
member of the team was regarded as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in their field, and all had to be 
highly experienced in the planning and decision-making process.  
 
As part of the military’s continuous improvement process and to learn lessons from experience, 
members of the team would regularly deploy into theatres of operations to capture lessons and new 
procedures, feeding them back into training to help reduce the time it took for feedback to clear through 
the system and the adaptation of good practice. On numerous occasions the CAST(S) staff were also 
able to adapt and improve training methods, increasing capability in the field for the commanders. Part 
of this process was the development of the doctrine advice document for Command Staff, The Combat 
Estimate User’s Guide. It guided the user, who may range from a junior commander on the frontline to 
a senior officer who may be in the rear echelons, on how to utilise the decision-making process to help 
develop an effective plan in a timely manner. The handbook goes in depth into the process to help 




The researcher was engaged as a senior SME in human terrain analysis (HTA), joint targeting 
procedures and the application of influence on the battlefield. The researcher was also viewed as an 
advisor when it came to Red Team doctrine. By reflecting on his own knowledge, experience and the 
lessons that he was involved in delivering, the researcher sought to identify the lessons the rail industry 
could learn from the military approach to command and control, the application of contingency planning, 
resilience management, communication between departments and the impact of culture and behaviour 
on organisational resilience. The ability of military commanders, through training and education, would 
seem to indicate that they are more capable of responding to dynamic situations, adapting to an 
environment of limited information and making critical decisions, based on the application of `Mission 
Command’ as indicated by Ivan Yardley, which is at the heart of its decision-making process.372  
 
Within the observed phases of the “Live Case studies” and interactive workshops, the researcher was 
very aware of the impact that he could have through the Hawthorne (observer) effect. To ensure that 
all reasonable steps were taken, the researcher sought to remain in the background during some of the 
military observed events, utilising the command and control facility at the LWC to observe, listen and to 
identify various issues within the party under surveillance. A second approach used during the 
observation of the military was to be a member of the training staff, thereby removing the external 
element created by the Hawthorne effect. The third method employed when working with military 
personnel on the tactical and strategic courses was to become a course delegate, to function alongside 
the parties for the training period, obtaining their thoughts and processes when considering certain 
issues given to them. These various approaches enabled the researcher to observe teams in their 
natural hierarchical environment, reacting to training situations where the focus was on the resolution 
of the task at hand, not the observer in the room. These methods also enabled candid feedback on the 
current situation, enabling the researcher to correlate the information offered in the various 
questionnaires that were returned. 
 
3.5 ACCESS ISSUES 
To enable a thorough study of practices, procedures and social interaction, access to the correct 
individuals within both organisations at the right level, with the right experience, was required. While 
resilience, incident management and contingency planning skills are widespread within the military, this 
was not the same for the rail industry. In the military these skills are deemed critical for any officer, and 
for many junior managers. Within the rail industry, these skills were restricted to a limited number of 
individuals, mainly clustered within the Operations element of the various companies. The researcher 
attended military training events to observe the command and control teams being placed into positions 
where they were constantly being faced with `Wicked Problems,’373 `Rising Tide’ events or unforeseen 
events. As the delegates went through the 10-day exercise process the researcher was able to move 
 
372Yardley, I., 2010, The Wider Utility of Mission Command, PhD Thesis, 2010, p.120. 




freely among the group, asking questions and discussing the actions and decisions of the teams and 
their various commanders. 
 
As part of his role within the rail industry, the researcher developed training for individuals tasked to 
deliver incident management, emergency planning and response practices within the company. This 
enabled discussion of the relevant issues identified with senior managers with respect to what shortfalls 
existed, and the risks and potential threats that the company faced. Through engagement at the senior 
level, the researcher was able to discuss the situation with various elements of the company, as well 
as run an investigative questionnaire for comparison with the military. The researcher’s position also 
enabled contact with members of the EPC, Senior Members of the British Transport Police and British 
Fire Service leadership organisations, as well as members of the Cabinet Office to help investigation 
into the current situation of resilience within the railway sector.  
 
To provide a wide base of knowledge on the areas of social interaction, collaborative working, problem 
solving and decision-making, the author utilised several methodological tools to enable an in-depth 
analysis into these areas within the military, and their application to the rail industry. Archival sources 
have been retrieved from the British Library, the EPC Resilience Library and DefAc’s central library. 
Coupled with this an extensive international literature search produced numerous secondary 
documents that assisted in grounding the research into existing and contemporary discussions, 
enabling a better understanding of the lines of development for both military and railway practices and 
procedures. In support of the development of the hypotheses, research articles into the individual 
qualities of leadership, management and competencies were reviewed.374 These documents enabled 
an understanding of the gaps and requirements that have been previously identified and discussed by 
key individuals within their field of investigation. Previous reports on the delivery of exercises and the 
effectiveness of the integration of organisations within the application of the Comprehensive Approach 
were also reviewed, informing the live case study development.  
 
Military doctrine publications provided secondary evidence, supporting the creation of several diagrams 
that are included within this thesis. The doctrine identified key crisis management organisations and 
practices utilised within the military, enabling the development of the framework for the live case study 
complex issues.375 Military doctrine publications also informed the research on the various cycles used 
for the development of resilience capability. Secondary evidence gathering was obtained from key 
research publications on the topic of competency and leadership capability and other research theses 
which informed the leadership questionnaire and the Battlegroup (BG) observation framework model. 
 
 
374Burke, E., Competence in Command: Recent R&D in the London Fire Brigade, Journal of Managerial Psychology, MCB 
University Press, Vol. 12, No.4, 1997, pp. 261 – 279; Australian Government, Organisational Resilience: Australian Case 
Studies, Attorney General’s Department, Australian Government, Commonwealth of Australia, 2011: Resilient Organisations, 
Resilience Benchmark Tool, Resilient Organisations Research Programme, University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 2012, 
downloaded from www.resorg.nz; Sheffi Y, `Building a Resilient Organisation’, 2007, pp30 – 36.  
375Ministry of Defence, Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4/05 The Comprehensive Approach, 2006; Ministry of Defence, Joint 
Defence Publication (JDP) 3-00: Campaign Execution, 2009; Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 2nd 
Edition: Campaign Planning, 2013. 
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3.6 SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
The use of Action Research enabled the utilisation of several research strategies in a mutually 
supporting mechanism to obtain data on how the military developed its Fighting Power capability for 
operations. Through the review of previous research, it was observed that in the field of Organisational 
Resilience, there had been use of case studies supported with either questionnaires only,376 question-
naires with surveys,377 self-assessment surveys, interviews and surveys378 or case studies and 
observations.379 These differing approaches enabled the collection of primary data for the research 
project. This research approach also used multiple methods to collect both qualitative and quantitative 
data for analysis. 
 
When it comes to resilience, the capability of the organisation is determined by the actions of many 
individuals, rather than an individual, which will dictate whether an organisation displays a level of 
resilience. To provide a useful measurement of the Organisational Resilience, it is important that 
information is gathered across the organisation, and not just from one individual.380 This is particularly 
important when it involves a strategically important business, such as the rail industry or other members 
of the CNI. There are certain social science strategies that would easily align themselves to this 
research project. Given the topic and the need to capture the interaction between individuals and teams, 
there were three strategies that came to the fore, based on the requirement for a qualitative approach 
to the data gathering phase. These were Survey,381 Case Study382 and Participatory Action Research383 
(PAR), which are discussed in Annex A. 
 
3.7 RESEARCH METHODS 
When measuring Organisational Resilience, the primary unit is the company itself, and therefore it is 
important that this is reflected in the collected information.384 Within the military this was aimed at the 
various BGs that were assessed, which in turn gave the information on the Brigade and the Army. The 
civilian equivalent in rail industry companies to the BG would be the functional area, followed by the 
Business Unit, and then the company. By mapping out this correlation, it enabled a deeper comparison 
of the two organisations, which was important for the identification of how the lessons from the military 
could be utilised within the rail industry. Having decided on the research strategy, methods were 
identified for the collection of information and data. Collaborative working and successful decision-
making are about relationships between individuals and groups, as well as technical knowledge and 
various practices and procedures. Organisational Resilience includes the individuals within the 
 
376McManus, S.T., `Organisational Resilience in New Zealand’, 2008. 
377Fox J., `Analysing Leadership Styles of Incident Commanders’, 2009. 
378Stephenson, A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations’, 2010. 
379Newnham C., `Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations’, 2012. 
380Stephenson, A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations’, 2010, p.115. 
381Denscombe, M., 2003, pp.6, 8. 
382Ibid., pp.31, 39. 
383Kemmis S and McTaggart R., Participatory Action Research, 2007; Dick, B. A beginner's guide to action research, 2002 [On 
line]. Downloaded from http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/arp/guide.html on 10 February 2014; Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. 
Becoming Critical Education, 1986, p.162; Bogdan, R. and Biklen, S. K. Qualitative Research For Education, Allyn and Bacon, 
Boston, Walter M., Social Research Methods: Chapter 21-Participatory Action Research, 1992, downloaded from 
www.oxforduniversitypress.com.au downloaded on 12 March 2014. 
384Stephenson A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations’, 2010, p.115. 
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organisation, as well as the processes and culture they operate within daily.385 It has also expanded its 
focus to also encompass innovation, intellectual property, partnerships and company culture, along with 
the traditional risk management, security, business continuity and incident management domains.386 To 
enable the collection of evidence on the importance of these personal interactions within the military, 
the researcher sought to capture technical and qualitative information on these areas across a wide 
sample of decision-making staff. Advice was obtained from academia, the University Guide on research 
as well as online documentation on the required size of the questionnaire sample to make it a reliable 
source of information.387  
 
Table 9 reflects this information and the quantities of audience responses required to enable the 
questionnaires to deliver a result that has an acceptable degree of reliability for research purposes.388 
This highlights that for the military, the 694 responses from 3 brigades (approx. 6000 personnel) the 
questionnaires provided an accuracy to within +/- 5%, whereas with Network Rail, the responses 
provided an accuracy to within +/- 10%. 
 
 
Table 9: Research Questionnaire Criteria 
 
3.8 RESEARCH DESIGN 
During the development of the research approach, a limited amount of research on the application of 
PAR as a strategy within the research domain was identified. Utilising information captured by Bob Dick 
in 1993, the researcher found few sources of documentation to compare and contrast against the UK 
literature.389 Material by Bob Dick was readily available via an Australian research website, while other 
international research papers where accessible via the internet and intranet. There was a growing 
amount of research on resilience and Organisational Resilience, though several reports still confused 
 
385Chartered Institute of Professional Development, 2011, Developing Resilience: An evidence-based guide for practitioners, 
downloaded from www.cipd.co.uk on 22 Feb 2014. 
386Braes & Brooks, 2010, p.16. 
387Israel G. D., Determining Sample Size, Program Evaluation and Organisational Development, Institute of Food and 
Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, 1992; Institute for Health and Care Research, Briefing document HB Nr: 1.1B-08 
Questionnaires; selecting, translating and validating, 2010, downloaded from 
www.emgo.nl/kc/preparation/researchdesign/questionnaires on 12 February 2014.  
388Israel G. D., University of Florida,1992, p.3. 
389Denscombe M., 2003, Chapter 3; Kemmis S and McTaggart R., 2007; Dick, B. 2000. 
Pop Size +/-5% +/- 7% +/- 10% Pop Size +/-5% +/- 7% +/- 10% Pop Size +/-5% +/- 7% +/- 10%
100 81 67 51 400 201 135 81 4000 364 194 98
125 96 78 56 425 207 138 82 5000 370 196 98
150 110 86 61 450 212 140 82 6000 375 197 98
175 122 94 64 500 222 145 83 7000 378 198 99
200 134 101 67 600 240 152 86 8000 381 199 99
225 144 107 70 700 255 158 88 9000 383 200 99
250 154 112 72 800 267 163 89 10000 385 200 99
275 163 117 74 900 277 166 90 15000 390 201 99
300 172 121 76 1000 286 169 91 20000 392 204 100
325 180 125 77 2000 333 185 95 25000 394 204 100
350 187 129 78 3000 353 191 97 50000 397 204 100
375 194 132 80
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resilience with business continuity.390 Applied Action Research allowed the opportunity to blend various 
research methodologies which pursue action and research outcomes at the same time, which was ideal 
for the observation of the case study exercises, military training events and the live case study 
practices.391 
 
Denscombe identified three benefits of a survey questionnaire; low cost; speed of data collection and 
richness of information.392 He highlighted issues concerning the ability to check accuracy of the 
information, and risk of a low sample size. Two sets of questionnaires were created. The first set looked 
at the military which was regarded as being resilient, examining the level of training, education and 
leadership within the officer element. This concentrated on the non-technical elements of resilience 
management.  
 
The second set of questionnaires, focussed on the rail industry, sought to identify if a culture of 
resilience existed, and therefore was designed to look at resilience functional training, education, 
leadership and management. Both sets were then compared to ensure they were able to deliver 
responses which would enable a comparison to be conducted, thus enabling the identification of 
potential issues across both organisations and whether solutions from the military may be transferable 
into the rail industry. For greater impact, the questionnaires were hosted on a social web platform, with 
links to it emailed to the relevant audiences. Support from relevant line managers and senior leaders 
within both organisations was also sought prior to the release of the questionnaire as this would provide 
support and add credibility to the data request.  
 
Within the design phase of the questionnaire targeted at the military organisation, an extensive review 
of professional article reports on the areas of leadership and decision-making, management, business 
continuity, COIN, asymmetric warfare, politics and culture, international relations and education was 
conducted.393 The question set was designed to elicit the importance of required skills for the individuals 
 
390 McManus S., Seville E., et al, `Resilience Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving the Resilience of 
Organisations’, 2007; Stephenson A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations’, 2010; Boin A, Comfort L. K., and 
Demchak C. C., Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events, 2010; Chang-Richards A., Vargo J. and Seville E., 
`Organisational Resilience to Natural Disasters: New Zealand’s Experience,’ 2013. 
391Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide, 2003. p.74; Dick, B., `A Beginner's Guide to Action Research’, 2000. 
392Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide, 2003. 
393Bogacz R., Brown E., Moehlis J., Holmes P. and Cohen J. D., `The Physics of Optimal Decision Making: A Formal Analysis 
of Models of Performance in Two Alternative Forced Choice Tasks’, Psychological Review, American Psychological 
Association, 2006, Vol 113, No,4 pp 700 -765; Gonzalez C. and Wimisberg J., `Situation Awareness in dynamic Decision 
Making: Effects of Practice and Working Memory’, Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, Pittsburgh, Volume 1, No.1 2007, pp 56 – 74; Rake E. L. and Nja O., `Perceptions and Performances of 
Experienced Incident Commanders’, Journal of Risk Research, Routledge, London, Volume 12, No 5, 2009, pp 665 – 685; Hitt 
M. A., Ireland R. D. and Hoskisson R. E., Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalisation, 9th Edition, South 
Western, Cengage Learning, Mason, Ohio, 2011; Rasche A., The Paradoxical Foundation of Strategic Management, 
Contributions to Management Science, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2008; Speight P., `Business Continuity’ Journal of Applied 
Security Research, Routledge, 2011, volume 6 Issue 4 pp 529 – 554; McManus S. T., Organisational Resilience in New 
Zealand', 2008; Lindstrom J., A model to Explain a Business Contingency Process, Disaster Prevention and Management, 
2012; Woodman P. and Hutchings P., Disruption and Resilience: The 2010 Business Continuity Management Survey, 
Chartered Management Institute, London, 2010; Woodman P. and Hutchings P., Managing Threats in a Dangerous World: The 
2011 Business Continuity Management Survey, Chartered Management Institute, London, 2011; Australian Defence Force, 
The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, Australian Ministry of Defence, downloaded from 
www.defence.gov.au/publications on 21 Nov 2010; Hammes T. X., `War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Routledge, 2005, Vol 26 Issue 2, pp 189-221; Freedman L., `War evolves into the Fourth Generation: A 
Comment on Thomas X. Hammes’, Contemporary Security Policy, Routledge, 2005, Vol 26 Issue 2, pp 254 – 263; Gautam P. 
K., `Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture’, Defense and Security Analysis, 2009, Vol 25, issue 4, pp 413 – 423; National Audit 
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within the resilience domain by various staffing groups. The completed question set used was reviewed 
with other members of the CAST(S) team and a trial version that was circulated within a test group, 
consisting of 60 army officers involved in the military tasks.  
 
Of the 60 questionnaires distributed, seven were disregarded as they were completed incorrectly and 
the remaining 53 were electronically uploaded. The trial questionnaire was reviewed with the group and 
feedback received, which resulted in questionnaire amendments as listed below: 
 
▪ Amend the statements to prevent them from potentially leading the individual; 
▪ Change the questions to statements to enable a neutral tone to the research;  
▪ Greater clarity on the scoring matrix being used for the questionnaire; 
▪ Breakdown the statements into single item statements to enable greater ability to capture data; 
and 
▪ Allow the ability to capture greater demographic data from the individual for later analysis. 
 
On completion of the review, the question set was changed from twenty-one quantitative questions and 
five qualitative questions to twenty-three quantitative statements and five qualitative questions. The 
scoring mechanism was also changed to make it more user friendly for the respondents.  
 
The focus of the questionnaire, shown at Annex D1, was a detailed examination, based on evidence, 
into how well individuals within the BG command teams felt they were prepared for their role, and how 
the military trained and educated its crisis management teams. The front end of the questionnaire 
sought to identify the key elements of developing resilience capability. The last three questions of the 
military questionnaire sought to obtain details about the roles, experience and rank of the individual, the 
level of training and education that they had received, and what they thought the military could do to 
improve the current level of training / education to increase the capability on operations. These 
questions also sought to identify if it was supporting the development of the individual around resilience 
activities, providing an option for individuals to exploit this knowledge once they left the military and 
sought to transfer their skills to civilian roles.  
 
For Network Rail, the researcher developed two questionnaires; one was issued in 2014 to the 
operational security and resilience personnel, and the second in 2015 to the planning community; both 
are shown at Annex D2. The engagement and information gathering approach that was conducted was 
like that for the military questionnaire. For the Operations department questionnaire the audience 
selected for the industry department questionnaires were in areas that had an element of either security 
or operational focus and came from frontline disciplines, such as incident response, emergency 
 
Office, Defence Committee inquiry into the Comprehensive Approach, National audit Office Report, 2009, downloaded from 





planning, leadership and training and development roles. By taking a holistic cross section, the intent 
was to identify whether a security and resilience awareness culture existed across the company or was 
only located in certain elements. For the planning questionnaire, the audience chosen from the planning 
department was represented from across the department.  
 
3.9 RESEARCH IMPLEMENTATION 
Figure 19 highlights the implementation model which was developed and utilised during this research 
project. The initial review of the problem, supported by the previous work of the researcher, enabled 
the scoping of the research project. A key element is understanding the participant groupings and their 
demographic characteristics. Table 10 details the participants demographics and what parts of the 
research they were involved in within Network Rail. On completion of the previous research review 
within the military sphere, the researcher analysed the current situation within the rail industry, seeking 
to identify what processes and procedures were in place to manage disruptive events on the rail 
network. This consisted of an analysis of existing policies, strategies and standards, observation of its 
training events, interviews with senior leadership personnel and tactical incident management trainers. 
Table 11 demonstrates the participant demographics from the military. 
 
 
The military education and leadership questionnaire and the rail industry resilience questionnaire were 
circulated concurrently. Within the military, information was also captured through semi-structured 
interviews and developing small table-top exercises which personnel were taken through to observe 
Figure 19: Research Framework Source: Author 
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their capabilities of managing incidents at a tactical and operational level. A brief analysis of each 















1 Questionnaire 130 Primary To obtain a greater understanding from NR individuals in 
decision-making roles on their level of education and 
preparation for resilience activities and respond / manage 
issues that affected the successful application of the 
various resilience activities. 
2 Questionnaire 119 Primary To obtain a greater understanding from NR individuals in 
decision-making roles on their level of education and 
preparation for their role within the Strategic Planning of the 
national timetable and collaborative working across the rail 
industry. 
Table 10: Network Rail Participant Groupings. 
 
3.10 OUTCOME MEASURES 
The multi-layered approach to the gathering of research data enabled the gathering of primary and 
secondary evidence to inform the development of the ORM3 framework and the creation of products 
used to build greater resilience within the rail industry. Following on from the case studies and 
observations of training events to set the research conditions that were discussed previously, the 












1 Observation of 
training events 
64 
Two separate headquarter groups. Various officer ranks from 
Lt Col – Lt. Male and female from various combat roles. Age 
varied from 25 – 45. 
2 Case Study N/A 
Various Command staff responsible for the execution of the 
campaign. Key focus was on the senior leadership staff for 
the Oman and Northern Ireland case study. The Iraq case 
study focuses on senior leadership / political leadership 
interactions. 
3 Live Case Study 
170 
(2 observations) 
Two separate Headquarter groups. Various officer roles Lt 
Col – Lt roles. Male and female from various combat arms 
and the three services. Age range 25 – 46. 
4 Questionnaire 656 
Various officer roles (Brigadier – Lt), male, female from 
various combat roles and the three services. Age varied from 
25 – 51. Completed by 9 BG Headquarters preparing for 
deployment on combat operations over a three-year period. 
5 Interviews 20 
Various officer roles (Lt Col – Lt). Male, female and from 
various combat roles, from the same BG headquarters. Age 
varied from 25 – 44. 
 
Table 11: Military Participant Demographics  
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3.10.1 Personnel Interviews 
The outcome measures for the interviews were transcripts of each interview from the BG personnel 
who participated. These were based on the responses being scored on the relevant information 
captured, with the relevant traits identified aligned within the key domains (Figure 20). A detailed 
analysis of the results against each other was then conducted, comparing the qualities to each other to 
identify a level of priority assigned to them from the BG personnel when it comes to the required traits 
of individuals within resilience and crisis management positions. This process enabled the mapping of 
the individual traits previously identified from the literature review and grouped into five key domains. 
By tracking each of the individual traits, as well as the domain it resided within, it enabled the 
visualisation of how the 20 individuals within an active headquarters, managing numerous issues of 
various intensity and complexity, viewed the importance of each personal trait. On completion of the 
data capture against the outcome measures, the domains were mapped with their individual traits, prior 




3.10.2 Questionnaires  
The questionnaires were hosted on Survey Monkey to enable direct completion by individuals, though 
within the military, individuals were also asked to complete written versions to enable the collection of 
data direct from source while on the training events. These were then uploaded immediately, which 
minimised the delay from training event to questionnaire completion. The military questionnaire 
framework consisted of multiple statements, aimed to help inform the development of a Comprehensive 
Approach to resilience within an organisation. The questionnaire was aligned against the domains 
identified below: 
 
▪ Initial preparation 
▪ Continued development 
▪ Utilising capability 
▪ Providing developmental support 
▪ Building conceptual flexibility and adaptability 
▪ Investing in a Comprehensive Approach 
▪ Maintaining conceptual adaptability 
 
The data from both the military and industry responses examined the level of initial training and 
development, how it is continued within the organisation and whether the focus is on training, or 
education. The other elements explored through the questionnaire were how the staff capability was 
Figure 20: Personal Interview Domains Source: Author 
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employed and how the organisation provided developmental support throughout an individual’s career. 
The final elements of the quantitative section of the questionnaire focussed on how the building of 
conceptual flexibility and adaptability, key requirements to enable an individual and a team to respond 
to and manage unfolding crises and serious incidents, and how well the Comprehensive Approach was 
explained, practiced and utilised in a multi-agency environment, while the second element explored the 
leadership capability present within the organisation. The quantitative questions were then captured 
into the five-point Likert scale, while the qualitative questions were analysed for themes, which were 
then also placed into a chart for visual representation. 
 
For the Network Rail questionnaires, like the military questionnaire, there was a similar level of 
engagement. Both questionnaires were designed around several statements, focussed on 
understanding the resilience and leadership capabilities within the two departments, aligned against the 
domains identified below, to help inform the development of a Collaborative Approach to resilience. The 
domains used were: 
 
▪ Initial preparation 
▪ Continued development 
▪ Utilising capability 
▪ Providing developmental support 
▪ Building conceptual flexibility and adaptability 
▪ Investing in a Collaborative Approach 
▪ Maintaining conceptual adaptability 
 
For the engagement around the consideration of security, continuity and resilience issues within the 
company, the questionnaire was given to 500 individuals with Band 1 to 4 roles, or equivalent seniority 
within the frontline operations team. 130 individuals completed the questionnaire, though only 117 
identified their relevant managerial position within the company. Within the Strategic Planning 
department, out of the 119 respondents, the majority were positioned within the middle management 
layer of the company. Band 5 represented the planning teams, with the Band 4 being the team leaders 
or planning technical specialists. The Band 3 level represented the team managers or project managers 
within the department. Above them sat the senior leadership team, consisting of the Band 2 personnel. 
Delivering the strategic guidance of the department, aligned with the direction set by the executive 
leadership, was the responsibility of the Band 1 community.  
 
Using similar domains for data collection and assessment across the military and industry samples 
enabled credible comparison of the results. The first industry questionnaire was focussed on the 
Operations Department, analysing the level of capability and knowledge that existed within that 
department. The second questionnaire, targeted at the Strategic Planning department, focussed more 
on how a department within Network Rail managed the capability of its staff to build a culture of 
leadership and adaptability. Having identified the importance of decision-making, adaptive leadership 
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and staff conceptual agility within the military case studies and military staff interviews, along with a 
detailed understanding of the level of resilience capability within the Operations department, the second 
industry questionnaire was run across the Strategic Planning department, with the outcome being a 
greater understanding and analysis of the leadership behaviours, and any barriers to performance, that 
were present within the department and experienced by the individuals involved in the response. The 
results were used to inform the development of lessons from the military that the rail industry can use 
to help develop a resilience leadership framework. 
 
3.10.3 Observation of Live Case Study 
Utilising McManus' resilience model, a matrix was developed to score and assess the resilience 
capability of the observed BGs as they conducted the Live Case Study. The event consisted of two 
independent operations. The practitioners planned and executed the first event, received a debrief from 
the observation team and then reset to conduct the planning and execution of the second event. The 
concept behind this was to identify the flexibility, conceptual adaptability and ability to reflect and learn 
from mistakes.  
 
The use of a comparison model enabled the identification of the organisation's level of resilience against 
McManus' framework, while also enabling a greater breakdown in detail through utilisation of radar 
graph mapping of each of the components. The BG was scored on its first event, with the comparison 
model completed and a resilience value attributed to the organisation. On completion of the second 
event the model was completed, with the scores compared to identify if there were any changes in the 
values. This was conducted for both McManus' model and the more detailed radar graph to identify 
changes at component level. The process was conducted on the headquarters’ performance being 
observed and scored by the observation team, with comments captured within the performance report. 
The score was then ratified by peer review and discussion on completion of the exercise, then allocated 
a numerical score which was entered into the comparison model. 
 
3.11 CODIFYING 
On completion of the initial information-gathering phase, the data streams were analysed to pull 
together key elements of the relevant areas of research. A conscious decision was taken not to set the 
codifying parameters prior to the research. It was intended to review the data captured and identify 
initial strands of similar information. The questionnaires, utilising the Likert scale, enabled a quantitative 
measurement to be taken, which offers clear-cut data sources. The qualitative element of the 
questionnaires, interviews, case studies and “live case study” events offered a less defined response, 
as many actions were interdependent with the actions of other members within the group / team. Within 
the military there was a higher level of engagement within the managerial staff, than seen within the 
industry audiences, though this was due to the environment and the fact they were on pre-deployment 




These processes, along with the selected resilience interviews conducted following on from the 
questionnaires, also produced a valuable amount of data, though the answers were less defined as the 
selection of the factors were based on the selective opinions of individuals on the factors of a resilient 
organisation. Through a process of codifying, the results identified the following factors as key to 
building organisational resilience: 
 
▪ Adaptive Leadership 
▪ Understanding of risks, issues and trends (intelligence gathering and exploitation) 
▪ Better training for role 
▪ Better investment in education 
▪ Investment in workforce development  
▪ Communication and information sharing 
 
3.12 SUMMARY 
This chapter has detailed the approach taken to develop an effective research strategy to gather 
evidence to inform the creation of the ORM3 framework. The approach was in line with the direction 
laid out, aligned to research guidelines on effective information gathering. Primary information was 
gathered through questionnaires, interviews and observation processes. 
 
The research approach allowed for the fact that, as shown in Table 9, and advised by the Institute for 
Care and Research, the minimum questionnaire response rate obtained should be between 50 – 100 
returns to enable the sample size to be effective.394 Table 9 demonstrated the levels of response 
required to deliver a level of research accuracy to the findings. This also factored into the distribution 
strategy that on average a questionnaire will only receive a 20% success return rate,395 thus there was 
the requirement to predict this situation396 and identify a sample audience large enough to account for 
this factor. It was a key element of the research approach that the methodology was primarily developed 
to provide an effective, transferable, reliable and verifiable way to gather information from the collected 
information and case studies, allowing comparison across the various departmental audiences that 
were surveyed and observed. 
 
The military questionnaire was presented to the various personnel groups after the observations of prior 
exercises to shape the questionnaires based the research outcomes. The questionnaires provided one 
of five research data gathering methods into how the military developed organisational resilience. The 
other research elements were case studies, live case study observations, interviews and previous 
exercise reviews. This provided a detailed methodology for gathering information on the research topic. 
The use of a live case study allowed for the gathering of key information on how military teams operate 
under pressure, identifying potential lessons through good and poor practices as the teams sought to 
 
394Institute for Health and Care Research, 2010, p.2. 
395Bolton University, Using a questionnaire introduction brief, Bolton University Library, downloaded from 
www.bolton.ac.uk/library/librarypublications/Cribsheets/questionnaires.pdf on 24 February 2014. 
396Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide, 2005, p.23. 
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manage complex situations. The case study review of the rail industry and military also informed the 
current situation to assist in the development of the resilience framework. 
 
Key to the information gathering within the rail industry was the level of audience engagement across 
the various industry departments. Within the rail planning department, it was mainly from the junior 
operational staff, whereas with the security questionnaire it was more focussed at the middle 
management layers, though there was double the level of return engagement at the senior (Band 1 and 
2) levels. There was a higher level of engagement within the senior management layers, though this 
may have been due to the position of the researcher and the cultural approach to identifying lessons 
that were being introduced within the organisation. 
 
The effective implementation of the multi-streamed research methodology enabled the collection of a 
large amount of primary and secondary information, which is explored in the following chapters. This 
information informed the creation of the various components of the ORM3 framework, based upon real 
business and operational issues being experienced across the business spectrum. As discussed within 
the literature review, though there has been an increase in the level of interest within the topic of 
Organisational Resilience, the level of understanding remains low, supporting the requirement for this 
level of research to be conducted. Chapter 4 articulates the business case for effective Organisational 
Resilience management, and the impact of not investing in it. Following on from this, Chapter 5 
introduces the concept of resilience within the military and rail industry using case studies, analysing 
the practices and processes that they utilise to maintain operational capability, supported by the 
examination of contemporary strategic thought.  
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR 
ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE MATURITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have set out the context regarding Organisational Resilience and has identified 
that the discipline is still evolving, with a limited academic and practitioner body of evidence available 
to date. Effective research within the UK on the implications of embedding an Organisational Resilience 
culture is conducted by a few research centres. Against this backdrop, there is less understanding of 
the business case for developing resilience and the creation of a management framework to assess, 
benchmark and plan resilience activities within the UK industry base. Organisational Resilience is still 
regarded as the mythical golden egg for business teams, with few academic establishments including 
it within their educational criteria. The area is mainly left to business leaders to attempt to develop their 
own approach, utilising guidance documents, such as BS:65000, to assist them. The literature review 
has demonstrated that there are several issues that are impacting on the resilience capability of 
organisations at a strategic level; limited situational awareness, cultural issues or ineffective leadership. 
The review also noted several key domains that support the implementation of resilience activities; 
these were assurance, agility and flexibility, effective planning, governance and organisational 
structure, and the investment into the social capital of the organisation.  
 
Building on those findings, this element of the research thesis will explore the business case for the 
development and implementation of an Organisational Resilience management framework within a 
business, and the key approaches required. It will evaluate what benefits an Organisational Resilience 
management framework would bring to a business, and how the executive leadership team can benefit 
directly from this innovation. This will pull together examples from the previous chapters on key issues 
/ deficiencies identified in the literature analysis, assisting with the development of the assessment 
framework for the live case study and the composition of an Organisational Resilience management 
framework.  
 
In the industry and organisational research domain, the topic of Organisational Resilience, and how to 
construct it within an organisation, has been experiencing renewed interest since the onset of the recent 
global events which have negatively impacted on national and international organisations. The 2008 
economic downturn, the increase in extreme weather, man-made crises which impact supply chains 
have resulted in performance impact.397 For the senior leadership of an organisation to consider 
investing in the development of an Organisational Resilience culture, there must be the development 
and acceptance of an effective business case for investment. The investment will only be obtained if 
the assumptions within the business case are based on clear evidence which demonstrates the value 
added by the implementation of said Organisational Resilience activities and cultural change. 
Therefore, the development of an Organisational Resilience business case must be as well developed, 
 
397Ceschi A., Fraccaroli F., Costantini A. and Sartori R., `Turning Bad into Good: How Resilience Resources Protect 
Organisations From Demanding Work Environments`, Journal of Workplace Behavioural Health, Routledge, Taylor and Francis 
Group,Volume 32, Issue 4, pp267-289. Available at www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjwb20  
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if not more so, than the case for the procurement of a new piece of operational equipment, the 
development of a new capability, or the hiring of a new member of the team. It must be clearly thought 
out, resourced, supported through clear evidence and demonstrate an effective benefit so that it is able 
to compete with other business cases that are fighting for funding and resources from the executive 
leadership team. The concept of embedding Organisational Resilience must be seen not as another 
silo within the organisation, but rather viewed as the outcome of good management processes, 
operational excellence and effective leadership, supported by proactive business intelligence networks 
to build and maintain situational awareness across the organisation. The ORM3 framework must 
therefore be developed as a holistic mechanism, rather than focussed on a single area of the business 
managed by specialised individuals. It must also obtain and sustain executive leadership support if it is 
to be successfully implemented. The organisation must be comfortable that the level of Organisational 
Resilience within its various suppliers is also effective; if not, no matter how robust the organisation’s 
own level of resilience is, it will be impacted if its supply chain is operating at a far lower resilience 
capability. 
 
Operating within the markets in the 21st century is becoming increasingly complex, with globalisation 
having changed the structure of the marketplace and the speed at which transactions and disruption 
can impact corporate activity. The saturation of once closed markets using technology and online retail 
platforms are driving organisations to take increased risks or face the possibility of going out of 
business. Many of the threats that now exist, such as organised crime, information security risks and 
terrorism, are becoming increasingly complex and difficult to combat. Individuals and organisations 
undertaking these activities are becoming networked and more asymmetric in their approach, making 
it harder to confine the impacts of these activities. As business leaders constantly seek to maintain a 
positive profit margin, new forms of accountability are being introduced. The need to have effective 
corporative governance frameworks in place, proactive corporate social responsibility polices and 
activities to maintain a positive image, and the use of internal assurance and auditing to assist in 
identifying areas of concern before they become areas of vulnerability all place pressure on the 
executive leadership team. Not only is society demanding greater choice, at a faster pace, it is also 
seeking to hold organisations to account and directs them to operate in an ethical manner, in line with 
the Corporate Social Responsibility policies.  
 
4.2 UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFIT 
To address new demands, organisations have transitioned from traditional functional hierarchical 
structures to more networked or matrixed arrangements in a bid to build more responsiveness and 
flexibility to cope with the dynamically changing business space within which they operate. This enables 
organisations to group themselves into tight knit clusters of diverse skill sets and experience, targeted 
at addressing a unique business issue within a given timeframe. This team is empowered by the 
organisation, with the decision-making and accountability devolved to the local level in a bid to maintain 
momentum. Within the military, this is the concept known as “Mission Command”; in business it is 
adaptive leadership. For this approach to be effective, there is the reliance on the leadership team to 
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be comfortable with devolving the decision-making and managing the organisation through trusted 
networks, rather than the historical rigidly hierarchical command and control channels. 
 
Although the UK has developed a standard to define Organisational Resilience at a strategic level, there 
is little consensus at the operational level as to how organisations can turn the strategic direction into 
business activities to deliver success.398 In 2011, Hubert noted that while the topic of resilience was 
nothing new, the ability for organisations to understand how to develop mechanisms to achieve 
resilience is, and as the definition is lacking quality, the approach is not clearly defined and there is a 
limited level of academic research within the UK on how organisational resilience can benefit 
businesses.399 In 2014, in an attempt to address this situation, the British standards Institute developed 
BS:65000 Organisational Resilience, with the intent to provide a clear framework for organisations to 
follow. On review, the standard was positioned as a “guidance” document, rather than a clear 
framework, which failed to provide businesses with clear definitions of how to implement the concepts 
at an operational level. 
 
Organisational Resilience is focussed on the ability of a business to manage disruption, change and 
uncertainty through effective resourcing, leadership and situational awareness. This approach requires 
the ability for the leadership team to concentrate on the long-term development of the organisation, 
rather than the quick financial wins which funds the shareholder returns or leadership bonus payments 
each year. To build the ORM3 framework, there is the requirement for investment at both the financial 
and resourcing levels to design, develop, implement and sustain the initiative. Building such a 
framework would require a cultural change from how many of the current organisations operate within 
the UK market space. The ORM3 framework will not stop all disruptive events from occurring. If 
implemented properly a well-defined framework may significantly reduce the number of disruptive 
events escalating through enabling the organisation to respond more effectively through the 
development of situational awareness. 
 
Within the UK standard, research identified that organisational resilience would bring several benefits 
to those organisations that implemented and maintained a framework. 400 These benefits included:  
 
• An increased level of effective leadership through the development of better situation 
awareness, which informs decision-making and an understanding of the current market trends. 




398BSI, `BS65000:2014: Organisational Resilience`, 2014. 
399Hubert R., Organisational Resilience, Discussion Paper, REX Management Systems GmbH & Co. KG, 2011. Downloaded 
from www.bcm2013.com/papers, accessed 10 September 2017.  
400BSI, `BS65000:2014: Organisational Resilience`, 2014. 
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• A higher level of competitiveness obtained through the ability to identify potential risks / issues 
or opportunities earlier, respond to them to mitigate potential impact and be able to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of other competitors if they fail to react; 
 
• An increased level of efficiency and effectiveness at all levels through the alignment of 
operational activities with relevant strategic resilience outcomes. The operational activities may 
consist of certain tasks which focus on for example, risk identification and management, 
incident response or business continuity, while the strategic outcomes are the development of 
longer-term growth, strategic decision-making and effective leadership. For the benefit to be 
achieved successfully, these activities and outcomes need to be mutually supportive, as this is 
fundamental to the development of an effective ORM3 framework. 
 
• An improved organisational reputation within its supply chain and the community within which 
it operates. This is obtained through an effective corporate social responsibility mechanism, as 
well as better understanding of the interdependencies of communication, brand, organisational 
behaviours and culture, and how it is observed externally. Good communication and ethical 
working increase the trust communities and other organisations have towards the business as 
it provides a level of assurance to the various activities the organisation is conducting. 
 
Further research into how organisations developed various frameworks to assist with the operational 
and strategic requirements identified several other potential areas of benefit that Organisational 
Resilience can deliver. Hubert proposed the introduction of a two-dimensional matrix of components 
which, when integrated, would provide a strong level of Organisational Resilience, providing strength 
and governance to identify and manage the outcome of a disruptive event. The cornerstone of his model 
was his organisational resilience definition;  
 
“Organisational resilience is the ability of an organisation to provide and maintain an acceptable 
level of service in the face of faults and challenges to normal operations by preventing, avoiding 
and resisting damage and recovering quickly.”401  
 
 
401Hubert R., Organisational Resilience, BCM discussion paper 2011. Downloaded from www.bcm2013.com/papers, accessed 
10 September 2017.  
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This was more focussed on 
maintaining the current state, rather 
than using the knowledge to adapt 
and potentially seize the advantage 
over competitors. His model is shown 
in Figure 21. Both these approaches 
demonstrate that the thinking around 
Organisational Resilience was 
focused on the physical aspects of 
risk, governance, security and BCM. 
Little thought had been given to the 
wider functions of the organisation, 
though Hubert does highlight the 
structure required for an organisation to perform, underpinned by the framework of his four key 
components.  
 
The work conducted by 
Cranfield University 
identified that in 2015 only 
one third of CEOs believed 
that their organisations 
were capable of long-term 
survival.402 The Cranfield 
project team reviewed 600 
academic papers, along 
with interviews and insights 
from organisations across 
the globe, to try and 
understand the current 
situation with organisational resilience and to develop a better understanding of the current resilience 
situation within industry. One of the major issues within the current thinking behind Organisational 
Resilience is how should it be applied. The common perception is that Organisational Resilience 
enables an organisation to `bounce-back`, therefore a resilience framework provides a defensive 
mechanism to protect an organisation and enable it to return to its previous state prior to the event 
happening (Figure 22). A second driver of Organisational Resilience is the concept that it is a 
progressive framework, which is aimed at developing internal structures and capabilities to provide early 
warning and avoid the major impact of disruptive events. This provides an organisation the ability to 
`bounce forward’, to obtain a market advantage by maintaining capability while others within its market 
 
402Denyer, D. Organizational Resilience: A summary of academic evidence, business insights and new thinking. BSI and 
Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield, 2017. 
 
Figure 22: Development of Organisational Resilience Thinking Source: 
Cranfield University 
Figure 21: Organisational Resilience Model Source: Hubert 
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area struggle to respond to the disruptive event and the following consequences. The Cranfield Report 
highlighted that the knowledge of Organisational Resilience has developed over time, moving from a 
preventative control method of application, through risk management, business continuity and incident 
preparation to the need to develop paradoxical thinking within the senior leadership groups to consider 
how events could impact on an organisation, unfold into a `wicked problem’ and how resources and 
capabilities within the organisation can be deployed to counter the effects and maintain organisational 
stability.  
 
The lack of understanding as to how the various elements of an organisation are required to work 
together to provide Organisational Resilience was still prevalent in 2014, with Patrick Alacantra, writing 
on behalf of the Business Continuity Institute, continuing to propose that Organisational Resilience was 
focussed on Risk Management, BCM and Governance. This siloed thinking reflected the current issues 
within the wider industry base. Little thought had been given to how softer skills aspects, or 
organisational culture, could impact on the resilience of a business. This research was focussed on 
performance optimisation. Few reviews mentioned the importance of human resource management, or 
stakeholder engagement, or the mobilisation of social capital. These are all key elements in developing 
and maintaining a successful organisation, especially during disruptive events. The ability to innovate 
and adapt is critical in large-scale disruptive events, as each is a unique construct of events, yet, as 
highlighted, few research articles considered the soft skills impact in detail. 
 
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE BENEFITS – ORGANISATION BEHAVIOURAL 
ATTRIBUTES 
In 2015 Bansal described Organisational Resilience as `an incremental capacity of an organisation to 
anticipate and adjust to the environment.’403 He highlights that social resilience is built through 
continuously anticipating and adjusting to potential threats, rather than responding to a single crisis. It 
involves the application of learning, adaptation and the general capability of being able to persist 
through disturbances. While organisations that seek to apply Organisational Resilience through building 
situational awareness and identifying and correcting poor practices, thus reducing risk and loss of 
efficiency, they also seek to benefit from the output, which is the development of a continuous 
improvement awareness, development of flexible resources and the ability to quickly process and 
respond to environmental signals. Together these elements enable an organisation to act as a complex, 
dynamic system, through their management of environmental analysis data and flexible resource 
frameworks, which in turn builds their sustainability and adaptability.404 Key to maintaining the 
situational awareness of the environment is regular engagement with stakeholders and the supply chain 
elements. A good relationship will allow the gathering of data that can warn of early shocks, thus 
enabling the preparation and resource management to be in place to absorb, deflect or avoid the impact. 
The interconnection of situational awareness, stakeholder engagement, flexible resources and adaptive 
 
403Ortiz-de-Mandojana, N. and Bansal, P., The Long-Term Benefits of Organisational Resilience Through Sustainable Business 




leadership, supported by an inclusive and innovative culture, enables an organisation to develop a base 
to build its resilience. Without these factors, an organisation will struggle to adapt to disruptive events.  
 
Building upon the information captured by the BCI and Bansal, in 2016 the Chartered Management 
Institute explored the importance of leadership within the development of Organisational Resilience. It 
identified that crises cannot always be avoided and therefore an organisational leadership team must 
be ready to manage the situation.405 Out of the 1100 managers that they surveyed, 94% indicated they 
had been involved with a company crisis, with only 55% thinking that they had handled it well. The 
surveyed group identified that one of the key factors that caused the crisis to continue was the lack of 
support from senior leadership (78%), with 52% indicating that senior leadership support would have 
helped them manage the situation better. Over 70% said the crisis was exacerbated by mistakes made 
by senior managers. The culture of the organisation is also a major factor to how an organisation will 
respond to a disruptive event. 68% of the group surveyed by the CMI surveyed group identified that 
culture failure was a factor within the crisis that they experienced. 
 
It is also important as part of building Organisational Resilience to understand the impact of a disruptive 
event on the workforce, especially those staff members that are closest to the crisis. Dealing with a 
disruptive event, and the ambiguity and subsequent consequences that it can cause, can be emotionally 
draining and affect the physical and mental resilience and capability of the individual. The group 
surveyed by the CMI highlighted that they struggled to manage the personal impact, with only 36% 
being able to effectively manage the emotional impact it had on themselves. The research by the CMI 
highlights the importance of the interactions between the managers on the ground and the senior 
leadership. The CMI also highlights the importance of making Organisational Resilience focussed on 
people, rather than systems, technology or processes. The engagement of individuals across 
departments and functional silos can help build understanding, develop lessons and embed knowledge 
to help increase a wider level of awareness within an organisation. 
 
The interactions between individuals and departments are key to developing and maintaining a 
resilience culture. Investment within the right behaviours, practices and staff development provides the 
ability for the workforce to flex and absorb the impact of a disruptive event, helping an organisation to 
react and recover. A study by Chakravorty in 2015 into how the US Air Force developed Organisational 
Resilience focussed on how the USAF Warner Robins Air Logistic Complex managed with several 
disruptions to maintain capability.406 The study showed how the organisation focussed on building better 
personnel networks, investment into leadership capability development, explored the current situation 
through systems thinking and analysis, and reviewed required outputs.  
 
 
405Skoberne, K., Plas, L., Ghazelayagh, S and Woodman, P., `Bouncing Back: Leadership Lessons in Resilience', Chartered 
Management Institute, London, 2016, p.7. 
406Chakravorty, S., `Organisational Resilience’, Industrial Engineer, Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineers, Vol 47, issue 
1, Jan 2015, pp 46-50. Downloaded from www.iise.org/industrialengineer/details.aspx?id=38360 on 10 Jan 2018. 
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The study identified that to survive disruptive events, organisations need to invest in a collaborative 
working approach, rather than working in separate functions, to maintain resilience and capability. The 
second key observation was that to build the resilience capability, an organisation needs to invest, 
maintain and display positive behaviours within the workforce to manage disruptions. Through 
displaying positive feedback loops within behaviours, staff delivered a significant performance increase, 
while negative feedback loops provided little or no performance improvement. This impact is shown in 
the work conducted by the CMI, which highlighted that 63% of the manager group surveyed admitted 
to their personal performance being impacted by the disruptive event they had experienced, with almost 
80% indicating it had caused an impact on their personal lives.407 By developing a greater situational 
awareness, through systems thinking and mapping, cross-functional engagement and developing a 
lessons learnt framework, organisations can start to understand what potential events may occur, and 
what actions can be put in place to mitigate against the occurrence the issue of them occurring, and 
managing the effect once they do occur. This level of anticipation of potential threats and organisational 
vulnerabilities is crucial pre and post disruptive events. By having an understanding where the 
organisation is weak, the executive leadership team can take steps to minimise the impact. Anticipation 
also promotes horizon scanning, assisting in providing the required level of intelligence on the potential 
changes that may occur in the near and distant future that may impact on the organisation. 
 
The work by Bansal, the CMI, Hubert and Cranfield University identified that there was something more 
than just good incident management and business continuity frameworks required for building 
organisational resilience. For businesses to be competitive, they need to be able to innovate, remain 
relevant to the market need and continuously improve and expand their products into emerging or 
expanding markets. To develop this capability requires a clearly defined vision, supported by the correct 
leadership framework. Underpinning this is the need to develop the correct organisational culture that 
embraces learning and adaptation as part of the DNA of the business. A good organisational framework 
for developing resilience will seek to invest heavily into these three areas as this will provide the 
foundations on which to build the operational activities to deliver the correct level of resilience across 
the organisation. Within the organisation, the executive leadership team provide the thought leadership 
to develop and implement this central core of strategic direction to the organisation. Such a move will 
require a highly effective leadership team, as embedding a resilience culture, which embraces learning, 
innovation and adaptation, will in itself rely on transformational leadership to change the cultural 
footprint of the organisation from relying on several corporate security activities, such as incident 
management, business continuity and risk management, to developing a strategic outcome focussed 
on Organisational Resilience. 
 
Work in this area by the Australian Government in 2016 sought to develop this concept into key activities 
for application for businesses across the Australian Commonwealth. The work conducted identified that 
 
407Skoberne, K. et al., Bouncing Back, Chartered Management Institute, 2016, p.11. 
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organisations that embedded an Organisational Resilience culture would receive the following strategic 
benefits when operating within an uncertain environment.408 
 
• Have the operational flexibility to seize and maximise new opportunities; 
• Have stronger BAU performance, higher profit margins and better return on investment; 
• During disruptions, maintain operational continuity for longer and return to BAU more quickly 
than competitors; and 
• Maintain and build reputation by minimising disruption to clients, communities and 
organisations reliant on their services. 
 
In 2011, research conducted on developing the resilience capability of the Australian CNI identified that 
the embedding of an Organisational Resilience culture within the relevant CNI functions would deliver 
extensive benefits in the areas of leadership, managing change and organisational performance.409 The 
work also identified that although the ability to have corporate security frameworks in place, such as 
incident response, risk management and business continuity, there also existed three strategic 
behavioural attributes to delivering effective Organisational Resilience. These were focused on 
leadership and culture, networks and being ready for disruptive change.410 By developing a positive 
approach to these three behavioural strands, it was proposed that organisations can manage the impact 
of a disruptive event far more effectively. The research into several organisations and how they 
responded to crises identified that the ingrained culture of an organisation can have a profound impact 
on how the leadership responds to a disruptive event and how long the crisis may last. It studied two 
similar sized organisations that dealt with a burst water pipe, and how they approached it (Table 12): 
 
Factor Type of Organisation 
 Accountancy Practice Law Practice 
Size 36 staff 
2 Storey building 
36 staff 
2 Storey building 
Issue Flooding due to over-flowing toilet 
cistern 




6 days 6 weeks 
Approach taken Collaborative approach 
Staff consulted and informed 
Early planning 






Impact Increased trust 
Staff empowerment 
Reduction in complexity and costs 
Loss of reputation 
Staff frustration 
Increased costs 
Table 12: Case Study on Resilience Behavioural Attributes. Source: Australian Government 
 
 
408Australian Government, `Organisational Resilience: Good Business Guide’, Brouggy P., (ed), Attorney General’s 
Department, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p.2. 
409Australian Government, `Organisational Resilience: Position Paper for Critical Infrastructure., Attorney General’s Department, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. 
410Ibid, p.14-15.  
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The case studies clearly identified the need for organisations to focus on building an effective 
behavioural approach, as well as having the correct practices and procedures in place. It was evident 
that several organisations relied on IT systems to manage the crisis response, rather than the 
leadership team. Organisations require the presence of effective leadership, supported with the correct 
culture, to navigate a rapidly changing risk environment which is characterised by the presence of 
disruptive technologies, globalisation, increasing technological complexity within the market space, 
while also contending with natural disasters, extreme weather events and the accelerating rate of 
change within the political, societal and environmental spheres. Organisations need to set a clear vision 
to set the direction around which to build the various resilience capabilities. This vision, supported 
through the culture and leadership teams, will position the value proposition for the organisation. It will 
promote the need for developing an organisational approach to learning, empowerment of the staff and 
the need to build a corporate body of knowledge to enhance the capability of the organisation to respond 
to, recover and adapt from disruptive events. 
 
4.4 BUILDING ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
To enable organisations to succeed within this environment, there is the need to support the strategic 
resilience elements that have been identified with operational activities to embed the strategic concepts. 
Work done by the Carnegie Mellon Group in the development of the CERT-RIMM framework focussed 
on developing operational resilience, focussing on the disciplines of security, business continuity and 
aspects of IT operations.411 This approach, by the US Department of Defense, demonstrates a limited 
way of thinking when it comes to resilience; the lack of behavioural attributes and socially focussed 
activities to support the implementation of a resilience culture impact on the effectiveness of the 
organisation. There is a need to build a framework at the operational level to support the development 
of the strategic concepts. The following section analyses current thinking within the resilience sphere 
and discusses the benefits that such a framework can deliver within an organisation. 
 
Literature on making a business case for Organisational Resilience is very limited within both the 
academic and practitioner spheres, though there have been several reports on the importance of 
developing an effective business case for sustainability and for Change Management for businesses.412 
These reports noted the importance of being able to communicate the level of performance across the 
organisation to help maintain the social performance and social engagement, which in turn supports 
the development and sustainment of competitive advantage. These reports assisted in creating an 
understanding pertaining to the relationship amongst the drivers, activities, measures and the critical 
paths within the organisations to develop better sustainability and management of change. In 2016 the 
Australian Government, based on the previous research into CNI resilience, developed the resilience 
 
411Allen J. H., and Davis N., Measuring Operational Resilience Using the CERT Resilience Management Model, Cert Program, 
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, US Department of Defense, 2010.  
412Schaltegger, S., Ludeke-Freund, F. and Hansen, E.G., Business Cases for Sustainability: The Role of Business Model 
Innovation for Corporate Sustainability, International Journal for Innovation and Sustainable Development, Vol 6 No.2, 2012. 
Downloaded from www.researchgate.net/publication/296013169; Abouzaglo S. and Kirschen T., `Why a Business Case for 




framework for business. This framework aimed to identify where organisations may acquire operational 
benefit when they implemented Organisational Resilience framework across the business. 
 
In the context for building the business case for Organisational Resilience, the ability to link the 
relationship between outcomes, activities and proposed resilience investment initiatives is critical to 
enabling the executive leadership team to decide what to support. The work by the Australian 
Government for building greater resilience within organisations incorporated into the framework’s 
physical and behavioural attributes (Figure 23). Through the clear measurement of the various 
operational elements, the organisation would develop an enhanced reputation, an improved level of risk 
management and situational awareness. This would in turn inform the leadership team’s decision-
making processes, providing an increased likelihood of surviving large-scale disruptive events. 
 
Research into the effectiveness of 
organisational governance and its 
impact on resilience by Lampel, 
Bhalla and Jha in 2014 identified 
that there was a strong correlation 
between the level of investment 
and engagement of the employees 
and the stability of the 
organisation’s performance.413 The 
research also noted that employee 
owned organisations had a longer 
investment payback horizon, and 
that strategic decision-making the 
leadership team were quicker to 
engage and seek input from the 
employees, creating a collaborative 
and empowered organisation. This also enabled a tighter coupling between operational feedback and 
decision-making, creating a stronger organisational learning loop. Their research identified that having 
a defined and embedded resilience framework, supported through employee engagement and strong 
governance, is beneficial when an organisation is facing a crisis. They noted that resilience should not 
be confused with survival; resilience is about maintaining the long-term social capital and operational 
integrity.  
 
An example of how the development of a resilience culture that integrates the social aspect, employee 
engagement and a strong ethical approach to building that capability can be witnessed in the recovery 
 
413Lampel J., Bhalla A. and Jha P.P., `Does Governance Confer Organisational Resilience? Evidence from UK Employee 
Owned Businesses, European Management Journal, Elsevier ltd, Vol. 32, 2014, pp. 66 – 72.  




of the law firm Sandler O’Neill & Partners, captured by Freeman in 2003.414 The law practice lost 39% 
of its workforce, its complete physical infrastructure and 66% of its management committee in the 2001 
World Trade Center Buildings attacks. Within three months it was back to trading and profitable, and 
within twelve months was performing better than it had done prior to the attack, despite the downturn 
experienced by Wall Street. The study shows that while leadership capability and slack resources 
enabled the organisation to survive, the ability to mobilise its social capital, through a strong moral 
purpose to survive, provided a driving force that was bought into by staff, customers and stakeholders. 
Freeman, Hirschhorn and Maltz expanded the framework of Organisational Resilience to also include 
the organisation's vision and culture. Though the company was decimated, the drive to succeed, allied 
with a new moral purpose, enabled it to mobilise the social capital of ex-employees, current staff and 
customers. By developing a strong moral driver, which set the core vision and culture of the 
organisation, managed by the adaptive leadership style of Jimmy Dunne, the remaining board member, 
the firm was able to utilise its social capital to pull it out of the crisis and maintain its resilience. By 
focussing on the employees, supporting all those that had lost family members, plus assuring the firm’s 
clients that the firm would continue to function, Dunne was able to mobilise the latent capability of the 
firm’s social capital and turn it into a dynamic driving force in re-building the organisation. This enabled 
the organisation to utilise the various avenues of support to rebuild its operations and capability, while 
larger organisations struggled in the aftermath of the attack.415 
 
The ability of the remaining leadership team to respond and recover quickly through the leadership 
style, the vision and cultural direction enabled the organisation to grow rapidly. While other 
organisations were still trying to recover, the company had adapted to the new situation and 
demonstrated a recovery capability not seen in others, much larger than itself. Sandler O'Neill was 
upheld as an example of Wall Street recovery capability, with other organisations seeking to learn the 
methods. Sandler O'Neill was able to restructure and re-design its operating model, thus increasing its 
speed of adaptability and growth. Sandler O’Neill had demonstrated a strong level of Organisational 
Resilience through the delivery of a holistic response to a catastrophic Black Swan event. 
 
 
414Freeman, S., Hirschhorn, L. and Maltz M., `Organizational Resilience and Moral Purpose: Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P. in 





Within the rail industry a recent 
example of poor governance and 
questionable organisational 
behaviours is the collapse of 
Carillion.416 Due to poor 
governance practices and strategic 
decision-making by the directors, 
the organisation's profits were 
reduced by £845m, with the shares 
dropping in value by 70% in late 
2017 (Figure 24). The overall 
impact noted in September 2017 
was £1.2bn, which completely 
negated the previous eight years profits.417 The government report also highlights poor behaviours from 
the external auditing and assurance organisations, which failed to prevent the directors authorising 
Carillion from agreeing to loans that outstripped its available assets by 283%.418 The application of poor 
governance does not only impact the organisation, it can also create strategic issues for the supply 
chain that supplies the organisation. As a result of the impact of Carillion’s collapse, several CNI 
organisations which had contracts with Carillion were forced to implement risk management and 
continuity plans.  
 
BS 13500 sets out the governance model 
(Figure 25). It is a symbiotic relationship 
between the leadership team, the culture and 
purpose of the organisation, and the 
accountability framework that is used to audit 
the business. By aligning these elements, it 
creates the proper organisational behaviours, 
with then builds trust and credibility with the 
stakeholder groups. The governance structure 
is aligned to the culture and vision of the 
organisation, with the objectives being set by the 
governing body to enable the organisation to 
achieve the business vision. Another element 
that is key to developing a strong governance 
framework is the ability to develop collaborative working practices across the organisation and industry. 
By conducting effective joint working practices businesses can address potential risks and issues, 
 
416Mor F., Conway L., Thurley D. and Booth L., `The Collapse of Carillion', House of Commons Briefing Paper Series, Number 
8206, House of Commons Library, Whitehall, London, 2018.  
417Ibid, p.5. 
418Ibid, p.16. 
Figure 24: Carillion Financial Figures Source: UK Government 
Figure 25: BS13500 Governance Model Source: BSI 
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minimise duplication of effort, share knowledge and research and minimise disruptive events through 
collective intelligence gathering and sharing. Allied with the effective vision and strong leadership, this 
approach can support the culture of organisational learning. 
 
Work conducted in 2006 by the DEMOS institute noted that many of the organisations that they spoke 
to remarked that there was a high level of frustration within senior managers when it came to having 
their recommendations for resilience building activities being rejected. 419 Old school corporate security 
activities were still seen as being core to the executive leadership team’s strategic planning, rather than 
the development and sustainment of strong governance and a culture of learning. The report identified 
that there was a need for many organisations to accept that the security department was now being 
faced with many other corporate functions, such as information assurance, business continuity and 
reputation management. The research by DEMOS, the BSI, Lampet et al and Freeman et al identified 
that the areas of corporate security, governance and operating procedures have converged as the 
landscape has become more complex. Corporate governance is recognised as providing the framework 
within which security, risk and information assurance activities operate. The DEMOS report discussed 
the wider aspects of corporate security, and the need for organisations to start developing the capability 
to manage the increased complexity.420 
 
Detailed investigations and research by the DEMOS institute identified multiple aspects of 
Organisational Resilience that 
successful organisations possessed 
(Figure 26). The research identified 
several approaches based on 
security, assurance, networks and 
relationships, leadership, staff 
focussed approaches and effective 
levels of governance. The report 
proposed that, based on the 
extensive research conducted, 
resilience was more than an effective 
corporate security framework; 
resilience relied on the senior 
leadership understanding the various 
concepts and requirements to ensure 
that it was effectively managed. It noted that there was a growing acceptance that individuals being 
placed into resilience building activities require professional development and experience within the 
field. If organisations wish to develop an in-house capability, there is also the need to have in place a 
clear career structure to enable the sustainment of Organisational Resilience knowledge. 
 
419Briggs R. and Edwards C., The Business of Resilience, Corporate Security of the 21st Century, 2006. Available at 
www.demos.co.uk, accessed on 20 September 2015. 
420 Ibid. P.32 – 35. 





McManus and Stephenson both reflect on the need to consider the organisation as a complex adaptive 
system, consisting of multiple systems operating in support of each other to deliver the working 
organisation. With the identification of the multiple factors by DEMOS in 2006, and the findings from the 
various reports in the space shuttle disasters, or the research by T D O’Rourke into Hurricane Katrina, 
it is clear that the development of Organisational Resilience requires the organisation to be seen as a 
system of systems, interacting with and being dependent on each other.421 Systems thinking posits that 
the sum of the systems is greater than the agents themselves. Within an organisation the resilience 
capability to manage the impact of disruptive events relies on more than just an effective response and 
recovery procedure from the corporate security departments. This now creates a complex but mutually 
supporting system of systems, as each element can impact or support another element to manage a 
disruptive event impact. If the organisation, under the concept of organisational learning, or continuous 
improvement, seeks to analyse and understand the causes of disruptive events, and then adjusts its 
structure, behaviours, culture or frameworks based on the findings, then it has begun to adapt to its 
environment. In essence, the organisation has now become a complex adaptive system, able to conduct 
horizon scanning and adapt before a disruptive event occurs in order to minimise the impact. 
 
This work by McManus and Stephenson identified the impact that the structure of an organisation may 
have on the ability for it to develop and sustain effective Organisational Resilience. A dynamic 
environment can create complex situations with multiple factors that can impact the organisation. These 
factors create complex issues and emergent strategic changes. As the organisation seeks to manage 
the emergent strategic changes, it is also managing the impact they are having on the operational 
activities of the company, with the various systems responding to the pressures being exerted on them. 
The incorrect organisational structure will prevent effective management of the various departments, 
resulting in siloed responses and actions, which can impact on response time, communications, 
resource management and 
financial or operational impact. 
 
The typical historical structure for 
UK industry is the top down M 
(Multi-divisional or “spider”) 
shaped organisation (Command 
and Control), (Figure 27), with a 
central leadership team directing 
how the organisation behaves, 
the key decisions it makes and 
how it responds to external stimuli from the markets. Research by Brafman and Beckstrom in 2006 
identified that organisations that stuck to this sort of framework struggled with the complexity of the 
 
421National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Columbia Accident Investigation Board. n.p.: NASA, 2003, available 
at https://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html; O’Rourke, T. D., `Critical infrastructure, Interdependencies, and 
Resilience’, The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, 2007, pp 22-29. 




modern markets.422 With such a rigid framework in place, the organisation could not react quickly 
enough to disruptive events, resulting in the organisation experiencing operational and financial impact 
to its performance. Their book sites several examples of large-scale organisations being heavily 
impacted by smaller, networked challengers that can operate at a far quicker pace, with smaller 
overheads. For organisations to respond effectively they need to operate like complex adaptive 
systems, with various departments interlinked and networked with a certain level of empowered 
decision-making to enable faster response. 
 
By taking this approach, 
the organisation will move 
to a more decentralised 
framework, which, 
according to Yardley, as 
well as Brafman and 
Beckstrom, will create an 
N-shaped organisation 
(Networked or “starfish”) 
(Figure 28).423 As an N 
shaped organisation, there 
are primary relationships 
(red lines) and secondary 
relationships (blue dashed 
lines), which provides greater agility and empowerment. As the business enters a period of significant 
change, there is need for a more authentic leadership style to come to the fore and deliver the desired 
organisational outcomes critical to the success of the strategic business plan. The development of an 
organisational culture, supported by the executive leadership team to empower various functions / 
departments to make decisions, based on the vision set out for the organisation, provides a greater 
capability for responding to and recovering from disruptive events.  
 
A de-centralised approach also provides the organisation with the ability to become a more proactive 
influence within the marketspace. By becoming more flexible, the organisation can avoid stagnation 
and promote innovation and creativity. Brafman and Beckstrom discuss how getting the balance 
between the M and N frameworks, creating a hybrid model, can result in increased performance, 
security and innovation, as well as developing a learning culture, through the analysis of how Toyota 
turned around a failing General Motors industrial plant.424 
 
 
422Brafman O. and Beckstrom R.A., The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organisations, Penguin 
Books Ltd, London, 2006. 
423Yardley, I. et al, From Battlefield to Boardroom, 2012: Brafman O. and Beckstrom R.A., The Starfish and the Spider, 2006. 
424Brafman O. and Beckstrom R.A., The Starfish and the Spider, 2006, pp.179 -184. 
Figure 28: Networked (N) Shaped Organisational Structure. Source Yardley 
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Figure 28, which reflects a more distributed organisation, can be witnessed in organisations with 
devolved leadership functions, complex insurgent / terrorist groups and the UK military. The military, 
when deployed on operations, are structured along the lines of a system of systems approach, providing 
the ability to rapidly adapt to the situation with which the group is faced, as elements are loosely coupled 
to various parts of the organisation based on the requirement at the time. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. 
 
This flexibility to adjust the shape and resources available at a given time provides an organisation with 
a far greater level of resilience when encountering dynamic change and complex situations. The 
research into how the Command Teams within the military managed to build and sustain their resilience 
while experiencing complex disruptive events over a sustained period identified multiple operational 
benefits. These included: 
 
• Clear understanding of the situation and an informed assessment based on available 
intelligence; 
• Effective and decisive decision-making, based on facts and analysis; 
• Effective intelligence gathering mechanisms; 
• Co-ordination of effort across various teams against a defined end state; 
• Effective leadership and direction to the teams; 
• Regular and clear communication articulated in multi-media form; 
• Effective monitoring and tracking of the situation and impacting factors; 
• Freedom to delegate tasks with an empowered workforce operating through Mission 
Command; 
• Effective prioritisation of activity based on threat to the organisation; 
• Effective assurance mechanisms (Red teaming, wargaming, back briefings); 
• Effective planning cycles and clear handover to operations team; 
• Stress management of the team; and 
• Effective Lessons learnt framework (Hot debriefs, After Action Reviews, Application of lessons). 
 
This reflects the Command Skills characteristics noted by Crichton, Lauche and Flin in their research 
into how to build effective Incident Command Skills for organisations to help minimise the impact of 
complex disruptive events and build Organisational Resilience.425 In their work they identified ten key 
skills that enhanced an effective response and increased resilience. These 10 skills were: 
 
• Situation Assessment • Monitoring 
• Decision-making • Delegating 
• Team coordination • Prioritising 
• Leadership • Planning 
 
425Crichton MT, Lauche K. and Flin R., `Incident Command Skills in the Management of an Oil Industry Drilling Incident', Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, Volume 13 Number 3, 2005 
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• Communicating • Stress management 
 
Research by David Denyer in 2017 also noted that the development of Organisational Resilience within 
a business would bring the following outcomes: 426 
 
• Performance Optimisation; 
• Preventative Control; 
• Adaptive Innovation; and 
• Mindful Action. 
 
Together these outcomes would enable an organisation to build the “ability to anticipate, prepare for, 
and respond and adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions.”427 
 
The ability to build and sustain 
Organisational Resilience 
requires engagement with 
internal and external 
stakeholders and organisations 
through robust and connected 
communication channels. This 
capability is, as demonstrated 
by the military exercises, reliant 
on the development and 
retention of key personnel and 
the knowledge and experience 
that they bring. Crichton et al 
also noted that the Incident 
Response Management skills shown by the military and Emergency Services are developed through 
training, continuous development, organisational culture and an understanding of potential issues / 
threats that they may face based on evidential learning. The observations of the live case study 
exercises highlighted that the greater the ability of the organisation, the better its level of resilience 
building activities and approach to learning. This in turn impacted on how it managed the response to 
complex disruptive events that were made part of the exercise scenarios (Figure 29). To build and 
obtain the benefits of an effective Organisational Resilience framework, there is the requirement to 
create a blend of the following: 
 
• Effective leadership; 
 
426Denyer, D. Organizational Resilience: A Summary of Academic Evidence, Business Insights and New Thinking. British 
Standards Institute and Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, 2017. 
427Denyer, D. Organizational Resilience, 2017, p.18. 
Figure 29: Organisational Ability and Impact on Organisational 
Resilience. Source: Author 
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• Empowered workforce; 
• Learning culture; 
• Understanding of the situation and mitigations;  
• Correct practices and processes in place; 
• Effective intelligence gathering and analysis; 
• Correct structural frameworks; 
• Effective and sustained communications with all stakeholders; and 
• Investment and continuous development of the workforce. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The development of Organisational Resilience provides organisations with the ability to survive and 
adapt to disruptive events, enabling them to maintain capability and return to delivering normal service 
to their customer base once they have recovered. The current thought processes around the 
development of Organisational Resilience has delivered a shift in business thinking and the 
requirements of how organisations review their operating practices and procedures, though there are 
few tools or guides on how to build an effective mesh, connecting them in a holistic framework. 
Processes, such as business continuity, governance, risk management and incident response and 
recovery, do not in themselves provide an organisation with the ability to maintain its resilience within a 
competitive market. Each factor by itself delivers a tactical capability. Together they provide a level of 
strategic capability, but unless they are aligned with the corporate vision, supported by the senior 
leadership and are recognised as part of the organisational culture and therefore accepted by the 
workforce, they may not receive proper investment.  
 
The investment into an Organisational Resilience management framework requires strategic leadership 
buy-in. While tactical activities, such as incident response or risk management, can deliver immediate 
results, the result and benefits of a resilience culture are not immediately apparent. It may take several 
years for the holistic approach developed through the implementation of an Organisational Resilience 
management framework to deliver results, as few companies or organisations record the number of 
disruptive events that are avoided. Only by tracking the performance of an organisation over time, 
mapped against a similar historic reference period, can an organisation demonstrate any benefits from 
the frameworks.  
 
While the long-term benefits may take time to track and demonstrate, an organisation with a high-level 
of resilience can deliver its core capabilities while managing the initial impact of a disruptive event, 
creating the time to form the required elements to manage the response and recovery activities. The 
observations of the military methods of developing resilience capability identified key components; a 
system of systems approach; effective intelligence gathering and analysis; effective communications; 
an adaptive leadership framework; and a supportive culture. The final part of the resilience jigsaw is the 
ongoing learning and continuous improvement that is required to obtain the strategic benefit of 




This element of the research has sought to build and clearly define the business case for the need for 
Organisational Resilience, and the approach to effectively manage it. There is a need to invest in a 
long-term sustainable framework to build organisational capability, starting from the culture, through the 
leadership framework and vision to the tactical components of the business. Building operational 
excellence and co-ordinating activities with a systems approach will build resilience. When supported 
with evidence-based cultural change activities, driven by a double loop learning approach, an 
organisation can move from just surviving a disruptive event to transforming itself through learning from 






CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is structured to provide an overview of the case study information that was captured during 
the research phase of the thesis. Each organisation is briefly described, with key issues that impact on 
the resilience of the organisation presented. It will initially set out the context of the organisation and 
the wider framework within which it functions, before exploring the various issues that the organisation 
has experienced, and the impact that has had on its level of resilience. A detailed discussion of the 
various elements is conducted within the next chapter to help build a greater knowledge base of the 
issues and impacts. The knowledge obtained from each case study is then used in the following 
chapters to inform the development of the ORM3 framework, which develops a means to analyse and 
assess the resilience capability across an organisation. 
 
The discussion of Organisational Resilience in each of the case study organisations that follows is 
structured to assist in the development of the ORM3 framework, using previous research in the field of 
Organisational Resilience as a guide to assist in identifying key areas for consideration. It looks at the 
three areas of strategic leadership, management of disruptive events and strategic planning capability, 
providing a clear understanding of the problem statement, key issues and consequences. This chapter 
analyses the railway industry and activities of the UK military over the period 2002 – 2018, setting the 
context of the resilience challenge. This provides the ability to conduct a clear comparison between 
industry and the military, with the case studies focussed on critical elements of the organisation 
responsible for delivering the core activities that enable the organisation to achieve its performance 
requirements. 
 
In the modern world certain skills are required when individuals or teams are faced with disruptive 
events, with different requirements placed on the leadership and management of the situation and the 
ways they are delivered. To increase the probability of success, specific requirements, tailored to the 
event, need to be applied in a timely manner. The management of large-scale disruptive events or 
routine performance issues require a blend of leadership and management competencies to enable an 
individual to lead a response team and give effective direction. Within the UK the most relevant example 
of an organisation which has experienced a significant change programme, with a diffuse and large 
workforce, while simultaneously incorporating a cultural change and a staff reduction programme, is the 
UK military. 
 
Regarding the rail industry, this chapter provides a historical overview of the recent British railway, 
before analysing the strategic context within which it operates. It reviews key components of the rail 
community, the operational constraints, issues and key challenges that face the industry. This chapter 
also examines similar aspects of the UK military, analysing recent campaigns that they have been 
involved in, the challenges, issues and complexities it has faced caused by a dynamically changing 
operational environment, and the impact that this has had to the resilience capability. This analysis of 
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both organisations provides the benchmarking of the problem situation which this thesis answers 
through the study of an organisation that possesses a good level of resilience. The issues around 
building and maintaining a culture of Organisational Resilience are also discussed, utilising evidence 
collected from research that is case study based, providing the information to answer the research 
question. 
 
5.2 SETTING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
Both the military and the rail industry have an economic influence on the UK economy, either through 
defence equipment procurement or the movement of goods. Both organisations suffer the tensions of 
centralization vs decentralization. Both are also subject to government regulation and budget scrutiny. 
Recent events in the UK over the last 15 years have resulted in both the military and rail industry having 
to implement resilience processes to manage the impact of major disruptive events. The UK political 
and economic landscape has been subject to destabilising events over the last two decades, through 
two protracted military campaigns, the actions and impact of the 2008 financial crisis, the ongoing 
political turmoil of Brexit, resulting in the political management of the nation becoming severely 
disrupted, or the current Covid-19 pandemic, which has resulted in a potential paradigm cultural shift to 
how businesses operate. This level of change and disruption is likely to continue over the next 30 
years.428 Ongoing natural and human disruptive events, such as extreme weather events, increased 
terrorist attacks or more sophisticated cyber assaults on the CNI, have forced organisations to rapidly 
implement changes to their structures and production lines. The recent impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic, Brexit, the political fallout of the 2017 General Election and the movement of European 
based organisations have led to several strategic shocks to the UK industry base. 
 
In 2007 the UK experienced exceptional flooding events, with the country experiencing the wettest 
summer since records began, with over 55,000 properties flooded, 13 fatalities and the military deployed 
to assist local councils.429 Transport networks were badly disrupted, and the 2007 UK floods were 
ranked as the most expensive in the world, with the insurance industry paying out in excess of £3 billion, 
causing the country’s largest peacetime emergency since World War II.430 The larger issue caused by 
the winter weather during 2007 was the identification by central government of resilience limitations 
within the transport sector, key infrastructure providers and local communities, with many businesses 
unable to trade for months.431 There was the identification of a poor level of senior leadership, with the 
Pitt Review highlighting that within organisations: 
 
 
428Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme, fifth edition – Global Strategic Trends out to 2045, Defence Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, Swindon, 2014, p.xiii. 
429Pitt M., The Pitt Review: Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods, The Cabinet Office, London. Available from 
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk, p. ix. 
430Ibid, p. vii. 
431Ibid, pp. vii - x. 
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“Change will only happen with strong and more effective leadership across the board…” 
with a need to “be much clearer about who does what…” and “be willing to work together 
and share information.”432 
 
Within the transport sector in 2008 major significant tranches of disruption occurred across the railway 
network as work conducted by industry members failed to keep to the planned schedules, forcing an 
investigation by the ORR that identified that the major disruption in February 2008 was caused by over-
running engineering works and poor planning. It was compounded by poor information management 
and notification by the industry to passengers seeking to use the rail network.433 This observation was 
replicated within a study conducted by the National Audit Office in 2008 on the management of 
information to passengers during disruption on the railway. It identified that: 
 
“More could be done, however, particularly in dealing with incidents which require the 
cooperation of third parties. There is scope to build more effective relationships and to 
improve contingency planning. There are also shortcomings in the way that passengers 
are handled when incidents occur and there is scope for the rail industry to keep them 
better informed when they are delayed.”434 
 
In 2009-10 and 2012-2013 the country suffered extensive periods of exceptional cold weather, and in 
the winter of 2013 – 14 the country was struck by heavy winter storms and a severe tidal surge on the 
East Coast. History indicates that the impact of severe weather is bad for the UK economy. In the last 
quarter of 2010 the UK’s GDP fell by 0.6%, most of this being attributed to the effects of the weather.435 
This equated to £280 million a day being lost from the UK economy.436 In February 2014 the railway 
link to the Southwest was severely damaged, costing the economy an estimated £20m daily; repairs 
were estimated to cost £35m over an eight-week period.437 During the Christmas period of 2014 the UK 
experienced several critical infrastructure resilience failures, including;  
 
▪ The railway network ground to a halt around London, leading to an inquiry to be raised by the 
Department of Transport into the Rail Network performance;438  
 
▪ 10 main hospital trusts across the UK reported the need to initiate major incident procedures 
as Accident and Emergency response targets were missed;439  
 
 
432Ibid, p. x. 
433Passenger Focus, `ORR investigation into Network Rail’s New Year engineering overruns report', 2008. 
434National Audit Office, `Reducing Passenger Rail Delays by Better Management of Incidents’, Comptroller and Auditor 
General, House of Commons, The Stationary Office, London, 2008, p.7 
435HoCTSC, Tenth Report of Session 2013 – 2014, `Ready and Waiting? Transport preparations for Winter Weather’, The 
Stationary Office, 03 January 2014, p.6. 
436HoCTSC: `Keeping the UK Moving: The Impact on Transport of the Winter Weather in December 2010’, The Stationary 
Office, London, 2011, p.3. 
437BBC News website 4 Apr 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-26874503 
438http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-30607689 accessed 04 Jan 2015. 
439http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-30694056 accessed 06 Jan 2015. 
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▪ The UK oil industry was under extreme pressure as the price of crude oil continued to fall;440 
  
▪ Heathrow, Gatwick and smaller airports were struck with a traffic control centre failure resulting 
in 10000+ passengers being affected, resulting in an independent inquiry being commissioned 
to investigate the cause;441 and 
  
▪ The British press were raising serious concerns about the capability of the UK energy sector to 
meet demand thus impacting on the ability to maintain an effective recovery programme.442  
 
Within a period of twenty-eight days many of the strategic organisations critical to the smooth 
functioning of the UK had witnessed a major disruptive event which affected capability, performance 
and brand reputation. It seemed that the lessons identified in 2007 had not been fully applied by 2014, 
evidenced by the strategic resilience failure of the CNI organisations.  
 
In a similar timeframe, the UK military found itself experiencing multiple complex campaigns facing 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, while undergoing several strategic reviews, re-organisations of 
capabilities and realignment of its organisational structures, hampered by poor strategic leadership, 
lack of political vision and complex resource issues.443 In contrast to the Cold War experience of inter-
state conflict framed by the interests and postulations of two super-powers, more recent intra-state 
conflict has become increasingly complex.444 Dr Paul Cornish notes that 
 
“What is clear, and what complicates the debate still further, is that much of the response to 
these threats and hazards will have to be developed and delivered within a broad framework 
of domestic policy, rather than confined narrowly to considerations of defence in the Cold 
War style or pursued at arm’s length under the rubric of foreign policy.”445 
 
The 20th Century saw a revolution in military affairs (RMA) focussed on the speed of information 
available and how it is managed across multiple platforms, with the UK military utilising a `system of 
systems’ approach. The employment of emerging technologies, stand-off precision munitions and fully 
integrated Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Information (C4I) systems enabled 
strike capability from distance.446 The perceived benefits of the new ways of warfare failed to arrive, 
with the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns demonstrating that the Western approach to large-scale 
 
440http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30693905 accessed 06 Jan 2015 
441http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30474738 accessed on 06 Jan 2015. 
442http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29038804 accessed 07 Jan 2015. 
443Gracey A., `Five Years On, Lessons From Iraq.` British Army Review Special Report: Lessons from Combat, Volume 3, 
2014; King A., Military Command in the Last Decade, British Army Review, 2011, pp20 – 31; King A., Command: The Twenty-
first Century General, 2019; Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 2012; Mansoor, P., `The British Army and Lessons of the Iraq War’, 
British Army Review, 2009, pp11-15; Mackay A. and Tatham, S., `Behavioural Conflict - From General to Strategic Corporal: 
Complexity, Adaptation and Influence', The Shrivenham Papers, 2009; Mackay A and Tatham S, Behavioual Conflict: Why 
Understanding People and Their Motivations Wil Prove Decisive in Future Conflict, 2011; North, R., Ministry of Defeat: The 
British War in Iraq 2003 – 2009, 2009. 
444MoD, JDN 3/11 (2011) page 1-1. 
445Cornish, P., (ed), Britain and Security, The Smith Institute, 2007, p.9. Available from www.smith-institute.org.uk accessed 02 
Mar 2015. 
446Gautam, P. K., `Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture’, 2009. 
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warfare was not effective when involved in a low intensity conflict, operating within urbanised 
environments. This resulted in the re-consideration of the hybrid warfare threat and the complex 
environment that it created. With the 24-hour media coverage and tactical events resulting in strategic 
impacts, the UK required a more population-centric approach to building resilience within failed or failing 
states that allowed it to focus the capabilities of cross-governmental influence, rather than creating an 
over-reliance on military solutions to predominately political problems. The analysis of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan campaigns enable a study of how the failure of setting a political vison, poor development 
of strategy, ineffective military strategic leadership and a lack of institutional level learning can impact 
of the ability to develop and sustain Organisational Resilience. 
 
The study of military operations provides an opportunity to observe lessons, which can be used to inform 
industry on how to manage complex problems. Increasingly, the Contemporary Operating Environment 
(COE) has seen the blurring of the battlefield and the financial markets becoming increasingly common, 
with financial establishments, corporations and large-scale public events becoming legitimate targets 
for hostile forces as they embark on 4GW conflict activities. This has resulted in military personnel 
requiring education in identifying and correctly collecting financial documents, credit cards and signs of 
financial transactions during searches within hostile areas. In September 2014 the MoD, along with HM 
Treasury, conducted an international study event in Counter Threat Finance and the means to address 
the situation within the contemporary operations arena. The COE has created an amorphous threat 
where the military and business establishments `are more likely to face a simultaneous amalgam of 
regular and irregular opponents than a clearly defined and identifiable threat.'447 The House of 
Commons Defence Committee identified this complex environment within its 2015 review of UK 
Defence capability;  
 
“For the first time in twenty years, an advanced military state has challenged the borders 
of European nations, and the security challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and South 
Asia have increased dramatically in scale and complexity. Russia has annexed Crimea, 
and Russian-backed separatists have taken much of Eastern Ukraine. DAESH (or ISIL) 
have seized the second largest city in Iraq, and now control areas of a territory larger than 
the UK.”448 
 
By conducting a study of the Military, particularly the Army, it is proposed that lessons can be identified 
that can be applied to industry to increase its resilience to strategic and localised disruptive events. 
 
5.3 UNDERSTANDING NETWORK RAIL AND THE RAILWAY COMMUNITY 
The rail industry has undergone several strategic reviews to identify the most cost-effective methods by 
which to operate the rail network, with several more being commissioned due to the impact of the May 
 
447Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach, 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham, 2007. P.1-1. 
448House of Commons Defence Committee, Rethinking Defence to Meet New Threats, Tenth Report of Session 2014-15, 
House of Commons, The Stationary Office Ltd, 2015, p.3. 
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2018 timetable crisis.449 The events detailed above have had a strategic impact on the financial 
landscape within which the industry operates and it will require strategic thinking and planning for an 
organisation to survive in such an environment. Based on a seven-year study, it was identified that 
implementing effective change was a key component of success, forming one of the nine pillars of 
strategic thinking.450 The level of change implemented in response to the shifting landscape needs to 
be managed as excessive change may exceed employees’ tolerances, provoking a negative reaction 
to the desired change.451 
 
Under the Railways Act 1993, the rail industry was split into two elements; the railway infrastructure, 
and the TOCS / FOCs. Initially the railway infrastructure was given to RailTrack, a separate privately-
owned company, to manage. The task was to maintain the track, signalling and freeholds of stations 
and other properties and private land over seven geographical zones. To achieve this, it employed a 
workforce of approximately 11000 personnel.452 The initial cost of the Railtrack sale by the Government 
was a source of investigation by the National Audit Office in 1998, which identified that had the 
government followed the process of the other natural monopolies it had privatised and that by selling 
them in tranches, the Government may have increased the sale price by at least £600m, though there 
was the option to have increased this to £1.5bn had the Government retained 40% of the shares.453 
This situation demonstrated that even at the beginning of the Government's direct intervention into the 
privatisation of the industry showed very poor commercial understanding of the actual value of the 
industry. Over the period of 1997 - 2001, Railtrack demonstrated a severe lack of capability to maintain 
the rail infrastructure in accordance with its licence.  
 
For the GB rail industry, the demand for services and rail capacity is a wicked problem that has 
increased in complexity over the last decade. As the industry experiences a high level of customer 
engagement, with passenger services increasing by 95% over the last 25 years and over two-fifths of 
journeys being conducted in London, the number of disruptive events also increased.454 The success 
of the industry has driven the complex issues that it now faces, with the increase of passengers resulting 
in the need for more rolling stock and network capacity. This in turn drives the need for greater 
investment into the industry to keep pace with the increasing demand. In contrast, Network Rail 
 
449Hendy, P., `Network Rail- Replanning the Investment Programme', Report to the Secretary of State for Transport, Network 
Rail, London, 2015; Bowe, C., `Planning of Network Rail's Enhancement Programme 2014 - 2019 Review', Report to Secretary 
of State for Transport, Department for Transport, London, 2015; Shaw, N, `The Future shape and Financing of Network Rail', 
Report to Secretary of State for Transport, Department for Transport, London, 2016; Hansford, P., The Hansford Review - 
Unlocking rail investment – building confidence, reducing costs, Nichols Group, 2017. Available at 
www.thehansfordreview.co.uk. 
450Wootton, S. and Horne, T., The Nine Steps to Strategic Thinking, Kogan Page, London, 2010. 
451Johnson, K. J., “The dimensions and effects of excessive change”, Journal of Organisational Change Management, Vol 29, 
Issue 3, 2016, pp 445 – 459.  
452Butcher, L.` Railways Briefing: Railtrack 1994 - 2002', Standard Note SN/BT/1224, House of Commons Library, Business 
and Transport Section, 2010. Available at www.researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. 
453Ibid., p.4. 




increased the Public Sector Net Debt by 2% of GDP since 01 September 2014, when it was re-
integrated as a Public Body, bringing with it a debt of £30 billion.455  
 
Under the Railways Act 2005 and post the 
demise of Railtrack, the Secretary of State for 
Transport took over control of the railway from 
the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), accepting the 
responsibility for determining the rail budget, 
setting the strategy and the leasing of the 
passenger rail franchises. To support the 
minister, these functions were carried out by the 
DfT Rail Group. It sought to work with local 
government bodies and passenger groups to 
deliver a modern railway. Figure 30 reflects the 
strategic governance framework for the rail 
industry during the research period. At the 
operating level, the industry framework becomes more complex, with several interconnected actions 
occurring between multiple actors. Figure 31 shows an overview of the GB rail industry, courtesy of 
Clayton.456 In 2007 the Rail Technical Strategy, which accompanied the UK Government’s Delivering a 
Sustainable Railway white paper, outlined the desire to develop a GB railway which would have “world 
class reliability of both infrastructure and rolling stock.”457  
 
 
455McLoughlin P `ONS Decision on the Classification of Network Rail', Written Statement to Parliament, Department for 
Transport, 2013, available at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ons-decision-on-the-classification-of-network-rail, accessed 12 
May 2016. 
456Clayton, R. J., Re-integrating Railway Silos, Research Paper, Loughborough University, UK, 2008. 
457Department for Transport, Rail Technical Strategy (2007), Executive Summary, p.5 available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-a-sustainable-railway-white-paper-cm-7176, accessed 10 Mar 2017.  
Figure 31: GB rail industry Operating Framework Source: Clayton  
Figure 30: rail industry Strategic Governance 
Framework Source: DfT 
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This natural monopoly phenomena allowed the infrastructure manager to continue to drive down the 
costs of maintaining the railway through obtaining the benefits of Dynamic Efficiency by the removal of 
a competitive market. The development of the franchise model for the railway operators aimed to 
develop a financial return and an increase in capability and technology across the network. The 
promised capability did not manage to keep up with the social demand, resulting in significant over-
crowding and reduction in capacity across the network.458 It was also based on a flawed privatisation 
model,459 which failed to accept that there would be a rapid growth rate expected from the railway users, 
and the fact that there was little centralised control over the industry.460 The initial regulation model 
delivered limited leadership and integrated planning, resulting in further Government interference, which 
did not deliver the required direction, increasing the pressure of regulation, impacting on RailTrack’s 
share price and eventually leading to the creation of Network Rail.461 It also caused the government to 
become more deeply involved in the strategic management of the industry.462  
 
5.4 KEY ISSUES IMPACTING ON THE RAIL INDUSTRY 
5.4.1 Strategic Leadership 
Research into the rail industry identified that strategic interference by the Government resulted in 
complications within the breaking up of the railway industry.463 While there was a distinct increase in 
passenger usage and cost decrease after the privatisation period,464 there were severe concerns that 
this came at a cost of reduced maintenance capability, culminating in infrastructure failures that resulted 
in fatal accidents under RailTrack’s stewardship.465 In his transactional Cost Model of Economics 
Williamson indicates that businesses seek to function efficiently, rather than wastefully, and that ideally 
individuals will work together to overcome inefficient working practices to obtain the opportunity.466 
Bartle also analyses the human actor impact and the need to adapt to the changing market situation. 
He discusses the failed approach which resulted in a fragmentation of the initial implementation plan 
due to a rushed approach.467  
 
 
458Frost, M.W., Ison, S.G. and Watson, R. `UK Rail Transport: A Review of Demand and Supply’, Proceedings of the Institute of 
Civil Engineers: Transport, issue 166, 2012. Pp 225 -234. 
459Department for Transport, The Future of Rail, 2004, pp. 9-10. 
460Bartle, I, `Britain's Railway Crisis - A Review of the Arguments in Comparative Perspective', Occasional Paper 20, Centre for 
the Study of Regulated Industries, University of Bath, 2004; Murray, I., 'No Way to Run a Railway’, Adam Smith Research 
Trust, ASI (Research) Ltd, Grosvenor Group Ltd, London, 2005; Frost, M.W., Ison, S.G. and Watson, R. `UK Rail Transport: A 
Review of Demand and Supply’, 2012. 
461Department for Transport, The Future of Rail, 2004, p.16. 
462Murray, I.,'No Way to Run a Railway’, 2005, p.15. 
463Pollit, M.G. and Smith, A.S.J. , The Restructuring and Privatisation of British Rail: Was it Really That Bad? Institute of 
Transport Studies, University of Leeds, White Rose University Consortium, 2002. Available at 
www.eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2468. Accessed 22 Jun 2017; Bartle, I, `Britain's Railway Crisis - A Review of the Arguments in 
Comparative Perspective', 2004; Glaister, S, British Rail Privatisation - Competition Destroyed by Politics, Occasional Paper 23, 
Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, University of Bath, 2004; National Audit Office, `The Completion and Sale of High 
Speed' , Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Transport, London, 2012. 
464Pollit, M. G. and Smith, A.S.J., The Restructuring and Privatisation of British Rail, 2002, p.2 
465Office of Rail Regulation, `Train Derailment at Hatfield; A final report by the Independent Investigation Board’, Office of Rail 
Regulation, Department for Transport, London, 2006; Pollit, M. G. and Smith, A.S.J., The Restructuring and Privatisation of 
British Rail , 2002, p.2. 
466 Williamson, O. `Transactional Cost Economics: An Introduction', Economics Discussion Papers, March 2007, available at 
www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers; p.4  
467Bartle, I., `Britain's Railway Crisis', 2004, p.4. 
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Due to these complex relationships mentioned in section 4.3, in 2010, with mounting concerns over the 
efficiency of the railway, Labour commissioned a strategic review of the value for money for rail, headed 
up by Sir Roy McNulty.468 The report indicated that there were eleven principal barriers to the delivery 
of effectiveness across the rail industry (see Table 13); furthermore, to be efficient, the industry needed 
to achieve a 30% efficiency savings by 2019. The McNulty report identified the need to expand the ORR 
remit to allow it to focus on the safety of the industry,469 rather than just the operational and technical 
aspects. This sought to create an efficient way of working across the industry and focussed on how the 
infrastructure manager operated, driving the development of an internal pricing mechanism for inter-
departmental working. Recent strategic reports have noted that the industry is yet to learn effectively 
from McNulty's review, especially in the area of cross-industry culture and working relationships. 
 
No. Barrier Narrative Revisited 
1. 
The roles of 
Government and 
Industry 
Lack of accountability and responsibility by the 
industry caused by constant government 
interference 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
2. Fragmentation 
A culture of silo operating exists within the railway 2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 




Lack of customer focus and collaboration from 
Network Rail towards train operating companies, 
while operating companies focused only on short 
term gains. 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 





Poorly structured and applied incentive framework 
for effective ways of industry working. 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
5. Franchising 
Poor management of process by government. 2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
6. Fare structures 
Complex and not well thought out. 2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2018 HoCTSC Timetable report. 
7. 
Lack of best 
practice models 
No clear examples of best practice in key areas, 
such as project management or supply chain 
management. 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2018 Hansford Review 
 
8. 
Weak HR / IR 
management 
Poor management and leadership within HR areas, 
resulting in wage drift and inefficient working 
procedures. 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 





This causes excess in time, costs and impacts on 
effective working relationships. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
2018 Hansford Review 
 
10. 
Lack of whole 
system 
approach 
Desire to focus on own interests, rather than the 
industry, resulting in the maintaining of a silo culture 
across the railway. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
2018 ORR May 2018 timetable 
disruption report. 
2018 HoCTSC Timetable report. 
11. 
Poor culture and 
relationships. 
It was stated that this was caused by a lack of 
leadership at industry level, supported by poor 
behaviours across the industry. 
2016 HoCTSC The Future of Rail report. 
2017 HoCTSC Franchise report. 
2018 Hansford Review 
 
468McNulty R., `Realising the Potential of GB Rail, Report of the Rail Value for Money Study', Summary Report, Office of Rail 
Regulation, Department for Transport, London, 2011. 
469McNulty R., `Realising the Potential of GB Rail', 2011, p.67. 
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2018 ORR May 2018 timetable 
disruption report. 
2018 HoCTSC Timetable report. 
Table 13: Performance of rail industry to Address McNulty Findings. Source: Author 
 
Post the demise of RailTrack, Network Rail was appointed as the infrastructure manager assigned to 
manage the maintenance and running of the infrastructure, working in tandem with the TOCs, FoCs, 
and multiple contractors who are used to manage elements of the maintenance and repair of the rail 
network. 470 The success of the infrastructure manager lies in the technical knowledge, experience and 
capability of its staff, which creates major challenges for the current organisation leadership team.  
 
The infrastructure manager was given a clear mandate from the serving UK Government to improve 
the safety, reliability and efficiency of the railway.471 Issues of poor maintenance and lack of 
investment472 resulted in the train services being severely affected, with almost a quarter of services 
running late at a time Network Rail assumed control.473 As a private organisation, the company has a 
large national footprint, with over 35,000 staff responsible for the management of 20,000 miles of track 
which includes 32,000 bridges and tunnels, 17 major train stations and 8,200 commercial properties. 
Over 2,500 other train stations are leased to TOCs, but the company is still responsible for ensuring 
that these properties are being correctly maintained and invested in.474 There is concern over the correct 
strategy for the industry. The House of Commons Transport Select Committee has remarked that the 
current strategy is unworkable, especially in the awarding of Franchising and building competition within 
a closed, natural monopoly. The infrastructure manager is attempting to conduct the strategic 
management of the infrastructure in an atmosphere of discord and ineffective strategic leadership. It is 
faced with constrained budgets, while also contending with an ageing workforce, constricting 
recruitment, reduced funding and the possibility of a polar shift in its cultural arrangement. Constant 
pressure to cut costs, increase passenger and freight carrying capability, while modernising a system 
much of which is over a century old and in a poor state of repair, required a cultural change of the 
business to focus on changing behaviours and social frameworks.  
 
 
470Network Rail is the trading name for Network Rail Ltd and its various subsidiary companies which operate under its banner. 
The most well known of these is Network Rail Infrastructure Limited, which is the element responsible for the national rail 
infrastructure management. 
471Network Rail website accessed 01 Sept 2014. 
472This was highlighted as the main reason for the Hatfield train crash, where poor servicing and maintenance of the infrastructure 
directly contributed to the crash. The following attempts to blame vandalism and cover the poor maintenance led to the collapse 
of RailTrack. 
473Network Rail website accessed 01 Sept 2014. 
474Network Rail website accessed 01 Sept 2013 
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This cultural change is being driven through the development of training and core business frameworks, 
seeking to modernise the company’s approach, developing a greater customer focussed and service 
aware industry. Not all change can be pre-planned. Palmer indicates that there are two key types of 
change which impact on an organisation, emergent and planned.475 Organisations within the rail 
industry are facing emergent change as they are operating within a dynamic and complex competitive 
financial market for a critical resource, its workforce, and the ability to sustain and develop the rail 
network. This can be clearly witnessed in the events of July 2017, when the Government announced 
the cancellation of key railway electrification programmes.  
 
 
This highlights the complex strategic environment that the organisation is operating within, represented 
in Figure 32, with the x-axis representing time in years. The diagram highlights the decreasing 
government investment over time, represented by the upper trend arrow, as it forces the Infrastructure 
Manager to obtain more revenue from the Operators. At the same time, due to the current arrangement, 
the infrastructure manager operates within five year "Control Periods" (CP) which are funding periods. 
The organisation is only awarded funding for one CP at a time and, if any work runs over, money is not 
allocated until the completion of the CP. This is shown by the blue and red CP funding bar per control 
period. The blue representing funded investment, the red indicating potential overrun. If there is an 
overrun, then the CP strategic plan is immediately out of date, as is the funding agreement. During each 
CP there is also an election to be conducted, shown above the strategy layer, with Labour and the 
Conservatives having fundamental opposite opinions on how the railways should be run.  
 
This situation places Network Rail in a difficult position, as Network Rail Infrastructure is not owned by 
shareholders and to that extent places it in a unique position as a natural monopoly within the UK. 
 
475Palmer L, Change Management for Managers: The No Waffle Guide to Managing Change in the Workplace, Amazon, 
London, 2014, p.4. 
Figure 32: Strategic Operating Environment for Network Rail  Source: Author 
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Recently recorded as being 100% owned by Network Rail Ltd, it is subject to various official 
requirements, which, in the future, may open the options for it to be taken into government ownership 
if a future statute were to be raised. This now creates an environment of uncertainty, as at every election 
period, there is a risk the Rail strategy from DfT will be reviewed and changed, such as the 2017 -18 
cancellations of several large electrical programmes. The lower red trend arrow indicates an ongoing 
loss of personnel through age, departure and aggressive recruitment from other organisations. This 
continues to impact heavily on the capability to deliver the required physical and cultural changes. 
 
The rail industry operates as a natural monopoly due 
to the economy of scale required to deliver the 
infrastructure framework needed for an effective rail 
industry. As Ran, Kim and Horn discuss, few railways 
are fully privatised due to the cost for an organisation 
to invest in the building of a new railway to offer 
competition.476 This situation, allied with the level of 
public interest and strategic impact the industry 
delivers, results in a high level of political interest, as 
shown in Figure 33.  
 
This political pressure has increased over the tenure 
of Network Rail due to several areas of concern with 
regards to the resilience capability of the GB rail 
network. As part of the analysis of the organisation in 
answering H6 and H7, the researcher conducted a 
review of the two key areas responsible for managing 
the daily operational running of the network. This 
analysis of the resilience capability within the 
Operations department and the Strategic Planning to enable the access to the network for other 
members of the rail industry would provide an understanding of the current situation.477  
 
Recent analysis of the CrossRail programme identified that the cost of the new infrastructure being built 
was estimated to be £14.7bn478 while in 2015 – 2016 the DfT spent £113m on the High Speed 2 Rail 
Link.479 Therefore, the effective running of the railway during disruptive events relies on the skillsets 
and capabilities of those serving within the industry itself. The operational effectiveness of the railway 
is reliant on the training, experience and competence of those who are its custodians. 
 
 
476Ran Kim, S. and Horn, A., `Regulation Policies Concerning Natural Monopolies in Developing and Transition Economies’, 
United Nations Report, DESA Discussion Paper No. 8, Department for Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1999. 
477Ibid., p.8. 
478 Cabinet Office, `Major Project Authority Annual Report 2014 – 2015’, Cabinet Office, London, 2015. 
479National Audit Office , `Departmental Overview 2015 – 2016: Department for Transport', National Audit Office, House of 
Commons, London, 2016. 
Figure 33: Strategic Pressures on Network 
Rail Source: Author 
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5.4.2 Effective Disruptive Event Management 
Discussions and investigative research into the industry identified several concerns over the level of 
effectiveness of the quality of incident management within the elements focussed on for the purpose of 
the research. In 2011 – 2012 Network Rail presided over a continued growth of the British Rail network, 
with areas of success, such as the Olympics, helping to promote growth and a positive image. 
Simultaneously, the industry was operating under sustained pressure to deliver the substantial 
programme of enhancements to the network. In mid – 2013 Network Rail was working well within this 
area, beating its own targets for rail network disruptions caused by this work. However, other areas 
within the company were not fully functioning, with performance within England and Wales failing to 
attain all the required targets.480 There was deterioration in the performance of passenger train service 
within the three areas of Long distance, London & South East, and regional. It was estimated that some 
604,000 trains were affected overall.481  
 
This poor performance affected the ability of the company to deliver the required target by the end of 
the Control Period 4 timeline.482 Since 2015, The East Coast Mainline (ECML) franchise was failing to 
deliver, resulting in a backlog of maintenance efforts, while the Thameslink, Southern and Great 
Northern (TSGN) franchise was the worst performing on the network, heavily impacting the reputation 
of the rail industry. The impact of the storm surge of 2013 – 2014 on the GB rail network resulted in an 
extensive degradation across the 
southern regions of the UK and 
concerns about the resilience 
practices and procedures within the 
rail industry. Initial discussions with 
the Association of Train Operating 
Companies (ATOC) and the EPC 
identified that there was an 
embryonic approach to Business 
Continuity within the rail industry in 
2013 - 2014, with several 
organisations beginning to explore 
the capability. This was also supported with the evidence gathered during the initial review of the current 
situation within Network Rail, demonstrating the low level of resilience education that existed within the 
organisation. Figure 34, based on information gathered through questionnaires to individuals within 
operational roles, identified a shortfall in developing the resilience capability at lower levels within the 
organisation. It was also noted that at this time, no formal strategic incident management training 
framework existed for the company. 
 
 
480ORR Network Rail Monitor, p.2. Jun 13. 
481Ibid, p.2 
482Network Rail Control Period 4 ran until March 31 2014. 




This poor level of capability was also identified by the Cabinet Office, with the EPC, located at 
Easingwold, tasked to develop strategic incident management and Business Continuity training for the 
transport sector in 2015. In 2010 the UK Government accepted that all CNI were at risk from natural 
hazards and recommended business continuity plans to mitigate against these risks.483 It also advised 
the use of the then British Standard BS 25999 – Business Continuity Management, now replaced by 
ISO 22301.484 In 2018, the Infrastructure Manager was yet to implement such a framework, placing it in 
direct breach of Government legislation; under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the company was 
mandated to have clear continuity plans and frameworks in place. 
 
In 2008, an investigation by the NAO studied the National Passenger Survey which showed that 29% 
of passengers were unhappy with how incidents were managed. Of that total, 75% indicated a lack of 
information was the major cause, preventing them the ability to contingency plan and utilise the support 
that they were given by the rail industry elements.485 The lack of communication across multiple parties, 
the poor incident management contingency planning and wider strategic mind-set identified in the Pitt 
report and the NAO, as well as the RAIB reports, resulted in brand damage at a time that the railway 
industry was trying to recover from a sustained period of neglect from the Railtrack era.486 In 2012 an 
independent report into the impact of severe weather in Scotland by John Curley highlighted poor 
communication strategy, identifying that:487  
 
“During the storm events of the 3rd January the quality of communications to passengers 
and intending travellers deteriorated as the day progressed.” 488 
 
It was identified that this was caused by the amount of information being received by the rail industry 
control staff within the various organisations. While the flow of information between Control and the 
TOCs was robust by the end of 03 Jan 2012, and strategic command was running conference calls and 
recovery meetings, it resulted in many critical management staff being diverted from their incident 
management roles for a significant period. 489  
 
There was also serious concern over the capability of Network Rail to work with third parties to rectify 
disruptive events, and its ability to contingency plan.490 An Office of National Statistics report in 2013 
identified that in the period of 2012 – 2013 the Network Rail debt was £30.7bn and as of the 01 
 
483Cabinet Office, Sector Resilience Plans for Critical National Infrastructure 2010; Houses of Parliament Office of Science and 
Technology Postnote Number 362, October 2010. Available at www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office; Cabinet 
Office, `Keeping the Country Running – Natural Hazards and Infrastructure', Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office, 
2011, p.35. Available at www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office. 
484Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption 
from Natural Hazards, 2010, p.6; Cabinet Office, Keeping the Country Running – Natural Hazards and Infrastructure, 2011, 
p.35.  
485National Audit Office, `Reducing Passenger Rail Delays by Better Management of Incidents', 2008. 
486www.independent.co.uk Network Rail and Balfour Beatty fined £13.5m for Negligence prior to Hatfield crash, 07 Oct 2005, 
accessed 25 March 2014. 
487Curley, J., `Independent Review of the Industry Preparation for and Response to the Extreme Storm on 03 January 2012'. 
Written on behalf of Network Rail and First Scot Rail, Network Rail, London, 2012. 
488Ibid, p.30 
489Ibid, p.31. 
490National Audit Office, `Reducing Passenger Rail Delays by Better Management of Incidents', 2008. P.6 
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September 2014 Network Rail would be re-classified as a central Government body in the public 
sector.491 The impact that this may have on the company’s reputation could be critical when aligned 
with the recent reports of failing to meet performance targets, poor customer relations and heavy historic 
fines for negligence and safety.492 In 2012 the quarterly review indicated that Network Rail had failed to 
complete the priority maintenance tasks on high-risk bridges, resulting in a poor audit report.493 There 
was also serious concern about the capability of the strategic infrastructure across the country, with the 
long-distance train travel capability performing poorly. This forced the ORR to issue an enforcement 
notice on the company, threatening a £1.5m for every 0.1% by which it failed to reach its target.494  
 
“I think that Network rail should deliver the Managing / Leadership training courses prior to 
appointment of a management position as this would give the prospective managers an 
insight of the requirements prior to them starting their positions as a line manager. 
However, anyone with the correct outlook on life will adapt and accept all problems as a 
challenge and overcome them.” 
Respondent 1 (NR Resilience Questionnaire) 
 
The failure to invest in staff training 
and development within the incident 
management domain at all levels 
resulted in a capability failure when 
it was required. In response to 
questions posed in the Operations 
department resilience 
questionnaire., it shows that over 
40% of respondents (N=130) did not 
think that the resilience training 
available prepared them for their first 
role, impacting the confidence within the management teams of leading others in a disruptive event 
(Figure 35). The results noted that just over 15% of individuals questioned thought that they were 
properly trained in this activity. This highlights a real concern as to the level of capability within the 
organisation when faced with disruption. 
 
In 2017 and 2018, investigations by RAIB and an independent party into several near misses on the 
railway, as well as a critical procedural failure which put several trainloads of passengers at risk, 
 
491Department for Transport press release – 17 December 2013, accessed 19 April 2014. 
492Network Rail Monitor CP4 Quarter 2, P.3; www.news.sky.com Network Rail fined £1m over crossing deaths, 15 March 2012, 
accessed 25 March 2014; www.telegraph.co.uk Network Rail fined £4m over Grayrigg train crash, 04 April 2012, accessed 25 
March 2014; www.bbc.co.uk – Network Rail fined £500000 after Beccles level crossing crash, 27 Jun 2013, accessed 25 March 
2013. 
493Network Rail Monitor CP4 Quarter 2, P.10. 
494Ibid, P.3. 
Figure 35: Ability to Lead Staff in Incidents Source: Author 
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identified similar issues to those that had been raised in 2008 and again in 2012.495 Lack of effective 
training and competence management, collaborative working, practicing of incident management and 
effective situational awareness were mentioned within the findings. It was noted that the similarity of 
the events of 2017 and 2018 indicated that while investigations had identified the issues and potential 
actions to address them, these had not been put in place. This lack of implementation of lessons 
identified in 2017, driven by an underlying culture of acceptance, placed multiple passengers at risk of 
fatal injury in 2018. 
 
5.4.3 Strategic Planning Issues 
As the industry was aiming to address the issues around operational performance and managing 
disruptive events, it was in the grip of another crisis, which resulted in a strategic impact to the UK, the 
failure to deliver the May 2018 revised timetable. For several weeks train services were badly disrupted. 
On the Northern network up to 310 scheduled trains did not run each weekday during the disruption 
and 470 scheduled trains per weekday did not run on the GTR network.496 The work by Glaister in 
September and December 2018 identified issues around the culture, behaviours, poor leadership and 
an acceptance of sub-standard planning within the industry when it came to the strategic planning of 
railway services.  
 
Research into the strategic planning process identified multiple areas of concern, with the processes 
used to plan the Railway timetable which is fundamental to Network Rail delivering its operating licence 
requirements (Figure 36). The timetable provides the synchronisation of all passenger, freight and 
maintenance trains that operate across the UK and international transport corridors. The current 
process is directed by the Network Code, Part D, which stipulates the timeline of the production cycle. 
 
495RAIB, `Detrainment of passengers onto electrically live track near Peckham Rye Station`, RAIB Report 16/2018, Derby, UK, 
2018; RAIB, `Self-Detrainment Of Passengers Onto Lines That Were Still Open To Traffic And Electrically Live At Lewisham’, 
South-East London, RAIB Report 16/2018, Derby, UK, 2018. 
496Glaister S., `Independent Inquiry into the Timetable Disruption in May 2018’, Interim Report, Office of Road and Rail, London, 
2018. P.7. 
Figure 36: Timetable Development Process Source: Author 
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Each year there are two iterations of the main timetable. The primary timetable is released in May with 
the secondary timetable issued in December. This framework was designed to be in line with other 
European nations, and to also allow for the change from summer to winter and winter to summer 
timetables.  
 
Figure 36 provides an example of the complexity of the timetable development framework that is 
detailed in the Network Code, in this case the integration of the engineering work being integrated into 
the wider timetable plan. D- 0 is when the timetable is implemented, with the timeframe being measured 
in weeks to delivery (D) timescales. Therefore, D-26, when the provisional timetable is handed across 
to the short-term planning team to implement, indicates 26 weeks prior to implementation. As this 
shows, most of the work to develop the engineering, maintenance and possession (worksite) planning 
is done in isolation away from the development of the long-term planning process, with the disparate 
elements only coming together 26 weeks before delivery. This creates a high-level of tension and 
workload for the short-term planning team, as they attempt to merge three separate strategies into one 
to deliver the timetable. Given the level of customer demand now being made on the operational rail 
network, the current iteration of the Network Code is increasingly at risk of not being fit for purpose for 
the 21st century. This in turn has caused issues for the train planning community, identified in the 
questionnaire responses obtained.  
 
"UK Government interventions and Network Code not efficient."  
Respondent 7 (NR Strategic Planning Questionnaire) 
 
"Train operators are allowed to make too many late changes to the timetable in "spot bids" 
making it difficult to allow enough time to fully validate the timetable. Network code should be 
more strictly worded in this respect." 
Respondent 6 (NR Strategic Planning Questionnaire) 
 
Before operators can run their services on the railway, they are supposed to obtain access through the 
Sale of Access Rights process (Figure 37). This process gives the operators access to the railway 




The process starts with the Event Steering Group (ESG), which plans and provides governance to the 
delivery of major infrastructure projects informing the industry of what changes / capability 
enhancements that may be available on completion of the work. Each train operator and Network Rail 
then agree a contract of access for the operator. This is a Network Rail internal process. If agreed, the 
submission becomes a section 18/22 (supported submission) and is forwarded for industry consultation 
and agreement by the regulator. If it is rejected, then it can proceed directly to industry consultation as 
a section 17/22a (unsupported bid).  
 
The simplified process is shown in Figure 38. Adding to the complexity of the timetable development 
phase, the SoAR process is failing to ensure all operators are being granted access rights to the network 
prior to the timetable being developed. This results in a number on contingency paths being planned, 
in case the operator is granted ratified access rights during the process. 
 
The fact there is no service level agreement governing the time a SoAR request should take for the 
ORR to give their decision and sign off also impacts on the planning process. The SoAR process, as 
part of the wider investigation into the May 2018 timetable crisis, required a review after the ORR 
indicated that Network Rail had breached its operating licence in a letter to Network Rail's CEO.497 





Figure 37: SoAR High-Level Process Map. Source: Network Rail 
Figure 38: Simplified SoAR Process. Source: Network Rail 
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▪ System 1: Development of the SoAR submission paper; 
▪ System 2: The strategic SoAR Panel process; 
▪ System 3: Industry consultation phase 
▪ System 4: ORR decision phase.  
 
If Network Rail rejects the submission within sub-system one phase of the process, the organisation 
loses track of the submission until it returns via sub-system 3. This is due to the SoAR process being a 
Network Rail internal process, which train operators can circumnavigate and approach the ORR direct, 
via industry consultation, to obtain access to the network.  
This is common practice if Network Rail rejects the submission early in the process, which then creates 
siloed working and performance impact, highlighted by the comments shown below from the planning 
questionnaire: 
 
"Too much change, too many people involved in processes. Too much passed on accountability 
and few decisions made."  
Respondent 15 
 
"Everybody busy looking out for their own sections of responsibility, the amount of late change 
and unrealistic expectations." 
Respondent 49 
 
Linked to this was a review of the strategic guidance document, the Network Code, which highlighted 
several concerns over the strategic guidance of the rail industry during the development of the national 
train timetable and breaking down siloed working. The Code itself, written in the late 1990s and regularly 
updated, is based on two assumptions that may be flawed. One, that there is always capacity available 
on the network and two, that the industry will work collaboratively. Unfortunately, both these 
Figure 39: Sale of Access Rights Process: Source: Network Rail 
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assumptions are no longer correct. Due to the increase in demand for access, there are areas on the 
network that are over-subscribed. Secondly, due to the competitive nature of franchising, the operators 
seek to bid against each other, aiming to increase or protect their market share. The very nature of this 
practice prevents a collaborative approach to the development of a strategic timetable, as operators 
seek to outbid each other. The impact of this situation manifests itself through late changes to the 
timetable, poor customer engagement, reputational damage and, in the worst case, failure to deliver an 
effective timetable to run the railway. This situation became an unfortunate reality in May 2018. 
 
The investigative research into the rail industry identified several key issues that impacted its capability, 
reputation and performance, resulting in several strategic reviews and performance improvement 
notices from the regulator and government. There is the potential that the organisation may be able to 
learn lessons from the military. Having analysed the rail industry and where Network Rail sits within it, 
the next section will explore the second case study, the UK military. 
 
5.5 UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY AND RESILIENCE 
5.5.1 Strategic Leadership – Setting the Direction 
UK National Strategy is delivered by government through the appropriate application of three national 
instruments of power; Diplomacy, Military and Economic levers.498 Interestingly, given the current threat 
of global terrorism and potentially a 2nd generation insurgency manifesting across the Middle East 
region, Information and Influence are not identified as strategic levers, though it could be argued that 
when fighting an insurgency, these are the two most powerful strands of strategic planning.499 The NSS, 
the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the International Defence Engagement Strategy 
(IDES) documents also identify the need to develop and maintain this capability to operate across 
multiple spectra utilising all components of UK capability, building on the thoughts of the UK strategic 
think tank which, in 2010, stated that: 
 
“The era out to 2040 will be a time of transition; this is likely to be characterised by 
instability, both in the relations between states, and in the relations between groups within 
states. During this timeframe the world is likely to face the reality of a changing climate, 
rapid population growth, resource scarcity, resurgence in ideology, and shifts in global 
power from West to East. No state, group or individual can meet these challenges in 
isolation, only collective responses will be sufficient. Hence, the struggle to establish an 
effective system of global governance, capable of responding to these challenges, will be 
a central theme of the era.”500 
 
Given the critical role that the UK’s military delivers to the security of the nation, it is important that their 
activity is aligned to the political climate of the ruling government. The military are core to the security of 
 
498MoD, JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 2011. p. 1-6.  
499Mackay A. and Tatham, S., `Behavioural Conflict - From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and 
Influence', The Shrivenham Papers, 2009; Tatham S., Strategic Communication: A Primer, Advanced Research and 
Assessment Group, 2008; Tatham S and Rowland L., Influence Operations – Do We really Get It?, British Army Review, 2011. 
500MoD, Strategic Trends Programme, 2010, p.10. 
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the UK, enabling the nation to establish the means to threaten or use force when all other levers of 
power are unable to protect the vital interests of the nation.501 The 2015 IDES reflects the direction given 
in JDP 0-01 where “National Strategy also involves determining UK support to multinational 
operations”.502 Both documents highlight the importance of working with allies and within coalitions in 
order to build an Integrated Approach across the political spectrum. In 2015 the UK sought to build 
greater ties with the international military community through several defence engagement activities, 
working alongside DfID and FCO. These activities included support in the search for MH370, disaster 
relief in response to typhoon Haiyan and the Ebola crisis, and joint international visits to China and 
Japan.503 Aligned to the NSS are the UK military standing strategic tasks which seeks to promote the 
strategic capability of the UK. These tasks also identify support to UK councils and civil bodies; 
  
▪ Military Task 1 states that it is tasked with; Providing strategic intelligence, while 
▪ Military Task 4 states the military will; Support(ing) the civil emergency organisations in times 
of crisis.  
 
The inclusion of these two tasks as strategic requirements demonstrates the need to develop the 
understanding of the unfolding of potential risks and concerns, and the need to enhance UK resilience 
through the ability to support the emergency services. These tasks have been shown to be of national 
concern as Europe experiences lethal terrorist attacks, several extreme weather events which have 
impacted the UK during the period of 1990 – 2015,504 costing over £11.8bn in damage. Two major 
events in the last decade were the floods of 2007 which cost £3bn in damage, and more recently the 
2013 – 2014 winter floods which cost £1.2bn worth of damage. In 2020, the military is heavily involved 
in the UK response to the Covid-19 global pandemic, which, at the time of writing, had claimed over 
31200 lives within the UK, and over 274,300 internationally.505 The pandemic also created a cultural 
shift towards how UK industry operated, with the nation being placed into forced remote working 
conditions for a sustained period. As of the 10 May 2020, the cost to the UK economy was extensive, 
with the predicted growth for the year to be -3.8%, and over 6 million workers temporarily laid off. The 
military initiated the deployment of up to 20,000 individuals to respond to the situation, in line with the 
strategic response.  
 
In 2007 the UK military issued the 2nd edition of their Joint Defence Publication (JDP) 02, The Defence 
Contribution to Resilience. This aimed to utilise the skills and supporting elements of the military to act, 
if required, in support of the UK Government, as well as building a framework to assist local councils in 
times of emergency. This doctrine sought to enable the military to train and develop its people in the 
application of the new skills being procured for the application for the Comprehensive Approach to also 
be used in support of national resilience if required. This approach sought to build on the lessons learnt 
 
501MoD, JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 2011, p. 1-1. 
502MoD, JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 2011, p.1-4. 
503Ministry of Defence, International Defence Engagement Strategy, Director General Security Policy, Ministry of Defence, 
Whitehall, London, 2015. p.6 
504Information obtained from The Telegraph, Met Office, www.gov.uk and Environment Agency sources. 




from the application of practices, procedures and leadership in disrupted communities within war-torn 
nations, where the UK forces had operated either independently or as part of a wider NATO / UN task 
force.506 
 
The range of tasks the military can expect to undertake also continues to increase, with concern over 
UK organisations funding illegal activity unknowingly, funding different warring entities, or their 
vulnerability to cyber-attack.507 Attacks on UK businesses, such as the cyber-attack on TalkTalk 
telecommunications company, or the NHS, demonstrates the level of threat that exists. To combat this 
new level of threat, which is potentially a strand of new warfare in the future aimed at disrupting and 
destabilising a nation, requires advanced information security skills within the Defence Intelligence 
Sector. The attack on Talk Talk resulted in 157,000 customers having their data hacked and 15,000 
losing financial data508, costing the organisation up to £35 million immediately after the event.509 Other 
threats are more apparent; recent images from Calais and the Mediterranean of large numbers of 
displaced migrants seeking to make their way to the safety of UK borders increases the strain on the 
resilience of local communities and the national infrastructure. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Libya confirm this trend of increasing complexity.510  
 
The military must increasingly 
work with civilian organisations 
and this inclusive approach is not 
just cross-governmental. It is an 
alliance between all those that 
have a stake within the complex 
battle-sphere. Figure 40 demon-
strates this approach through the 
human dimensions of conflict and 
the recognised constituent parts 
of human society which, when 
aligned and effectively resourced and managed can create a functioning society. These tenets of 
society, and the supporting frameworks (such as history and culture) that weave them together, are 
critical to create a stable structure.  
 
Though the UK military have continued to develop greater technological weaponry, with supposedly 
better training and resources being delivered to frontline troops, the development of political 
engagement and an understanding of the cultural and behavioural aspects of warfare has been woefully 
lacking. The failure to understand the lessons of the Oman conflict (1965 – 1975), which occurred in 
 
506Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), JWP 3-50: Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, 2nd edition, 
Ministry of Defence, 2004. 
507MoD, JDN 3/11, 2011, p. 1-1. 
508Farell, S., The Guardian: Nearly 157000 had data breached in Talk Talk cyber attack, dated 6 Nov 2015. 
509 Thomas D., (2015) Financial Times: TalkTalk warns cyber attack costs could rise to £35m, dated 11 Nov 2015; 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk dated 11 Nov 2015.  
510MoD, JDN 3/11, 2011, 1-1. 
Figure 40: The Comprehensive Approach Model Source: MoD  
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similar terrain, with similar tribal factions and political fractures and apply them to the deployment of 
forces to Iraq was clear in the lack of clear political direction and rationale for the long-term strategic 
campaign. Just as concerning is the lack of recognition of the importance of working with state 
organisations and political primacy, as in Northern Ireland, to build a co-ordinated civil engagement 
approach. This was unfortunately very evident at the beginning of the Iraq and Afghan campaigns. Lord 
Richards, a former Chief of Defence Staff, states that: 
 
“At the same time, the civilian effort is primary. The military effort in Afghanistan in 2001 was not 
matched by a similar one in 2002 and 2003, and we paid for it later. And in 2006, while many 
countries were focusing on military efforts, there was no reliable system to cohere the civilian and 
diplomatic engagement.”511 
 
To enable the military to achieve its political requirement, it develops a military strategy which provides 
the high-level roadmap for the organisation against which to align objectives, resources and capabilities. 
In recent years, the ability of the UK Government to deliver a successful political strategy for military 
campaigns has been under scrutiny. It has failed to formulate effective strategy and, worse still, it has 
demonstrated a clear lack of how to conduct it.512 However, research has also shown the senior military 
leadership failed to deliver the correct advice to the political leadership. There was also a collective 
failure of moral courage; Generals failed to challenge poor political strategy, limited resource allocation 
and the failure of the Ministry of Defence to adjust to a war-fighting role until 2006, under the new Chief 
of Defence Staff, Graham “Jock” Stirrup.513  
 
Those that seek to describe themselves as strategists have a single purpose; to implement the theory 
of strategy. Strategy is there to educate those who seek to change policy into action.514 They are the 
individuals that bridge the gap between the direction set by government and its implementation through 
action. Through proper strategic design, the Ends, Ways and Means for a successful outcome will be 
aligned to available resources, integrating resilience and agility into the requirement actions required 
for mission success.  
 
The art of strategic planning is important to the development of the long-term organisational framework. 
The weaving together of the organisational strategy needs to link with other industry and political 
frameworks that exist. Based on the research conducted during this thesis, the strategic planning 
framework to deliver effective capability is shown in Figure 41.515  
 
511Johnson, A.L., (ed), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies, Whitehall, London, 2014, p xii. 
512Savill, M., `UK Security Strategy: Clarity or Compromise', Defence Studies, Volume 11, No. 3, 2011, pp. 359 - 295: 
Cavanagh, M., `Ministerial Decision Making in the Run Up to the Helmand Deployment', RUSI Journal, Volume 157, No. 2, 
2012, pp. 48 - 54. 
513Ripley T., Operation Telic: The British Campaign in Iraq 2003 – 2009, Telic-Herrick Publications, Lancaster, 2016, p.23. 
514Gray, C.S., The Strategy Bridge, 2010, p.15. 





This shows three potential courses of actions for campaign planning, and the differences in 
implementation strategy. It may be a purely military led approach, with all actions conducted by military 
personnel, a military campaign guided by FCO and DfID input, or a fully integrated approach to the 
campaign, directed by a cross government strategy. The approach that is utilised is dependent on the 
situation that is facing the campaign, and the potential threats that exist; to develop the correct approach 
planners need to understand the principles of delivering a comprehensive approach to operations. 
 
The questionnaires identified that the 
Comprehensive Approach was not 
being effectively taught to the lower 
levels of the officer corps, and the 
key integration of other government 
departments, or an understanding of 
their capabilities, was not presented 
in detail. Using the live case-studies 
as a model, the end-state mapping 
that was present aimed to reflect that 
which should happen on operations. 
The model, from the UK Doctrine, is 
shown in Figure 42.516 It 
demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the end-state or 
strategic aim and aligning the various 
layers of planning to develop a 
coherent strategy, linking the operational tasks to the strategic end-state. This process supports the 
development of organisational resilience as the organisation understands its key deliverables which are 
 
516MoD, JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning, 2013, p.2-16. 
Figure 42: Developing a Political End-State. Source MoD 
Figure 41: Campaign Planning and Political-Military Strategy Differences. Source: MoD 
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aligned against the strategic end-state; therefore, in times of crisis it can identify rapidly which systems 
and processes need to keep functioning, and which ones can be sacrificed to support the critical areas. 
 
5.5.2 Managing Disruptive Events 
The ability of multiple agencies to work together to develop National Resilience through the creation of 
organisational resilience within industry is critical to combating irregular activity or national crises which 
seeks to cause a detrimental impact to the UK, from within and without. Terrorist events in France, 
Germany and the UK during 2016 and early 2017 demonstrated signs of 5GW modelling, where 
disaffected elements of the home population are isolated, radicalised and weaponised against the 
parent state, conducting disruptive acts to damage social cohesion and community structures. This 
phenomenon is not new. Lind et al commented on it within their seminal article on 4GW in 1989 on how 
4GW could morph and be enhanced. 517 Natural disasters, such as extreme weather, man-made crises 
and pandemics can also create threats to the resilience capability of a nation or an organisation. The 
effective training and development of staff provides an agile resource, able to adapt to changing 
situations quickly. 
 
The military has sought to learn from previous errors and make great strides to ensure personnel who 
are in direct contact with critical parts of the organisation have the proper skills and the relevant tools, 
while training them to be attentive to their own skills and the events unfolding in the surrounding 
environment. However, recent investigations conducted as part of this research identified a limited level 
of capability within the military, particularly the Army, in the role of strategic learning advisors within the 
organisation. There were several instances of frameworks and vehicles being brought into service 
without the correct level of training and education delivered to the relevant staff. At the operational level, 
the development of doctrine, critical to building the knowledge base, had no formal training process in 
place for those involved in the development process. Rather it was the thoughts of those seen as 
experts in the field being captured, developed into a framework, then circulated around the 
organisation’s leadership groups for comments and observations. Realising the threat that this posed 
to the organisation, the Army leadership group invested in its Reservist members, pulling expertise from 
industry into bespoke projects, minimising the risk to the organisation and utilising skilled personnel. 
This mobilisation of social capital enabled the Army to avoid a potentially disruptive event to its ongoing 
development of doctrine and critical training events for personnel. A detailed deep dive into the  
 
Within the emergency services, `major incident’ is an emergency planning term used to describe a 
situation that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency 
services, and generally includes involvement of numerous resources. By declaring a major incident, 
this will activate extra support and resources to respond to manage the situation. An example, from a 
local resilience forum document, highlights the guidelines for calling an event a major incident: “an event 
or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be 
 
517Lind WS, Nightengale K, Schmitt J F, Sutton J W and Wilso G I, `The Changing Face of War; Into the Fourth Generation', 
Marine Corps Gazette, 1989, Vol 73 Issue 10, pp. 22-26, accessed from UK Defence Academy Online Library 15 May 2015. 
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implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies,”518” while the Civil Contingencies 
Lexicon, which is the document referenced by the rail industry when it comes to operations and used 
as the base document for the JESIP, states that a Major Incident is: “Implementation of special 
arrangements by one or all of the emergency services, the NHS or the Local Authorities.”519 
 
Within the military, the development and mainte-
nance of organisational effectiveness, which is 
labelled `Fighting Power’, is critical to success. This 
capability is obtained through the blending of the key 
areas of the organisation; the physical, moral and 
conceptual (intellectual).520 The effective blending of 
these components develops resilience within the 
organisation, delivering functional components that 
are tailored to the role required of them. This concept 
is also being explored within business, with the 
analysis of military thought and the study of military 
doctrine and practices. Several military or Civil 
Service authors, such as General Elliot, Commodore 
Jermy, Major Simpson and ambassador Cowper-
Coles have discussed the practices and procedures that they have experienced. The flexibility and 
agility of the military on operations was explored, with observations around collective planning, use of 
intelligence, methods and issues around communication, decision-making and leadership in crisis.  
 
Within business, there are stakeholder management tools which are very similar to Human Terrain 
Mapping frameworks seen on the walls of Afghanistan Command centres, and business intelligence 
and planning frameworks based upon the military intelligence gathering tools. These tools are used to 
manage change, either planned or disruptive, as they provide a mechanism to identify networks, 
information and effective resource management. The military planning tool also provides a level of 
rigour around the tactical and operational planning process, utilising questions to assist individuals in 




518Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Local Resilience Forum, Major Incidents, available at www.llrprepared.org.uk 
(accessed 10 Jul 2016). 
519Wiltshire and Swindon Local Resilience Forum, Major Incident Joint Procedures Guide dated 2010, p. 12. Available at 
http://www.wiltshire.police.uk/information/documents/major-incident-planning/104-emergency-multi-agency-procedures/file 
(accessed 10 Sept 2015).  
520Ministry of Defence, Developing Leaders: A Sandhurst Guide, Training Innovation Centre, Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst, Camberley, 2012, p.4; Ministry of Defence, ADP: Operations, 2010, pp.2-2 – 2-3. 




Within the rail industry, particularly the Operations 
Department, the military decision-making process 
has been incorporated into the incident manage-
ment training given to the senior leadership teams 
(Figure 44). This process, based upon the tactical 
decision-making tool used by the military, seeks to 
guide the individuals through several steps, 
enabling them to develop a plan based on 
objective analysis of the situation and the 
information available. The use of the military 
planning tool in Table 14 is used to illustrate this; 
with the questions that the military ask as part of 
their planning process, they can easily be transferred to industry to develop a similar approach to 
building a standardised approach to planning. 
 
Military Question Business Component Equivalent 
1 What is happening and why? 
Risk / issue management, market and business impact analysis 
tasks and business intelligence gathering. 
2 
What is my part in the plan 
and how may it change? 
Stakeholder engagement, business change, contingency planning 
and requirements analysis. 
3 
What direction to the team do I 
need to give? 
Communications strategy, contingency planning, objective 
planning and task analysis. 
4 What resources do I need? 
Resource planning, financial planning, contingency planning and 
optioneering. 
5 
Where do I need my 
resources? 
Logistical planning, movement plans and task analysis. 
6 
When do I need my 
resources? 
Resource synchronisation, operations plan and logistical 
planning. 
Develop Courses of Action 
and choose best option 
Optioneering, contingency planning, risk mitigation planning and 
logistical planning. 
7 
What control measures do I 
need to put in place 
Portfolio, programme and project management capabilities, 
communication frameworks, governance and assurance 
frameworks. 
Wargaming plan 
Testing the plan, issue, and consequence management 
frameworks, stakeholder engagement and alternative analysis. 
Table 14: Military Planning Questions and Representative Business Activities. Source: Author 
 
Managing disruptive events requires the ability to effectively manage disruptive, or emergent, change, 
through strong leadership, communication and maintaining situational awareness. Successful leaders, 
either in business or in conflict manage the change that the disruptive event causes through 
transformational leadership, building confidence in those around them. Cameron and Green note 
multiple skills (Table 15) required of an effective leader during change, noting that rarely are leaders 
proficient in all of them.521  
 
 
521Cameron E. and Green M., Making Sense of Change Management, 4th Ed., Kogan Page, London, 2013, p.136. 
Figure 44: Incident Management Decision Making 
Tool. Source: Network Rail  
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Goal setting Communicating vision Facilitating 
Monitoring and controlling Building coalitions Dealing with conflict. 
Coaching and supporting Networking  
Building vision Negotiating  
Table 15: Qualities of an Effective Leader During Change. Source: Cameron and Green. 
  
They also note that continuous improvement and the ability to learn is key in managing change, ensuring 
that lessons are captured and utilised in managing the nest disruptive event. This can be seen in the 
recent doctrine published by the military. The organisation has sought to capture and apply the lessons 
learnt from recent disruptive events, enhancing its collective understanding and building capability. The 
publication of an updated COIN doctrine utilised lessons learnt from Iraq, as well as from working closely 
with international forces, while a revised Operations doctrine brings together collective lessons from the 
tactical and operational level. An updated Resilience doctrine focuses on enhanced understanding of 
the need to work closely with the emergency services, introducing various ways of working and the joint 
doctrine framework that they employ.  
 
Under the moral component, the military builds a strong cohesive bond through its culture and values. 
Using Hofestede’s original dimensions of culture, the UK military demonstrates a strong sense of 
Collectivism when on operations, with a strong focus on the team mission, belonging and the building 
of tight knit bonds to manage the delivery of tasks. When reviewed against the organisational 
dimensions of culture, developed to study companies and business, the military on operations is a 
results-focussed, employee orientated, professional, closed system with tight control but is 
simultaneously pragmatic. This allows the organisation to get the best out of the personnel on the 
ground through the provision of clear direction, flexibility of an adaptive leadership mentality enhanced 
by a well-developed localised support network. The military also has developed the means to rapidly 
change the culture of teams, from warfighting to recovery to UK focussed operations. By understanding 
the cultural dimensions of teams, the military can, through training, education and understanding the 
strategic context, match the right team culturally to the task at hand. The result is a very effective, task 
focussed, team-based organisation where individuals will regularly go beyond their own normal working 
parameters for their colleagues. However, as this becomes the culture it risks becoming the normal 
state accepted by the leadership, resulting in the acceptance of doing more with less; a situation that 
was played out in Iraq and Afghanistan which impacted on the ability for the organisation to remain 
adaptable to the changing environment and impacted on its operational continuity. 
 
A review of how the military utilised the elements of resource management, leadership, integration of 
digital communications and training to maintain organisation resilience while operating in complex, 
chaotic and contingent environments identified the complexities of modern warfare.522 This is high-
 
522North, R., Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003 – 2009, 2009; Marston, D. and Malkasian, C., Counterinsurgency 
in Modern Warfare, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010; Fergusson, J., A Million Bullets – The Real Story of the British Army in 
Afghanistan, Corgi Press, 2009; MoD, AFM Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency,2010; Ledwidge,F., Losing Small Wars: 
British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2012; Rid, T. and Keaney, T., (ed), Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, 
Operations and Challenges, Routledge, London, 2010. 
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lighted very effectively during operations which require the application of a comprehensive approach 
with other government departments and international partners.523 This is explored in greater depth in 
the next section. 
 
5.5.3 Strategic Planning - Developing a Comprehensive Approach 
In 2006 the MoD, responding to Tony Blair’s Labour Government interventionist approach, changed its 
approach to intra-state military operations, applying a new doctrine labelled “The Comprehensive 
Approach”, which sought to build resilience within a nation state through the support of critical national 
functional areas within a multi-disciplined framework approach through NGO and OGD elements, 
supported by the military to create a safe operating domain.524 This approach would enable the rapid 
delivery of a stable nation by focussing on critical civilian national structures, governance and financial 
establishment. By applying a population centric approach, based on the cultural requirements of the 
nation on which the intervention has focussed on, and enabling the re-establishment of the relevant key 
tenets of society, it was proposed that it would deliver the factors identified as critical to success. 
Lessons learnt from the events in the Balkans, Kosovo, Iraq and the early stages of Afghanistan also 
justified the need for a better integrated approach. It was clear that “coherence could only be achieved 
if strategic processes, planning and objectives were harmonised across all instruments and 
agencies”525. This formal government approach builds on the recommendation within the military 
publication on Peace Support Operations (PSO).526  
 
To support the government approach to develop a culture of cross-departmental planning when faced 
with a potential political crisis, the military developed multiple joint doctrine publications aimed at 
integrating these principles of the Comprehensive Approach, weaving them into the standing military 
tasks.527 This doctrinal approach demonstrates the incorporation of lessons learnt from previous 
intervention operations that occurred in the final decade of the 20th Century. Fundamental errors by 
United Nations forces during the Bosnian conflict, culminating in the slaughter of 8000 Bosnian 
males,528 plus interventions in Sierra Leone and Kosovo led to the identification of the need to create a 
more robust approach when conducting multi-lateral operations. Though the Comprehensive Approach 
was aimed at operations outside of the UK, there are elements of the approach that can be utilised for 
home-based operations to support the UK population in time of crisis. To ensure that the development 
of the Comprehensive Approach was able to meet the requirements of the future state of warfare, and 
 
523MoD, JDP 0-01 – BDD, 4th edition, 2011, p. 1-12; National Audit Office, `Defence Committee Investigation into the 
Comprehensive Approach', NAO Paper for Defence Select Committee, available at www.nao.org.uk/report/perspectives-of-non-
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that the military would be effective in this role, they consulted with emergency services and other 
organisations to help develop a structure to deliver this capability on the battlefield. 
 
With the drawback of the British Empire’s reach during the latter half of the 20th Century, the UK aimed 
to avoid open conflict, seeking instead to utilise the levers of power to bring a successful resolution to 
conflicts. COIN warfare was a British forte, with the nation historically involved in COIN conflicts in 
numerous countries during and post the Cold War era.529 The UK military have a long history of utilising 
political and community engagement approaches within campaign planning. Though not always 
successful when seeking to develop a multi-lateral approach employing military, political and socio-
ecological options, the lessons that should have been learned offer a wealth of knowledge that can be 
accessed by any individual who takes the time to study history. This is especially pertinent when 
operating within regions littered with numerous belligerents, competing political, religious, social and 
cultural ideals and a population desperate for change and re-growth. 
 
Since the cessation of the Cold War, the role of the UK military has been re-developed to return to the 
ability to conduct intervention operations and expeditionary warfare. Military personnel training focussed 
on the need to conduct contingency or major incident planning, with many of the senior non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and officer corps being extensively trained to deal with an unfolding, 
dynamic and often risk heavy environment. Lessons from the Balkans operations in the 1990s resulted 
in the need to develop a united “Comprehensive Approach” being identified in military doctrine as early 
as 2004 where: 
 
“Events have shown that the prospects of success in a PSO are much enhanced if a 
comprehensive response is used. In adopting such an approach, planning and execution must 
be coordinated across government departments and potential participants. Unfortunately, there 
remains a tendency for government mechanisms to be optimised for the demands of routine 
government, or short-term crisis response, rather than the specific, complex, and protracted 
demands of PSOs. In the absence of unifying leadership and suitable coordinating structures, 
the full range of contributions may not be used, or may be delivered in a less than efficient 
manner.”530 
 
JWP 3-50 doctrine publication clearly identified the challenges that UK Forces would meet in the future 
and the need for a multi-faceted approach to rebuilding resilience within a failing or failed state. 
 
At the onset of the Iraq campaign in 2003 the UK sought to apply a similar approach to that of the 
American cultural way of warfare. This method of engagement sought to use a grinding strategy of 
annihilation, attrition and sheer weight of firepower and numbers witnessing the rise of net-centric 
warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles and effect-based operations.531 This strategy was also replicated by 
 
529Mumford A. `From Belfast to Basra: Britain and the Tri-Partite Counter Insurgency Model’, PhD Thesis, 2009, p.1 
530MoD, JWP 3-50 Military Support to Peace Support Operations, 2004. 
531Gautam,P. K., Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture, 2009, p.415. 
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other militaries, with governments seeking to reduce the risk of human casualties through greater 
application of technology and information sharing. As the Iraq campaign began to unravel in 2004 – 
2005, and later the increasing presence of insurgents within Afghanistan, another approach was 
required. The Comprehensive Approach offered this as it directed a co-ordinated strategy across 
several government departments to deliver success. Based on the Hearts and Minds military strategy 
that was a success during the Malaya campaign for UK forces, or for the Sultan of Oman during the 
Oman conflict, the Comprehensive Approach suggests a lighter touch approach to campaign planning 
and implementation. However, history has shown that the Hearts and Minds strategy can include 
coercive, violence and destructive methods of delivery to seize the initiative from an opponent and 
shape the battlefield.532 COIN operations also require extensive resourcing, long-term financing and 
political support and guidance. Analysis of the Iraq campaign demonstrated what happens when there 
is a lack of leadership, governance and effective assurance measures to develop a clear strategic 
planning framework for a long-term campaign. While the initial military campaign delivered success, the 
social reconstruction campaign failed within the UK’s region. The report from the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2013 highlighted that key projects in Basra were delivered 
late and over budget on multiple occasions. An example is the Basra Children’s Hospital, which was 
part of the Iraqi government's key social development programme, which was 200% over-budget and 
four years late.533 
 
This clearly identified a gap in UK strategic planning and capability, with the lack of a co-ordinated 
strategy aligned to the three strategic levers of power quite evident in the confusion of the Balkans and 
Iraq. There was a need to realign strategic planning culture to enable it to be flexible to the operational 
requirement. The skills learnt on the congested and complex battlefield can also be utilised to help 
integrate a cross-governmental approach to complex crises, disaster response and large-scale 
humanitarian emergencies caused by extreme weather events. The organisation had, over a period of 
15 years, transitioned from a culture of large-scale armoured warfare to multi-agency, government led 
stability building operations within failed or failing states. However, the required skill sets in developing 
the conceptual strategic planning capability were soon to be absent, with the failure of the campaign 
leaders to understand the culture and the mind-set of the population when faced with a major disruptive 
event and the required resilience building activities to mitigate the impact, while at the strategic level 
there was a failure of moral courage and effective leadership. Resilience is holistic and those tasked to 
develop the resilience of organisations must be able to influence all activity at strategic and operational 
levels, providing an active voice in the organisation’s direction.534 Only by understanding fully the 
dynamics of any particular situation or crisis can the appropriate range of activities be planned, 
orchestrated, reviewed and evaluated, and managed by strong governance linked to effective 
intelligence analysis and impact assessment.535  
 
532Abe, N., What is the Universal Principle of “Hearts and Minds”?, Defence Research Paper, Advanced Command and Staff 
Course 16, UK Defence Academy, 2013, p.1 
533Bowen S. W., `Learning from Iraq: A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction', SIGAR, US 
Congress, 2013, p.11. Available at www.SIGIR.mil. Accessed 16 May 2015.  
534Newnham, C., `Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations', 2012, pp.3-4 




Building resilience, at either the national or organisational level, requires the right number of individuals 
with the right skill sets and with the right strategic direction. This promotes effective strategic workforce 
planning for the benefit of the organisation and the situations it may face, enabling the correct level of 
skilled personnel to be aligned to tasks to maintain organisational capability. Strategic workforce 
planning analyses future demands and situations to obtain a greater understanding of the environment 
and manage the risk of complexity within the sphere of operations. The reduction of the military force 
in the UK area of operations in Iraq from 43,000 to 11,000 during the period 2003 - 2004 was an example 
of a limited application of strategic workforce planning, driven “by a lack of strategic vision at the turn of 
the 21st century and a fundamental misunderstanding that the political objective and the military 
objective were not, and never could be, the same. The political aim, the policy, was simple but totally 
misguided”.536 This impacted on the Military capability to build its own effective strategic plan, as it had 
no clear understanding as to the final political aim of the campaign. 
 
5.6 MILITARY CASE STUDIES 
To build a greater awareness of how the UK military managed the complex issues that it faced, the 
three case studies summaries (Table 17) chosen for analysis all focus on the need to apply the key 
components raised in the previous section. Effective blending of these core components of building 
Organisational Resilience against complex problems provides a framework within which to work 
successfully. The application of shared knowledge, accepted joint working practices and intelligence 
driven operations to maximise the use of the available resources, is critical for both the military 
commander and the business leader. The review of the case studies pulls out these lessons to support 
the development of the ORM3 framework and guidance on its implementation. The case studies raise 
the learning points from each study, demonstrated through success or the failure to apply aspects of 
an organisational resilience in disruptive situations. The combination of these learning points creates a 
base proposition, shown in Table 16, and aligned against each case study that it was identified from in 
Table 17, for developing the ORM3 framework, which is discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Importance of setting, 
communicating and 
maintaining a vision to 
deliver 
Effective 




Effective resourcing of the 
tasks to enable the 
delivery of the long-term 
goal 
The need to have the 
correct moral legitimacy 
to operate effectively 
Investment in strategic 
leadership to set the 
required culture 
Investment in the right 
level of leadership with 
the correct skill sets 
Building social and 
ethically accepted 
operational approach 
The need to develop and 
sustain the correct culture 
to provide the potential 
for success 
Effective communication 
and sharing of the end 
state 
The need to develop 
and sustain situational 
awareness 
Empowerment of teams to 





Table 16: Key Resilience Components from Military Case Studies.  
 
 
536Ledwidge, F., Losing Small Wars, 2012, p.124. 
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These issues are as important for UK industry to understand as they are for the UK military. As the 
three case studies have shown, critical to understanding why the military is organised and how it does 
business is the awareness of the underlying tenets of doctrine and the primary source of military culture. 
The importance of setting the strategic context for the campaign and developing the direction of travel 
is fundamental in setting a purpose for the military organisation. The case studies of Oman and Northern 
Ireland demonstrate that if an organisation implements an effective strategy, which is politically 
supported and resourced effectively through cultural awareness and intelligence, the potential for 
success is high. Iraq demonstrated what happens if the reverse occurs; the failure to build the correct 
culture, develop a defined vision, understand the current threat that the organisation faced, apply 
lessons learnt or implement a co-ordinated approach through strong leadership and a defined end-state 
creates a detrimental impact on the capability for delivering success. 
 
5.7 SUMMARY 
The research conducted into the railway industry and military has demonstrated several mechanisms 
that may be present within the military that potentially could provide a means to develop organisational 
resilience within industry. It has also identified areas which impacted on effective resilience capability 
development, which are further discussed in Chapter 7 during the design of the ORM 3 framework. 
Within the rail industry, persistent political interference and poor direction by strategic bodies have 
resulted in a highly fragmented natural monopolies being allowed to develop, often with critical failings 
being noted but rarely effectively mitigated until it is too late.  
 
The research that was gathered as part of the initial investigative findings of the current situation within 
the rail industry, focussing on the two key departments within Network Rail, highlighted glaring concerns 
within the disruptive event management capability, and the strategic and tactical leadership frameworks 
within the strategic planning teams. These findings are supported by several strategic reports, already 
referenced in this chapter, which point to a fundamental failing of industry strategic leadership, a siloed 
culture, individual rather than collaborative working, poor behaviours and a lack of unity in effort across 
the industry. In response to H6, the current Organisational Resilience capability within Network Rail is 
limited. By the end of 2018 there was no strategic business continuity plan, which, as a category 2 
responder, making it non-compliant to government legislation under the CCA 2004. The fractured 
resilience framework, siloed working, cultural issues and limited proactive development of staff and 
investment in human capital is also a concern.  
 
For the railway these issues are not new; they have been identified in several reports and research 
documents since 2004. This raises the situation that not only does the railway suffer from several 
fundamental issues when it comes to planning and managing the response to complex disruptive 
events, it is also demonstrates a critical failure to learn from past events and address these issues. Key 
to developing Organisational Resilience is the ability to review, learn and adapt from incidents and 
events. This research has shown that unfortunately this is not the case at the tactical and strategic 
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levels of the rail industry, with RAIB reports consistently raising the same issues; from this it is clear 
that the organisation is yet to embrace an effective learning culture. 
 
For the military, the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan became drawn out affairs, draining the 
nation’s resources while diffusing key assets, prestige and power.537 Conflicts of intervention became 
grand strategic campaigns of political survival requiring a single identified and clearly communicated 
political aim to build military strategy around. It is rare that a COIN campaign can pinpoint the point in 
time that turned the tide of the campaign. In the case studies that this research reviewed, these points 
can be identified. For the Oman campaign it was the day Qabus came to power and implemented a 
well thought out, structured and aligned Comprehensive Approach. For Iraq, it was the day that the 
Coalition leadership made 400,000 individuals who belonged to the Ba’ath party unemployed. In both 
these instances the situation changed instantly. For Oman, it was beneficial, for Iraq, catastrophic. The 
failure of the UK political and military leadership to develop an effective Comprehensive Approach for 
Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in the eroding of the UK’s standing globally.  
 
This chapter has analysed the military and industry organisations in the areas of leadership, strategic 
planning and effective management of disruptive events. Each organisation has shown that while there 
are numerous lessons that it could have applied to improve its performance, several opportunities were 
lost, leading to disastrous consequences to both reputation and capability. For the rail industry, the 
review of the recommendations made by McNulty has shown that the organisation has still failed to 
apply the critical learnings, which has led to continuous strategic reviews and concerns over the 
performance of the rail network. For the military, the failure to understand the lessons from numerous 
COIN campaigns and the failure to effectively plan for the post conflict element of the Iraq campaign 
demonstrated a strategic failure of the executive leadership. The case studies have demonstrated that 
while both organisations have a surface level learning framework in place, they do not yet possess the 
maturity to be classed as learning organisations. However, the analysis has also identified a base set 
of components that can be taken forward to develop the ORM3 framework around, based on the lessons 
pulled from each of the case studies. The following chapter discusses the research findings in detail, 
identifying key areas of concern that impact on the resilience of the relevant organisation. Following 
this, Chapters 7 and 8 design and build the ORM3 framework.  
 





Oman 1965 - 1975 Northern Ireland 1968 - 2005 Iraq 2003 - 2009 
The Oman COIN campaign demonstrates the benefit of 
clearly linking political strategic planning, grand strategy 
and tactical planning. By understanding the situation 
through intelligence gathering and effective analysis to 
confirm the political direction enabled the Sultan of Oman 
to maintain the strategic aim effectively while building 
national resilience within a divided kingdom.  
The Oman campaign also provided key lessons that were 
not identified prior to the intervention into Iraq in 2003. 
Having similar terrain, cultural schisms, operating climate 
and tribal arrangements, the Dhofar campaign provided 
several key lessons that could have been applied to the 
Iraq conflict. Unfortunately, as history has demonstrated, 
this was not the case although the UK military trained and 
exercised in the Oman for desert warfare experience, they 
forgot to review and apply the lessons of fighting a COIN 
campaign within a Middle Eastern nation. 
The Northern Ireland campaign (1968 – 2005) against 
the insurgency that was driven initially by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), and subsequently from 1974 the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). This 
campaign is a good demonstration on the importance of 
committing to an operational / political Comprehensive 
Approach to build cohesion and a unified message 
across an organisation.  
By operating collaboratively with local government, 
security forces and within the international arena, the 
PIRA campaign was eventually defeated, and its leaders 
brought to the negotiating table. It provides key lessons 
on understanding the length it takes to build resilience, 
the importance of the vision and the need for strong, 
unified leadership as well as a deep understanding of the 
cultural landscape that exists within the operating 
environment. 
The recent campaign in Iraq (2003 – 2009). The deployment of 
forces into Iraq in 2003 saw how the failure to adapt to the current 
threat and a failure to understand the contemporary conflict arena 
could cripple any attempt to build resilience within a failing state. 
Professor Richard North questioned the preparation of the UK 
Forces to deliver current capability in Iraq, when money was being 
diverted into the purchase of high intensity war equipment for 
potential future state on state conflicts.538  
Key to building resilience within a nation or an organisation is 
understanding the current operational and strategic climates, 
potential risks and underlying issues. In 2003 this was not the 
case for the British Forces, who believed that the population would 
welcome as liberators and that developing provincial resilience, 
key infrastructure and security framework, similar to how it had 
occurred in Northern Ireland.539 Lessons identified during the 
Oman campaign three decades earlier had not been fully 
embraced, which was to lead to disastrous consequences for the 
British. 
Lessons for Building Resilience 
The lessons that this campaign highlights with regards to 
building organisational resilience are: 
 
• Importance of setting, communicating and 
maintaining a vision to deliver; 
• Investment in strategic leadership to set the 
required culture; 
• Effective communication and sharing of the end 
state; 
• Effective understanding of risks, hazards, 
vulnerabilities and operational requirements; and 
• Effective resourcing of the tasks to enable the 
delivery of the long-term goal. 
The lessons that this campaign highlights with regards to 
building organisational resilience are: 
 
• Importance of setting and maintaining a vision 
to deliver; 
• Investment collaborative working; 
• Building social and ethically accepted 
operational approach; 
• Empowerment of teams to deliver the 
outcomes;  
• The need to develop and sustain situational 
awareness to be aware of vulnerabilities and 
operational requirements; and 
• Accept building resilience will take time. 
 
The lessons that this campaign highlights with regards to building 
organisational resilience are: 
 
• Importance of setting and maintaining a vision to deliver; 
• Investment in the right level of leadership with the correct 
skill sets; 
• The need to develop and sustain the correct culture to 
provide the potential for success; 
• Effective understanding of risks, hazards, vulnerabilities 
and operational requirements; and 
• The need to have the correct moral legitimacy to operate 
effectively 
Table 17: Military Case Study Summaries and Resilience Lessons
 
538North, Ministry of Defeat, 2009, p.2. 





CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section analyses the findings of the research conducted in line with Chapter 3 under the research 
methodology. Within this element of the thesis the research findings from the investigative work into 
both the rail industry and the military are captured. Following on from Chapter 3, it discusses the 
participants who were involved, the results obtained, along with analysis of the findings and map them 
back to the research aim and the relevant questions identified to help demonstrate the response to the 
aim. The aim of the thesis is: 
 
The development of an Organisational Resilience Management Maturity Model (ORM3) framework 
to enable organisations to unite the various operational functions within the business, creating an 
internal resilience against potential threats and crises which can be implemented through strategic 
leadership. 
 
To enable this, there was the need to understand what issues both the military and industry case study 
organisations were experiencing, and how the military, which has a high level of Organisational 
Resilience on operations, develop and sustain their capability over an operational deployment. The key 
output of the research framework was to analyse the flexibility and methodology of how the military 
developed Organisational Resilience capability and how the individuals within the organisation rate that 
capability. To conduct this, the key objectives of the research were to answer the following research 
questions mentioned in section 1.5, while the study conducted in Chapter 5 has answered H7. The 
remaining answers were obtained through the application of the following tasks during the research 
period: 
 
▪ The analysis of the current understanding and writings on Organisational Resilience; 
 
▪ The analysis of the current Organisational Resilience situation within the GB rail industry; 
 
▪ The analysis of the Comprehensive Approach through military case studies; 
 
▪ Identification of methods the UK military employ to build Organisational Resilience; and 
 
▪ Observations of the military operating within complex situations and how they manage to 
maintain Organisational Resilience capability. 
 
6.2 SETTING THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
H1 can be answered through understanding how the military plan for operations; it develops its resilience 
through intense virtual and physical training exercises run on numerous training estates, where the UK 





training area to simulate Middle Eastern villages, with exercises being redesigned to incorporate COIN 
training events. Regular Mission After Action Reviews (MAARs) and Campaign Learning Symposiums 
are conducted to enable the transfer of knowledge from the operational unit currently in theatre to the 
successor unit being prepared for deployment. Lessons learnt, from successful and failed events, are 
also captured, discussed, written down and circulated. This continuous approach to improvement and 
development is part of the mission culture for the military on operations, with key lessons being 
integrated into training sessions to ingrain the information. These physical training events are also 
supported by large scale combat exercises involving either the whole organisation or the leadership 
teams, dependent on the training cycle, in a virtual domain. This virtual training capability provides the 
opportunity to stretch teams and place them into complex, multi-scenario events which require 
teamwork, resilience, evidence-based analysis and collaboration across multiple partners. 
 
The military have been very successful in the large-scale, manoeuvre warfare on which its war-fighting 
and military culture was based, though the application of a more resilience building strategy against an 
aggressive insurgency quickly highlighted shortfalls in technology, vision, intelligence gathering and 
exploitation, leadership and capability. The observation of military teams during the planning and 
implementation of resilience activities was developed to obtain data on how teams reacted when tasked 
to plan for an event, and how they responded as the event unfolded in a dynamic, non-linear fashion. 
This approach was then used in conjunction with questionnaires and interviews to validate and cross 
reference findings. The researcher created a live exercise scenario, based on actual operational events, 
to enable the observation of teams conducting their planning and implementation of resilience building 
activities. This live case study enabled the observation of leadership staff managing complex situations 
and their ability to adapt under pressure. The initial exercise was deemed to be of merit and was refined 
and incorporated into formal training for command staff in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan 
from 2012 onwards.  
 
6.3 PARTICIPANTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
For the purpose of the military analysis, the participants were drawn from across nine separate BG 
headquarters staff who were attending pre-deployment combat operational training prior to entering the 
final preparations for their transit into Afghanistan. For the purpose of the data gathering, including the 
live case study, the Company / Squadron Group (sub-unit) was the unit of measure. Depending on the 
exercising unit, this could vary from 90 – 120 individuals, supplemented by the attached support staff 
that had been assigned to them. Figure 45 demonstrates the military organisation of a Sub-unit group, 
the smallest tactical unit deployed independently, broken down into components, delivering an 
enhanced capability as the relevant systems work together to develop greater capability through the 
ability of intelligence gathering and analysis, core military activity, evaluation and lessons learnt. The 






The respondents to the 
questionnaires, interviews 
and live case studies were 
of differing ranks and 
experience, as would be 
expected to be found within 
a normal military unit being 
deployed on operations. As 
is representative of the BG 
structure, there was a blend 
of front-line Combat Arms, 
Combat Support and 
Combat Service Support 
personnel. While it was not 
normal for servicewomen to 
serve within the frontline 
Combat Arms units in the 
infantry or armoured role at the time of the data gathering, servicewomen were present in the Combat 
Support and Combat Service Support elements of the BG formation. Servicewomen were also present 
across the rank structure within the Combat Support and Combat Service Support roles. This obser-
vation is of importance as it provides evidence that demonstrates the UK military does enable women 
to operate within the Frontline Role during Combat Operations. Of note was the attachment of 
servicewomen to the frontline units through Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers support elements. 
Although described as Combat Support elements, the Armoured Engineer Reconnaissance Officer and 
the Royal Artillery Fire Support Team Commander were both found to operate with or in front of the 
Combat Arms units. For the purpose of the live case study, questionnaires and the interviews, no 
differentiation was made between male or female; the investigations observed how the groups 
interacted and how individuals were prepared for operational deployment.  
 
The headquarters role was to complete a successful operational level plan to manage the complex 
tasks that had been set by their higher command to build resilience within their area of operation. This 
would involve the creation of military combat operations, security sector building, population 
engagements and military / NGOs and OGDs redevelopment activities, all happening concurrently 
through its various component parts. This was replicated for the live case study, enabling the 
observation of the team managing complex situations with multiple components of their system.  
 
During the live case study observation period, which occurred over two days, the participants were 
observed in their natural role, with the headquarters communications, IT infrastructure and temporary 
accommodation and real-life support also present. Realistic combat information, events and 
occurrences were provided through a virtual synthetic battle-space simulation, enabling accurate 






reporting, geo-location of personnel and information generated based on events. The Headquarters 
formation was developed as a system of systems, replicating the complexity of real-world operations. 
Figure 46 shows the sub-unit group, again broken down into its components, detailing how it would be 
structured for current operational requirements. It demonstrates how operating as a collection of 
systems, the organisation builds flexibility, adaptability and resilience through direct control of core units, 




This enabled the participants to experience the complexity of multiple platform operations during a 
difficult and dynamically changing problem as it unfolded within a challenging environment. The 
observation team circulated within the headquarters, observing practices, processes and interactions, 
capturing notes and evidence that were recorded in the observation report. Each BG headquarters 
experienced two cycles of operational planning. This enabled the observation team to provide feedback 
and support after the first event and then observe to what extent the BG amended their behaviours, 
approaches and practices based on this knowledge. This is important, as it assesses the capability of 
the headquarters as an organisation to become a dynamic learning organisation and how rapidly they 
assimilate and integrate lessons from previous mistakes. The next section explores the relevant data 
results from the data gathering tools used to capture information from the military groupings, and the 
significant findings from the analysis of this collected evidence. 
 






6.4 RESEARCH DATA GATHERING TOOLS  
In line with the research strategy, the research programme utilised a five work-stream approach to 
gathering information for analysis and cross referencing. The five streams of data gathering that were 
employed during the evidence gathering period to build greater situational awareness across the 
research area (Figure 47): 
 
Figure 47: Research work-streams Source: Author 
 
Work-streams 1 and 2 have been answered through the data gathering and analysis conducted in 
Chapter 5, which investigated the current situation within the rail industry and the review and analysis 
of the three military case studies. The sections below discuss the findings from each of the data 
gathering streams and cross references them to answer the remaining research questions that are 
focussed on the military Organisational Resilience capability. 
  
6.4.1 Interview Results 
The military seeks to develop its Organisational Resilience capability through effective preparation for 
the task, the development of the various teams that were being utilised for the task, and the building of 
evidence-based decision-making supported through effective intelligence analysis. To identify how well 
individuals thought they had been trained to adapt and manage complex problems within a dynamic 





were questioned in line with the 
question framework.540 The 
results were collated541 and 
then reviewed against a 
scoring mechanism, with the 
scores placed into a table to 
highlight the key elements.542 
The scoring was conducted to 
quantify those key personal 
traits, identified through 
professional and academic 
publications that are key in 
developing a resilience leader-
ship capability. Key phrases 
were mapped to the various 
sub-categories of the domains and the relevant personality traits and scored, enabling a comparison 
across the other traits within the Headquarters Staff.543 This allowed the development of an overall 
resilience leader profile, which took into consideration the five key domains and personality traits aligned 
to each domain, identified by the research findings from the audience group (Figure 48).544 From the 
interviews, the key elements regarded as critical to building organisational resilience leadership were:  
 
▪ Effective leadership;  
▪ Development of people; and 
▪ Demonstrating values and standards. 
 
Figure 49 reflects the three lead domains and the components within them that the audience group 
identified as important to a leader. It shows how the weighting is distributed within these domains. These 
domains are key to developing the capability to manage a dynamic situation and mobilise the team to 
manage the situation.  
 
540Annex B B1. 
541Annex B B2 – B21. 
542Annex C, C1 – C2.  
543Annex C, C2. 
544Annex C, C4 












Building on these observations, the various individual traits were then ranked on the value of the scores 
that each had obtained across the interviews, arranged in order of perceived importance by the 
participants545. What the analysis of the interviews has established is that in the consideration of those 
operating within the complex and dynamically changing environment, the key trait of the leadership 
team managing the complex situation was the ability to demonstrate sound decision-making, often on 
the back of clear analysis of evidence presented (Figure 49). Supporting this was the need to show the 
moral courage to make difficult decisions, often under pressure, to enable the diffusion of the situation. 
The ability to do this within the team relies on the key aspects of trust and clear communication. 
Therefore, at the top end of the qualities, we see the action elements of crisis management and the 
traits required to facilitate this aspect of management. In the middle of the qualities are those that focus 
on maintaining the situation after the initial direction has been given and the decisions made. These are 
the directions to teams, maintaining capability and understanding the skills of the various team members 
involved in the tasks at hand. There is also the need to start gathering an understanding of the wider 
situation and understand what the senior leadership team are seeking. Whereas moral courage and 
trust are pulled to the forefront of the required personality traits, demonstrating the other values and 
standards, values-based leadership and innovative thinking sit within the lower third of the identified 
qualities.  
 
While the “action” traits are required from the outset to respond to an unfolding situation to immediately 
start to build resilience, the longer-term factors, such as identifying new capabilities and delivering 
change sit further down in order of importance as they are also longer term. Lateral thinking and 
innovative responses are also at the lower end, which may initially seem surprising. However, the 
military is a process driven machine, with processes developed for decision-making, information 
gathering, warfighting and delivering directions to teams. The issues around culture and politics are 
based on human interactions and making complex decisions rather than processes and procedures 
that can be analysed, understood and then amended to suit the required situation. Deeper analysis of 
the transcripts of the interviews also highlighted that there was a concern regarding the level of 
knowledge within the senior leadership of the military as to how to address a complex, non-linear 
campaign against a threat that was based on strategic messaging. At least 60% of the interviewees 
raised the concern that the military did not invest enough in young officer conceptual development early 
enough, highlighting the lack of understanding in the frontline leadership (Lieutenant – Captain - Major) 
on how to effectively apply the Comprehensive Approach.  
 
This was raised in conjunction with the failure to conduct more joint operational training and professional 
education events with OGDs. When the detailed analysis and comparison of all the factors is conducted, 
the top five aspects are focussed around decision-making, communication and the building of trust. 
This is underpinned by the need for the leader to demonstrate moral courage through authentic 
leadership during disruptive events.  
 
 





These findings were then cross-referenced with the results from the military and rail industry 
questionnaires to identify if the issues being discovered in this analysis were also present in the other 
research work-streams. A detailed analysis of the results against each other was then conducted, 
comparing each of the qualities against the others, assigning a level of priority from the BG personnel 
when it comes to the required traits of individuals within a resilience and crisis management position. 
This enabled the visualisation of how the 20 individuals within an active headquarters, managing 
numerous disparate issues of various intensity and complexity, scored the importance of each personal 
trait comparatively against the others. Several interviewees raised the issues regarding the lack of 
development within the junior officer contingent on resource and people management, as well as feeling 
ill-prepared to conduct operations within a Comprehensive Approach framework. One of the key topics 
raised was the ability to plan and execute aggressive kinetic military operations to engage and defeat 
the enemy, which was the focus of multiple exercises they had conducted, but that there was a limited 
awareness of influence operations and consent building activities within a population through non-
kinetic operations.  
 
From the twenty interviews, the key 
observations obtained from the review of 
the domains identified was that the 
participants identified effective leadership 
as the lead element to building resilience 
within an organisation. In their opinion, 
giving clear direction, decision-making and 
communicating the requirement was critical 
to surviving a disruptive event. Behind 
effective leadership was the development 
of capability and then the demonstration of 
values; particularly that of moral courage to 
make the difficult decisions during disruptive events (Figure 50). The review of the completed 
questionnaires identified similar issues to those brought out from the interviews. These results are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
6.4.2 Questionnaire Results 
Attached at Annex D is the questionnaire framework used in line with the direction given in Chapter 3, 
and the responses returned against those questions. While the interviews discussed above were 
conducted across one BG headquarters, the military questionnaire was run over a three-year period to 
capture the responses from three separate groups of participants, consisting of members from several 
BG headquarters staff. This was aimed at enabling an objective response to be captured due to the 
numbers surveyed, helping to reduce the effect of local variances from skewing the overall 
questionnaire results. The responses from each group of participants were then compiled together into 
joint tables to enable comparison across the three different audience responses to identify any trends 





or exceptions. As the information collected was during the period of transition of 2012 – 2013 for the 
Afghanistan mission and the embedding a new population-focussed resilience building approach, the 
focus of the campaign effort moved from insurgent focus to the development of a greater influence and 
stabilisation capability in preparation for the UK extraction from Afghanistan in 2014. The campaign task 
moved from one of building security to building resilience across Helmand Province, supporting and 
maintaining the capability of several civil and government organisations. In this effect, the military was 
developing Organisational Resilience at a provincial level, thus the participants proved a highly suitable 
group on which to conduct this research. 
 
Detailed analysis of the questionnaires identified that though the initial training and development of the 
junior officers was deemed by the audience to be sufficient for the role of leading individuals in combat 
operations,546 there was greater concern over the ability of the military to prepare them to manage 
resources within the wider context.547 This is a concern, as young officers are expected to manage their 
command, including multi-million-pound specialised equipment, for between 60 – 80% of their time at 
the junior command level.548 The collated research identified that there was a gap, during the research 
period, in the Officer Education courses from both the RMAS and the Young Officer Special to Arms 
events that left the young officers feeling ill-prepared to manage the various resources under their 
command. This can affect the capability of the organisation to perform effectively, as the young officers 
are tasked with delivering the effect required from the plan. In a business operations context, while the 
BG Commander is the department head, the young officer is the junior manager responsible for turning 
plans and strategy into action and results. If the organisation has failed to develop their capability 
properly, then this provides a strategic gap in resource development and the sustaining of resilience 
capability. 
 
The level of preparation provided by initial officer training appears to deliver the required level for the 
operational role within command for the new officer.549 However, while many would agree that they felt 
prepared, when the subject is further investigated, the situation is not as clearly defined as was initially 
proposed, with a significant number feeling exposed when it came to resource management. When 
analysing the level of professional education, there is over a 10% reduction in those who indicate it 
effectively prepared them for their first role. The research highlights concern within the participant group 
over the quality of education delivered by the Army.550 Interestingly the 2012 Royal Marines, which are 
Naval forces, demonstrated a higher level of satisfaction with their level of education. 
 
Deeper analysis into the topic of how the junior commander is prepared for their first role exposed 
certain areas of concern around their preparation and resource management capabilities when 
 
546Annex E1, Q1. 
547Ibid, Q5. 
548Figure based on the analysis of the data collected during the questionnaire periods, with an average tour length being 
accepted as 6 months. For example: a newly promoted Captain may have served 3 years (graduate) or 5 years (non-graduate). 
Having deployed on 2 operational tour of 6 months, this would mean that the young officer would be responsible for resource 
management for the remaining 66% (graduate) or 80% (non-graduate) of their time in role. 
549Annex E1, Q1 and Q5. 





implementing the Comprehensive Approach. The results showed that the time spent at their initial phase 
officer training, and the subsequent time given for professional development, is not adequate. Over a 
third indicated concerns over the lack of professional knowledge and training time when working with 
OGDs to deliver a Comprehensive Approach to deliver resilience in a conflict environment.551 
Conversely, conducting Joint Services combat operations is well understood.552 The development of 
the junior officer is still heavily focussed on the single service capability, with limited development of the 
wider combined operations with OGDs and NGOs. Given that recent operations have required a 
combined approach to operations, this lack of experience within the groups tasked to deliver the effect 
impacts on the delivery capability on the battlefield. Across the surveyed group there was a concern 
over the conceptual preparation of the individual for the next role that they were being moved into.553 
The review of the collective data for the three separate participant groups identified that, while the Royal 
Marines audience felt well prepared, this was not reflected within the larger army group reviewed. Both 
army participant groups reported a greater number of individuals that were concerned over their 
preparation for their new role than those who indicated they felt fully supported. This concern also 
increased from 2012 to 2013 by an extra 4%. This period was the time that the military had initiated the 
management efficiency programme across the three services, seeking to reduce the organisation in 
line with the SDSR. The Army participants also raised concerns regarding the level of preparation 
training being delivered prior to operational deployment. In 2013 over 42% indicated that they did not 
feel properly prepared. This highlighted an increase over the audience in 2012, as well as concerns 
over the development of the UK units 
deploying to conduct resilience building 
activities within the security forces of 
Helmand Province.  
 
Supporting the quantitative analysis was a 
qualitative analysis on the current issues 
impacting the successful delivery of resilience 
through the Comprehensive Approach. The 
analysis sought to identify the key themes to 
inform the CAST(S) facility on ways to 
improve the exercises to mitigate the 
concerns of the audience and enhance the 
development of the Comprehensive 
Approach capability. The questionnaire 
sought to build a greater understanding of the 
rank range, operational combat background, 
seniority and professional experience of the 
 
551Ibid, Q20 and Q21. 
552Ibid, Q22. 
553Ibid, Q8. 
Figure 51: Questionnaire Audience Rank Range Results 





audience groups554 (Figure 51). Participants were asked to consider what could be done to enhance 
and re-design the military's approach to education rather than training, focusing on the preparation for 
the application of the Comprehensive Approach on upcoming operational deployments.  
 
The final question sought to determine how resilience within the workforce was being maintained, 
looking at how many individuals had received civilian accreditation for the training and education 
courses completed while serving. This was focussing on the areas of concern raised during the research 
into how the military supported individuals entering the civilian workplace on completion of their service. 
The concept being how does the military manage to support its social capital and use ex-service 
personnel to provide resilience support through either returning as Reservists or selling the military to 
the next generation. The ability to mobilise the social capital requires initial investment by an 
organisation. Q26 reported how well the military had invested into the people it was sending onto 
combat operations. 
 
When the results were analysed across the three separate audiences, they highlighted some interesting 
trends across the audience, as well as who was being deployed to manage effective resilience 
operations. Q24 highlighted that within the main participant group of 2012, most respondents were of 
the Captain rank, which is the first step on the middle management ladder of the army. A captain will 
have already served approximately 6 years, depending on their profession and have had 18 months 
invested on their leadership and management development. They would be in senior frontline command 
roles within sub-units, or specialised technical liaison officers where trust, integrity and an ability to self-
motivate and advise others were key skills. Though there were over double the number of respondents 
in 2013, when compared as a percentage, it was very similar. In contrast, the Royal Marines, in their 
tight knit BG of 58 positive respondents, displayed a higher proportion of Captains than either of the 
Army participant groups.  
 
This may be due to two key issues; the size of the respondent group within the Royal Marine BG and 
the fact that the Royal Marines, being a specialised naval unit, are more comfortable with the concept 
of Joint Force operations. This concept results in more liaison officers, who are normally of Captain 
level, being part of the task force. When this finding is then mapped against Q8, Q13 and Q15,555 the 
officers highlighted that the level of Professional Military Education (PME) does not fully develop them 
for the next role they move into, the organisation does not give them enough time to access the 
education throughout their career, and almost 36 %(2012) and 45%(2013) of the audiences remarked 











Another observation that can be witnessed is the 
change in the makeup of the participant groups. 
Although the same type of organisation (an 
operational BG), there is a marked higher level of 
more senior officers in the 2013 audience. This may 
be representative of the change in mission for the UK 
military. In 2012 - 13 it was about stabilisation of the 
situation within Helmand Province and therefore 
more focus on combat and interdiction operations to 
defeat the insurgents. In 2013 - 14 the mission had 
changed; the UK was withdrawing from the region 
and developing Afghanistan security forces resilience 
was the way out; therefore, more senior liaison 
officers, with previous experience in force 
development and resilience building endeavours, 
were present. This would also be consistent with the 
previous observation that the skill sets required were 
not being delivered effectively to the junior officer cohort and therefore a more senior rank was required 
for the task.  
 
This knowledge does not only come 
with professional education and 
development. A significant amount of 
capability development is also obtained 
through exercising and operational 
experience. Figure 53 contrasts the 
level of operational tour experience of 
each of the participant groups in 
numbers and percentage of the 
deploying staff. When the participants 
are compared the experience of the 
deploying organisation is far greater 
within the 2013 deploying 
organisations. This is also reflective of 
the previous observation that a more 
senior cadre cartel of officers was being 
deployed to the combat zone. 
 
Further investigation into the written 
responses to the qualitative questions, 
Figure 52: Questionnaire Operational Tour 
Results (%) and (n). Source: Author 
Figure 53: Themes That Impact Delivery of a Comprehensive 





revealed several themes that were identified during the codifying process. These were broken down 
into overarching themes which impacted on the delivery of leadership development and the 
development of staff capability to deliver an effective Comprehensive Approach methodology to 
resilience operations. These themes were captured and compared over the three participant groups, 
but for a balanced comparison only the army groups were used from 2012 and 2013. 
 
During the observation period, the Army introduced its management efficiency programme, seeking to 
reduce its numbers from 101,000 to 82,000 under the Army 2020 restructure programme. The impact 
of this is clearly seen within the comparison of the results. In 2012 the focus was on the quality of 
training and preparation for operational deployment. In 2013 the emphasis had shifted with an increase 
in concerns over strategic leadership and how the military was preparing individuals to transition out of 
service and into civilian life. A deeper analysis of the personal development support of individuals across 
the three participant groups by the military also supports the initial findings. By analysing those who had 
sought professional accreditation of their work, there is a distinct difference in the number of 
accreditation events being achieved, as well as the level of accreditation. This demonstrates a shift in 
thinking (Figure 54); individuals in 2013, due to the restructure, were more focussed on demonstrating 
their capability to a civilian employer and preparing themselves for the transit out of service life. This 
was also underpinned with the launch of the Army Skills Programme, which sought to push civilian 
accreditation in a bid to align military skills with required civilian employment skills. 
 
For the rail industry, the review of the questionnaire responses identified several areas of concern in 
relation to staff capability, organisational structure and the effectiveness of its resilience capability when 





faced with a disruptive event. Initial 
discussions with the ATOC the ORR and 
RAIB reports identified that there was an 
embryonic approach to Business 
Continuity within the rail industry in 2013 
- 2014, with several organisations 
beginning to explore the capability. This 
was also supported with the evidence 
gathered during the initial review of the 
current situation within Network Rail, 
which is attached in the questionnaire 
answers at Annex E. The responses to 
Questions 1 through 3 demonstrate the 
low level of resilience education that 
exists within the organisation. Those 
questioned across both functions within 
the organisation had the demographic 
spread shown in Figure 55, which 
highlights that both questionnaires cut 
across the hierarchical management 
framework of both functions within the 
company. 
 
The 130 respondents to the Operations 
Department questionnaire were drawn from across the management layers of the department. The aim 
was to capture, by using a cross-section, a more representative range of opinions, thereby delivering a 
fair interpretation of the actual environment within the company. The majority are based within the junior 
(Band 4) and middle management levels (Bands 3 & 2). Band 4 represents the team and specialists 
level of management, while Band 3 is more the Local manager / project manager layer within the 
organisation, focussing on the tactical level. Band 2 and Band 1 are the layers of management that 
focus on strategic leadership and decision-making within the department.  
 
Within the strategic planning team respondents (n=120), the layers of seniority were similar. The 
demographics show the train planners (Band 5) and the team managers (Band 3). Supporting the 
managers are the Team specialists, (Band 4), experts within the planning domain. Band 2 personnel 
are the Route team managers, which may encompass two or more planning teams, while the band 1 
managers are the strategic leaders of the department. There were approximately 550 individuals within 
the department during the research phase. 
 






The full responses to both questionnaires run across the rail industry are located at Annex E. The 
questionnaire that was focussed on resilience capability reflects the concern raised regarding the level 
of management capability and leadership within the delivery of resilience, with concerns over the level 
of training, education and resourcing of the teams. Within the Strategic Planning function, there is 
concern over the level of staff development and management support, as well as the indication that 
individuals feel their teams are not properly resourced. Within this area it is also noted that the staff feel 
the company does not understand the needs of the rail industry, managers are not held accountable 
for their decisions, and the rail industry is not working in an effective and collaborative manner. This 
would seem to indicate that there were limited levels of communication and engagement with key 
stakeholders, poor investment and retention of staff, limited understanding of the level of risk the 
organisation was operating at, and a limited management of talent within the departments. These 
elements are people focussed but critical in building and maintaining a resilience capability within an 
organisation, which can then be enabled and enhanced through technology. 
 
Working with the questionnaire responses, the next steps were to pull together what factors they thought 
would enable the development of an effective industry, Figure 56 demonstrates the key factors that 
were presented. The top three they suggested were: training and education; improved behaviours; and 
investing in a Collaborative Approach. 
 
 
Figure 56: Building an effective collaborative industry.  Source: Author 
 
Taking this a step further, the strategic planning questionnaire asked the respondents, within their 
operating environment, what issues they were currently witnessing which were impacting on the 









The three main elements raised by the respondents were: The methods of working; staff behaviours; 
and a lack of a holistic planning approach. When viewed with the rest of the answers to the 
questionnaire within the Strategic Planning function, which raised issues around management 
development, team suitability and resourcing and issues around stakeholder engagement, it is clear 
why there were such issues identified that were impacting on the collaborative approach and effective 
planning of the rail network. Based upon the findings of the research into rail incidents investigated by 
the ORR and RAIB identified several key themes identified that were impacting on the organisation’s 
resilience. The table below looks at these themes, observations and impact. It also identifies what 
element of the ORM3 this theme would be attributable to.557 
 




Industry failed to manage the situation 
effectively and did not prioritise the 
customer, with many self-evacuating onto 
the track. 
Several passengers suffering from minor 







Staff development,  






Network Rail team failed to become 
aware of the wider unfolding crisis and did 












Rail industry response was lacking in 
knowledge, capability or experience of 













The communications framework and 
procedures, across many dimensions, 













Industry procedures were not followed 













557RAIB, `Detrainment of passengers onto electrically live track near Peckham Rye Station`, RAIB Report 16/2018, Derby, UK, 
2018; RAIB, `Self-Detrainment Of Passengers Onto Lines That Were Still Open To Traffic And Electrically Live At Lewisham’, 
South-East London, RAIB Report 16/2018, Derby, UK, 2018. 












Lack of use of all information channels 
available to build situational awareness 













Little consideration given on how to 
communicate to passengers when faced 












Actions by control, signalling and driving 
functions contributed to the situation 














Industry focussed on removing the 
stranded vehicles, rather than duty of care 
to stranded passengers, resulting in 
discomfort of several hundred passengers 
and eventual forced self-evacuation, 
















Table 18: Impact of Poor Resilience Implementation During a Major Rail Incident.  Source: RAIB 
 
6.4.3 Previous Exercise Reviews 
To enable the observation of military personnel within a complex environment, it was key to develop a 
situation where the individuals and the team could function utilising their skills, knowledge and capability 
without having an initial awareness of the situation they were about to enter. The key element of the 
case study was to identify within the leadership group how, when faced with a complex problem 
requiring the application of a cross discipline implementation strategy, to deliver Comprehensive 
Approach based activities to obtain success. The case study exercise was developed, informed by the 
information being collected by the researcher during research interviews and observation of training 
exercises. Utilising the lessons observed from the two exercises discussed below, the Live Case study 
was developed. 
To ensure there was little disruption to the organisation and to negate the Hawthorne Effect, the decision 
was taken to observe the planning and mission execution serials based on military tasks already being 
used to train individuals for operational deployment. Two training exercises were chosen for observation 
based on their structure and similar requirements to that of the case study, with the findings shown in 
Table 19. Exercise Eagle’s Claw and Exercise Red Wolf were developed to train the military staff at the 
BG Headquarter level, aimed at developing the planning capability to deliver an effective operational 
plan within a Comprehensive Approach framework to address a complex environment based on the 




558 Ministry of Defence JDP 05: Shaping a Stable World: The Military Contribution, Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK 








Threat Type Geographic 
Location 





introduced a hybrid 
threat, based on 
the generic enemy 
model created for 
planning exercise 
events. 
The geography was 
based on the UK, with 
the country broken into 
4 separate geographical 
regions. These regions, 
called Nordland, 
Blueland, Redland and 
Eastland sought to 
replicate a complex 
political environment. 
Redland was the aggressor, 
having launched a border 
incursion into Blueland. The 
audience were there as part of a 
UK Brigade deployed in a NATO 
multi-national formation. The 
exercise ran over 2 days and 
was successful in its aim in 
introducing planning cycles and 
practices to the headquarters 
staff. It developed problem-
solving, decision-making and 
evidence-based analysis under 
pressure.  
While the concept provided 
context, the unreal setting 
detracted from the realism, with 
the generic enemy being fit for 
purpose, but not credible. There 
was little in the way of a political 
higher story to help build the 
complexity of the situation; this 
resulted in little consideration 
being given to non-military 





introduced a hybrid 
threat, modelled on 
an Islamic 
fundamentalist 
threat, modelled on 
the Taleban / Al 
Qaeda framework  
This situation was 
based in the Middle 
East with the exercise 
narrative built around 
the audience being part 
of a UK rapid reaction 
deployment in support 
of a wider NATO action 
to deter the threat. 
The exercise sought to develop 
the relevant planning processes 
and intelligence gathering 
activities to enable evidence-
based analysis and complex 
event management. It aimed to 
build greater cultural awareness, 
problem-solving and decision-
making practices. The exercise 
was planned to run over a two-
day period, focussed on the 
building of team capability. 
The audience identified key 
limitations to the exercise, the 
mapping used was very limited, 
preventing little ground analysis. 
There was little in the way of 
population information to 
conduct targeted analysis; there 
was little political high-level story 
to build greater awareness of the 
complex environment. Limited in 
the way of other agencies inter-
action, which in turn detracted 
from the need to create a 
Comprehensive Approach 
answer to the problem. 
 
Table 19: Exercise Threat Observations 
 
From observing both Exercise Red Wolf and Exercise Eagle’s Claw, several issues that impacted on 
the ability for the various audiences to fully embark on a Comprehensive Approach planning exercise 
were identified. The review of both these exercises identified that though they had been developed to 
build a greater awareness of planning military activities against a hybrid threat within the framework of 
the Comprehensive Approach, the focus was on the military action, rather than the complexity of the 
environment. The limited consideration of non-military activities impacted on building an understanding 
of the Comprehensive Approach or the need to create a people centric approach to the planning. It also 
continued to build the incorrect premise of hybrid warfare being a complicated, rather than complex, 




Limitations Learning Impact Impacted Domain 
1 Red Wolf The mapping being used for one of 
the exercises was not detailed 
enough to enable a clear 
understanding of the ground or 
terrain. 
This prevented detailed planning 
activities and urban operations due 





2 Red Wolf 
 
Eagle’s Claw 
While the detail around the exercise 
scenario and enemy threat was 
substantial on both exercises, there 
was limited information on the 
cultural dispositions of the 
population, tribal allegiances, political 
issues or the local elder council 
frameworks 
This limited the ability for non-
military actions and planning events 
to be embarked on in detail, 
impacting on the ability to plan 







3 Red Wolf 
 
Eagle’s Claw 
There was limited information on the 
infrastructure, the commercial 
impact, organisational structures and 
its condition. 
Unable to plan Comprehensive 
Approach activities which seek to 
build consent and support in the 
population. COIN operational 
success relies on the embarkation 
of non-military activities that add 







4 Red Wolf There was little scope given to 
exercise events to “grow”; to allow 
The exercise had a list of events to 









the event to react and develop 
according to how the audience 
responded to the issue. 
/ response was witnessed, the 
serial was closed, preventing the 
audience the ability to learn how to 
respond to wicked problems and 
understand the wider implications 
of their actions on a military, 








5 Eagle’s Claw The generic enemy model for the 
exercise was fit for the purpose of the 
exercise team but the operational 
doctrine, combat approach and 
responses were not credible. 
The impact on the quality of the 
complex training, with the 
Headquarters staff not being tested 
when dealing with complex social-
political situations being 
intermingled with hostile forces’ 








6 Red Wolf 
 
Eagle’s Claw 
The audience spent the first part of 
the exercise reading the exercise 
scenario, building situational 
awareness, pulling together various 
maps and identifying the required 
forms required to conduct the 
exercise. 
Planning and staff development 
time wasted due to building simple 
situational awareness. No testing of 
pre-deployment, intelligence 
sharing activities within the unit 









organisation for task 
 
Table 20: Learning Observations From Exercise Reviews. Source: Author 
 
These observations were used to inform the development of the “live Case Study” exercise. Through 
constant review of the credibility and authenticity of these events, dynamic situations were created for 
the participating individuals, with their responses being based on actual practices and procedures at 
the time, rather than preconceived information enabling individuals to prepare for the event. These 
training events looked at the ability of the individuals and the team to react to unfolding tactical, 
operational and strategic events, how they reacted with the environment, collaborated with other 
individuals, as well as the social interaction between the individuals and various groups during periods 
of intense pressure, limited information and continued threat to the organisation. The exercise 
framework was developed to incorporate events that would drive critical decision-making, contingency 
planning, communication and the building of situational awareness skills within individuals, though 
success could only be achieved through teamwork, problem solving and information sharing. 
 
6.4.4 Live Case Study Results 
Having identified the key areas of concern that impacted on the capability development, the use of live 
exercise scenarios was aimed at observing the capability in action, managing complex disruptive 
events, and assist in the understanding of how the military units built and maintained resilience within 
a dynamic and complex operating environment. As part of the observation, both groups conducted a 
self-enforced continuous improvement process, supported by the members of the Directing Staff at the 
CAST(S) facility. These members offered impartial observation, being able to benchmark the two 
organisations against each other and other units that had gone through the event previously, capturing 
the evidence in a detailed observation report. 
 
The case studies identified the importance of building a clear understanding of the operating 
environment, the complexity of the actors and relationships within that environment. The need to 





gaps and task constraints. This allows the adaptation of the organisation to deliver the required 
operational structure to respond to the environment and mission essential tasks. The reports, through 
the performance grading system,559 demonstrated that there was a limited capability within the 
headquarters to deliver an effective Comprehensive Approach to resilience operations, which was then 
developed through the support given by the observation teams through a continuous improvement 
framework.  
 
On completion of the observations, the results were scored against the criteria. This enabled the 
comparison of the activities of the BG headquarters against proposed industry requirements for building 
resilience. The performance of the BG was mapped against the activities of McManus' framework, in 
line with section 3.10.3. The framework (Figure 58) is provided for reference. By using this approach, a 
comparison of how the organisations performed in each of the live case study events was possible, as 
well as an identification of areas of change / performance enhancement through the review and lessons 
learnt process. Attached are the findings for the four events mapped into the framework; two for BG 1 
and two for BG 2.560 The framework has been completed using the scoring system discussed in section 
3.10.3, with organisational resilience profiles also completed to enable an accurate comparison to be 
conducted.  
 
The detailed analysis of the BG demonstrated the importance of leadership, flexibility and the capability 
to conduct a lessons learned activity to adapt to a complex and dynamically changing disruptive 
event.561 Figure 59 shows the resilience profile of BG 1 using the original McManus model, giving a 
clear indication of the benefit achieved through the experiential learning and the after-action review 
events with the instructional staff. The adjustments made by the leadership team for the second series 














Figure 59: Resilience profile of Battlegroup 1, before and after. Source Author 
 
 
Figure 60: Resilience profile of Battlegroup 2, before and after. Source Author 
 
A review of the diagrams of both BGs show an increase in resilience capability post the lessons learnt 
review and the ability to reflect on their current operational approach and amend it based on the 
feedback received. Using McManus's framework, it is possible to show the actual change to the profiles 
of both organisations. Each of the three domains are designed with the higher score towards the outer 
edge; the larger the triangle, the greater the resilience profile of the organisation. Building on this, the 
detailed analysis of each component of McManus' framework is also reviewed to determine whether 
the more detailed reporting provides a better model for observing the resilience profile of an 
organisation. By being able to drill deeper into the resilience profile, it provides a framework that can be 
used by an organisation not only to build a resilience capability, but also act as an assurance and bench-







Figure 61 demonstrates this for BG 1, while Figure 62 demonstrates this for BG 2: 
 
 
To obtain a greater understanding of the impact of the lessons learnt and process review, the next step 
was to map the individual components of each of the domains. These scores are obtained from 
changing the grading given in the organisational observation reports and allocated a representative 
numerical value. This value is then used to score the individual component against the other 
components. This provided a scoring mechanism for each organisation on its situation awareness, 
keystone vulnerability and adaptive capacity, varying from very low to very high562. Figure 61 presents 
the score of each component and details the improvement from the first and second exercise events, 
for BG 1. The comparison provides a visual representation of the impact of the lessons learnt and 
reflection on the actions of the BG, with the subsequent organisational learning providing a larger 
resilience profile on the second model. The process was also conducted for BG 2 to cross-check that 
the process was functioning correctly and to provide a second independent observation. The same 
process was conducted, with Figure 62 graphically demonstrating the initial level of capability and 
reflecting how the lessons review and subsequent adaptive capability of the headquarters enabled a 
significant change to the resilience profile. 
 
 
562See Annex F for detailed scoring framework 
Figure 61: Battle-Group 1 Resilience Profile Before and After Review. Source: Author 





The application of the McManus framework enabled the investigation to be conducted into the level of 
organisational resilience that is demonstrated within the military units as they plan, conduct and recover 
for disruptive events. Though the analysis was conducted in the virtual environment, with the 
observation of real time activities within the combat zone viewed as introducing a high-risk approach to 
information gathering, the activities, pressures and complexities experienced by the command team 
were similar. Though the risk of actual casualties was not present, the increased tempo of operations, 
the high level of complexity and the detailed scrutiny of every decision made replicated a high-level of 
operational pressure. 
 
Based on the results of the various work-streams, discussed in detail in this chapter, and building on 
the research of McManus and Stephenson, the base components for the ORM3 was developed using 
the BG reports to demonstrate its effectiveness at promoting a greater level of granularity and 
awareness when it comes to understanding the level of resilience that exists within an organisation, and 
the various complexities that exist in attempting to understand the shortfalls and potential outcomes.  
 
As part of the research framework, this thesis reviewed numerous texts, business publications and 
research papers. Based on the observations and the results from the various research activities, this 
research developed several additional factors that it proposes should be incorporated into the McManus 
/ Stephenson Organisational Resilience framework, which were incorporated for consideration in the 
design phase of the ORM3 framework. This research also proposes a conceptual model, aligned to the 
framework, to help demonstrate how the various elements are interlinked. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss 
the design and development of the new maturity model identified through this research. 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
The analysis of the information from the questionnaires and the codifying process from the 
organisations enabled the identification of key areas of resilience building capabilities. By cross-
referencing the findings of the railway and the military case studies in Chapter 5, it was clear that areas 
of concern within both organisations that focussed on Organisational Resilience were highlighted. The 
key aspects of effective strategic leadership, managing complex disruptions and the development of an 
effective culture were all critical to building a resilience capability. For the military, these issues, when 
cross-referenced with the three case studies, highlighted core elements that were needed to promote 
a successful approach to building resilience capability within organisations and at national level. The 
use of the political-military framework was chosen as these government organisations are normally the 
framework elements of a national resilience structure. Their capability reflects the readiness of the 
national resilience groups to respond to a national crisis. This element of the thesis sought to build on 
the components that support the operational development of Organisational Resilience once the 
strategic framework of culture, organisational vision and purpose, and the leadership framework is in 
place. This investigative work was conducted along five independent research streams, enabling 






The questionnaires and interviews identified that resilience capability is not inherent. There is a need 
to build and maintain skills throughout the organisation to enable it to respond effectively. The 
questionnaires brought to the surface issues around staff conceptual development and exercising with 
other resilience-based organisations. This impacted on the level of knowledge of other organisations 
and potential issues / working practices that were required in the combat zone. The interviews also 
teased out the importance of evidence-based analysis to support decision-making and delivering 
leadership and guidance to the team. Moral courage was also high on the list, demonstrating that in 
disruptive events, individuals understand the importance of decisions being made, and that some may 
be difficult choices. The leader is expected to have the moral courage to make the tough call on what 
needs to happen, based on the evidence available and unfolding situation. 
 
Using the work of McManus and Stephenson to build the assessment framework of the observed case 
studies, it allowed for a review of the activities of the BGs, and a check of the resilience frameworks. 
Whereas McManus did not have a core element, Stephenson had added this to the original framework, 
though it did not fully identify the elements that were being highlighted in the organisations observed. 
The observations also highlighted that there were several key groupings of activity within the BG 
headquarters staff. All elements required alignment to the vision, supported by a military culture and 
the dynamic mission command leadership methodology. Across the headquarters, elements where 
broken down into key operational elements to maintain a functioning organisation as it managed several 
disruptive events within a dynamically changing environment. The following chapter will look at how the 
observations of the BGs, supported by the evidence of the interviews and questionnaires across both 
organisations, have resulted in the development of the ORM3 framework to provide a more detailed 
benchmarking tool, aligned to a conceptual model. 
 
Having clearly identified the various issues and concerns around the current level of resilience capability 
and awareness within the organisations, there is a need to build a framework to enable the relevant 
individuals within both organisations to enhance their organisation’s capability. However, this can only 
occur if the senior leadership teams buy in to the need to develop an Organisational Resilience culture 






Chapter 7: Designing the Framework. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters of this thesis have explored and documented the current situation within the GB 
rail industry regarding the implementation of an organisational resilience culture. The review of the 
military as an organisation that is seen as having a high level of resilience capability, often operating in 
highly dynamic, congested and often highly complex environments, also identified areas of weakness 
when it came to sustaining a resilience culture, with critical concerns over the ability to apply and embed 
lessons. In the last decade, there has been the identification of several concerns over the academic 
establishment’s approach to building and maintaining resilience at a staff, student, faculty and 
establishment level and supporting the development of a body of knowledge.563 This would raise severe 
concerns within the business sector, when those regarded as the leaders in industry thinking often find 
it difficult to manage their own sector. 
 
Given that the academic sector is also demonstrating limited levels of resilience within several of their 
establishments, an inability to provide a forward thinking approach to IT and finance management, and 
a concerning limitation to the support to their students, there is concern within business sectors that the 
level of understanding within the academic world is more restrictive than that of the business world.564 
This can be witnessed by the sparse volume of high-grade academic research in the subject area of 
Organisational Resilience within the UK. Most of the work is still being driven through the various 
businesses and certificate organisations aligned to the operational delivery of a training capability, 
rather than academic research. Until there is a clear understanding of the Organisational Resilience 
requirement, the framework, impacts and a detailed body of knowledge, industry will seek to mitigate 
this through action research, utilising commercially painful lessons learnt and experiential learning by 
individuals and organisations. 
 
Within this element of the thesis, the concept of the ORM3 framework will be clearly articulated, drawing 
upon the literature review, though as previously identified in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the lack of 
a body of academic knowledge and the limited level of trust between the business and academic 
spheres demonstrate the need for academics, and the establishments they operate within, to begin to 
understand the concept at a more comprehensive level. This lack of clear understanding of how to build 
and sustain a resilience culture was evident in the evidence collected through the questionnaires that 
were returned from railway personnel, as well as the reviewed literature. The suggestion that individuals 
should have the cognitive flexibility and readiness to be able to ’think on their feet’ and react to the 
 
563Day, C., Edwards, A., Griffiths A and Gu Q., `Beyond Survival - Teachers and Resilience, Economic and Social Research 
Council Report, University of Nottingham, UK, 2011; McIntosh E. and Shaw J., Student Resilience: Exploring the Positive case 
for Resilience, Unit Students, Bristol, 2017. Available at www.unite-group.co.uk;  Baik, C., Larcombe W. and Brooker A., How 
Universities Can Enhance Student Mental Wellbeing: The Student Perspective, Higher Education Research and Development, 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London, Volume 38, Issue 4, pp 674 – 687, 2019.  
564Redscan Report, `The State of Cyber Security Across UK Universities`, Redscan Cyber Security Limited, London, UK, 2020; 
Bolton P., Higher Education Funding in England, house of Commons Briefing Paper Number 7393, House of Commons Library, 
2019, available at www.parliament.uk/commons-library_intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library_papers@parliament.uk; 
Cavandish C., Universities are Pleading for a Bailout to Paper Over Their Failures, Financial Times Report, April 2020, 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/7be4f44e-7582-11ea-95fe-fcd274e920ca; Baik, C., Larcombe W. and Brooker A., How 





dynamic, unfolding situation in front of them was challenged. Personnel proposed that the current 
situation was working, so why is there a need for it to be changed. This research identified that training, 
and development of a set of procedures and practices, would enable an individual to be better prepared, 
in certain circumstances, to react quickly, more effectively and obtain a better chance of optimal 
decision-making. It was also clear from the numerous strategic reviews and RAIB reports that the 
current methodology was flawed. The lack of a strategic business continuity framework was also a 
legislative non-compliance as a Category 2 responder. 
 
The development of a common Organisational Resilience Model for utilisation within the management 
of a disruptive event would provide a means to address these issues, reducing the detrimental effect of 
an incident and assisting with effective decision-making, which in turn would reduce cost, increase 
capability and develop a collaborative working approach to future incidents. Previous work has clearly 
identified that there is a need for organisational resilience to be more focussed on the workforce, rather 
than processes and organisational structures.565 The BSI framework provides a strategic guidance 
based on themes, rather than a clear roadmap on how to develop Organisational Resilience (Figure 
63). In times of disturbance the ability of the workforce to adjust and re-align to the situation is what 
provides an organisation with its agility. Observation of the military demonstrated that, when faced with 
a complex problem, the adaptive leadership and dynamic decision-making capability of the headquarter 
staff enabled a rapid re-tasking of forces on the ground within the exercise scenarios.  
 
Events such as the Buncefield 
disaster and the financial crash 
in 2008 have negatively 
impacted on organisations 
within the UK. Yossi Sheffi 
discusses the reasons why 
events such as these had such 
an effect, using BP as an 
example. Most companies will 
have an approach to Risk 
Management, identifying high, 
medium and low-level risks. 
They will use this knowledge to 
then triage the risk and place 
safeguards to respond if these 
risks become manifest, making strategic and tactical decisions to control those risks that should be 
controlled and exploiting those that can be exploited.566 High Impact - High Probability risks (HIHP), 
 
565McManus, S.T., `Organisational Resilience in New Zealand', 2008; Stephenson, A., `Benchmarking the Resilience of 
Organisations’, 2010; Seville E. et al, `Building Organisational Resilience: A New Zealand Approach’, 2010; Newnham, C., 
`Gold or Dust? Creating Resilient Organisations’, 2012; Briggs R and Edwards C, The Business of Resilience, 2006. 
566Coleman, T.S., A Practical Guide to Risk Management, The Research Foundation for CFA Institute, 2011, p.1 
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which could cause severe damage, are not of concern, as robust processes will be in place to react to 
the event. High Impact-Low Probability risks (HILP) are a different issue. These are events that 
organisations are poorly or not prepared for as they rate them as low probability. This can result in 
catastrophic damage to the organisation as the defences are inadequate or not in place.567  
 
 
7.2 CRITICAL CONCERNS TO ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
Key to the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach to develop resilience at a strategic 
level, either on the battlefield against an insurgency or within a company against disruptive events, is 
the building of situational awareness, which develops the understanding of organisational culture, 
required structure and leadership capability required to 
address the unfolding situation. This is like the approach 
that is taken within High Reliability Organisations, which 
seek to minimise the risk of accidents occurring. Unlike 
Perrow’s approach, which proposes that, based on the 
Normal Accident Theory, complex organisations en-
gaged in high risk operations, will experience disruptive 
events irrespective of their efforts to avoid these, Weick 
and Sutcliffe proposed that high reliability organisations 
exercise active practices to avoid such situations.568 
Their research into nuclear aircraft carriers, power 
stations and air traffic control towers noted that there 
were several similar activities that these conducted to 
minimise risks (Figure 64).569  
 
It is important for high reliability organisations to operate differently to the approach proposed by Perrow 
as there is the need for multiple complex activities to happen simultaneously in a tightly coupled 
environment. Perrow noted that nuclear organisations and military systems were “high-risk”, while 
industry and manufacturing plants were “low-risk”. This was challenged by the work of Levenson et al 
who argued that their research identified that industrial plants demonstrated a higher incident rate than 
the complex nuclear or military systems.570 As they and Weick and Sutcliffe noted, the complexity of 
the nuclear or military systems meant that any incident could rapidly become catastrophic, therefore 
the organisations were focussed on identifying potential areas of failure and addressing them prior to 
an incident occurring. This approach, using the factors in figure 64, developed a holistic approach to 
building a safety focussed culture to build reliability. 
 
567Sheffi, Y., `Building a Resilient Organisation’, 2007, pp 30 – 36.  
568 Weick, K. E., and Sutcliffe, K. M. Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an age of uncertainty. Second edition. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007. 
569Lekk C., High Reliability Organisations: A review of the literature, Health and Safety Executive, Open Government License 
(OGL), London, 2011. 
570 Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Marais, K., and Carroll, J., Moving beyond normal accidents and high reliability organisations: A 
systems approach to safety in complex systems. Organization Studies, Issue 30, 2009, pp. 227-249. 
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These factors are applicable to the battlefield and the workplace, which are multi-faceted arenas of 
social, cultural and political inter-related values, each introducing complex interactions on the other. To 
deliver a successful outcome, the leader needs to be able to identify, manage and direct the competing 
values and narratives to create a single direction of travel, flexing their resources to absorb and respond 
to the various disruptive influences and impacts the organisation may experience. The successful leader 
can match the best available and capable resource to the disruptive event in a timely manner, while 
giving the correct level of direction with minimal interference to enable the successful mitigation of the 
impact to the organisation's strategy and daily activities. The early building of situational awareness is 
key, maximising business information gathering networks and analysts to turn information into 
intelligence. Within the battlefields of modern conflicts there is the need to work through indigenous 
forces, be these either security services, government departments or social structures, to build a 
relationship with the population to obtain their trust and support. Modern conflict is a competition 
between the insurgent and COIN forces, the side that wins the hearts and minds of the population wins 
the conflict. It is similar to the current influence campaigns within global markets as organisations use 
their brands and reputations to attract and maintain customers.  
 
Within the rail industry a similar dynamic exists between Network Rail, the train operators and the public. 
As organisations of the State, both Network Rail and the UK military, while on operations, have key 
strategic tasks to deliver. For Network Rail it is the safe, secure and reliable running of the rail network, 
in all conditions. For the military, it is the delivery of a safe, secure and reliable security framework to 
enable other organisations of the State to function. Network Rail, like the UK military, is seeking to win 
the support of the host nation population, yet it is at arm's length, operating through the entities of the 
train service providers to influence the population and win their trust. Within this relationship there exists 
a recognisable issue that was also present in Iraq for the UK forces: when things went wrong, the Iraqi 
entities were quick to blame the UK forces, as was the UK government, even though at times the failing 
was down to a lack of strategic direction. Within the rail industry, when disruptive events occur, the train 
service operators and government departments are quick to apportion blame to the infrastructure 
manager, even though the management of train services and crews are the domain of the train 
operators, and strategic decisions around franchising agreements and access rights are the domain of 
the ORR and DfT.  
 
At the operational level, the lessons identified from the analysis of the military can be used to assist the 
development of a resilience culture within the railway. The trackside environment is a hazardous area, 
with many separate systems linked across the nation. Though they may possess different qualities or 
run on different systems, they all share common hazards, such as working in areas which require 
controlled access due to the movement of trains; presence of high-powered voltage supplies; moving 
on uneven and at times unstable areas; and having to operate in slippery, uneven and unhygienic 
areas.571 There are numerous risks to individuals daily, which become greatly magnified when there is 
 





a major incident or emergency. It then becomes imperative that the business resilience plan takes into 
consideration these risks and mitigates against them, thereby ensuring they do not become issues, add 
to the effect of an incident or worsen an emergency. Failure to have a proper strategy and management 
framework will result in an incident occurring as each layer of the business is penetrated. Organisational 
Resilience therefore requires a holistic approach to be delivered across all levels of the organisation to 
build the correct cultural framework, supported by tactical activities.  
 
This can also be applied to the battlefield. Each organisation on the battlefield is there to deliver a 
capability. At the tactical element it is the infantry to close in and defeat the enemy; the tank to provide 
precision firepower and protection; or the aviation and aircraft which provide rapid strike and extraction 
capability. Support and sustainment are managed by the logistics or support agencies, maintaining the 
vehicle fleet or providing the human resource, administration or medical support required. To deliver 
this comprehensive approach to operations, there is the need to understand the long-term plan, the 
direction of travel and how it is to be managed. This is the central requirement of any organisation and 
therefore creates the core component of the framework.  
 
7.3 SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR THE ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE MATURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, work into developing an Organisational Resilience has been conducted 
through doctoral research in New Zealand by Sonia McManus and Amy Stephenson, both working 
closely with the ResOrgs group. By reviewing their published frameworks and the findings of their 
research, it was clear that while their work provided a capability to measure the Organisational 
Resilience of an organisation; there were elements missing from their frameworks. 
 
The ORM3 framework, developed as part of this project, sought to build upon the existing knowledge, 
utilising the findings from the research and develop a framework, with the supporting information, for 
UK industry to utilise in building a greater understanding of Organisational Resilience, and how to 
measure it. There was a clear justification, identified in Chapter 4, in the need to build, enhance and 
sustain Organisational Resilience within the industry sector; it was also clear that currently the 
mechanism to do this was not evident. 
 
7.4 TESTING ENVIRONMENT – THE ’LIVE’ CASE STUDY 
The live exercise sought to assess and observe how the command group of a Battlegroup Headquarters 
would operate in a destabilised situation to bring order and lead the development of Organisational 
Resilience within their area of operations. The aim was to force the individuals out of the comfort zone 
of normal high tempo military operations, for which the British Forces had been trained and regularly 
exercised in, and instead focus on the “Hybrid Warfare” situation, concentrating on the development of 
long term recovery and resilience building activities. To enable this, it was designed to enable current 
military planning processes to be utilised, building on core skills and capability, while enabling the 





situation initially with a limited level of information. While technical equipment and well-rehearsed 
practices can give teams the edge, the critical element within complex incidents is clearly the human 
factor, represented by the commander and their team.572 Reference documents and international 
reports were used to build a credible situation, which delivered both political and operational complexity 
for the audience.573  
 
By building a complex political environment, supported through a destabilised national identity and a 
disenfranchised population, the case study sought to place the military commanders and their teams in 
an already complex, complicated and congested battle-space, with the need to temper activity and 
understand 2nd and 3rd order consequences being paramount. This pressure to understand the 
importance and fallout of their actions at the operational, social and political levels immediately placed 
the teams under a degree of simulated pressure. This was increased through reduced planning 
timelines, primary and secondary tasks being filtered into the headquarter planning teams from several 
media lines of communication, and the need to maintain full situational awareness of the unfolding 
socio-political environment surrounding them. Aligned to this, using the digital virtual reality testing 
system, which enabled the assessment of the activities through the application in a virtual battlefield, 
the CAST(S) team, as part of the case study analysis, could observe the decisions being taken in real 
time, and the impact that they were having on the situation and the participating soldiers. This also 
added to the level of complexity, as the headquarters team were having to manage the deployment, 
activities, recovery and intelligence dissemination of troops “recovering” from the combat zone.  
 
The assessment team observed and graded the teams on their performance through a detailed 
performance report, noting how they maintained capability and operational effectiveness through the 
activity. After seven days, the teams were debriefed, taking key observation points and lessons from 
the various events that they had experienced, before being immersed into the next phase of the case 
study. This was based on similar situations, but in a different political and social context; the aim of this 
second phase was to observe whether the ability to reflect and consider their activities enabled them to 
improve their resilience capability through collective learning. Through observation of the two live case 
studies, over two separate exercise cycles, the information that was captured within the performance 
reports was then distilled to identify the key components that helped enable the organisations to function 
effectively throughout a highly complex, demanding and sustained period of activity. This enabled the 
development of an understanding of key factors for building and sustaining resilience, utilising a learning 
organisation approach to the framework development.  
 
 
572Burke 1997 – Competence in Command, p.261. 
573MacDonald N., QC, Afghanistan: The Relationship Gap, The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), 
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2009; Wilson D. and Conway, G., `The Tactical Conflict and Assessment Framework: A Short-Lived Panacea’, RUSI Journal, 
2009, Vol 154, No.1, pp 10-15; Newton, P., Colley P. and Sharpe, A. `Reclaiming the Art of British Strategic Thinking’, RUSI 






7.5 DEVELOPING A LEARNING CULTURE. 
Across both the military organisation and the industry departments the research identified several key 
concerns about the culture of the two separate organisations and the ability to effectively identify and 
implement lessons from experience and review. A detailed review of the principles of a Learning 
Organisation in Chapter 2, and the three campaigns in Chapter 5, noted that there was a strategic 
failure of the military to apply lessons learnt at the outset of each campaign.  
 
So how do we develop a Learning Organisation 
that enables it to identify, respond, adapt and 
thrive in an environment that is Volatile, 
Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA)? 
Peter Senge promotes an approach that 
organisations need to implement if they wish to 
survive within the VUCA landscape, and which 
forms the core of a Learning Organisation. He 
notes that organisations need to embrace 
Systems Thinking, to understand how various 
elements impact each other. There is the 
requirement for individuals within the 
organisation to seek Personal Mastery of their 
trade; to become experts within their roles and 
understand how to constantly grow and develop within that role to support the growth of the 
organisation. The third element is the building of the Mental Model, which assists employees to blend 
and adapt the way the company is developing. It helps them feel that they “belong” within the 
organisation and are key to its growth. If this is supported through the development of team learning, 
sharing understanding between the various elements of the organisation should help break down silos. 
The final key element is the development of clear direction for the organisation through the shared 
vision of the leadership team to the workforce; this enables objectives, activities and strategies to be 
aligned across the business. The following sections identify the critical areas required to develop the 
ORM3 framework based on the research conducted. 
 
7.6 ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE COMPONENTS 
7.6.1 Culture and Strategic Leadership Capability 
The leadership of an organisation needs to clearly outline the objectives required against which the 
delivery plans would be aligned, as well as setting the direction that the organisation undertakes. This 
formulation of strategy promotes the understanding of resource requirements and delivery, allowing 
organisations to track their effectiveness. In industry it is calculated in terms of profit and loss. On the 
battlefield it is calculated through casualties, materiel expenditure and objectives achieved. Using 
Hofestede’s original dimensions of culture, the UK military demonstrates a strong sense of Collectivism 
when on operations, with a strong focus on the team mission, belonging and the building of tight knit 






bonds to manage the delivery of tasks. When reviewed against the organisational dimensions of culture, 
developed to study companies and business, the military on operations is a results-orientated, 
employee focussed, professional, closed system with tight but pragmatic control. This allows the 
organisation to get the best out of the personnel on the ground through the provision of clear direction 
and the flexibility of an adaptive leadership mentality enhanced by a well-developed localised support 
network. The military has also developed the means to rapidly change the culture of teams, from 
warfighting to recovery to UK focussed operations. This ability requires a clearly defined and controlled 
methodology to enable the organisation to transform from a hierarchical framework when in barracks, 
to a more adaptive and agile entity, based on the adhocracy model.574  
 
By understanding the Contemporary Operating Environment, the military adapts the culture of the 
deploying organisation to enable it to function as effectively as possible through a defined mission, 
adaptive leadership and a cultural framework suitable for the task at hand. The ability to change from 
hierarchical to adhocracy releases the key component of the UK military's capability; that of Mission 
Command (Figure 66), with the change in cultural frameworks aligned to the operational deployment 
preparation phases. 
 
Within the military, the successful delivery of any organisational change is the presence of effective and 
timely strategic leadership. Through the development of an adaptive leadership framework, the senior 
leadership team can lead the required cultural change programme, utilising the support of the various 
managerial staff below them, to maintain momentum while remaining aligned to the strategic objectives 
which are driving the need for cultural change. The right leadership framework and strategic direction 
are key to building organisational resilience. The apparent new phenomenon of strategic leadership 
and the desired factors first discussed in the early 1980s within business schools is also not new, though 
in recent years this thought stream has also been remarked on by senior UK military officers as the 
characteristics of conflict have changed. General Kiszely commented on the need for future military 
 
574Cameron K S and Quinn R E, Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture: Based on the Competing Values 
Framework, 1999. Note: An adhocracy, in a business context, is a corporate culture based on the ability to adapt quickly to 
changing conditions. Adhocracies are characterised by flexibility, employee empowerment and an emphasis on individual 
initiative. For the military on operations, flexibility, “Mission Command” and empowerment are key to responding to the various 
risks and challenges experienced on operations. 





commanders to have the ability to utilise the concepts of business and warfare jointly to deliver success 
within a COIN environment.575  
 
Organisational leadership teams must support staff to remain flexible, informed and given clear direction 
to allow the organisation to achieve strategic success. The strategic vision sets organisational direction 
which then creates the organisational culture to achieve that vision. This culture is maintained by the 
adaptive leadership framework, which seeks to empower the workforce, developing an agile 
organisational core which can flex to and absorb disruptive events. Within the military, this leadership 
framework is known as `Mission Command’, which empowers the junior commander to make decisions 
based on knowing their commander's intent. During the Iraq campaign it was observed that this flexibility 
of command had been lost, with frontline commanders having their decisions scrutinised by officials in 
Whitehall.576 This leadership paralysis was apparent across the organisation, with poor political 
leadership, inappropriate training and a failure to understand the local population dynamics.577 This 
resulted in the UK revising their leadership framework, adopting Krulak's `Strategic Corporal’ approach, 
which was endorsed by General Patreaus with the aim of decentralising decision-making and develop 
a more flexible force while operating in a congested, complex and dynamically changing environment.  
 
The Strategic Leader has got to be aware of the current operating state and the capability of their 
organisation, how it is functioning, under what pressures and its cultural framework. This is as important 
for the materiel that is present as it is for the personnel. Recent operations have shown the impact of 
poor management of the human element, resulting in the excessive combat fatigue witnessed by British 
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, brought on by a lack of understanding of the size of the task by the 
strategic planners and the political leadership in Whitehall. General Elliott, North and Ledwidge have 
looked at this in detail in their publications. In his Defence Research Paper, Colonel Biddick analysed 
the `strategic illiteracy' of the policy decision makers during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, 
identifying serious concerns regarding the capability for the UK political leadership to manage and 
understand the importance of Grand Strategy.578 This matter was also investigated by the House of 
Commons Defence Committee due to the severity of the planning errors and incorrect assumptions that 
were made during the conflicts, which generated a political response from the Government.579  
 
Similar leadership and communication issues, as well as poor risk management practices, were 
identified within Network Rail’s engineering over-runs in 2013-14, which shared similar issues as those 
experienced in 2008. The evidence, gathered through the questionnaires into the rail industry, identified 
key leadership issues, poor staff engagement and a blame culture that impacted on organisational 
learning, causing junior managers to feel unsupported in making decisions. As a result, they would 
 
575Kiszely, J., `Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors', The Shrivenham Papers, Number 5, Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 2007, pp 8 - 13. 
576North R, Ministry of Defeat, 2009; Ledwidge F Losing Small Wars, 2012. 
577Johnson A.L., (ed) Wars in Peace, RUSI, 2014, p.124. 
578Biddick, D. S. J., `British Strategic Illiteracy', Defence Research Paper, Advanced Command and Staff College Course 
Number 14, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 2011. 
579House of Commons Defence Committee, `Operations in Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth 





regularly abrogate their decision-making responsibility to more senior individuals to decide. The report 
into the 2013-14 engineering over-runs highlighted that frontline managers were afraid to notify their 
line managers of delays and issues until it was too late to mobilise resources. The blame culture 
impacted on resilience and capability, damaging the leadership model and impacting on the agility of 
the organisation. The delivery of the Planning and Delivery of Safe Work (PDSW) Programme is another 
area where we see a failure of the senior leadership to address the ingrained culture of the rail industry. 
The PDSW programme sought to enhance planning of engineering maintenance works, placing better 
safeguards within the process to minimise the risk to track workers. Eight months after the programme 
had been delivered, RAIB released several reports on poor safety behaviours, limited safety planning 
capability and poor cultural behaviours. In March 2018, a works team had deployed on to the worksite 
with no-clarity as to who was appointed as being in charge, several unsafe working practices being 
conducted, and the workforce spread over a large area. This resulted in workers being narrowly missed 
by a moving train.580 The RAIB report indicated that Network Rail had not effectively managed or 
evaluated the rollout of the updated safety planning framework. In 2019, two railway workers were not 
so fortunate, with them being struck and killed by a moving train. The concluding investigation identified 
several similar issues to that of the March 2018 incident. The lack of organisational learning had resulted 
in a tragic loss of life.581 
 
7.6.2 Organisational Assurance 
Key to delivering an effective organisation is the ability to maintain operations during all situations, while 
being aware that the relative structures and activities provide the correct level of assurance, insurance 
and governance, directed by the correct policy and strategy frameworks. This enables the core element 
of the organisational values to be woven into physical activities to improve the assurance throughout 
the organisation and supply chain. Critical to developing the assurance framework are measurements 
of performance against Key Performance Indicators, effective risk management practices, clearly 
defined and supported internal monitoring, and an assurance framework supported by internal and 
external audit and objective analysis. This enables the organisation, through the development of 
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Applying these criteria to the rail 
industry, specifically the two strategic 
areas of incident management and 
strategic planning, there are several 
activities that need to be addressed 
through lessons learnt from the military. 
The military has developed an 
assurance framework through the 
creation and maintenance of a doctrinal 
framework, from political strategic 
direction down to the front-line practices 
it employs, which spans from NATO 
directives, through UK Joint Force 
doctrine, single service doctrine and functional practice directives directions (Figure 67). This creates 
an operating framework which enables the organisation to perform against certain criteria, which also 
provides key performance indicators that units can be assessed against. Through the effective mapping 
of the documents, philosophical direction is transformed into battlefield activities, aligned against the 
culture and ethos of the military, delivering political effect. This doctrinal framework then provides the 
assurance criteria when post-operational reviews, parliamentary enquiries and campaign analyses are 
conducted by external organisations. This process, supported through lessons learnt and internal 
auditing, provides a robust methodology to effect change. Two clear examples are: 
 
▪ The review of military procedures post-Camp Bread-Basket inquiry, which saw a breakdown of 
UK military integrity and leadership within a detainment camp in Iraq, leading to the death of an 
Iraqi inmate and reports of systemic abuse of detainees. The identification of a complete 
breakdown of the military values and operational standards resulted in the directive that all 
service personnel receive an annual Values and Standards educational package. 
 
▪ The review of British COIN tactics, practices and procedures within Iraq during 2003 – 2005, 
which clearly identified a lack of capability, understanding and resources to effectively deliver 
campaign success. Through this process, it was identified that one of the factors impacting on 
success was the out-dated COIN doctrine. Initially the newly published US Field Manual 3.24 
was applied, then replaced with the newly designed UK Chapter 10 Countering Insurgency 
doctrine.582 
 
Military training establishments are subjected to three tiers of assurance reviews; 1st Line Assurance, 
conducted by the Brigade Headquarters, 2nd Line conducted by the Army Inspectorate team, and 3rd 
 
582United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 3.24: Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, United States Army, Washington, 2006; 
Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1 Chapter 10: Countering Insurgency, 2009. 
 





line, which is conducted through Ofsted review. This assesses internal and external assurance and 
benchmarking against a recognised standard. The military is also subject to political assurance review 
through the Defence Select Committee, which provides four layers of assurance monitoring. 
 
The same cannot be said for the rail industry. While the military has a risk awareness on operations, 
with each commander being taught to understand and conduct risk analysis through the planning 
process, recent investigations and reviews of projects and programmes in the rail industry have shown 
assurance to be sub-optimal, the May 2018 timetable rollout and PDSW issues being testament to this. 
An analysis of the Network Code583, highlights several issues with this strategic document, including 
the planning timeframe not being fit for the purpose of a modern railway. There is little redundancy in 
the planning process, with many planning events tightly coupled. Multiple processes do not integrate 
until late in the process, increasing the probability for errors. The document is also non-compliant to EU 
law, resulting in conflict being placed across international freight corridors. Furthermore, where the 
military may red-team a plan, there is no time within the strategic planning processes for the timetable 
to be rigorously checked584 prior to roll out. Any issues present will materialise and then require a 
rectification and change process. The Network Code is also extremely limited in advising organisations 
as to how to proceed when a situation is sub-optimal or breaks down. There is little guidance on how 
to set and maintain key priorities within the planning framework.  
 
Combined, these issues identify a strategic framework that is not suitable for the railway of today. The 
rail industry is subject to a certain level of external auditing via the regulator, with results captured within 
the monitoring report published quarterly. In the response to a disruptive event, the RAIB will also 
conduct reviews and assurance examinations of practices and procedures. In the event of a strategic 
event, the Transport Select Committee may conduct a review. However, unlike the military on 
operations, these audit events are reactive. The military, through its assurance reviews and constant 
lessons learnt, red-teaming and exercising, creates a pre-emptive approach to preventing disruptive 
events, based on intelligence, analysis and observations.  
 
As the government report into the May 2018 timetable demonstrated, better pre-emptive planning 
reviews and effective risk management might have prevented the catastrophic impact. Furthermore, 
the complexity of the industry leadership and constant flux of political strategy prevents the 
implementation of a long-term assurance framework. This reflects a difference in mentality between the 
military and the rail industry. By being risk aware, the military personnel on operations have integrated 
risk management into their planning process, as well as an understanding of how situations may 
change. Developing courses of action and contingency plans are also part of the planning and 
implementation phases, tested in the wargaming and red-teaming phases of planning. 
 
583The Network Code, 2020, available at https://sacuksprodnrdigital0001.blob.core.windows.net/network-
code/Network%20Code%20and%20incorporated%20documents/The%20Network%20Code%20.pdf 







7.6.3 Organisational Agility 
As shown through the analysis of the military, the clearer the understanding of the risk, the easier it is 
to identify potential hazards and issues that can impact on the organisation. The reports into the 
management of complex situations within the railway identified a systemic gap in the management of 
dynamic risk in both the operational incident response and the strategic planning processes. Whereas 
the military have developed a process, based on the planning cycle, that can be used in tactical, opera-
tional and strategic planning, with risk, consequence management and contingency plans being part of 
the planning framework, a similar holistic framework does not exist within the areas investigated within 
the rail industry; instead there is a reliance on the experience of project and programme managers to 
use the required tools and processes.  
 
The tactical planning process provides a guide for the local commander to consider the situation, based 
on the information and intelligence that is available at the time, allowing the development of an 
operational plan that is designed through evidence-based analysis. The review of the questionnaire and 
the comments from personnel indicate that no such framework exists in such detail within Network Rail. 
The organisation relies on the experience of the individual, while the military have developed a process 
that is taught and regularly tested. This enables all commanders to be able to apply the process when 
under extreme pressure, through an unconscious bias of understanding. Secondly, as there is a single 
process that is used from the frontline team commander up to the Brigade commander, this provides a 
“mental model” of the planning mechanism. This empowers junior commanders to push potential 
courses of action up the chain of command, demonstrating true adaptive leadership capability.  
 
A review of the Rail Incident Officer’s (RIO) course, the Station Incident Officer’s (SIO) course and 
Route Control Centre incident response training identified a hierarchal approach to incident response, 
with less adaptive leadership than the military and a more defined command and control directive. There 
was little evidence of adaptive planning and contingency planning. Within the SIO and Control Centre 
training it was a case of one option that was implemented and if this failed, a second option was initiated 
from the beginning of the planning process. The senior RIO course, which had been recently developed 
and is still being implemented, had been adapted to a three-day multi-agency training event with the 
emergency services. This course was beginning to embrace the potential of Joint Working but was still 
command and control heavy. 
 
On operations the military will maintain a standing reserve, which can be deployed in a major incident 
to provide a rapid response to an unfolding crisis with the aim of preventing the situation escalating and 
allowing the headquarters time to move more assets to the right place. In the UK there is a similar crisis 
management team, located within the Standing Joint Command Group, that provides an immediate 
response to buy the military more time to deploy the correct resources to the right location. The Crisis 
management team provide the initial strategic guidance and mobile reserves to deliver an immediate 





During the period of 27-28 October 2013 when the St Jude storm struck, there was no strategic co-
ordination of resources which resulted in the South East routes being left to manage by themselves. 
The same situation was witnessed in February 2014, with the Western route being left for a sustained 
period to cope with the collapse of the Dawlish sea wall, rendering the railway impassable. Several 
issues existed that impacted on the response and recovery capability: 
 
▪ The National Operations Centre was only able to advise, not direct, the routes as to what is 
required. This limits its ability to move vital resources around the nation to respond to large 
scale disruptive events;  
 
▪ There was no Strategic Crisis Management team; the local routes took strategic control of the 
situation and only after a period of time is a Crisis Management Team stood up, relying on the 
experience of individuals rather than proper training, knowledge and regular practicing and 
exercising as a team; 
  
▪ The organisation employed five Emergency Planning Specialists to over-see the routes’ 
emergency planning, reviews and re-writing of plans, practices and procedures. These 
individuals are not JESIP trained, although three of them were ex-service personnel;  
 
▪ No defined training strategies existed for ensuring the route leadership teams were properly 
trained and prepared in how to respond and manage a major disruptive event. Few of the senior 
staff had attended emergency exercises or engaged with their Local Resilience Forums. 
 
Discussions across both the operations and strategic planning departments also identified a lack of 
business continuity frameworks, key objectives and a clear understanding of risks and issues which 
would have been identified through a departmental Business Impact Assessment. Unlike the military, 
which had a doctrinal publication, practices, procedures and a management structure aligned with the 
national standard since 2001, no such equivalent existed within the Railway infrastructure manager. 
Collectively, the lack of a business continuity management system and a fully developed incident 
management training framework compromised and limited the level of resilience to disruptive events 
within the company. By not fully understanding the key recovery priorities, many response teams were 
already operating in a limited capacity. It also brought into question whether, as a Category Two 
responder, it was fulfilling its licence to operate the railway. An area of learning that can be implemented 
is the linkage between identifying the risks and their management, building organisational assurance 
processes and practices and communicating them through to the relevant parties that need to know 
and apply the various mitigation plans. This can then engender a collaborative approach across various 
teams to manage the risks. The investigations into the 2008 and 2014 engineering over-runs, as well 
as the May 2018 timetable crisis, all indicated concerns regarding how well risks were identified, tracked 
and communicated to various parts of the business. This was reinforced with the strategic planning 





customers and stakeholders, while 39% (46/118 respondents) indicated a lack of collaboration as a 
major contribution to planning issues. 
 
7.6.4 Organisational Governance and Structures 
Organisations require structures, governance frameworks, resource management and the ability to 
build and sustain the workforce and future talent. The governance mechanisms that are built into the 
organisation are vital to providing a level of trust between the organisation and its stakeholders. It is 
increasingly obvious that society's expectations of an organisation's performance and behaviours, and 
thus governance, are rising.585 The case study into Iraq showed the impact of poor governance and the 
importance and how it can affect the performance and reputation of an organisation. The British 
Standard, BS:13500, sets out a clear governance model, based on best practice, for organisations to 
implement. 586 Research has shown that within the rail industry there are concerns with governance 
frameworks currently in place in the Strategic Planning and Operations departments. Rail incident 
reports raise concerns over safe work practices, levels of fatigue and poor decision-making, which have 
had major impacts on the stakeholder groups in the Operations department’s activities, while 
respondents in the Strategic Planning department raised concerns over managerial practices and 
accountability. 
 
`Updates on changes to policy/standard needs to be cascaded better. Conveyance on how this 
affects people on the ground must be cascaded. Identification of specific training to specific roles 
might be useful. Regular refresher courses will also help.' 
Resilience questionnaire Respondent 1 
 
`Provide an integrated approach to resilience management that provides clear direction in 
respect of individual's responsibilities when dealing with a resilience management incident. This 
needs to be the subject of a targeted communications campaign, underpinned by relevant 
individual/group training and briefing. Resilience management plans need to be developed and 
then tested (the results of which should be appropriately reviewed and de-briefed). The plan(s) 
also need to be kept up to date.' 
Resilience questionnaire Respondent 90 
 
`Stop bringing in consultants from outside who know nothing and pretend everything will be all 
right if we adopt process xyz. Any process will work if it is followed correctly. Stop pretending 
that change won't happen if we get the process right.' 
Strategic planning questionnaire Respondent 100 
 
Developing collaborative working practices across an organisation also supports the creation of a strong 
governance framework. By conducting effective joint working practices, businesses can address 
 






potential risks and issues, minimise duplication of effort, share knowledge and research, and minimise 
disruptive events through collective intelligence gathering and sharing. The military have developed this 
to a high level, with clearly written directions, methodology and practices published through Joint 
Doctrine Publications, many of which are referred to in this research although, when investigated, are 
poorly communicated to or read by the members of the organisation. Collaborative working provides a 
strong capability as each functional element understands the requirements and capabilities of the 
others. The military maintain and enhance these capabilities through regular real-time exercising, 
simulation training, Table-top scenario training and case studies. This knowledge and skills sharing, 
especially on operations deployment preparation helps identify and mitigate potential risks and issues. 
The rail industry does not have such an elaborate methodology of collaborative working practices. 
Across Network Rail only one department had obtained recognition of collaborative working through the 
British Standard 11000:2010 - Collaborative Working Frameworks. This standard seeks to build better 
relationships between the organisation and stakeholders. 
 
Within the incident management and strategic planning domains, collaborative working practices with 
either the emergency services or train operators are key to success. For incident management, joint 
ways of working and an understanding of the requirements of each responder enables rapid response 
and recovery of the situation. Unfortunately, there were several occasions where members of both the 
military and rail industry highlighted that there was a lack of education, especially in the management 
of disruptive events that required co-ordination with multiple organisations, either within stations, or on 
the battlefield. The research highlighted a lack of incident management understanding around the 
importance of joint working at tactical and strategic levels within leadership teams of both the industry 
case study organisations. The expectation was placed on the experience of the individual, rather than 
the training and education of the team. The comments below reflect these concerns: 
 
`More cross-industry / agency Table-top and mock incident management scenario events'. 
Resilience Survey Respondent 10 
 
`Resilience often requires assets that are not fully utilised. True resilience for the railway will 
require the TOCs and FOCs to work with each other to permit diverse routing of services etc. 
Unless government is prepared to fund resilience and require the TOCs and FOCs to co-operate 
then it is difficult to see how things can improve radically'. 
Resilience Survey Respondent 17 
 
`Requires dedicated training, focused on individual areas of the operational estate, tailored to 
individuals’ capabilities. Cross functional training would improve resilience'. 
Resilience Survey Respondent 24 
 
Within the strategic planning functional area, there is also a need for collaborative working between the 





operators to manage the train service bids and turn them into a functional national timetable; May 2018 
saw the impact when this collaboration and effective planning breaks down between various parties. 
The development of training material and the implementation of a competency framework for the 
Customer Teams would increase the capability of the teams and the quality of the information provided, 
supported through a more robust governance and assurance framework at the tactical and strategic 
levels. The development of a Service Level Agreement framework and an escalation process for the 
operators within the process addresses issues around greater customer engagement, better 
information awareness and effective assurance and monitoring of the decision-making process. It would 
also be aligned to the auditing framework, thus enabling an independent observation of the end to end 
process to be conducted. This level of knowledge and awareness improves resilience through better 
corporate accountability, collaborative working, breaking down of silos and evidence-based analysis. 
 
An update of the Network Code to provide better strategic guidance to address poor cross industry 
planning behaviours would be beneficial. Clear decision-making criteria that are objective and simple 
to apply, clearer application of the Access Rights granting process and better risk management 
frameworks would provide increased confidence within the planning teams, improved planning at the 
front end of the process and more effective communication. These governance and assurance 
frameworks provide a strong framework at organisational and functional level, enabling the 
development of an effective strategic planning capability. 
  
7.6.5 Organisational Strategic Planning Capability 
The understanding of the 
organisational vision is critical, as 
Grand Strategy sets the End state 
for the military to plan its approach 
to a campaign (Figure 68), or for the 
MoD to engage with industry to 
procure the right equipment with the 
right contracts in place to maintain 
an agile edge over the opponent. 
From the strategic direction of 
Government, either through policy or the National Security Strategy, the military command group can 
then develop the required Defence Doctrine framework with which to guide the military in how they will 
deliver their strategic tasks. British Defence Doctrine provides the broad philosophy and principles that 
underpin how the military should be employed on behalf of the State, by the current Government.587 
National doctrine, derived from the British Defence Doctrine Capstone document, enables the 
development of a Mission Command framework as it sets the strategic intent for the military 
commanders to align the military against. The linkages extend from Grand Strategic decision-making 
 
587MoD, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 2011, p. 1-1. 
Figure 68: Interactions Between Tactical and Grand Strategic 





through to tactical events occurring on the ground, reflecting the importance of getting the strategic 
leadership and policy right at the outset of the campaign.  
 
Within the rail industry, the DfT sets the end-state for how the rail industry is intended to operate, with 
its key delivery requirements. This political strategy sets the key requirements and objectives for 
delivery, which in turn impacts on the creation of the operational tasks and, if things go wrong, the 
response to the various disruptive events. However, this strategy is at risk and subject to change every 
five years, based on the political party in charge. Given that the infrastructure requires a 10 year plus 
framework to deliver large scale, complex programmes of renewal and enhancement, the ongoing 
political risk creates a volatile planning environment. This can be clearly seen in the cancellation of the 
Western line electrification programme in 2017, five years after it had been endorsed by Parliament as 
the way forward. Investigations by the Transport Select Committee raised concerns over the financial 
mechanisms and strategic planning within the decisions made by the then Transport Secretary.588 
 
The analysis of the strategic reviews conducted on behalf of the DfT into the rail industry has shown an 
industry that lacks effective strategic leadership at an industry level. The ongoing disruptions occurring 
on the TSGN rail franchise, the May 2018 timetable crisis, and the failure of the East Coast Mainline 
Franchise after only three years demonstrates serious leadership concerns at industry and political 
level. The recent review of the Franchise framework and passenger experience by the Transport Select 
Committee painted an industry that is suffering from a lack of direction, management, monitoring and 
governance. The Passenger Experience report recommends greater assurance measurements, more 
robust controls and strong leadership to remove failing franchise owners, while the Franchise report 
identified that the concept of franchising had failed to deliver the proposed benefits to the Network.589 It 
also held the political leadership responsible for the failed running of the TSGN franchise through a lack 
of leadership and robust governance.  
 
With these issues providing an unstable environment for the rail industry to operate within, there is a 
need to address the current situation. Strategically, there needs to be a political cross-party agreement 
that the rail industry is not a tool to be used for election purposes. Like Defence, there needs to be an 
agreed strategy for 30 years and beyond to enhance and improve the network. This calming of the 
strategic environment would provide a baseline for the infrastructure manager and the Franchise 
owners to plan collaboratively. With a stabilised strategic environment, there can then be the revision 
and, if required, the re-write of the Network Code to suit the modern railway. Provision for multiple 
infrastructure managers who are a mixture of private and public owned organisations, agreed cost and 
benefit sharing for major renewal works, and a cross-network charging fee that applies to all the train 
operators would provide a stable framework for operators. This would reduce the risk of major issues 
 
588House of Commons Transport Select Committee, `Oral Evidence: Rail Electrification, HC702', House of Commons, 
Whitehall, London 2018, pp 2-12. 
589House of Commons Transport Select Committee, `The Future of Rail: Improving the Rail Passenger Experience' Sixth 
Report of Session 2016-17, House of Commons, Whitehall, London 2016; House of Commons Transport Select Committee, 





caused by engineering over-runs or critical over-sights due to teams planning in an air of uncertainty, 
providing a better environment for operators to develop the strategic operating plans against. While the 
reports into the 2008 and 2014 engineering over-runs highlight a poor risk and planning capability within 
the operational teams, the development of a stable environment removes several issues, including 
potential major disruptive events that can impact normal service. Within that calmer environment, the 
activity of obtaining access to the network, or changing the services that are being run, can also become 
easier for operators to plan.  
 
Ideally a framework should be implemented where there is a transparent planning process, so issues 
are addressed collaboratively. Within the military, this is known as a Common Information Operating 
Picture, which enables all members of the organisation to be aware of what is happening across the 
operations zone. While there will be restricted information that cannot be shared with others, there is a 
high-level awareness developed so all parties remain informed. To develop this, there is the 
requirement to review and update several strategic planning processes across the industry. Though 
these changes will provide better assurance within the planning domain, they also range across other 
domains within the ORM3 framework, demonstrating the need to implement the framework holistically. 
This research has resulted in the proposal of changes to improve several processes, frameworks and 
develop the internal capability and resilience of the strategic planning department. These activities have 
been taken forward for further investigation within the rail industry.  
 
These activities aim to develop a more customer focussed framework, obtaining assurance and 
governance through a better approach to information management and shared awareness. As shown 
during the observations of the military live case studies, by developing this capability, an organisation 
can increase its resilience footprint through the activities of others.  
 
Within the military, the ability to manage change, at all levels, is critical to mission success. 
Organisations are deployed into complex, dynamically changing environments, many with hostile actors 
included within the stakeholder groups. Through the training, preparation for and exercising activities 
that the organisation conducts prior to operational deployment, the planning staff are trained to become 
comfortable with change and skilled in applying the military planning tool. While military personnel can 
apply and adapting the planning process, where required, a similar capability does not exist in such 
depth within the rail industry. Chapter 6 analysed the responses to the planning questionnaire, which 
indicated siloed working, lack of collaboration, lack of accountability and levels of conflict between rail 
organisations. Clearly there is need to develop a more inclusive culture and technical changes, in order 
to set the conditions for greater resilience within the timetable strategic planning process. While culture, 
processes and technology impact on the strategic planning capability of an organisation, the 
development of the workforce is critical to maintaining the planning and ability to manage change within 






7.6.6 Organisational Capability Development 
This domain covers the areas of effective communications, continuous improvement, the inclusion of 
research and innovation, staff talent and succession management, effective staff engagement, focusing 
workforce development to operate effectively during disruptive events, enabling personnel to apply 
adaptive leadership frameworks and operate towards the delivery of the organisational objectives. 
Research by Sheffi, Adair, The UK Defence Academy and Yardley et al has shown that an important 
element of building organisational resilience capability is workforce development across all levels. 
Informal networks, open communications and teamwork builds a tight-knit team which can manage 
disruptive events. Conversely, lack of such networks, or a culture biased towards apportioning blame, 
damages an organisation's ability to react to events which destabilise normal operations.  
 
Clear guidelines exist within the military on the management of key resources and the succession 
planning framework to build and manage talent. Individuals are taught to do a minimum of two roles. 
Everyone is trained to a basic infantry level enabling all members to perform basic combat fighting 
tasks. On top of this, individuals are then taught their role speciality, enabling them to work as part of a 
tightly knit team but, in extremis, also operate as an infantry soldier.  
 
 
Looking at the managerial level of the military, the leadership talent of the individual is developed 
throughout their career by structured periodic training and development events. As a Major (middle 
management), over £138k is spent on the individual's development, while for a Lieutenant Colonel, the 
next level up, that is increased to £238k per individual (Figure 69).  
 
The development courses that are spread across an individual's career are created through a defined 
process, aiming to provide the right level of development for the role. Key technical skills are mapped 
to the job description, supported with behavioural and soft skills modules, known as Command, 
Leadership and Management (CLM) events. This framework is designed to promote the skills of critical 
analysis, effective communication, management of others and adaptive leadership and decision-
making. During the initial phase, individuals are also introduced to the importance of corporate values 
and standards and are regularly updated on issues and means to address them. Sheffi's research, also 
looks at how military organisations develop the capability of their personnel. He proposed that through 





six interlocked steps teams can develop the ability to manage dynamically changing circumstances 
effectively.590 
 
The development of military training material 
utilises the Defence Systems Approach to 
Training (DSAT) process (Figure 70), supported 
through the development of doctrine and 
implemented through strategic learning advisors. 
Within the military, each of the services has its 
own Educational Training Service, accountable 
for implementing the learning doctrine, which 
regularly share ideas and practices to increase 
learning and innovation. Using a systems 
approach, a requirement is reviewed, a learning 
needs analysis is conducted, which leads to the 
design of a course framework, incorporating key 
learning points and learning outcomes. This 
framework is then developed to deliver the required end-state, piloted, reviewed and, if required, 
amended before it is signed off.  
 
 
This is not the case with the rail industry. Rather than a clear career progression that is punctuated with 
training and development events, the training approach is fragmented and not applied effectively across 
the organisation. Within both the Operations and Strategic Planning departments there exists training 
for safety critical roles that are track facing. The key training events for Station Staff were not fit for 
purpose, while within the strategic planning process there were no training or competency frameworks 
for the customer teams. At managerial level competency frameworks were also not well understood, as 
reflected in the findings in Figure 71. The questionnaires for both the resilience and planning audiences 
 
590Sheffi Y., Building a Culture of Flexibility, World Trade Magazine, December 2005, p.2, available at 
www.globaltrademag.com, accessed 20 Jun 2017. 
Figure 70: The DSAT Process Source: MoD 





clearly articulate issues around the quality and quantity of training that is offered and the fact that the 
industry has split technical and soft skills training, rather than building complementary training events. 
 
 
Talent management also sits within this domain, which is important to the development and growth of 
the organisation. Within the military, due to the nature of the tasks that personnel are involved in, 
personnel are trained and educated to do the job of their line manager as well as their own. The effects 
of this are two-fold. It enables the organisation to develop an information push mentality on operations, 
rather than the operations room having to pull information from the teams. Secondly, if a team leader 
or commander is removed from duty, individuals have the competence and capability to step up into 
the role, rather than the organisation relying on the individual possessing a natural capability to assume 
command. On operations this is built into the process through the activities of training and situational 
simulation, like the live case study and the exercises observed to support the development of the live 
case study. This provides the leadership team with a clear understanding of what gaps exist within the 
team, and how to develop individuals to address those gaps. This process is supported by continuous 
improvement frameworks and shared understanding, which is obtained through the processes of war-
gamming plans, after action reviews and extensive communication frameworks (Figure 72). 
 
The capability of the military to operate in a Joint formation is a key strength in building operational 
resilience. The military develops resilience through a systems approach to the task, aligning various 
specialist units to deliver a collective team effectiveness. This ability to generate and re-generate force 
packages to suit the task at hand enables effective use of limited resources, increases capability and 
sustains resilience to conduct complex operations. Effectiveness is maintained through a detailed 
framework of continuous improvement activities, underpinned by comprehensive communications, 
intelligence and analysis, via the After-Action Review (AAR) process. The process is initialised during 
the development of the activity plan, not on completion of the event. This allows for refinement of the 
activity, risk mitigation and the identification of potential areas of observation for the process, supporting 
the development of innovation and wider organisational research programmes through identified 
lessons. The intelligence that is captured, along with the impact of the current situation, can then be 
utilised to build a business case for taking the research or innovation idea forward (Figure 72). 
 





This process supports research by 
Argyris into the way individuals use 
learning skills in the art of decision-
making, applying observed 
information, processed via their own 
experience and knowledge, to create 
a response to the situation they are 
faced with. He noted that during 
decision-making at a low-level, 
information was readily fed back and 
challenged by individuals prior to them 
deciding, whereas the more important the decision, the more barriers there were to information 
feedback.591 By conducting the feedback sessions at different levels (Figure 73), it limits the impact of 
group think, increasing the honesty of the feedback and effectiveness of the process, reflecting the 
observations of Blanco, Lewko and Gillingham.592 Increased review and analysis of events generates 
a higher level of obtained information which can then be fed back into the organisation to improve 
current processes, or design new processes.  
 
The evidence gathered from the personnel 
within the industry case study organisations did 
not reflect that this was occurring within the 
railway. In both the operations and strategic 
planning functions, there was not a strategic 
talent management framework as in the military. 
While a junior officer or soldier can have a clear 
timeline of career and required courses to 
support their development, this was not repli-
cated within the rail industry. The talent 
management framework was not present 
within the Strategic Planning function, with a limited level of managerial development, training and 
education being highlighted within the questionnaire responses. This was evident in how the individuals 
within the department reflected the level of support and engagement by their line managers in their 
personal development. There was a clear image of limited support, development and management of 
the performance objectives for the teams within the function, (Figure 74).  
 
591Argyris, A., `Single-loop and Double-loop Models in Research on Decision Making', Administrative Science Quarterly, 1976, 
p.367. 
592Blanco J., Lewko J.H. and Gillingham D., `Fallible Decisions in Management: Learning from Errors', 1996.  
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Figure 74: Level of Development Support Within the 






There was also concern about the level of 
managerial training and accountability of 
managers for their decisions (Figure 75). 
This graph represents the impact of not 
having a talent management framework in 
place, with a clear understanding of how to 
manage and develop the personnel within 
the department to build and sustain 
capability when faced with severe 
disruptive events.  
 
Within both railway functions there did not 
exist a training and development process 
as rigorous as the DSAT framework. The 
training within the planning function was 
mainly focussed on the technical skills of 
planning and not the supporting soft skills 
required when working with people, often 
in difficult or pressurised situations. This 
impacted on the quality of the training 
delivered as there was no detailed 
learning needs analysis in place (Figure 
76). The material developed was based on what current planners and their line managers deemed 
required from planning staff, with no corporate governance or assurance applied to the quality of the 
training material.  
 
The approach in the Operations function 
was different, with more emphasis on the 
need to develop the correct approach to 
managing incidents effectively. Using 
learning specialists that were present 
within the company, the Operations 
function directed that a role and learning 
needs analysis be conducted prior to the 
development of the training course. 
Behaviours and soft skills were woven into 
the incident management training solution, with a Competency Development Group (CDG) overseeing 
the process and providing a level of assurance and governance around the development process, like 
the DSAT framework. While this was for the track focussed element of the Operations function, the 
Figure 75: Managerial Accountability Perception Source: 
Author 
Figure 76: Level of Readiness In Management Teams 
Source: Author 






Station facing elements were not as 
thoroughly developed. Within the incident 
management framework, the RIO, 
responsible for responding to train 
incidents, would receive five days of formal 
training, three of them in a joint environment 
with the emergency services. A SIO, the 
station equivalent, received a 5-hour 
briefing and presentation on their role. To 
place this into context, the RIO would 
manage a train crash site with 
approximately 1000 personnel in a large-scale event; a SIO would be responsible for the evacuation 
and management of a large-scale London 
train station, with an average passenger 
footfall of 4000 - 6000 per hour, depending 
on the time of day. While the processes were 
in place, they were not evenly applied, 
creating different levels of capability within 
teams, resulting in staff being under-
prepared for managing a disruptive event 
(Figure 77). 
 
Developing organisational capability requires 
collaborative working with stakeholders, both internal and external. The two railway functions analysed 
displayed different levels of effectiveness in building a collaborative way of working. Within the 
Operations department and, potentially due to the nature of the role when working within disruptive 
event situations, the feedback was quite positive in the approach undertaken. This reflects the joint 
training with the emergency services, the regular working practices with the British Transport Police and 
the fact that the incident management role functions on collaborative working and team response.  
 
This was not the case within the Strategic Planning department. The respondents indicated that there 
was a poor level of collaborative working within the department (Figure 78), symptomatic to the 
evidence seen around the lack of talent management and leadership development. The questionnaire 
responses reflected teams that were undermanned and with limited team and personal development 
opportunities, a situation which affects the resilience capability of the team itself.  
 
The respondents also reflected on the level of awareness of the organisation on the delivery of its 
capability to its stakeholders, reflecting that in the opinion of the planning community, the organisation 
was not listening to its stakeholders or delivering what was needed as an industry. It was their opinion 
that it was not functioning effectively. These results reflect an element of the organisation that is 
Figure 79: Effective Delivery of Industry Planning 
Requirements Source: Author 
Figure 78: Team Resourcing and Development Within 





struggling to develop its internal resilience, failing to invest effectively in its workforce and is operating 
in siloed teams (Figure 79). The impact being, in the opinion of its own staff, that it is failing to deliver 
to its customers and not working collaboratively with the rest of the rail industry. These results, obtained 
from the various audiences delivering the requirements for the organisation, either in the Operations or 
Strategic Planning departments, indicate concerns within the effectiveness of the organisation's 
management of its key resource, its workforce. The impact of poor workforce engagement, development 
and management leads to several key issues with the delivery of the company's requirement to provide 
an effective timetable.  
 
The crisis in May 2018 was the manifestation of these issues, and the failure of the industry to work 
collaboratively and when paired with ineffective leadership, created a black swan event. This resulted 
in the loss of trust in the rail industry by passengers and the instigation of a government led review of 
the end to end railway industry. Having reviewed the various Organisational Resilience factors 
identified, the summary will pull out some key observations, which will be carried forward to the next 
chapter for the development of the ORM3 framework. 
 
7.7 SUMMARY  
The comparison of how the military and industry have developed their respective resilience capabilities 
raises some key areas for discussion, which have been reflected in the previous sections. Across both 
organisations, the importance of having a strong strategic core is evident. For the military the 
development of the correct culture to deliver the vision is part of its preparation for deployment onto 
operations. The cultural change process was implemented over an 18-month period through education, 
training and development events. The leadership teams were fundamental in this, setting the direction 
of travel and held accountable for the organisation of applying the capability during the operational 
deployment on completion of the preparation phases. Deeply embedded within the change process 
was the alignment of multiple value systems from the various units into one clear value system for the 
organisation.  
 
The railway infrastructure manager also possesses a deep rooted cultural core, built upon the values 
of the industry and the journey it has been on. Chapter 5 highlighted issues around the leadership and 
cultural impact, with industry reports raising concerns over empowerment and management 
development. At the strategic level, there is an apparent gap within the leadership at industry level. 
Reports from various strategic and academic bodies have noted that the government and ORR are not 
providing clear strategic guidance to the rail industry. Politically, there is an instability around which 
strategic model the railway can utilise for long term strategic planning due to the diametrically opposed 
values of the two main political parties when in government.  
 
Failure to provide an effective strategic core critically impacts on the capability of the organisation. This 





incorrect culture and no clear end-state. For the railway, the example of the May 2018 timetable crisis 
highlighted a lack of strategic collaboration and leadership across the rail industry. 
 
For both case study organisations, a clearly documented assurance framework, supported by the right 
practices and procedures, was key to enabling the organisation to build and maintain its awareness of 
the volatile and dynamically changing environment within which it operated. This assurance is fed by 
the business intelligence capability; the more effective the information gathering and analysis teams, 
the more the organisation is aware. This enables the teams responsible for the management of 
disruptive events and preparation planning to be pro-active, rather than re-active. The military have built 
processes and train regularly for these situations, empowering junior leaders to make decisions on the 
ground, based on the intelligence available at the time. The incident reports and research evidence has 
shown that this is not the case within the rail industry. There is still a training gap, which results in an 
increasing skills and capability gap across the organisation. The review of the incident management 
courses identified a significant capability gap between similar roles, and a lack of strategic leadership 
development for managing complex events. While the military develops the capability of the individual 
regularly and educates them to be able to operate effectively at the upper command level, this practice 
is not regularly taught and employed in the rail industry. For the military this provides a pro-active 
mentality through information push; for the rail industry it is still more aligned to an information pull 
approach. 
 
The effectiveness of staff development, collaborative working and the delivery of planning requirements 
are critical for an organisation to survive within the modern business environment. The findings noted 
that there are several challenges that face both organisations within this area, though the military clearly 
invests more time, resources and energy into the development of its staff capabilities, thus providing a 
more effective approach to organisational resilience and agility. This is explored in more detail in the 











Chapter 7 has analysed the findings of the research conducted across the military and industry case 
study organisations, identifying the key components that each of the organisations relied on, or 
struggled to develop, in order to build and sustain their resilience framework. The review of the 
information captured from the various research workstreams enabled the designing of a framework of 
six key areas. These areas were: 
 
▪ Culture and strategic leadership; 
▪ Organisational Assurance; 
▪ Organisational Agility; 
▪ Organisational Planning; 
▪ Organisational Governance and Structures; and 
▪ Organisational Development 
 
These six components provided the strategic framework for the initial consideration of what the ORM3 
framework would be required to deliver. The framework, when completed, would be required to enable 
an organisation to effectively map the various activities that it was conducting within these six 
component areas. The ORM3 framework would require the ability to be easily applied and understood, 
but rigorous enough to deliver a mechanism that enabled the senior leadership to understand the 
current situation of the organisation, the challenges being faced and the areas that require development. 
To be useful to the senior leadership team, it would also need to provide guidance on assisting them in 
developing the organisation’s strategic business plans to help improve and sustain the resilience of the 
business.  
 
One of the more interesting aspects of the research was that the level of resilience capability of the 
organisation relied not on just the technological systems or processes in place, but also the level of 
empowered leadership, the organisational vision and the type of culture that existed within the 
organisation. These intangible elements created a core to the organisation that provided either strength, 
or weakness, to the organisation during times of difficulty and disruptive change. A second finding was 
the importance of informal networks and communication channels that managed to keep information 
flowing and the systems functioning, often putting into place work around activities to maintain a 
reduced capability during disruption. In the military live case studies, these observations, aligned to a 
strongly defined and understood vision, enabled a high level of devolved decision-making and 
leadership, maintaining organisational capability even when the central leadership was disabled for a 





It was observed that tested organisations that already possessed a strong risk management process in 
place, managed as part of its planning process, also possessed a strong continuity framework which 
was delivered through a “contingency operations” planning team. It also had a crisis management team, 
or the “Principal Planning Group” (PPG), assigned, with a decision-making hierarchy, for managing any 
unfolding crisis. What the military live case study demonstrated was that even though an organisation 
may have a strong process for managing disruptive events in place, without effective leadership that 
can keep pace with the dynamically changing situation, and maintained situational awareness, the 
process failed. The situations that they faced were shaped to challenge their current way of thinking. 
The events were complex, unique and information flow was limited; the processes that they had 
developed were based on information rich situations with time to analyse and contemplate potential 
actions. These events forced the teams to adapt their approach and build their resilience while under 
pressure to deliver.  
 
The historic military case studies clearly identified the strategic impact of poor leadership, an incorrect 
culture and the need for a clear understanding of the organisation’s vision to align decisions against. 
These findings are not new; other researchers into the area have also noted the impact of poor 
leadership or culture on the resilience capability of an organisation.593 However, this research has taken 
these findings, along with current thoughts on building resilience, and added to the knowledge through 
the development of the ORM3 framework, to assist industry in better understanding what their level of 
resilience is, as well as understand their internal vulnerabilities. 
 
Observations of the military teams during the live exercises also noted the level of preparedness they 
invested in prior to conducting the various activities. Both the industry and military case studies noted 
a level of planning, using various methodologies. The military utilised the Combat Estimate, a militarised 
version of the planning cycle, while industry sought to utilise an adapted version of the Managing 
Successful Programmes planning framework. Comparing both organisational planning teams, there 
was far greater latent knowledge within the military planning team than the industry team. There were 
several factors to this: 
 
a. The military team, consisting mainly of officer (middle managers) and senior non-
commissioned ranks (front-line managers) were practiced and experienced in the use of the 
planning tools under pressure in a complex environment. The industry team has various 
levels of experience and knowledge of the planning tools. 
 
b. The military teams were utilising a tool that was standardised and familiar to all members 
of the team – the process remained constant, it was the level of detail within the information 
that increased depending on the seniority of the headquarters. This provided a core level of 
 
593Seville E., Brunsdon D., et al, Building Organisational Resilience: A New Zealand Approach, Resilient Organisations 
Research Programme, 2006; Boin A and McConnell A., Preparing For Critical Infrastructure Breakdowns: The Limits Of Crisis 
Management and the Need for Resilience, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Blackwell Publishing, Volume 15, 





understanding the process, as individuals understood the steps to be taken. The industry 
team did not demonstrate a similar level of familiarity with the tools that they were using. This 
was caused by members having little experience in the framework, having used different 
frameworks, not understanding the various stages, and a limited level of training and practice 
within the planning process.  
 
c. For the military commanders, at all levels, there were bespoke leadership development 
programmes invested in by the organisation, ranging from 4 weeks (20 days) up to eight 
months (160 days), depending on the seniority of the individual, that focussed on key aspects 
on planning, information management, team management and operations in complex 
situations. Within the industry teams, there was nothing equivalent to what the military 
delivered. The maximum leadership offering was 11 days, distributed over a six-month period 
for the senior members, with the other members receiving between 2 – 4 days project 
management training.  
 
d. The military headquarters, as part of the planning process, conducted various levels of 
alternative analysis and wargaming during the planning process, provided several 
observations and false assumptions that may have led to failure. The integration of this testing 
approach, allowing consideration of risks, issues, impacts and potential contingency planning 
requirements was not apparent in the planning processes of the industry team. A review of 
one programme within the industry identified a failure to apply any of the planning framework 
at the initiation of the programme, eventually leading to programme failure and significant 
financial impact. Review of the industry operations team identified that there was also no core 
planning framework in place for managing disruptive events; a review of the initial training 
also identified a gap in teaching the incident responders in the ability to effectively plan 
response and recovery activities, relying on individual expertise or waiting for the arrival of 
the emergency services to take control, by which time the situation could have escalated.  
 
8.2 REQUIREMENT FOR A RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK MODEL 
The benefit of Organisational Resilience is not only applicable to the military or industry; the UK higher 
education sector is also experiencing a decline in its resilience capability and legitimacy within business 
research. Research in 2005 into business schools noted that they were failing to deliver practical 
expertise and advice to their students; they were too focussed on the “scientific” approach, treating 
business as a transactional environment, rather than the complex fluid situation that exists in reality.594 
Observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that the business sector is concerned that the academic 
community are too focussed on developing the “sterile” approach to build a resilience framework, rather 
than understanding the complex and wicked problem environment that businesses actually operate 
within. At a recent conference on the subject of Organisational Resilience, it was noted that there had 
 
594Bennis W. and O’Toole J., How Business Schools Lost Their Way, Harvard Business Review, May 2005 Issue, available at 





been a failure of the UK academic sector to work with industry to build an effective body of knowledge 
around Organisational Resilience.595 This is forcing industry to develop its own approaches from painful 
errors in judgement, failures and experiential learning, based on practitioner knowledge rather than 
scientific analysis, or relying on the work done by international consulting firms. In 2012, Professor 
Wilson noted that although the level of University-Industry collaboration was increasing, there was still 
a long way to go especially in supporting student transition into business, engagement with small 
businesses and localised networking hubs.596  
 
Unlike New Zealand or Australian institutes, which have dedicated elements supported by the academic 
sector, in 2018 the UK does not have such an established framework, though steps are being taken in 
the right direction through the development of academic courses at the UK Resilience Centre 
(Wolverhampton University), Coventry University and the New Buckingham University. However, this 
oversight of UK academia to support the business sector within this critical area of business 
development has contributed to the current limited level of understanding in the development of 
organisational resilience capability. 
 
In 2017 a report across the UK into the health of small and medium enterprises within the UK noted 
that there was real concern over the lack of managerial skills within the workplace. When broken into 
regions, this varied from 26.5% (North East) to 39.7% (London), while the level of technical skills was 
significantly lower.597 Research also indicated that in 2016 there was no apparent impact to the growth 
of the Small or Medium Enterprise environment by university research or engagement, with concerns 
that the research a university is undertaking may not benefit the local businesses.598 The report did 
highlight that where universities invested into “business hubs” supporting the local businesses in the 
area, it increased the performance and resilience of the organisations, though it was noted that this 
mainly happened in the South, or Scotland. 
 
In 2016 there was also a level of concern raised over the capability of several academic establishments’ 
abilities to manage their responsibilities to their students.599 In 2017 concerns were raised over several 
universities unable to manage their own levels of resilience; concerns over poor support services being 
provided to student communities,600 limited level of understanding the need to build personal resilience 
of individuals, while in 2019 the failure to manage budgets, student recruitment and establishment 
growth models in several universities was released in a report by the Universities and College Union.601  
 
 
595Price K., The Resilience Association Congress, London, 10 October 2019. 
596Wilson T., A review of Business-University Collaboration, Government Report, 2012, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32383/12-610-wilson-review-
business-university-collaboration.pdf accessed 10 Feb 2020. 
597Kelly S. and Mulgan G., The State of Small Businesses, Business Research Report, Sage and Nesta, Nesta Ltd, 2017, pp 
40-41.  
598Ibid, p.44 
599 Heath A., Too Many Universities are Failing Their Students, The Telegraph, 17 August 2016, available at www.The 
Telegraph.co.uk. 
600McIntosh, E and Shaw J., Student Resilience: Exploring the Positive Case for Resilience, Unite Students, Bristol, 2017 






The research has raised concerns over the level of Organisational Resilience within industry, noting in 
Chapter 4 the business case for developing a resilience culture. However, as the above reports and 
evidence have shown, there is a wider utility in having a Resilience Management framework in place 
within the UK. The following sections will discuss the development of the ORM3 framework, and how it 
can benefit organisations in the future. 
 
8.3 SETTING THE FRAMEWORK CONTEXT 
With the findings above clearly demonstrating that there were strategic and tactical activities that could 
impact the effectiveness of an organisation to build and sustain its resilience, the challenge was to build 
a robust framework to reflect that. It had to be easy enough for the workforce to understand and use, 
holistic in its approach to capture the organisation as a system of systems rather than developing silos, 
and informative enough to provide the correct level of analysis and direction to the senior leadership 
team to assist in their decision-making and planning. The initial six areas, identified from Chapter 7, 
provided the structure around which to design the ORM3 framework. Reviewing the research from the 
case studies, interviews, observations and analysis of the research from multiple sources over the last 
decade, there were multiple factors identified that impacted on the resilience of an organisation. These 
were: 
 
Identified Factors from Research 
Effective Risk 
Management 








Systems thinking Adaptability Culture Organisational 
Learning 
Threat awareness Assurance 
mechanisms 















Corporate image Communication 
frameworks 
Organisational 
vision and strategy 

































Table 21: Organisational Resilience Factors.  Source: Author 
 
These 45 factors, created from cross-referencing of the various research documents discussed in 
Chapter 2, create a footprint of what researchers have identified since 1976 when Turner started 





21st century the works of Stephenson, McManus and Somer et al, looking at resilience, leadership and 
building organisational capability also helped shape the approach that the model should take. 
 
8.4 ORM3 FRAMEWORK WORKSTREAMS AND ELEMENTS 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the factors raised in Table 21. Each workstream that 
was identified in Chapter 7 is then broken down into elements to provide a mechanism for organisations 
to measure their Organisational Resilience capability; section 8.5 will then discuss placing them into the 
ORM3 framework. Within this section, each of the definitions of the designed components, based on 
this research, are indented and italicised for the purpose of the reader to clearly identify, while attached 
at Annex G are examples of the Strategic Core Workstream, to assist the reader in visualising how the 
framework appears. 
 
8.4.1 Strategic Core Workstream. 
The strategic core workstream refers to the core elements that set the context of the organisation, 
defining its very ethos, character and ways of working. These elements, if incorrectly set, can have a 
critical impact to its survival.602 A poorly defined vision or strategic outlook can cripple an organisation’s 
growth, and the process for developing this is often badly taught in business schools.603 If the senior 
team apply the incorrect leadership style, it can result in talent leaving the organisation and poor 
strategic decisions being made, especially when under pressure during disruptive change and in 
crises.604 Within the Strategic Core, there are three elements. These are discussed below. 
 
8.4.1.1 Corporate Culture Maturity 
As noted in the previous chapter, culture is a core element of the organisation, which can result either 
in the organisation becoming flexible, or unable to change or adapt to the environment that is changing 
around it. The result of beliefs, myths, and organisational history, as well as the style of senior 
leadership, the corporate vision and the various strategies and objectives set, an organisational culture, 
once set, may take a significant period to change. The correct culture can super-charge an 
organisation’s performance and attract customers and investment; the incorrect culture can have the 
opposite effect. The culture can also impact how the various elements of the organisation interact with 
each other during normal and disruptive situations. It can drive the organisation into a defensive posture, 
unable to understand the potential benefits of the situation and to embark on a learning journey; it may 
also result in staff leaving the organisation if the culture is more around identifying blame rather than 
learning and adapting. The approach to corporate culture is more than just its performance element; it 
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focuses on a strong consideration of the various backgrounds of its staff, aiming to create and maintain 
a just and fair culture, which in turn will drive early reporting and awareness of potential issues before 
they become incidents. 
 
Culture also defines the underlying approach to how incidents are managed. The research into HROs 
noted that, although they operated in high risk environments, their different cultural approach to 
operations enabled them to operate at a very high level of effectiveness. This breaks down cultural 
silos, developing a culture focussed on safety and reliability, resting atop a learning organisation culture, 
which leads to a high level of performance. Taking these various observations into consideration, the 
definition of cultural maturity is: 
 
This element analyses the level of maturity that the organisation has when it comes to its cultural 
approach. A high performing organisation would aim to develop an open and culturally diverse 
approach to the workplace, supporting personnel from numerous faiths and backgrounds. There 
would be a drive to build an inclusive and just culture, where individuals feel safe to work, free from 
harassment and blame. A just culture will also include a safety focussed approach, with individuals 
comfortable to raise concerns, issues or events and seek to address and learn from them. As an 
organisation, there is an embedded values and standards framework, which complements the 
industry and government frameworks. There is also a strong presence of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, building the organisation's reputation as a fair, just and supportive member of the 
community. Within the organisation there is a culture of learning, with best practice seen as the 
normal standard to seek to achieve, while the industry looks to the organisation as a benchmark. 
 
This definition weaves into the core of the model the critical elements of an organisation’s framework. 
It enables the assessment of the corporate culture on the approaches taken towards staff, performance 
and safety, the core values that it is based upon, and its approach to the external community. 
Organisations that do not invest in a culture that promotes learning and openness suffers from poor 
performance and a negative image; research into the NHS identified that there was a reporting issue 
driven by the culture of the organisation.605 Observations from the case studies and interviews from the 
military personnel, and evidence captured from the questionnaires, highlighted the importance of a 
positive culture on the effectiveness of the organisation and the performance of the staff within it. 
 
8.4.1.2 Strategic Corporate Vision 
This element is focussed on the level of communication and understanding that the workforce and 
management teams have of the corporate vision, strategies and objectives to enable the organisation 
to achieve its aims. This element analyses the level of engagement that the senior leadership has given 
to the various stakeholder groups about what the organisation’s key performance objectives, values 
and direction is. It is also tied to the level of sustainability and whether the organisation is seeking short, 
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medium- or long-term success. From the observations and research findings, there is a key requirement 
for the workforce to understand the organisational intent and vision; this enables them to quickly identify 
the key factors that must be maintained at a level of functionality while the organisation is going through 
a disruptive phase.  
 
For the military, they consider this as the ’Strategic Intent’ and ensure all activities link back to this, with 
teams effectively briefed on how their actions link directly to the vision and strategy being delivered. It 
would link into the leadership approach and the empowerment of individuals to make decisions through 
the application of `Mission Command’, as well as the culture of the organisation. Observations from the 
industry questionnaire indicated a lack of understanding across the workforce of the higher-level intent 
and leadership vision and communication. Taking this into consideration, the definition of this element 
within the framework is: 
 
This element is identified through how well the vision is briefed and understood by the members of 
the organisation. This can then be tested through how well company and department objectives 
align to the delivery of the strategic vision. Another indicator is how engaged the staff feel with the 
strategic vision. Corporate vision is aligned to industry and government strategy, with achievable 
objectives clearly mapped out to enable the vision to be delivered. The Corporate vision is also 
linked to organisational cultural framework, social responsibility and presented through business 
literature, frameworks and activities. 
 
This definition enables the observation of how the various departments or functions of the organisation 
also work together to deliver the vision, or whether there are issues around communication, trust and 
silo working. It links into how effective the leadership consider the importance of the workforce to 
understand the bigger picture, which, when facing a disruptive event, is critical for team leaders and 
middle management to make decisions around resources, processes and services to keep functioning 
when operating at a reduced capability. 
 
8.4.1.3 Adaptive Leadership Framework 
This element is focussed on the effectiveness of the leadership framework that is in place within the 
organisation, and how it impacts on the ability of it to manage disruptive events that force the leadership 
team and managerial staff, at all levels, to operate outside of the normal parameters of the organisation. 
Leadership teams have a limit to what they can manage during a disruptive situation and the flexibility 
of the managerial staff to make certain decisions without needing to seek clarification provides a greater 
ability to respond and adapt to dynamically changing situations. Boin and McConnell noted that there 
needs to be greater consideration of the management of major disruptive events. Top down crisis 
management is not effective when dealing with large scale complex events; contingency planning is 
required but is also not effective on its own in today’s complicated operational environment.606 
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The effectiveness of the organisation’s ability to respond at a strategic level to large-scale disruptive 
events is dependent on the capability of its senior leadership team. Observations of the ineptness of 
the response to Hurricane Katrina by the Federal leadership has been noted in several research papers; 
in comparison, the adaptive leadership approach implemented by the Wal-Mart group provided a level 
of response that the Federal government failed to deliver.607 Taking the observations from the 
documents researched, the live case studies and the feedback from the questionnaires received, the 
definition for this element within the framework is: 
 
This element examines the leadership framework and the ability of the organisation to develop and 
sustain its strategy. Within the area there is the analysis of policy and strategy documents to analyse 
the level of direction within the organisation. This also looks at the type of leadership framework, 
whether it is heavily devolved, with flat hierarchies, or hierarchical, with pillars of command and 
control. Leadership training and education programmes, staff development packages, regular 
leadership tabletop discussions and a multi-agency response understanding to promote the 
organisation as a leader within its industry setting. This element also analyses the depth of 
leadership capability across the organisation, and whether it is confined to a few key decision-
makers, or there is a level of devolved leadership, providing an agile element to the decision-making 
within the organisation. 
 
8.4.2 Organisational Assurance Workstream 
The first tactical workstream consists of five key components that have been identified as being 
important to developing the correct level of assurance frameworks within an organisation. An assurance 
framework provides checks and balances within the organisation, ensuring it is aware of the potential 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities, and has the correct mechanisms in place to manage the relevant 
insurance requirements, the understanding of the external environment to help develop the decision-
making, effective risk management and understanding what the key recovery priorities are for the 
organisation. With these frameworks in place, the senior leadership group have a level of awareness 
over what is occurring within the business environment, the risks to the organisation and, if those risks 
should result in the onset of a disruptive event, what the key recovery priorities are to enable the 
organisation to function at a reduced capability to continue to deliver its key obligations. The five 
elements are discussed in more detail in each of the sub sections below.  
 
8.4.2.1 Insurance 
The awareness of insurance within both the case study organisations and the length that it would take 
to implement business interruption frameworks was limited. For the military personnel, few had 
considered the topic of insurance until they had been faced with issues on operations when contractors 
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failed to deliver re-build projects or programmes. Limited awareness of the legal frameworks required 
resulted in several interviewees discussing escalating costs of very Quick Improvement Projects (QIPs), 
as there was a mentality of “just get it done” by the senior leadership. The time delay and obtaining the 
buy-in of the population outweighed any potential delay that may be incurred awaiting the settling of an 
insurance requirement. Within industry, there were differing levels of understanding on the time it would 
take to settle an insurance situation; in some circumstances analysis of projects identified that the 
reason for delivery failure was not down to the contractor, but to the organisation for not clearly 
understanding the complexity of the problem it was trying to solve. 
 
An understanding of the insurance capability is a key component of effective leadership and good 
corporate governance, which was noted in 2010 in a report by the consultancy group PwC in its report 
on business best practice.608 For the framework, the definition of the insurance element is: 
 
This element looks at how the organisation manages the impact to cash revenue generation, loss 
of key services and resources, taking into consideration the level of contingency funds currently 
held, the claiming process and the level of understanding around the availability and capability of 
the relevant organisations that are used for damage / liability cover. Part of the insurance 
frameworks is the level of direction for the required security frameworks to be in place to protect 
key assets and information, and the regular review and update of the insurance policies and impact 
of loss. Key responsibilities for insurance processes, procedures, standards and guidance 
documents are clearly assigned, reviewed and managed across the organisation. Within the project 
/ programme / portfolio management domain, the correct frameworks, review practices and 
assurance mechanisms are in place to provide the correct level of insurance against disruptive 
events and financial impacts. 
 
For the organisation, the assessment relies on the level of insurance in place, the various key activities 
that are covered by the insurance framework, and how it provides the level security to disruptive events. 
This element also interacts with several elements across the framework. 
 
8.4.2.2 Internal and External Situation Monitoring and Reporting 
The second element of the business assurance workstream aims to observe the effectiveness of the 
organisation at monitoring the internal and external environments. This element McManus did not factor 
as an individual element within her research, though the work by Stephenson did identify the importance 
of having the ability to monitor, track and inform the organisation about both the internal and external 
environments within which the organisation is operating within. Tracking the external environment 
enables effective development of situational awareness, potential risks and opportunities within the 
market; understanding the internal environment assists an organisation understanding whether it has 
 






the ability, processes and resources in place to react effectively, or if there are critical gaps within its 
structures and frameworks. 
 
This element reviews the level of feedback within the processes that are looking inward and outward 
and how effective they are in informing the organisational decision-making process. Stephenson noted 
in her research that this was a capability lacking in McManus’s original model, as within a disruptive 
situation there is the requirement for a constant flow of information required across the organisation to 
maintain situational awareness. From the industry case studies, the engineering disruptions clearly 
identified the impact that a poor level of situational monitoring and reporting can cause. Within the 
military case studies, this was part of the planning process, with the planning teams clearly directed 
within the process to issue several information updates to the wider organisation. This was then 
reinforced through the exercising activities distributed within the planning process. Once the initial 
planning of the response was complete and the team moved into the managing phase of the disruptive 
event, the monitoring and flow of information became more difficult, This was partly down to the 
available resources to maintain organisational effectiveness while managing the situation and needing 
to dynamically plan several contingencies as the situation developed. This required regular updating 
and review of the situation to maintain abreast of the conditions on the ground. To effectively do this, 
there is a blend of mechanisms and systems to capture the information, and human input to conduct 
the effective analysis of the information and convert it into intelligence to assist with the decision-making 
and resource allocation. HRO theory notes that the effectiveness of the response to a disruptive event 
relies on how effective the organisation is at managing its situational awareness. With this analysis, the 
definition for this element within the framework expands on that of Stephenson’s: 
 
This element looks at how the organisation utilises the business intelligence links that is has both 
internally and externally to build its situational awareness through effective monitoring and reporting. 
Effective monitoring and reporting assist the leadership team to build situational awareness and 
helps track whether the organisation is moving towards its strategic vision. Poor monitoring and 
reporting impacts on the level of governance and assurance management that is present within the 
organisation. This area includes the level of compliance within the organisation with key industry 
documentation, regulator direction and government legislation, policies and directives. Internally, 
this analyses the level of compliance with organisational standards, frameworks and formal 
processes and the level of divergence from the official publications; this includes the programme / 
project and portfolio management domains. Under this element, the organisation would also include 
the analysis of the socio-political environment it is operating within, as well as current and potential 
competitors and their market strategies. 
 
Stephenson’s definition focuses on the importance of the reporting and monitoring of the information, 
and the effectiveness of the human-technical system in doing this. It did not discuss about the 
requirement of the organisation to comply with the relevant internal and external polices and standards, 





with several others, providing a system within the organisation for gathering, analysing, distributing and 
reviewing the gathered information. 
 
8.4.2.3 Risk Management and Planning 
A core element of building effective Organisational Resilience is understanding what threats and 
opportunities exist within the operating environment and how they may impact the business if they come 
to pass. Although there are elements within the framework that analyse the hazards and vulnerabilities 
of the organisation, as well as the previous element of situational reporting, these elements only provide 
parts of the equation. Neither Stephenson or McManus included a defined risk management and 
planning element within their frameworks, though the primary evidence analysed in Chapter 5 identified 
that there was a need for a clearly defined risk process within the framework to enable organisations to 
assess their capability. 
 
Within organisations, risk management is seen as the position where most of the ’security’ elements 
are located, Business Continuity management systems, financial risk analysis, fraud analysis, etc are 
normally found within the Risk department, which, in the industry case study organisation, sat within the 
Finance department, underneath the responsibility of the finance director. This highlights a real 
difference within the two case study organisations; the military placed the risk component of the 
headquarters within the Intelligence function, utilising intelligence experts to capture information, 
assess, prioritise and back brief the planning teams on what potential risks that existed. This was 
conducted at the first phase of the planning phase to respond to a disruptive event, with the identified 
risks then catalogued, tracked and distributed to the various teams that were impacted for them to 
employ he required response activity. This approach required the crossflow of information across 
several different functions to maintain situational awareness. 
 
Such a mature approach to risk management did not occur within the industry case study organisation, 
especially the Strategic Planning department. Discussions identified individuals in risk management 
positions without any formal education or training. Within the reports reviewed on the engineering over-
runs, one of the clear underlying factors in both reports was the failure to manage risks and understand 
the consequences. The report into the May 2018 timetable crisis also noted that as an industry there 
was a poor level of understanding the importance of effective risk management. Based on this evidence, 
this element is defined as: 
  
This element examines how the organisation conducts its risk management procedures and how 
this informs the wider development of the business continuity planning process. The organisation 
should also be able to demonstrate up to date, regularly reviewed and tested emergency plans, with 
key information accurately and securely maintained. It monitors the level of compliance and 
assurance that is placed within the framework, with working practices, procedures for risk 
identification, prioritisation, management and reporting as part of this. Part of this framework is the 





organisation. Also included is mapping and accreditation to the relevant industry / national / 
international standards. 
 
8.4.2.4 Robust Processes for identifying and Analysing Vulnerabilities 
This element reviews the processes that the organisation has in place to identify potential areas of 
weakness within the organisation and to analyse how that creates an internal vulnerability in how the 
business operates. Vulnerabilities are those components of an organisation, be it a resource, process 
or a key decision-making requirement, that, if absent or incorrectly applied, can have a severe 
detrimental impact to the effective performance of the organisation. This may be the absence of 
connectivity to a core IT server, or absence of key staff to manage complex machinery. 
 
By being aware of the internal vulnerabilities, organisations can develop robust continuity processes to 
maintain the basic functions to keep the organisation delivering its key functions. Within the military 
case studies, this was maintained through the building and sustaining of situational awareness, aligned 
to an agreed risk appetite, where the commander was willing to allow minor processes to be sacrificed 
to maintain the critical services functioning. The industry case studies identified a failing in this area, 
compounded by a limited application of a risk appetite and an understanding of the vulnerabilities due 
to a lack of a business continuity framework. This materialised during the May 2018 timetable crisis, 
when it was noted that there were several internal vulnerabilities that existed. With this evidence, the 
description of this element in the framework is: 
 
This element studies the capability of the organisation to identify key components of the 
organisation, either resources, services or infrastructure, and the mechanisms in place to avoid the 
impact of a disruptive event which affects these internal structures. This element includes the 
analysis of man-made and natural issues, such as conflict, climate change or air pollution. Within 
this element the organisation has a good understanding of systems modelling and demonstrates an 
understanding of how system failures can affect other systems within the organisation. This is 
closely linked to an effective business continuity framework and regular reviewing and testing of 
recovery assumptions, mapped against identified vulnerabilities. 
 
Studies into HROs noted the focus on potential vulnerabilities and addressing potential hazard factors 
before they became an incident. 609 Pidgeon, Boin and van Eeten noted that HROs are focussed on 
developing the processes that can be used to identify and rapidly address vulnerabilities; these 
processes are included in risk management or business continuity mechanisms. These factors may be 
natural occurring or man-made, or activities that may destabilise the smooth functioning of the system. 
 
8.4.2.5 Recovery Priorities 
 
609Pidgeon N., `Complex Organisational Failures: Culture, High Reliability and Lessons from Fukushima’, The Bridge, National 
Academy of Engineering, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, Volume 42, Number 3, 2012; Boin A. and van Eeten M. 
J. G., `The Resilient Organisation’, Public Management Review, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, Volume 15, Issue 3, 





A fundamental component of building organisational resilience is understanding what the minimal level 
of services are that you need to deliver in order to maintain effective operations. By clearly defining the 
minimal level of service, an organisation can then identify its key recovery processes, be they the 
delivery of services, the provision of resources, or maintaining the capability to deliver key processes 
or decision-making activities. This is heavily linked to an effective business continuity system, which the 
industry case study organisation did not have in place, therefore it struggled to clearly articulate what 
the key recovery priorities where. This was evident in the 2008 and 2014 engineering overruns, and the 
impact caused by the May 2018 timetable crisis. 
 
Within the military case study organisations this requirement was better understood as it was part of 
the decision-making process, effectively analysed through the combat estimate analysis process, which 
was used to identify the minimal resources and activities needed to deliver the various tasks. The case 
studies did note that though the information was available, some commanders chose to ignore the 
recommendations, thereby introducing risk of failure into the process by seeking to trade one risk off 
against another. When questioned within the interviews or the questionnaires, it was apparent that while 
both the military and industry case study organisations had some understanding of the impact of not 
having the correct resources in place, or understanding the minimal recovery priorities in place, the 
level of understanding around consequences was limited. This element is defined as: 
 
This element looks at how well the organisation understands what its key functions are, and how 
quickly they need to resume service after a disruptive event. This analyses whether the organisation 
has a clearly defined strategic recovery framework in place, which is communicated across the 
organisation and supported through tactical and operational processes, procedures and staff 
education. The use of a business continuity framework, the ability to function in dispersed locations, 
and staff awareness of key priorities and minimum recovery times are all part of this element. An 
understanding of the impact of failing to meet the minimum recovery timelines is also expected in 
the areas of people, facilities, technology and equipment. It is informed through gathered 
intelligence and understanding the organisational risks, capabilities, vulnerabilities and potential 
threats and trends. 
 
Discussions with personnel from both the military and industry case studies identified that the 
organisations were more aware of the required levels of recovery priorities for the locations that they 
were operating from, though when faced with the complexity of managing disruptive events over several 
locations, assumptions were made, with the planning teams trading information for response time. This 
sometimes resulted in incorrect decisions or responses occurring, resulting in an actual increase in the 
time the organisation took to respond effectively to a disruptive event. 
 
8.4.3 Organisational Agility Workstream 
The second tactical workstream of the ORM3 framework was focussed on the ability of the organisation 





protecting key resources and services. It enables the review of how effective the organisation is in 
building and maintaining its situational awareness, the potential threats that exist and the impact they 
could have, and whether the organisation has the correct security frameworks, such as crisis 
management, business continuity and disaster recovery, in place. It also enables the assessment of 
how effective the decision-making by the organisation is when faced with a disruptive event, and 
whether the organisational culture impacts on the decision-making. 
 
8.4.3.1 Hazards and Consequences 
The analysis of the literature in Chapter 2 and the observations taken during the live case studies of the 
military teams highlighted the importance of understanding the first and second order consequences of 
various hazards that they may encounter. Likewise, examination of the various reports into the industry 
case study identified a lack of consequence understanding and management; the over-run of 
engineering works in 2008 and 2014, the impact of poor decision-making and large scale change onto 
the timetable in May 2018, the delay in the effective roll out of the safety cultural change programme 
due to limited frontline staff engagement and investment in learning programmes that were learner 
centric. The various industry reports indicate that the level of consequence awareness was limited 
during these events. Likewise, the failure of NASA to understand the consequence of a perished “O 
ring”, or the impact of ice striking the heat shield on take-off resulted in the loss of two Space Shuttles. 
 
What was apparent during the observations of the military live case studies, and the conversations with 
the interviewees, was the level of understanding of how many potential hazards existed that could 
impact on their approach. It also noted that there were breakdowns in the communication between the 
planning teams, the information collection teams and the risk management teams, which resulted in 
several assumptions being made which impacted on the overall effectiveness of the plan. This 
operational silo mentality, created through the pressure of trying to function under pressure to respond 
to a dynamically changing environment, is in itself a hazard to organisational effectiveness. The 
definition for the element is: 
 
This element is identified through the level of knowledge the organisation has of key internal and 
external threats, issues and potential crises that it may face within the working environment. Key 
documents, reporting frameworks, practices and policies, supported through staff briefings and 
engagement with other organisations who may move to assist in a disruptive event would also be 
expected. A clear understanding of the consequences of the hazards / threats and their 
management should be present, which requires detailed knowledge of the current organisational 
vulnerabilities and capabilities. 
 
By clearly understanding the hazards that the organisation potential faces, along with the consequences 
if these hazards cause an impact, the leadership and workforce can put into place frameworks and 





closely with effective risk management, business intelligence, environment monitoring, corporate 
security frameworks and vulnerability identification.  
 
8.4.3.2 Connectivity Awareness 
This element is focussed on the capability of the organisation to understand the various key internal 
stakeholders and other parties that it works with, and the impact of losing the support, engagement or 
working agreements with them. Within the military live case studies, the planning teams had a good 
understanding of their primary stakeholders and military organisations that they were working with; 
however, when pushed further by the observation team, the organisational planning team were unaware 
of the second or third level internal stakeholders that provided key elements of the supply chain and/or 
services that they were required to consider when responding to the disruptive events within the 
exercises. When discussing the issue in the after-action reviews, it was noted that there was an 
assumption that this information would have been identified in the risk assessment and planning phase, 
supplemented by the business intelligence and information collection frameworks. The reviews 
demonstrated a critical gap in the level of cooperation among the teams, which was resulting in the 
development of an incomplete operating picture being developed. 
 
Within the industry case study organisation, a similar pattern was occurring, especially within the 
Strategic Planning department. Projects and programmes were being initiated without a clear 
understanding of the size or importance of the various internal stakeholders and their supply chains. 
Poor communications and engagement resulted in several major projects and programmes failing to 
deliver their stated outcomes, with one project failing to deliver any output, though it had lasted for 18 
months and spent upwards of £2million. With this evidence, the definition for this element within the 
framework is: 
 
This element is internally focussed, seeking to understand how well the organisation is connected 
and engaged with the internal workforce and key internal stakeholders. The level of cross-
departmental engagement and collaboration, as well as the management of the company's supply 
chain, is captured within this metric. This analyses the number of channels and mechanisms used, 
the type of media, the time for messages to be released around an event and the level of resource 
and investment provided. This element also looks at the number of staff, their development 
framework and the number of gaps within communication teams across the organisation, and the 
impact it causes. 
 
In theory it should be easier for organisations to maintain internal stakeholder engagement and 
information flow to the various parties, yet within the analysis it was noted that both organisations 
struggled to manage this effectively, though the military had a more capable approach. The research 
articles noted that in times of major disruption, many organisations struggled to maintain an internal and 
external communications framework to the interested parties or failed to understand the various 





situational awareness for the organisation; understanding that organisations are a system of systems 
rather than multiple silos is a key skill for the high-resilience organisation. 
 
8.4.3.3 Corporate Security Frameworks 
This element focuses on the development and maintaining of multiple tactical frameworks to build an 
organisation wide security framework to respond, manage and recover from disruptive events. Both the 
case study organisations had various mechanisms in place, though the military organisations had a 
more mature approach to maintaining the various frameworks in place. Captured within this element of 
the framework are the tactical activities that an organisation should have in place to manage the onset 
of a major disruptive event. This would include the presence of a business continuity management 
system, crisis management capabilities and disaster recovery capabilities. A key function of an 
organisation that has a high level of resilience is its ability to manage and adapt to a complex situation, 
being able to rapidly utilise key resources and processes to minimise the spread and impact of a 
disruptive event. Through the various research activities, the definition of this element is: 
 
This element examines the internal security frameworks that exist within the organisation in order 
to protect it from the effects of a disruptive events. Key aspects within this area are the presence 
and regular review of emergency planning, disaster recovery, incident response and business 
continuity frameworks. Clear understanding of how the threats may impact and the response 
required is present within the staff, with regular updates and publications available. This element 
analyses the level of trained and competent individuals within the organisation, the accuracy of their 
job descriptions and competency frameworks. It also assesses the training frameworks in place for 
this element and the effectiveness of the reporting. A key measure is the number of incidents that 
breached current security frameworks and the relevant outcome. Also included is mapping and 
accreditation to the relevant industry / national / international standards. 
 
Organisations that have this ability understand the need to be able to rapidly move from normal 
operations to disruptive event management, while maintaining daily operations at as near as normal 
operating level as possible, accepting the requirement to re-task key resources to manage the disruptive 
event response. The evidence demonstrated during the analysis of the research articles in Chapter 2 
and the primary resource sources noted that the military organisations had a far better understanding 
of contingency planning, resource allocation and dynamic decision-making processes. This was 
supported though effective risk management, understanding of hazards and internal vulnerabilities, and 
situational awareness of the environment. Review of the events used for the analysis of the industry 
case study identified major issues with its effective management of disruptive events through its 
corporate security mechanisms; the analysis demonstrated a fractured response to incidents, an 
absence of a business continuity system and poor understanding of hazards and their consequences. 







8.4.3.4 Adaptive Decision Making 
This element analysed the level of adaptive decision-making capability and how it was developed and 
utilised within the organisation. Research into decision-making, especially during crises, notes that the 
amount of time required to make the required judgement is often sub-optimal. Individuals are often 
faced with the dilemma to take decisions without a full information picture, often having to trust their 
judgement and previous experience.610 Complex disruptive situations require individuals to adjust how 
they manage the decision-making; these types of events require the acceptance that normal thinking 
tools and processes do not apply.611 This research indicates that based on the potential factors and 
complexity of the situation, along with the need to be comfortable taking critical decisions without full 
situational awareness. Observations within the live case studies identified that the more experienced 
individuals took steps to eliminate potential factors, narrowing down the key issues that they were 
dealing with. Based on what information they had, atmospherics, previous intelligence on the situation 
and their own experience, they would make decisions to act, seeking to maintain the momentum, 
accepting that in a complex situation their actions would change the shape of the disruptive event. As 
they placed their decisions into action, they initiated teams to start developing contingency plans, based 
of courses of action that focused on most likely, worst case and best-case outcomes of their decisions. 
The research into the industry case study organisation, in both the engineering over-runs and the May 
2018 timetable crisis saw the situation deteriorate as individuals sought to obtain more and more 
information prior to them making a critical decision. This desire to make the best possible decision 
utilising as much information as possible resulted in the disruptive event becoming more established 
and harder to control. Based on this analysis, the definition for this element is: 
 
This element analyses how decentralised the decision-making within the organisation is and 
whether it supports the core adaptive leadership framework. Evidence of empowered workforces, 
devolved decisions and the sharing of managers' intent and key objectives fall under this element. 
Key to this is evidence of critical thinking and evidence-based analysis, providing the construct for 
informed leadership decisions. This observes the accountability for decisions, how informed the 
decision-makers are, the management of decisions and how these are communicated to the 
workforce. This also looks at decisions made by governing boards and project / programme / 
portfolio boards across the organisation responsible for key decisions and expenditure approval.  
 
8.4.3.5 Exercising 
The ability to design, develop and conduct exercises, at various levels, from conceptual table-top to full 
scale run through of processes using staff, vehicles and locations, is a key function in developing and 
sustaining an organisation’s resilience capability. Exercises enable organisations to test their 
assumptions, review their vulnerabilities and assess whether their risk management frameworks are as 
effective at tracking the various levels of threats that exist within the environment that the organisation 
 
610Grier R.A, `Military Cognitive Readiness at the Operational and Strategic Levels: A Theoretical Model for Measurement 
Development’, Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Volume 6 
Number 4, 2012, pp 358-392. 






is operating within. Exercising also allows the organisation to implement and review its emergency 
response and recovery plans and amend where required. Observations of the military and emergency 
services noted the importance of table-topping potential events. For the military part of their planning 
process is to wargame their potential plans to identify weaknesses and test assumptions prior to final 
drafting and publication of the plan. The exercise element is used as a way of gaining potential insights 
into the potential actions that may occur. Within industry there was very little evidence of this sort of 
testing and reviewing of plans, either within the Strategic Planning or Operations departments. For the 
framework, the definition used for the exercising element is: 
 
This element examines how the organisation utilises exercises to build awareness and capability 
within the organisation. It looks at how well the role of exercising is incorporated into the planning 
framework, either through table-top or actual physical exercising of events and outcomes. This also 
seeks to track how the exercise outcomes are then incorporated into the continuous development 
of organisational practices and procedures. 
 
The value of organisations conducting exercises for teaching, analysis or reviewing assumptions and 
their planning processes is captured in the various articles reviewed in Chapter 2. Exercising links 
heavily into the Learning Organisation culture, as well as developing a systems thinking approach to 
complex activities. For the military, they use exercising at various levels of the organisation, and at 
various stages of the process. At the outset they may engage in Red-teaming, or alternative analysis 
processes. This informs many potential scenarios that may occur. Once a scenario is accepted and 
used to plan against, various courses of actions may be war-gamed and assessed, prior to being full 
developed. The final wargame, or rehearsal of concept (RoC) drill is conducted to walk the teams 
through actions and potential events, ensuring all members are aware of what is expected of them. 
 
Exercising also contributes to the building of system awareness, vulnerability tracking and staff 
development. As the model proposes, each of the elements is informed, or informs, other elements, 
thus indicating that the development of organisational resilience is a systems approach delivered 
holistically across the organisation. 
  
8.4.4 Organisational Planning Workstream 
This third tactical workstream of the ORM3 framework was focussed on the ability of the organisation 
to conduct effective planning activities, and the supporting elements that enable this activity to occur. 
Within this workstream the review of how the organisation collects and analyses information to develop 
intelligence to enhance effective decision-making, long-term planning requirements and the various 
information gathering activities that exist. Together these elements allow the framework to assess how 
effective the approach is towards the planning and intelligence management processes. 
 
8.4.4.1 Business Intelligence Frameworks 
This element focusses on how the organisation manages the collection of information from internal and 





that the organisation can utilise. The credibility of the intelligence can impact on the accuracy of the 
decision-making conducted by the leadership team, especially when the organisation is experiencing a 
disruptive situation. Key to the effectiveness of this element is how the organisation develops the 
information to decision-making system, linking the information gathering mechanisms to the analytical 
teams who then prioritise the intelligence to the decision-makers to maintain the effective maintenance 
of situational awareness. Within the military case studies, the organisation had a combined team 
responsible for the management of the collection of information from multiple sources, clearly directing 
where information was required to assist in building awareness. This team was accountable for the 
analysis and converting the information into effective intelligence. Within the industry case studies, 
especially within the Strategic Planning department, there was a limited analysis of market options, 
trends or organisational requirements within the projects that were reviewed. With these observations, 
this element is defined as: 
 
This element studies the level of application of business intelligence to inform business decisions 
and operations. It analyses how well the organisation uses business analysts to conduct market 
research, inform key decisions and support the programme / project frameworks that are present. 
A second element to this criterion is the level of research and cross-referencing of data that occurs 
prior to the information being utilised to inform the business decisions. this element is closely aligned 
and is dependent on an effective information and knowledge collection framework to inform it. This 
element also considers the number of business analysts / information gathering personnel that are 
present within an organisation and how effectively they are being used within their primary roles. 
 
This element is not reflected in either the McManus or Stephenson models, which raises questions 
around how the information is gathered and analysed within their models. The importance of accurate 
and timely intelligence to help inform the decision maker during disruptive situations is not to be under-
estimated. The inclusion of this element as a resilience indicator reflects the importance of the 
intelligence mechanisms in assisting the ability of the organisation to respond effectively and accurately 
to the unfolding situation. The ability of the organisation to have a capability that can capture and feed 
the information into the correct analytical processes to develop situational awareness and support the 
corporate decision-making process is key to enabling rapid response and adaptation to complex 
disruptive situations.  
 
8.4.4.2 External Connectivity 
In an organisation, there is the requirement to invest and maintain strong communication links with the 
various external stakeholders and supply chain members. Studies into organisations and disruptive 
events note that at times there is a breakdown in communications between the organisation and their 
supply chain. The Nokia / Phillips case study is a clear example of this; while Nokia responded quickly 
to the impact of a Phillips warehouse fire, Ericsson failed to have an active stakeholder engagement 





losing a significant slice of the market to Nokia, who implemented an adaptive stakeholder engagement 
approach.612 
 
The military industry case study participants had a good understanding of their immediate external 
stakeholders, maintaining a good level of engagement with them during steady operations, though 
second and third order external stakeholders where not as well engaged with. Review of project tools 
and frameworks within the Strategic Planning department observed that there were limited levels of 
stakeholder engagement and mapping; this may have been caused through the lack of business change 
capability within the organisation, who would possess this skill set. Within the military, stakeholder 
analysis and mapping were part of the intelligence gathering frameworks, with the intelligence team 
being accountable. Several detailed mapping and assessment tools were utilised, provided a detailed 
understanding of external stakeholders, their alignment and impact / influence onto the various 
organisational activities. With these considerations, this element was is defined as: 
 
This element is externally focussed, seeking to understand how well the organisation is connected 
and engaged with the wider community and business district. The level of stakeholder, community, 
industry and customer engagement, as well as the management of the company's supply chain, is 
captured within this metric. This also analyses how effective external feedback loops are, and how 
well the organisation captures this information to pass on and whether it is delivering a single image 
externally, or multiple images due to a lack of internal control. Key performance factors, such as 
stakeholder ratings, reputation and trustworthiness may be used to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the organisation within this role. 
 
Seeing the various actors that impact on the resilience of the organisation, especially those that are 
part of the supply chain, is critical for an organisation to understand the bigger picture when facing a 
disruptive event. Maintaining effective communications across the external stakeholders and supply 
chain provides the ability to map and inform the organisation and wider supply chain as an organic 
system of systems, building a detailed awareness of where potential vulnerabilities may occur when the 
system is placed under extreme pressure. 
 
8.4.4.3 Long Term Planning Performance Requirements 
This element of the framework focuses on the ability of the organisation to develop effective long-term 
plans to deliver key programmes and activities to enable the delivery of the business objectives and 
strategy. The ability for effective long-term planning is important to the development of organisational 
sustainability and direction. The 2018 British Standards Institute report identifies that the mindset of 
“waiting out the storm” is no longer an option for the modern business.613 There needs to be a clearly 
defined approach to planning and sustaining business activity during disruptive events. Research by 
 
612Sheefi Y., Building a Resilient Organisation, The Bridge, 2007, pp 30 – 36; Valestro J., (ed), `Organisational Resilience Case 
Studies’, Attorney General’s Office, Australian Government, commonwealth of Australia, 2011. P.11. 
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Meyer noted that long-term planning to mitigate potential disruptive events was more cost effective than 
responding to the unfolding crisis, especially if supported by short-term planned response and recovery 
activities, which also pull upon social capacity to improve capability.614 The work conducted by Pollock 
noted that the UK government’s direction on building resilience within communities and in business also 
focussed on the development of an effective planning process to assist in mitigating the risk of disruptive 
events.615  
 
Within the military organisation, there was a strong focus on the implementation of an effective planning 
process within the headquarters. This was underpinned by everyone within the organisation being well 
practiced in the use of the planning process, which was also used to give regular leadership briefings 
and updates to the various implementation teams. This familiarity with the process enabled the 
headquarters staff to rapidly conduct planning reviews and contingency planning activities, utilising the 
structure of the process, without becoming slaves to it. The act of planning also provided a secondary 
impact; the individuals became adept at being able to quickly re-plan and develop several courses of 
action, as the complex situation unfolded around them. This ability to plan under pressure enabled an 
improved level of agility within the organisation. 
 
McManus noted in her research that, of the organisations with which she engaged, few considered a 
long-term planning approach to developing resilience; rather the effort was based on the development 
of short-term plans, based on the requirements of the incident they were facing, or driven to meet a 
business continuity plan activity.616 She observed that in several organisations investing in the planning 
process was due to an audit requirement, rather than from good practice. This created the wrong 
behaviours within those organisations which saw the planning process as a compliance requirement, 
rather than as a risk management and good practice approach. The definition for this element is: 
 
This element looks at the long-term performance planning strategies of the organisation, and how 
these are aligned to the delivery of the organisational end state. This looks at the ability to create 
and disseminate Strategic Business Plans, linking resources, funding and time to enable their 
delivery. Within this area sits the requirement for effective project, programme and portfolio 
management, supported by the correct governance and assurance frameworks. It also analyses 
the regularity of emergency planning, business continuity planning and incident management 
planning activities, and how these are communicated and embedded into the organisation. 
 
8.4.4.4 Information and Knowledge Collection Frameworks 
This element analyses the various mechanisms that the organisation has in place to facilitate the 
effective collection of information on its environment, stakeholders and competition, and its ability to 
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retain and share the knowledge that is collected. This element links with the business intelligence and 
connectivity elements that have been previously discussed. Within crisis events, Fink notes that 
communication is key to maintaining a situational awareness, though effective communication can only 
occur if the correct information is collected and the teams have the knowledge to manage its 
application.617 In 2013, Fink, when analysing the BP disaster Deep Water Horizon, observed that the 
circulation of incorrect level of information can initiate a greater crisis. He notes that crisis management 
is about managing the situation, while crisis communication is about managing perception.618 This links 
it to the Corporate Social Responsibility and Silo Mentality elements, as for this to work effectively, the 
other elements are also required. 
 
For the military, ineffective collection of information and knowledge has contributed to several recent 
operational failures, leading to corporate brand damage, incorrect procurement of equipment and 
casualties on the battlefield. The failure of the purchase of the Chinook Mk 3 helicopter was littered with 
poor information reviews, uninformed assumption and incorrect knowledge of the MoD teams as to how 
to procure and manage a complex contract.619 Observations by Marston and Malkasian of the British 
experience in the Iraq conflict noted the initial failure to gather information and effectively use the 
knowledge of its environment and complex social and political situations that it was operating within, 
while Ledwidge discusses the failure of commanders to pass the correct levels of information back to 
Whitehall, for fear of being seen to have lost control of the situation.620 
 
Within the industry departments, feedback from the questionnaires indicated that there was a poor level 
of information capture and flow, hampered by the levels of process knowledge within the leadership 
teams. Responses to the questionnaires led to the observations that this resulted in the departments 
not understanding the requirements of the customers, and not operating collaboratively internally with 
other teams. The military case studies also demonstrated the impact of not having effective information 
gathering frameworks in place or circulating knowledge across the various teams within the 
organisation. Observations captured within the case study reports noted misplaced resources, 
assumptions and incorrect decisions being made as key pieces of information, already collected and 
analysed, were not shared. 
 
This element observes the level of sharing knowledge and information across the various 
departments and levels of an organisation, and how this is managed effectively. It also assesses 
how the information frameworks are involved in the building of an end to end system that enables 
the collection of accurate information, its analysis and how effectively it is communicated to key 
stakeholders to inform evidence-based decision making. Part of this process is the creation of a 
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pipeline from research through to development, with the correct level of staff capability in place to 
manage it. 
 
Both McManus and Stephenson focus on the importance of information gathering and the effective 
sharing of knowledge. Stephenson notes that good information management helps the breaking down 
of silos, while sharing knowledge across the organisation builds capability and awareness.621 McManus 
indicates that the limited sharing of knowledge impacts on the capability of the staff to operate outside 
their normal role, which, in times of disruption, is detrimental to the organisation being able to respond 
and adapt to the situation it is facing.622 Effective knowledge sharing of what individuals and teams do 
can promote greater engagement and awareness as to what critical activities are required to be 
maintained during disruption, enabling individuals to pull together collectively. An effective case study 
for this is the Sanders O’Neill & Partners situation, where, because several individuals each knew their 
role and those of their colleagues, when faced with a catastrophic loss of staff and information, they 
were able to recover the majority of customers through latent knowledge within the organisation and 
the remaining staff.623 
 
8.4.4.5 Operating and Licensing Frameworks 
An organisation that wishes to conduct effective operations, either within the military or business sphere, 
needs to understand the relevant operating frameworks and restrictions that are in place, and the 
agreed licensing requirements that exist. For the military, this can replicate itself as certain restrictions 
on weaponry, engagement protocols, limited air and aviation missions and a restriction as to which 
ground vehicles can be used in certain areas. This may also extend to how the teams on the ground 
act in relation to the population that they are interacting with, and their limits of activity. Recent examples 
within Iraq624 and Afghanistan625 have shown that not following the accepted international frameworks 
can lead to extensive reputational damage and prosecution. The fall out of the Baha Mousa situation 
for the British Army was a strategic investigation, which identified that the culture of the organisation in 
question had become toxic. The Army instigated rapid recovery procedures to address the reputational 
damage, including the development of Values and Standards education packages, which became 
mandatory for all members of the organisation to attend on an annual basis. Failure to attend carried a 
disciplinary censure. Situations that challenged the correct Values and Standards were also written into 
training events and exercises to help ingrain these into the organisation. 
 
For the military case study organisations, pressure was placed on the teams to operate effectively in a 
complex disruptive environment with increasingly restrictive operating frameworks being placed upon 
them, from both a political and an operational level. The increased pressure for more information, 
reduction in certain activities and more reporting procedures started to impact heavily on the capability 
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of the organisation to conduct its role, as well as increased the frustrations experienced by the staff 
through feeling they were being prevented from being fully effective. 
 
For the industry case study departments, there was also a clear requirement for understanding the 
operating and licence frameworks that impacted upon the organisation. The Strategic Planning 
department was held to account through the Network Code, which is the operating framework that 
defines the process of developing the national railway timetable. Investigations in Chapter 5, section 
5.5.3  have identified that the framework is not fit for purpose for the 21st century railway, which has led 
to multiple issues with which the planning department had to contend. The Strategic Planning 
department is also responsible for delivering a key component of the parent organisation’s licencing 
arrangement, namely, that of developing, delivering and maintaining an effective national railway on 
behalf of the Department for Transport. With this evidence, the definition for this element is as follows: 
 
This element analyses how the organisation manages the relevant operating and licensing 
frameworks within which it is bound to function. It observes how well the organisation is reporting 
against its agreed frameworks, the number of recorded breaches of the contractual agreements 
and how information is captured and disseminated to the relevant regulatory bodies. Within the 
element is also the examination of current security and operational requirements, stipulated by 
legislation or the regulator, and how the organisation is delivering against these requirements. At 
an industry level, key Service Level agreements between industry partners are captured under this 
element. It also looks at the level of engagement that takes place with the various regulatory bodies 
and the level of collaborative working. 
 
Though both McManus and Stephenson note the importance of operating within the legal frameworks, 
there was no clear element defined within their separate frameworks, even though the lack of clear 
understanding and awareness of the required operating and licensing carry the risk of severe 
reputational damage.  
 
8.4.5 Organisational Governance and Structure Workstream 
This workstream is focussed on the structures of the organisation and whether it is properly aligned 
with the various tasks and requirements it needs to carry out to deliver its goals and strategy. Allied to 
this is the level of governance that is in place, and the mechanisms that have been developed to enable 
the effective implementation and management of the governance frameworks, which support the first 
workstream, that of building business assurance. Within the workstream the elements analyse whether 
the roles and responsibilities are correctly aligned, the capability and capacity of internal and external 
resources to respond effectively, how the organisation manages breaking down silos, and how it builds 
and maintains a positive corporate image through the investment into Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
8.4.5.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
In an organisation, the development of situational awareness and maintaining the flow of information 





information / intelligence they require in order to make the difficult decisions to maintain the organisation 
operating at an effective level. Within both the military and industry case studies there were very 
different approaches to the roles and responsibilities of individuals, especially at the junior and middle 
management level. Feedback from the military audiences is clear that the effective understanding of 
the roles and responsibilities of the individual, and the level that they were empowered to operate at, 
meant a higher degree of trust, decision-making under pressure and engagement existed. When the 
industry questionnaires were reviewed, there was several responses that noted the lack of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities, especially around accountability, resulted in the breakdown of trust, 
disenfranchised employees and a reduction in performance. 
 
Key implications of a poorly defined roles and responsibilities matrix was the confusion of who should 
be doing what within the team / function. When speaking to the military personnel, individuals had a 
clearly defined primary and secondary role within the planning headquarters. In times of disruptive 
change, or a major incident, each individual was also heavily trained in the role of their line manager to 
enable the organisation to function effectively if the majority of the decision-making team was 
incapacitated; some members were also trained to operate a two levels above to maintain key functions 
for a limited period of time. This level of redundancy was not apparent within the industry team; feedback 
noted that this may be due to cost and potential efficiency savings; the majority of managers did not 
advocate empowering their subordinates in being able carry out their role completely in case it impacted 
directly on them. With these observations, the definition for this element is: 
 
This element is identified through the level of knowledge a member of staff has of their role, 
members of their team and their supervisor's role. A clear understanding of roles and responsibilities 
is important during a disruptive event, as each individual may have a key responsibility to maintain 
the operational functions of an organisation as it tries to manage the impact of the disruption. Across 
the organisation this also encompasses the accuracy of job descriptions, competency requirements, 
levels of authority and whether similar roles in different departments are aligned. This includes 
levels of staff awareness, level of trust within the team and engagement with the strategic vision. 
 
The organisational culture can also heavily influence the approach to how roles and responsibilities are 
managed. The level of responsibility deferred to the individual also differed from the military and the 
industry case study organisation. The military was based on a decentralised, networked organisation, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, and therefore the decision-making was decentralised, using the principles 
of `Mission Command’ to enable the teams on the ground to react quickly and effectively, based on the 
understanding of the Headquarters’ intent. The industry model was very centralised, for both the 
Strategic Planning and Operations departments; the questionnaires noted that at times decisions were 








8.4.5.2 Internal Resources 
This element of the workstream is focussed on understanding the situation and capabilities of the 
internal resources of the organisation. Research conducted by Pollock on behalf of the Cabinet Office 
noted the importance of having the right individuals with the right skills in the right positions within an 
organisation, supported by the correct technology and resources to enable them to respond rapidly, 
and effectively, to a disruptive event.626 He noted that common failings across the 32 crises he analysed 
were poor training, ineffective leadership and a failure to learn lessons. There were several others that 
fit elsewhere in this model. McManus and Stephenson also note the importance of clearly understanding 
the human resources available and what their capabilities are; Stephenson notes that the capability and 
capacity of staff can determine whether or not an organisation will be effective in its response to a 
crisis.627 McManus identified through her research that several organisations she engaged with had 
failed to consider secondary working locations for their staff during a disruptive event, while others had 
over-inflated expectations of their staff being able to operate remotely.628 
 
Research into the importance of social capital when responding to disruption was the area of research 
by Johnson, who analysed how organisations could utilise their social capital to enhance the building 
of resilience. As already noted, a good example of this was the law firm Sandler O’Neil & Partners, 
which was decimated by the World Trade Center attack in 2001, yet, through the utilisation of its social 
capital and internal resources, survived the loss of almost 40% of its staff and its premises and 
continued to trade.629 The military live case study teams were effective in managing their internal 
capabilities, with individuals trained to have a primary and secondary role, as well as empowered to 
make decisions based on the wider operational intent. In comparison, the industry departments 
struggled with understanding their capabilities, with the strategic planning department suffering from a 
20% turnover rate in staff, presence of a blame culture and a damaging aggressive leadership 
framework, as shown by the responses to the questionnaires. With this evidence, the definition for this 
element is: 
 
This element examines the level of internal resources within the organisation and how they are 
managed. It aims to identify whether the organisation, through its Business Continuity Plans, has 
identified secondary locations and/or alternate arrangements for its critical functions. There is also 
the need to identify key services and assets, such as technology and power, which could lead to 
major issues if these services are disrupted. Within this element the management and 
implementation of effective Business Change Management is also assessed. This element also 
considers financial management and the correct practices, procedures and frameworks that are in 
place to deliver effective financial resource management. It also looks at the level of staff manning, 
the number of critical and non-critical gaps within the organisation, levels of turnover and the 
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management of internal recruitment frameworks. A key element is the level of health and well-being 
support that is also in place for individuals to access. 
 
8.4.5.3 External Resources 
This element of the workstream is focussed on understanding the situation and capabilities of the 
external resources that the organisation can utilise to support it during the management of a disruptive 
event, and the effective understanding of the various requirements needed to enable the organisation 
to engage these external resources. This is more focussed on the organisation being aware of the 
limitations of such external organisations such as the emergency services, insurance organisations, 
local and central government agencies in the time it takes to respond to a disruptive event and to 
mobilise the required resources. This element also takes into consideration the impact of a disruptive 
event on the organisation’s supply chain, and whether there is a clear understanding of the implications 
that this could have on the delivery of effective services for the organisation.  
 
With the military live case studies, the degradation of their supply chain during several of the complex 
events, ranging from lack of spares for vehicles to reduced external support services, resulted in a drop 
in effective performance and a loss of situational awareness. Within the industry Strategic Planning 
department, the actions of the external resources in failing to provide the correct information in the 
correct format resulted in major delay in the production of the timetable. For the industry Operations 
department, the delivery of equipment by a third-party supplier that was untested and faulty resulted in 
major delays within the engineering works around major London stations during the 2014 Christmas 
period, damaging the business’s performance and reputation. 
 
McManus noted in her research that many of the organisations she interviewed had unrealistic 
expectations of the emergency services and local government departments when it came to crisis 
response. 630 She also noted that the successful organisation is the one that understands its place within 
the supply chain and develops its own engagement strategies in the event of a crisis. After the 
September 2001 attacks, Sandler O’Neill & Partners relocated to its secondary locations, operating 
effectively within days afterwards, due to understanding the limitations to damaged IT infrastructure and 
focussing on utilising the social capital of external resources who were seeking to support them through 
their disruption. The testing of secondary locations and understanding the limitations of the external 
resources resulted in an increased situational awareness, limiting the damage to operations.631 
Therefore, the definition of this element is: 
 
This element is identified through the means by which the organisation understands its position 
within the local economy, and the wider supply chain. It examines what external support / aid it 
would expect to receive from Government agencies, 1st responders and security personnel in a 
major disruptive event, and the frameworks in place to initiate and manage this support. This 
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includes frameworks, engagement processes and the relevant communication channels and 
methods an organisation has with the various parties, its supply chain and other key external 
stakeholder groups. 
 
8.4.5.4 Silo Mentality Management 
Research into instances of poor responses to disruptive events regularly identifies organisations that 
fail to work collaboratively, have limited communication and do not utilise information or resources 
effectively. Various reports from the Chartered Management Institute noted the failures of leadership to 
co-ordinate responses, develop effective communications and break down the various silos created 
within the organisation through culture, operating mechanisms or staff issues.632 Spieght remarks on 
the benefits of departments working together to manage the impacts, where risk and corporate security 
teams can pool resources and get a better awareness of the risks facing the business.633 Lindstrom 
posits that organisational silos also damage the ability for an organisation to learn, damaging the flow 
of information between teams, individuals and the organisation.634 
 
The issues around silos and the mentality of their development in organisations are not new. They 
cause a fractured approach to disruptive events and create individualistic responses, rather than a co-
ordinated reaction. McManus notes that organisations that experience rapid growth or decentralised 
operations suffer from the effects of siloed working; within the military case studies there were several 
occasions of teams failing to deliver the required actions due to siloed working and fractured information 
flow. Within the industry departments, the siloed working led to a breakdown in communications when 
developing the timetable or managing the unfolding complex engineering situation. With reference to 
these examples, the definition for this element is: 
 
This element analyses how an organisation performs across its various departments and whether, 
through its communication frameworks, it enables cross organisational working. It looks at how well 
the workforce is engaged with the strategic vision and understand the bigger picture, or if groups 
operate independently of each other. It also identifies whether practices are mutually supporting, or 
if independent operations cause detrimental issues for the organisation through the creation of 
internal conflict and the ensuing reputational damage. 
 
Stephenson remarks that silo mentality is a social phenomenon that can affect individuals, communities 
and business units, brought on by individualistic traits, geographical proximity or by thought 
processes.635 Silo mentality can also be driven by the organisational culture, which drives certain 
behaviours. The first step towards being able to limit the impact of silo mentality is being aware that it 
exists and understanding the drivers that creates such a mentality. The evidence from both the military 
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and industry case studies was that several situations caused by the silo mentality were driven by 
individuals placing their requirements above those of the organisation. Stephenson described silo 
mentality as: 
 
“Cultural and behavioural barriers which can be divisive within and between organisations which 
are most often manifested as communication barriers creating disjointed, disconnected and 
detrimental ways of working.”636 
 
8.4.5.5 Corporate Social Responsibility 
In the 21st century, the way that an organisation behaves is becoming as important as the services or 
products that it delivers. With the increased pressure on the environment, socially acceptable working 
conditions for staff, minimum wage payments and carbon neutral working practices, companies are now 
subject to the need to consider their impact on the biosphere and their local natural and social 
environments. The UN treaties of Hyogo and Sendai identify the requirement for organisations and 
governments to take responsibility for the development of ethical working practices that also focus on 
reducing the impact to the environment.637 
 
Recent disasters that have impacted on the environment on a global scale, such as the BP Deepwater 
Horizon event in 2010, which saw the sinking of an oil rig and a 1100 mile oil slick decimate the wildlife, 
and placed approximately 12000 individuals in temporary unemployment by restrictions put in place 
following the spill. The company was fined $44.5bn and banned from bidding for any federal contracts 
until mid-2014. Reputationally the damage for the company was global. 
 
For the industry and military case studies, there was a level of focus on the approach taken to develop 
a better corporate image within their operation roles. For the military, operating in a complex disruptive 
situation, managing the various active threats and simultaneously seeking to obtain the trust of the 
population requires consideration for the public image. Often regarded as “Hearts and Minds”, the UK 
military has spent a significant period of time and effort in developing, through strategies such as the 
Comprehensive Approach, which has been discussed previously, to build a more positive approach to 
engaging with populations, being more aware of their social responsibility to minimise damage and 
casualties within the campaign areas. For the industry case studies, the organisation has invested 
heavily in becoming more aware of its public image, utilising the Social Capacity of its workforce, 
through volunteer leave activities, to build its corporate social responsibility and public image. Using 
regular engagement with public and industry forums, the industry departments increased their efforts 
to build the engagement with the wider social communities it affected, aiming to build a positive 
relationship between the organisation, the workforce and the local communities and stakeholders it 









This element looks at the external image of the organisation and how well it engages with the local 
community in order to build a sustainable framework. It analyses the level of community events, 
research sharing, and the support given to local initiatives through either financial or staff support. 
Examples, such as volunteer days, support to local re-growth events or the use of staff to provide 
volunteer support to charities and local economy activities are captured within this measure. It seeks 
to identify whether these events provide a positive impact to the organisational image. This is key 
because, in the event of a disruptive event, it may enable the organisation to recall the goodwill and 
support through the short-term mobilisation of human capital to help stabilise the situation. 
 
While both the military and industry case study organisations have placed significant effort into building 
better corporate social responsibility footprints, there is still a lot of work to be done. The recent 
observations from the Afghanistan, Syria and Libya campaigns, plus the drop in recruitment, which has 
resulted in the Army, for example, being under-staffed by 10,000 personnel, have shown that there is a 
disconnect between the military and society. For the industry departments, the responses from the 
questionnaires, plus several government reports, indicates that the approach is still flawed and is 
impacting on the reputation of the organisation. 
 
8.4.6 Organisational Development 
This tactical workstream focusses on the key elements that support the long-term sustainability and 
growth of the organisation. Rather than focussing on the core processes as the other four have, this 
workstream is more people and development centric. Therefore, within this workstream the ORM3 
framework analyses how the organisation empowers and engages with its internal workforce to build 
and promote the required culture, how it recruits, develops and retains the key experience and skill sets 
within the workforce, enabling sustainment of knowledge and technical capability. It also studies the 
communications and frameworks that exist, allowing the organisation to improve the flow of critical 
information and data across various teams. The last two elements focus on the ability to develop and 
maintain a continuous improvement approach, which is closely linked to organisational learning, and 
how organisational learning is used to support the research and innovation activities that are present 
within the organisation, thus allowing it to adapt and learn from its environment. 
 
8.4.6.1 Staff Engagement and Involvement 
This element focusses on how well the organisation engages with its staff and engages them within the 
various processes and decision-making activities. This is important, as the more involved the staff feel 
with the organisation and the situation, the more they are willing to find a way to respond and adapt to 
the situation and go beyond their normal day requirements. The ability for staff to feel empowered and 
supported to act is key to developing a positive culture within the organisation. This element is heavily 
influenced by the organisational culture. 
 
The feedback from the industry departments through the questionnaires indicated a level of frustration 
with the leadership group, with the staff feeling isolated and poorly informed of key decisions or changes 





process. It was also noted that within several of the projects that were being delivered in the planning 
department, there was a level of frustration within the staff that they were not being listened to by the 
leadership team. 
 
Within the military case studies, there was a focus on ensuring that the military team leaders were 
heavily involved in the planning and delivery processes. The headquarters planning team would 
regularly seek to engage with those that they saw as the “technical specialists” for advice on certain 
issues. This is embedded in the `Mission Command’ approach that is itself embedded within the military 
mentality. Teams are also properly briefed on the disruptive event and the commander’s intent, which 
enables them to understand the bigger picture. The plan is then war-gamed and walked through, 
enabling the commander to confirm the staff understand the plan, while also presenting the staff 
opportunity to discuss potential risks and issues that they may observe. 
 
McManus does not identify this as a key resilience indicator, though the loss of staff engagement can 
lead to personnel leaving the organisation, increasing the risk that the organisation loses key skills and 
capabilities. She does, however, note within several other elements of her model the importance of staff 
engagement and empowerment. Stephenson did identify that this was a resilience indicator and 
captured it as a key factor. She noted that in high resilience organisations, staff are empowered and 
flexible in their response to disruption, and described it as: 
 
“The engagement and involvement of staff so that they are responsible, accountable and occupied 
with developing the organisation’s resilience through their work because they understand the links 
between the organisation’s resilience and its long-term success.”638 
 
Based on the knowledge obtained from the case studies and questionnaires, as well as the evidence 
from reviewing McManus and Stephenson’s work, the definition for this element is: 
 
This element analyses the level of staff engagement across the organisation, and what mechanisms 
are in place to capture staff feedback. It also analyses how often staff are consulted and involved 
in key decision-making events and the development of staff focussed events, such as corporate 
and department information and update days. Within this area is the level of engagement with Union 
representatives, working approaches with Unions and the internal consultation processes to 
maintain effective working practices. During disruptive events, this also incorporates how the 
organisation manages the emergency communications and manages the involvement of key staff 
members to maintain critical capability. 
 
8.4.6.2 Communications and Relationships 
In his work Turner notes the importance of effective communication and working relationships when 
managing the required resources allocated to disruptive events. Depending on whether the situation 
 





shrinks or increases, the resources can be moved through effective communications across the 
organisation. He notes that one of the major causal factors that was involved with the initiation of the 
observed disasters was the failure of communication and a working relationship between various teams 
within the organisations. His review of the British Rail disaster at Hixon focussed on the failure of 
communications between multiple individuals within the organisation.639 This is a familiar situation, with 
several recent accident investigation reports also referring to poor communications between railway 
staff. Poor communications were also one of the causal factors for the timetabling crisis and the 
engineering overrun situations experienced by the industry departments.  
 
The failure to manage this element was also reflected in the G4S security crisis for the delivery of staff 
for the London 2012 Olympic games. The report into the G4S failure notes that there was a failure of 
communication across the various elements of the project teams, with the whole project not being 
properly managed or risks being communicated effectively. There was also a failure within the approach 
to communicate early and effectively with potential recruits, which resulted in the failure to recruit the 
numbers required for the task.640  
 
For the military case study organisation, the importance of communications and relationships was key 
for the delivery of mission success. The flow of information over communication frameworks was vital 
to maintaining situational awareness and organisational capability, as well as enabling cross-
organisational working with other organisations as part of the Comprehensive Approach. The more 
effective the communication frameworks and the flow of information, the stronger the relationship 
between the various operational groups. Fink notes that during crises, organisations often fail to 
communicate effectively, allowing the situation to deteriorate further, or incorrect decisions to be made 
in the information gap that exists.641 
 
Evidence from the military and industry case studies through the observation reports for the military 
organisation, or from the questionnaires from the industry departments, both raised concerns over the 
level of communication during disruptive situations. It was remarked that the reduction in clear 
communication impacted on the effective performance of the organisation. Stephenson noted in her 
research that effective communication and strong team relationships assisted in the development of 
situational awareness, while McManus noted that there was a clear link between effective 
communication pathways, respectful relationship building and the ability to acquire, retain and share 
critical information during times of disruption.642 Without effective communication frameworks, the 
organisations she analysed struggled to develop effective information flow during a crisis. With these 
findings, the definition adapted for this element is: 
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This element explores the various internal and external communication frameworks that are in 
place. Linking with the resource and the staff engagement elements, it studies the effectiveness 
and management of the various communications processes. It focuses on how well the key internal 
structures are informed around organisation issues. It also looks at how well and how regularly the 
external organisations within the supply chain, as well as key stakeholders, are engaged to maintain 
situational awareness. This is key to developing business intelligence networks and human capital. 
 
8.4.6.3 Research, Innovation and Creativity 
Creativity has always been at the heart of human endeavour to expand, develop and find ways to 
improve the current situation, and has been recognised to be critical to organisational development, 
performance improvement and long-term survival.643 As organisations seek to develop the social 
capacity of their workforce to grow the level of internal innovation and creativity, which can help 
generate individual research projects and programmes, it has become a source of competitive market 
advantage. The ability to innovate, through creative thinking and activities, is a key element to allowing 
organisations to quickly adapt and maintain an advantage over their competitors, or the events that are 
unfolding around them. 
 
The military involved in the live case studies were forced to innovate and be creative in order to respond 
to a threat that was regularly adapting their approach to maintain an enhanced level of combat 
effectiveness, seeking to maintain the advantage over the case study threat scenario and the resulting 
hostile activities. The enemy was not more technologically advanced rather conversely it was able to 
change rapidly with its operating procedures, tactics and engagement methodologies, preventing the 
military organisation from having a stable operating environment. The challenge faced by the military 
organisation is that innovation is not realised instantaneously. Staff need the supporting frameworks 
and culture to be allowed to try and test ideas and concepts without the fear of recrimination if the 
initiative fails. Most organisational management staff make the error of trying to manage the process, 
rather than managing the frameworks that support the process.  
 
For an organisation to develop a successful approach to innovation there are several components that 
need to be in place for it to develop a successful innovation system. These can include systems thinking, 
decentralised teams, knowledge frameworks and the correct level of resourcing, supported through an 
organisational culture that supports creativity and innovation.644 There are also mechanisms that can 
be put in place to minimise silo thinking and groupthink. To obtain the best from innovative teams 
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In the military, this process is linked into the various pre-deployment exercise activities that it conducts, 
allowing it to test and adjust certain concepts, ideas, processes and procedures in the relative safety of 
the virtual or training environment. This allows a level of growth and exploration within the organisational 
staff, providing aspects of a learning organisation. Feedback from the industry department question-
naires demonstrated that there was a level of creativity within the operational department staff that 
enabled them to address disruptive events on the railway, though there is a limited level of support 
within the organisation due to the restrictive risk averse and safety heavy culture. Within the planning 
department, the questionnaires demonstrated a very rigid, top down organisation that was heavily 
managed with little room for the teams to apply any innovation and creativity. Even the “innovation” 
team was directed to adhere to processes and procedures, restricting the level of actual creativity or 
innovation that could be conducted. 
 
McManus did not consider this element as a key resilience factor and therefore did not investigate the 
impact that this may have on an organisation.645 Stephenson did identify this as a potential resilience 
element, and in her research identified it as a key component of an organisation being able to adapt to 
a disruptive situation and described this element as being critical to the generation of new ideas during 
crises or emergencies.646 For the purpose of this framework, this element is described as: 
 
This element studies the degree to which research, innovation and creativity are encouraged and 
actively supported across the organisation at all levels, rather than held within siloed areas of the 
organisation. The generation of new ideas and "thinking outside the box" for the management of 
complex disruptive events is key to maintaining a flexible approach to the operational requirements 
of an organisation during disruptive events. A reliance on siloed working will limit the effectiveness 
of innovation and creativity within the organisation. Within this area is the management of user 
groups, dynamic innovation and the interaction between the R&D department, user innovators, legal 
department and the operations delivery teams. 
 
8.4.6.4 Continuous Improvement Frameworks 
This element analyses the ability of the organisation to identify lessons and conduct learning at the 
operational and strategic levels, improving the capability of the organisation to react, adapt and protect 
itself from disruptive events. Neither McManus nor Stephenson captured this as an independent 
resilience element within their studies, though they did note the importance of organisations being able 
to identify and address vulnerabilities. 
 
Continuous improvement frameworks, such as lessons identified, learned and applied, are key to the 
development of an organisation. Linked closely to research, innovation, intelligence and knowledge 
collection mechanisms, this element provides the business with a Learning Organisation approach, 
learning either from its own experiences, or from observing the experiences of others. The military live 
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case studies identified the importance of the lessons identified and applied approach. Both the military 
organisations that carried out the exercises demonstrated a noticeable improvement in their resilience 
profile after conducting an After-Action Review from the first case study activity, identifying areas where 
improvement was required and making the requisite adjustments. This provided a better functioning 
organisation for the second series of activities. 
 
Work by Paul Matthews into how organisations learn highlights the importance of conducting lessons 
identified activities, which in turn will assist with the creation of learning transfer actions across the 
organisation.647 He noted that many organisations focus more on the development of training activities 
intent on delivering knowledge obtained from the lessons review process, rather than facilitating the 
action of knowledge transfer. It is the knowledge transfer that delivers the impact, yet he remarks that 
few consider this. The issue is that the component of the organisation that is responsible for knowledge 
transfer is also responsible for developing training; therefore, it focuses on developing the material, 
rather than managing the transfer of knowledge, which is where the actual improvement will occur. 
 
The importance of learning lessons and building a continuous improvement framework to link into the 
development of a resilience culture should not be under-estimated, yet, as shown by the work of 
McManus and Stephenson, few identify the importance of this element to the developing and sustaining 
of a resilience culture. This element ties in with the work of Argryis in developing cultural, or double 
loop, learning, which seeks to address the root cause of the issue, rather than treating the surface 
symptoms, while Lukic et al note that the organisation needs to have the correct culture in place to 
promote and sustain effective learning across the various teams.648 They also propose that the focus 
of the learning should not just be on the organisational responses and the staff, but also understanding 
the causes and lifecycle of the disruptive event. This would identify whether there were trigger signs, or 
if it was a complex event that could not be anticipated, in which case the focus is on how the situation 
was managed. With these observations, this element is described as: 
 
This element looks at the effectiveness of the organisation to learn lessons from previous events, 
or from similar events within the sector. By learning from previous events, or from others, the 
organisation builds a culture of continuous improvement through learning. This also creates an 
environment where learning is part of the organisational framework, where staff are trusted to learn 
from mistakes and are unafraid to report incidents or errors for fear of recrimination Also observed 
is at what level is post event learning, such as a project or programme review, integrated into the 
framework, and where lessons observed are reviewed and applied to similar projects and 
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8.4.6.5 Staff Talent and Succession Planning Frameworks 
A key element of building and maintaining resilience within an organisation is the investment in staff 
development, building the talent management and succession framework. This is particularly important 
when managing a complex situation where there is no time for information to move up and down the 
chain of command for decisions to be made. Within HROs, the direction is that the individual who has 
the most experience and knowledge takes the lead in a situation, advising the leadership element of 
the complexities of the situation. A similar approach is taken within the emergency services and the 
military, where technical advisors will take priority in providing the guidance and direction to the 
leadership group, with the Ammunition Technical Officer (military) or the Chemical Advisory Team 
(emergency services) being examples where, though they may be outranked by the leadership group, 
they have primacy in certain complex situations. 
 
Within the military and emergency services there is a high level of redundancy in the staff capability 
held within the organisations. Individuals are trained in their own role and the role of the individual above 
them. For the military live case studies, one of the exercise serials was the removal of the leadership 
team part way through the event, forcing the junior managers to step up and into the command level 
roles. This effect then rippled throughout the organisation, with the organisational structure having to 
adapt, with many individuals within the headquarters and frontline teams having to adjust to operating 
at the level above. This approach is regularly conducted in military training as well, using the need to 
operate at one level above their role as a means to develop adaptive thinking and being comfortable 
with change, as the situation may regularly present itself on combat operations. By building an 
empowered workforce, the military organisation, through its `Mission Command’ ethos, embeds 
flexibility within its individuals, simultaneously providing a level of operational agility. 
 
This was not the case with the industry departments. Feedback from the questionnaires, as previously 
discussed in Chapter 7, demonstrated an organisation that was not investing in the development of staff 
as much as it should. The feedback identified an inefficient senior leadership framework, an aggressive 
approach to management, and an overarching presence of a blame culture being experienced at the 
lower levels of the organisation. This situation can be detrimental to the performance of the organisation, 
damaging the psychological contract between the management team and the employee.  
 
This lack of investment in staff is clearly seen when it comes to developing leadership and management 
capability. Using the middle management role as a prime example, for the industry departments this is 
a Band 2 individual, for the military this is the rank of Major. For the military, on promotion to Major, 
every individual will attend an 8-month residential management development programme, investigating 
areas such as project management, operational planning, crisis management and team development. 
For the industry individual, their development programme also occurs over an 8-month period, but only 
consists of a total of 12 days of actual education and professional development. This difference in the 
approach to leadership development and critical problem solving and management of complex 





apparent. The military approach is something close to the learning culture advocated in a Learning 
Organisation, placing approximately 400 individuals through the programme annually. The industry 
approach is quite inefficient, providing a limited level of investment into 40 individuals annually, relying 
on the individual to do most of their development and learning while “on the job”. 
 
Neither McManus nor Stephenson identified this element as a stand-alone resilience indicator, though 
they did capture it in various observations within their identified resilience factors. The various research 
streams conducted during this thesis identified the importance of staff development and investment, 
with effectively trained staff providing an organisation with a level of agility during a disruptive event. 
Observations during the military live case studies demonstrated the importance of having a level of 
operational redundancy when faced with a complex situation. Being able to rely on the lower 
management tier to take critical decisions without hesitation as they understand the organisational intent 
was critical in preventing the situation deteriorating further. With this evidence, this element is described 
as: 
 
This element analyses the level of staff training, education and development that the organisation 
invests to build and manage its internal staff talent. It studies the level of succession planning and 
whether junior members are taught, informed and encouraged to do their line manager's role. This 
focuses on whether the organisation can effectively function if the "second eleven" were required 
to manage the organisation in the wake of a major disruptive event. It also analyses the level of 
corporate knowledge that is retained, and what processes are in place to prevent critical information 
loss on the departure of an employee. 
 
8.5 THE ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE MATURITY MODEL ELEMENTAL 
STRUCTURE 
Having analysed the various elements within the ORM3 framework, pulled from the review of the factors 
identified in Table 21, the next step was to develop the framework, providing a mechanism that business 
could utilise to assist them in assessing and developing their approach to building and sustaining 
organisational resilience. The following sub-sections will discuss the development of the framework and 
the various components within it that, collectively, deliver the ORM3 framework, providing the 
mechanisms for organisations to assess their Organisational Resilience capability. 
 
8.5.1 The Initial framework 
The research findings from across both industry and the military that are discussed in previous chapters, 
clearly articulated that there was a requirement to develop a framework to assist in the development 
and monitoring of resilience within organisations. The ORM3 tool was aligned to having 5 tactical 
streams, with an over-arching strategic theme. The supporting framework was built from the twenty-
eight components identified above, derived from the list in Table 21. Rather than considering these as 
independent factors, the matrix was designed to also reflect the system of systems approach, identifying 





organisations to map their tactical activities against the British Standard BS65000: Organisational 
Resilience, thereby conforming to the guidelines laid down within the UK standard. The Organisational 
Resilience Measurement Maturity Matrix (ORM3) framework is shown in pictorial form in Table 22. 
 
 
Table 22: Organisational Resilience Measurement Maturity Matrix  framework. Source: Author 
 
The ORM3 framework pulls together the factors that both McManus and Stephenson identified within 
their frameworks, but also highlights that there are gaps within the current understanding of resilience. 
Denyer’s academic review of organisational resilience identified that organisational resilience was “the 
ability of an organisation to anticipate, prepare for, respond and adapt to incremental change and 
sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper.” 649 This is the same definition used in BS65000. 
While the definition focuses on the ability of the organisation, it does not highlight the importance of 
investment into staff capability, training and competence management, or the importance of managing 
change and disruptions. It also fails to consider mechanisms to support effective Change Management. 
Based on the research findings, the next section discusses in detail the various elements of the ORM3 
framework.  
 
8.5.2 Defining the Elemental Components 
Having defined the elements and workstreams of the ORM3 framework, the final step was to develop 
the various components of each element, which would assist in providing the ability to assess the 
element using three individual components. The intent was to enable an individual to score the element 
against the three components. The approaches taken by McManus and Stephenson was to give each 
of their elements a score, based on questions asked during an interview with the leadership team of the 
organisation. The approach to be used for the ORM3 framework was different. The intent is to provide 
a simple tool interface that members of the organisation would complete, scoring each element using 
the three components discussed below. This approach would provide a greater level of detail, based 
 
649Denyer D., Organizational Resilience: A Summary Of Academic Evidence, Business Insights And New Thinking, BSI and 
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on the observations of the organisational staff, allowing a cross-organisational observation on how the 
staff are experiencing the various resilience elements. Each element obtains three independent scores 
for the activity being witnessed, the behaviours being observed, and the quality of the evidence being 
captured and circulated to demonstrate that the activity was being conducted at the appropriate level.  
  
8.5.2.1 Activity 
This component focusses on the 
type of activity that the 
organisation should be conducting, 
based on the level within the 
maturity model. Each element has 
six levels of activity within the 
maturity framework, ranging from 
non-existent up to the organisation 
being regarded as an industry 
leader and delivering best practice, 
with others seeking to replicate the 
practices and processes that they 
are conducting. Within the tool, individuals are tasked to give each element an activity score, based on 
what they have observed within the organisation and align it against the narrative that best suits their 
observations (Figure 80). This will then provide an element activity score and a narrative detailing what 
is being observed. 
 
8.5.2.2 Behaviour 
This component was focussed on the type of behaviours that the individual is observing within the 
organisation as it is delivering the activity required within the respective element. It sets out what 
behaviours the organisation should be conducting, based on the level within the maturity model. As with 
the Activity measure, each element has six levels of behavioural activity within the maturity framework, 
ranging from non-existent up to the organisation being regarded as an industry leader and delivering 
best practice, with others seeking to replicate the behaviours that the organisation is demonstrating. 
Within the tool, individuals are tasked to give each element a behavioural score, independent of the 
activity score, based on what they have observed within the organisation and align it against the 
narrative that best suits their observations. This will then provide an element behavioural score and a 
narrative detailing what is being observed. 
 
8.5.2.3 Evidence 
This component describes how the organisation is reporting and demonstrating the quality of the activity 
it is undertaking, and the behaviours that it is demonstrating, through the evidence that it is capturing. 
As part of the resilience element score, if the evidence is not present on whether the activity is being 
done effectively and in an ethical manner, then the quality of the delivery of the actual resilience element 
is brought into question. As with the Activity and Behaviour measures, each element has six levels of 





expected evidence frameworks and documents that should be in place within the organisation entered 
into the maturity framework, ranging from non-existent up to the organisation being regarded as an 
industry leader and delivering best practice through effective reporting, governance and assurance. 
Within the tool, individuals are tasked to give each element an evidence score, independent of the 
activity and behaviour scores, based on what they have observed within the organisation and align it 
against the narrative that best suits their observations. This will then provide an element evidence score 
and a narrative detailing what is being observed. 
 
8.5.2.4 Resilience Element Value and Efficiency Score 
Once the three scores have been captured from the individual analysis, the tool creates a resilience 
element score and an element efficiency score. The element score provides a value that can be used 
to benchmark the element, as reported on by the organisational staff. The efficiency score is used to 
assess how effective the organisation is delivering the resilience element. It takes into consideration 
the score given for the activity, then factors in the quality of the behaviours being observed and the level 
of evidence being used to demonstrate how the activity is being delivered.  
 
The individual resilience value for each element is obtained using the formula in equation 1:  
(An+Bn+En) / 3 = Rvn   (Equation 1) 
  
Where A is the activity score, B is the Behaviour score, E is the Evidence score; and RV is the Resilience Value, 
with “n” being the number of participants in the questionnaire. 
 
For example, if three participants had responded, this would generate three independent scores for each element 
within the ORM3 framework, as shown below: 
 
Participant 1 would generate value: (A1+B1+E1) / 3 = Rv1 
Participant 2 would generate value: (A2+B2+E2) / 3 = Rv2 
Participant 3 would generate value: (A3+B3+E3) / 3 = Rv3 
 
To obtain an Organisational Resilience value for each element, based on participant input, then the 
resilience value for that element is calculated using the following equation: 
(Rv1 + Rv2 + Rv3… + Rvn) / n = Rvorg (Equation 2) 
  
Where RVorg is the organisational aggregate score for that element.   
 
The element efficiency score for each element is obtained using the formula:  
((Bn/An) + (En/An)) x 0.5 = Ren  (Equation 3) 
 






To obtain an Organisational Resilience efficiency value for each element, based on the feedback from 
the various members of the organisation, then the resilience efficiency value for that element is 
calculated through the following equation: 
(Re1 + Re2 + Re3… + Ren) / n = Reorg (Equation 4) 
 
Where Reorg is the Organisational Resilience efficiency aggregate score. 
 
By utilising these formulae, the ORM3 framework can present each element in terms of its resilience 
value and its resilience efficiency score. The tool can be used to review how each individual staff 
member graded each element, or it can deliver an organisational value for each element. This flexibility 
affords the leadership team the ability to drill down into the organisation to identify where areas may be 
experiencing resilience element issues, allowing for upstream engagement before the situation 
becomes disruptive to the organisation. 
 
8.6 THE COMPLETE ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE MATURITY MODEL 
FRAMEWORK 
The organisation would identify various members of the structure to complete the scoring questionnaire, 
providing independent scores from each individual, which would give an organisational average score 
for that element. This approach would be taken for the 28 separate elements, which would result in the 
creation of an average score for each element, decided by the various individuals chosen by the 
organisation. This would provide the initial benchmark score for the organisation, as shown below. 
Individuals score the element components on a sliding scale from 0 to 5, which is aligned against a 
source maturity framework. The table starts with the score being based at a value of “3”, and a narrative 
that corresponds with that value, with the individual reviewing the provided narrative and deciding 
whether their organisation is at a higher or lower level to that described within the narrative box, and 
amend the score accordingly. 
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The framework (Figure 81) has been developed through the analysis of several maturity frameworks, 
discussions with various industry leads and the results of the five research workstreams. This has 
provided a very detailed framework that has been developed to provide a total of 504 potential values 
that can be entered into the framework. This framework is developed to then provide each scored 
element with a rating, based upon the three scores, and an efficiency score, providing an individual 
score for that element based on the moment of scoring. The tool is designed to collect the various 
scores from all individuals involved in the scoring of the organisation and produces an overall element 
score based on their feedback. Once all the scores are collated and processed, the tool will then 
produce an overview of the current situation within the organisation, based on the score and the 
efficiency rating that each element has received, as shown previously in Figure 80. The tool is designed 
such that if no value has been calculated, the field will remain yellow. Once a value is collected it will 
change colour.  
 
The tool also produces a dashboard (Figure 82), based on the values collected, benchmarking where 
the organisation is at the moment of assessment, providing a clear understanding of how the employees 
see the organisation. This provides a visual representation of the organisation’s resilience profile, 
analysing the overall organisational profile, and each of the six workstreams, based upon the values 
obtained during the initial assessment completed by the staff. By putting these various reporting tools 
in place, the senior leadership team of an organisation can quickly observe how the workforce is 
picturing the organisational resilience capability of the organisation. As the assessment delivers a 
holistic view of the organisation, it can provide a clear picture of where the staff see the strong and weak 










Chapter 4 has developed the business case for building a culture of resilience within an organisation, 
while Chapter 7 detailed the key areas into which investment would need to be channelled to build and 
sustain Organisational Resilience. This chapter has taken those key areas and developed the approach 
and components required to create a framework to measure the level of an organisation’s resilience. 
The ORM3 framework has utilised the lessons learnt from the detailed analysis of the case studies of 
the military and Industry organisations, as well as the outcomes of the military live case studies 
conducted as part of the research framework. By understanding the concepts of both McManus’ and 
Stephenson’s frameworks, the researcher has been able to apply the research findings to the previous 
work conducted within the Organisational Resilience domain.  
 
Review of Stephenson's and McManus' templates highlighted gaps in their models at the strategic level. 
The ORM3 framework addresses this through the three strategic core components which provide the 
strong central strand around which the five business functional domains are wrapped. Using the 
research into both the military and the rail industry, the research highlighted the benefits and impact of 
developing the components of resilience within the organisation. The research also highlighted that 
resilience is a holistic outcome of developing the various strands, with the components mutually 
supporting other elements within the framework. The presence of a strong guiding principle or vision 
statement, supported through cultural frameworks and organisational leadership, is critical for 
developing a core resilience within the organisation.  
 
As both the military and rail industry have experienced, poor leadership and a lack of a long-term vision 
can impact on the capability for the organisation to effectively plan and deliver a positive return on 
investment. For the military, this moment was the strategic failure of the Iraq campaign; for the rail 
industry it was the strategic impact to the UK economy caused by the failure of the May 2018 timetable 
roll out, with the surveyed staff indicating that the industry was failing to work in a cohesive manner. 
Both events tarnished the reputation of the respective organisations, leading to multiple reviews and 
soul-searching into the issues that had occurred. 
 
Linked to systems thinking, and effective governance frameworks the right configuration of the 
organisational structures also impacts on how the organisation maintains its capability. The military on 
operations is a set of many smaller systems working together to deliver the task. The system of systems 
approach provides a level of flexibility and redundancy across the organisation, enabling it to respond 
and morph quickly to face a disruptive event. Flexible structures and a networked framework also 
provide this resilience capability, enabling information and intelligence to rapidly travel across and 
through the network. These frameworks are supported through a set of strategic guidance documents, 
such as doctrinal publications, which provides a single form of operational practice to the organisation, 






The importance of developing staff capability is an area into which the military allocate a substantial 
amount of financial support and resource. The level of investment develops the capability of the 
individual as well as the team. At the operational level the detailed lessons learnt approach develops 
concepts, doctrine, training and operational insights to improve how the organisation operates, while at 
the tactical level this is reproduced through the war-gaming and course of action reviews, allowing the 
command staff to review and amend, or cancel, combat activities. This level of insight and preparation 
allows individuals and teams to identify potential threats and issues and adjust accordingly. This 
process is supported by detailed information gathering and analysis, along with an embedded 
organisational learning framework.  
 
This level of investment was not as evident within the observed industry case study organisations. While 
the Operations department has a training governance framework in place, as well as a strategic lead 
for training governance and assurance, the Strategic Planning department had no such structure. The 
review identified a lack of a formally detailed learning needs analysis tool, with training being developed 
based on what experienced individuals thought was required. Within the Operations department there 
was the understanding of the benefits of Joint working, either with internal elements or external 
agencies. Within the Strategic Planning department there was a more siloed approach. Both functions 
highlighted the need for better personnel development, with the Strategic Planning department clearly 
suffering from managerial, specialist knowledge and under-manned team issues.  
 
The ORM3 framework has shown the importance of applying a holistic approach to resilience building, 
with the strategic components being fundamental to the success of the venture. Organisational 
Resilience requires a level of maturity and understanding of the key business functions and an 
acceptance that the organisation will never be totally resilient; there might always be an event which 
could destabilise the organisation. While technology, frameworks and doctrine provide the enabling 
components, the critical element is the people within the business. These individuals provide the agility 
and determination to continue functioning when in the midst of a disruptive event. This is as true on the 













This research used a study of the military on operations to identify lessons in Organisational Resilience 
that can be applied to UK industry. Set against this was a study of the GB rail industry to identify current 
resilience challenges and determine methods to build and improve it. Due to the size of the rail industry, 
the study focussed on the infrastructure manager, restricting the research gathering to the two key 
functions of operational incident management and strategic planning. This chapter provides an 
overview summary of this research, its findings and discussions of potential further work that could be 
conducted to build on this research. The research findings are presented in relation to the aim, 
objectives and research questions that were stated at the beginning of the thesis. 
 
9.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The definition created for Organisational Resilience within this document was derived from a detailed 
review of the military on operations, as well as the analysis of certain issues within the wider GB rail 
industry. It has been created through implementation of the five-tiered research gathering methodology 
that is discussed in Chapter 3. Information was gathered through questionnaires, interviews, case 
studies and live observations of complex events. Using the acquired information, it was postulated that 
organisational resilience is a people focussed capability based on strategic co-ordination of business 
functions. 
 
The thesis aim was the development of the ORM3 framework to unite various operational functions 
within the business, creating an internal resilience culture, developed from capability and the 
understanding of potential threats and crises, which can be implemented through strategic leadership. 
The need for the ORM3 framework is analysed in Chapter 4, and the development of the ORM 3 frame-
work is discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 8, through identifying how the military developed 
Organisational Resilience on operations and what lessons could be applied to the rail industry. To 
achieve this aim, the following objectives were developed: 
 
▪ Conduct a review of the current literature in the organisational resilience sphere to identify key 
ideas and concepts; 
 
▪ Conduct a case study review of military operations to identify lessons that can be applied to the 
rail industry; 
 
▪ Conduct the development and implementation of a live case study model to observe military 
personnel in complex dynamically changing environments to understand how they develop and 






▪ Conduct a review of a key element of the rail industry to identify the current resilience 
challenges and what lessons need to be applied; and 
 
▪ Using recognised Organisational Resilience tools, develop these lessons into activities that can 
be applied to the rail industry to develop organisational resilience capability. 
 
The research question determined included the following areas for investigation: 
 
▪ A review of the current literature on Organisational Resilience; 
 
▪ A review of the current resilience situation in the GB railway industry; 
 
▪ A review of the UK military operational practices and procedures and how the military builds 
resilience on operations; and 
 
▪ Case study analysis of the UK military on operations. 
 
The starting point for the thesis was to determine and define a clear understanding of what was meant 
by Organisational Resilience and to establish a clear baseline from which to conduct this research. 
Previous work conducted through national and international organisations was reviewed to assist in this 
element of the thesis, which is covered in detail in Chapter 2. The analysis of recent data highlighted 
that the term resilience is used across numerous disciplines which can range from engineering to the 
social sciences. This provided the challenge to clearly define the focus of the research and the meaning 
of the term for this research. Further investigative work into the subject identified that the subject area 
had minimal academic scrutiny within the UK, with most of the published work reviewed in Chapter 2 
being developed by practitioners or organisations. It was also noted that most of the material was 
focussed on a business continuity framework, rather than Organisational Resilience, a position that was 
determined as being symptomatic of the current situation within the UK, with organisations mistaking 
business continuity as resilience. 
 
As part of the research journey, this thesis reviewed the frameworks created by McManus and 
Stephenson to help define the key areas of Organisational Resilience. McManus’ model was used to 
assess the military during the planning and implementation phases of a live exercise to identify whether 
her model provided an accurate framework to apply to organisations to develop their Organisational 
Resilience. Based on this analysis, ORM3 was developed, which was used to identify lessons from the 
military that could be adapted and applied to the rail industry. This created a framework based on six 
domains which can be used to assess the quality of the organisation through an assessment of the 
relevant resilience criteria that are located within each domain. The ORM3 model brings together the 





space and placing at its core critical activities observed when analysing the military on operations. 
Unlike Stephenson’s model, which states there are two dimensions to Organisational Resilience, 
research into the military campaign planning methodology identified that there existed a strategic core 
and several tactical domains that collectively deliver organisational resilience capability. The importance 
of culture and an adaptive leadership framework aligned to the vision for the organisation was clear in 
delivering a successful framework. 
 
Using the Stephenson and McManus models as a base layer for reviewing how organisations develop 
Organisational Resilience enabled a comparison of the military operational planning process against 
one of the models. Subsequently, several alterations were made to the McManus model, which was 
used as this was the original concept. This adaptation of the model and the observation of the military 
live case studies resulted in the identification of 28 key resilience factors which were positioned within 
the six domains, as opposed to the 3 domains present in the McManus model, or the 4 domains present 
in the Stephenson model.  
 
9.3 ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
As stated in Chapter 1, the key objective of this study, was the identification of key lessons that the rail 
industry can learn from the military on operations and the creation of an Organisational Resilience 
model through which to apply these lessons. To enable success in answering of this question, there 
were seven hypotheses that required investigation to answer the research question: 
 
▪ H1: Within a dynamically changing situation within limited situational knowledge, the military 
develops its resilience capability through the application of an adaptive planning and the re-
shaping of its organisational culture. 
 
▪ H2: Within a hostile environment, the military has developed the capability to successfully plan, 
respond and recover from a disruptive event through effective preparation, education and 
training of its personnel. 
 
▪ H3: In order to successfully manage a complex, dynamically changing problem, the military 
develops and maintains an effective multi-agency approach, employing a systems-thinking 
approach. 
 
▪ H4: To remain effective when managing the response to a disruptive event, the military develops 
and maintains a shared organisational ethos and culture across all the departments.  
 
▪ H5: To support the implementation of tactical operations, the military develops and maintains a 






▪ H6: Organisations without a clear understanding of resilience and the supporting activities fail 
to improve their resilience levels after reviewing previous events and impacts. 
 
▪ H7: The GB rail industry, through a lack of clear understanding of the importance of 
Organisational Resilience and the supporting activities, delivers a limited level of capability and 
performance. 
 
In response to H1, the military planning process has been developed to provide an agile planning 
capability, allowing staff to rapidly amend plans as a situation changes or develops, building resilience 
into the process through flexibility. This provides a level of embedded Change Management capability 
and review focus across the team to ensure that the final plan is suited to the task at hand. Regular 
updating of intelligence and analysis, supported through the red-teaming and war-gaming steps allows 
the plan to be aggressively assessed against an intelligent, dynamic opponent. 
 
In answering H2 the research has shown that the military have adapted and developed planning 
processes to include intelligence gathering and analysis activities to build situational awareness to 
better understand the environment, risks and potential outcomes. This allows it to build the required 
force structure, through the application of systems thinking, to equip deploying organisations with the 
required skill sets and specialists for the task at hand. This process is influenced through an in-depth 
lessons learnt and continuous improvement process that encompasses training and previous 
operational events. The research into case studies and observations from the live events also noted 
the impact of poor communication and inflexible leadership styles, which led to sub-optimal performance 
and a detrimental impact on resilience. 
 
The research has shown that, in answer to H3, the military develops a joint approach to planning and 
operations through doctrine, training, education and lessons learnt events. Exercises, such as those 
used for the live case study observations, showed an organisation that implements a systems approach 
to develop capabilities to match the task at hand. This is underpinned by the wider military values and 
standards framework the organisation, through this systems approach, promotes diversity of teams to 
enhance capability and disruptive thinking, a trait that is critical when responding to a complex disruptive 
event. However, when placed under pressure, either through limited time windows or missing 
information, it was noted that individuals revert to their comfortable operating model, which may impact 
on the performance of the team. This highlights the importance of the changes to the various practices 
and procedures to be sustained at a cultural level if the organisation is going to operate successful 
under pressurised environments, reflecting the need for a Learning Organisation approach.  
 
The exploration of the ethos and cultural mechanisms of the military, in response to H4, demonstrated 
through the various traditions, myths and practices, showed a level of shared ethos and culture. This 
was supported, and further developed, through the shared learning on pre-operations training, the 





and the development and use of joint service doctrine to build shared understanding and capability. 
During pre-operations training and staff development there was the focus on core skills, such as critical 
analysis, systems thinking, leadership and joint working. 
 
In response to H5, the research findings also demonstrated an organisation that failed to invest 
effectively in its workforce, in turn damaging its ability to manage large disruptive events through 
educated, resourceful and empowered teams. Within the domain of incident management there was a 
sense of the cult of the individual, while in the strategic planning environment there was a clear picture 
of a dysfunctional, siloed and under-staffed organisation that failed to listen to or understand the needs 
of the industry it was supporting. The lack of a coordinated approach to the act of planning is detrimental 
to developing organisational capability; the activity provides the framework for subordinate units or 
functions to conduct their planning processes to deliver the required strategic outcome. Well-resourced 
teams, with the correct experience, capabilities and systems, supported by detailed interaction between 
the planning strata and effective leadership, as shown in the live case studies, provides a robust yet 
agile framework for strategic planning. 
 
In response to H6, there were limited lessons identified or lessons learnt processes being captured and 
few examples of a continuous improvement framework being in place. Finally, there was a culture of 
hostile and aggressive leadership, which created an environment of blame and fear. This culture 
naturally deterred staff from willingly offering potential continuous improvement ideas, detailing errors 
that had occurred or disruptive thinking events to help promote innovation across the department. While 
the military conducted lessons identified reviews at all levels and at various points of the activity to 
capture raw thoughts and post review considerations, no such extensive framework, or lessons learnt 
library and dissemination process was present within the departments reviewed. This creates a 
consistently re-active mechanism with no clear drive to promote pro-active behaviour within the industry, 
therefore not developing an organisational resilience ethos across the wider organisation. 
 
H7 has been answered through the detailed examination of the rail industry in Chapter 5, supported by 
the research findings in Chapter 6 and the identifications of the factors impacting on the effective 
delivery of resilience; when compared against how the military develop Organisational Resilience there 
are several issues that have been discussed. The analysis of the railway demonstrated a strategically 
fractured organisation which is hampered by a lack of effective government leadership and strategy, a 
poorly constructed strategic operating framework, the Network Code, and a franchise awarding 
methodology that promotes siloed planning fuelled by the spirit of competition, rather than collaborative 
planning to deliver the best for the fare paying customer.  
 
In answering the research question framework and testing the several hypotheses, the researcher 
developed the ORM3 framework to assist industry in developing a more effective approach to building 
Organisational Resilience. This model was developed using a systems approach, based on how the 





Learning Organisation and High Reliability Theory, supported with previous lessons from McManus, 
Thompson and Yardley. It was designed to promote a holistic approach to building organisational 
resilience within industry. 
 
9.4 DEFINING A NEW MODEL OF ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
Based on the research the full proposed definition of organisational resilience is: 
 
”A people centric capability based on the strategic co-ordination of organisational resources, 
adaptive leadership, intelligence, communication and staff development which enables the 
identification and analysis of strategic threats through shared situational awareness. This enables 
the preparation, education and contingency planning to establish effective resistance to hazards, 
multi-level response, recovery and learning to maintain operational sustainability.” 
 
As part of the wider discussion on the subject, the development of a tool for implementing 
Organisational Resilience was developed. The ORM3 framework, discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 
8, provides a framework, building on the work of McManus and Stephenson models, to enable an 
organisation to build and review its level of Organisational Resilience capability. ORM3 incorporates 
the key components that were included in both the previous models, while also integrating the 
knowledge from the research obtained from observing how UK military teams prepared to develop 
resilience on operations.  
 
The enhancement of the framework with the research conducted within this thesis has resulted in a 
comprehensive model which, if used correctly, can then be mapped against BS:65000 Organisational 
Resilience, delivering a holistic means to develop Organisational Resilience against the standard. The 
ORM3 model can be used to create a focused approach within an organisation to address areas of 
concern as part of a lessons learnt process, while also informing the strategic planning process at the 
Board Level. 
 
9.5 PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON RESEARCH LIMITATIONS:  
The research employed five research strands within the methodology. These were: 
 
▪ The review of previous military resilience building campaigns to identify potential lessons and 
factors that may be used in the development of the live case study.  
 
▪ A detailed analysis of recent military exercise documentation, pulling key components from 
those exercises and tailoring the components to produce a complex, multi-layered strategic 






▪ The observation of military battle-group headquarters during their preparation phase for 
deployment on operations, with the original McManus framework applied to obtain an 
Organisational Resilience framework score.  
 
▪ Review of the questionnaire responses obtained from both the military and industry audiences. 
The audiences were able to review their submissions prior to submitting them. The 
questionnaires were captured either directly into the electronic analysis tool, or through paper 
copies which were then uploaded.  
 
▪ Conducting 20 interviews with serving military personnel of various ranks and positions of 
authority to obtain a greater understanding of the situations. These interviews were reviewed, 
with key words or phrases being pulled out and used to develop and analyse the framework of 
key leadership qualities for developing organisational resilience.  
 
The evaluation of the literature within the resilience and business domains identified that there was an 
extremely limited selection of documents relating to both the development and maintaining of 
Organisational Resilience and the methods used by the UK military on operations and training 
exercises. Recent publications centred more on how the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan had 
failed to deliver their strategic objectives. Several publications discussed the importance of military 
virtues and leadership capability, as well as the effectiveness of military personnel on operations, but 
most of these publications were written subjectively with little evidence or objective research to support 
their findings. 
 
The nature of the research question was narrowed during the investigation phase, with the selection 
based on personal observations during the transition from military to industry by the researcher. 
Research information gathering and analysis became protracted as multiple data collection streams 
were conducted consecutively. This imported the potential risk of key information being lost due to the 
time taken for analysis. This was mitigated through digitising the returns, with paper copies kept until 
the data was uploaded, with the interview notes being captured directly to electronic means for quick 
analysis and codifying. 
 
To ensure that there was a fair review of the military and industry, two military headquarters were 
observed independently, this prevented researcher bias. Within industry, the two departments selected 
were those within the infrastructure manager that had a major impact on the successful running of the 
railway. To ensure fair responses were obtained, the questionnaires were given out across the multiple 
strata of leadership and management personnel. 
 
9.6 BUILDING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the ability for organisations to invest in the development of resilience 





return on investment and evidence-based analysis. Currently, as the literature review and research has 
shown, in the rail industry this approach is fractured, resulting in an inability for the senior leadership to 
effectively invest in building Organisational Resilience, due to a failure to invest in multiple areas shown 
within the ORM3 framework. To be able to invest definitively in Organisational Resilience, there is the 
requirement to create a business case that is clearly articulated as the case for a new piece of 
technology or rail maintenance equipment. The issue with developing a business case for 
Organisational Resilience activities is that it is a prevent and prepare activity. It is therefore difficult to 
clearly articulate a defined benefit by the way of a balance sheet, yet the business case must be able 
to compete aggressively against other investment requirements placed before the executive board. 
 
The ORM3 framework provides the means for an organisation to conduct a clearly auditable activity to 
identify potential areas of risk, or under-investment within an organisation, which may contribute to a 
crisis. When mapped against risks already identified and other potential risks and outstanding issues, 
it starts to provide the evidence required to quantify the detrimental impact of poor resilience. If correctly 
supported by evidence, the financial impact of previous events, and reviewed under the continuous 
improvement and lessons learnt practices, then a failure to invest can be met with an impact cost if the 
disruptive event occurs again. This starts to build an evidence-based approach to business case 
development. The review of the military teams experienced in managing disruptive events demon-
strated the links between the various elements of the ORM3 framework, while the investigations into 
the rail industry identified a failure to learn re-occurring lessons when managing disruptive events. This 
significant factor, which has also been reviewed by industry leads in two cross-sector conferences, 
demonstrates the contribution that this research has for industry. The analysis of the military 
organisations within the live case study clearly identified that an improvement in resilience capability 
resulted in a measurable performance improvement, while also highlighting the importance of effective 
leadership, a clear vision and embedding the correct culture. 
 
9.7 RESEARCH IMPACT 
Due to the subject matter, this research project has occurred in a dynamic space within UK industry, 
resulting in several activities which have utilised the research to improve current performance. Though 
the subject matter was predominately focussed on the military to obtain key lessons and observations 
to build a model for industry, the application of the various research streams resulted in both the military 
and industry organisations receiving several benefits. The following sections discuss these benefits, 
with the supporting tables showing a benefit overview and the impact that the various benefits delivered 
to the military and industry. The benefits were spread across performance enhancements, staff 
capability and academic research and knowledge acquisition. 
 
9.7.1 Military Organisational Benefits 
Table 23 highlights the impact that this research had on the military and how it has been applied. The 
research has enabled a level of joint understanding and capability development across several areas 







Impact How it was applied 
1 Case Studies Observations of strategic issues 
between military and political strategic 
planners within the Iraq Campaign 
Observations captured within Peer reviewed 
British Army Review lessons from Conflict 
doctrine, used to educate middle management 
officers on operational planning issues and risks 
as part of the Military Analysis Programme. 
2 Live Case Study Observations of development of effective 
training and development of teams to 
build capability and resilience. This led 
to the development of a training analysis 
tool, now utilised to develop effective 
military training solutions. 
The training analysis tool has been used for the 
development of strategic doctrine writing and 
intelligence gathering courses for the military. 




Development of the organisational 
resilience maturity framework and the 
ORM3 tool. 
The research into the development of the ORM3 
and training analysis tool were used in the 
development of military doctrine. The research 
was used to inform the re-drafting of JDP 02 – 
Defence Support to UK Resilience Operations 
doctrine publication. 




Development of industry presentation 
and briefing on rail industry resilience for 
Defence Joint Resilience Liaison 
Officers (JRLO) 
Development of military understanding for 
JRLOs on the capability of the rail industry to 
manage the impact of major disruptive events, 
incident response procedures and joint working 
methodologies for the JRLO community. 
Table 23: Military Organisational Benefits from the Research 
 
The effective application of the various workstreams provided a level of knowledge and a change in 
certain activities that improved the processes within the military. The lessons obtained from the detailed 
review of the Iraq campaign were incorporated into the ongoing officer education programme, while the 
knowledge obtained on various international approaches and direction to building and sustaining 
resilience was incorporated into the development of JDP 02. 
 
9.7.2 Industry Lessons 
As well has having an impact on the military, the research was applied to several areas within industry 
to develop or enhance capability. Table 24 discusses these areas and how the research benefitted the 
organisation. Where applicable, evidence is also supplied to demonstrate the benefit impact achieved 
through the various research streams. The key benefits were identified to be within incident 
management, strategic planning and staff capability development, though there were also minor 










Ser Research Strand Impact How it was applied 




Military live case study 
Development of an incident 
management framework from 
operational to strategic levels. 
Creation of a strategic, cross-industry incident 
management framework for frontline Rail incident 
management officers operating at various levels within 
the industry. The framework consisted of eight training 
interventions, across various operating levels, focussing 
on building staff capability and a joint way of working. The 
processes were designed upon the JESIP and MoD 
decision making processes. 
2 Industry questionnaire 
Military interviews 
Literature review 
Military live case study 
Development of a learning 
analysis tool for greater staff 
capability. 
Based on research findings, the researcher developed 
the Industry Holistic Approach to Learning and 
Development Tool (IHALD), used for the development of 
training interventions. The IHALD tool has subsequently 
been used to develop training interventions for both 
industry and military organisations. 
3 Industry questionnaire 
Literature review 
Military live case study 
Strategic planning capability 
development through 
enhancement of framework 
Review of the current processes and development of 21 
change components to improve the current strategic 
planning capability. Focused interventions to build staff 
capability, better governance and assurance mechanisms 
and a clearly defined, cross-industry single way of 
working. 




Military live case study 
Industry capability 
development obtained by 
cultural change through safety 
compliance and quality 
measures. Defence 
engagement for recruitment of 
skilled personnel and post 
graduate workshops. 
As part of the business development strand, development 
of a strategic framework for alignment and recruitment of 
key skills for the industry from the Military community. 
As part of the wider development of industry capability, 
cross industry workshops delivered on rail industry 
incident management. This is delivered via the University 
of Birmingham Post Graduate programme in Railway 
Engineering. The workshop is delivered to each course to 
help build greater understanding and awareness of the 
need for joint ways of working when managing large scale 
disruptive events on a railway. This course is delivered 
annually to an international student base. 
5 Industry questionnaire 
Military interviews 
Military live case study 
Developing a shared national 
standard of organisational 
resilience 
Working as part of the consultancy team to the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat on the development and review 
of the first national standard in organisational resilience, 
BS:65000 Organisational Resilience. On completion of 
the document, delivered a joint briefing with Head of the 
CCS at the 2014 Business Continuity Institute 
International Conference in London. 
On the development of the resilience framework, the 
researcher was asked to brief to the Corporate Security 
and Resilience Networks (CSARN) annual conference in 
2015 to promote the development of organisational 





Subsequently the researcher has presented to the BCI 
International conference in Holland (Jun 2019) and at the 
Resilience Association Congress (Nov 2019). 




Military live case study 
Development of academic 
interventions at BSc and MSc 
levels, delivered through the 
UK Resilience Centre. 
The researcher was commissioned to write and deliver 
modules on the BSc and MSc Disaster Management and 
Emergency Planning academic programmes for the 
University of Wolverhampton, delivered through the UK 
Resilience Centre. This is focussed on developing a 
better level of awareness of Organisational Resilience 
across industry practitioners.  
Table 24: Industry Organisational Benefits from the Research  
 
A critical impact from the research was the development of the corporate incident management 
framework, created through the research findings and a greater understanding of how the military and 
emergency services operated within complex and dynamically changing situations. Having conducted 
the initial review, identified the concerns and conducted an initial review of the key stakeholders, it was 
clear that there were differing levels of pressure across the senior stakeholders. The analysis was used 
to build a greater understanding of the situation and strategic drivers for change that were impacting on 
the organisation.  
 
Figure 83 depicts a clear visual demonstration of the change drivers and the impact that the drivers 
where having on the company 
during the period of the project. 
The Change Kaleidoscope 
model enables the means to 
pull together a range of 
contextual features pulled 
together within a 
comprehensive framework. 650 
The model consists of an 
external ring which looks at the 
strategic issues, with an inner 
circle that focusses on eight 
change factors of:  
 






650Balogun J. and Hope Hailey V., Exploring Strategic Change, 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall Financial Times, Pearson Education 
Limited, Harlow, 2004, pp 56-93.  







• Readiness for Change 
• Power 
 
Using this tool, key areas of concern were identified within the company when it came to plan for a 
successful project implementation and sustainment phase. Pressures caused by government and 
legislation, as well as a desire to focus on a more cost effective, multi-agency approach by the senior 
leadership team, resulted in the project being constrained by financial, business and cultural constraints. 
Figure 83 is the pictorial representation of the various factors that were impacting on the project.  
 
Figure 84 represents the changes made to the railway infrastructure manager’s incident management 
training framework. The left side of the image is the pre-research training framework. There was little 
focus on the training and development of the station staff, joint ways of working between track and 
station staff, and few training interventions at the middle management level. There is a limited training 
framework, with no training or collaboration between the middle and senior management level to 
practice collaborative working in a major disruptive event. On the right-hand side of the diagram is the 
revised framework, post-project. Emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the Rail and Station 
incident officers receive a similar incident management training solution, which incorporates joint ways 
of working.  





Both courses are aimed to be multi-agency offerings, bringing into the course design the emergency 
services, who were recently implementing the JESIP framework. Figure 84 also shows a cross-industry 
information management training event, as well as collaborative training for the middle and senior 
management across both stations and track operations. This approach was to build the greater 
understanding for the need for collaborative working, information management and building situational 
awareness of the wider picture. There is increased investment into the lower levels of station staff, 
aiming to build basic incident management awareness skills to increase the resilience of the stations. 
At the strategic level, there were three new courses also developed, targeted either at the control room 
managers, or the senior route leadership teams. The third course was a joint exercise, which sought to 
place the individuals into roles and manage an unfolding complex disruptive event. It was designed the 
same way as military operational deployment exercises were developed, seeking to test critical 
analysis, teamwork, decision-making and maintaining situational awareness. This new framework 
provided a greater level of disruptive event management, in turn building the resilience of the 
organisation. 
 
The new framework sought to improve 
the efficiency of the railways through 
better management of incidents, more 
informed communications across the 
industry and the development of a multi-
agency approach, working closer with 
train operators and the emergency 
services.  The piloting of the two 
strategic incident management courses, 
based on the findings of this research 
into how the military prepared for and 
managed complex situations, had a 
distinct impact on the development of 
the route leadership teams that were 
involved (Figure 85). This clearly 
highlighted the importance of 
collectively training the decision-
making members of route teams to 
effectively manage complex events at 
a strategic level. The breaking down of 
the silo mentality that was present 
within the route teams and is still 
present across many parts of the rail 
industry, was key to enabling the flow 
Figure 86: Incident Management Capability Improvement 
Source: Author 






of information and the capability to be developed.  
 
Figure 86 demonstrates the capability improvement, based on each of the 18 individuals within the 
route strategic team scoring their own capability at the beginning and end of the course. This self-
reflection approach, based on Kirkpatrick's evaluation methodology, enabled a value to be assigned to 
the training impact.  
 
9.8 PROPOSED NEXT STEPS 
Further work within the development of organisational resilience within the rail industry would include 
the standardised approach across the industry in an initial audit process across organisations, , using 
the ORM3 framework, to build a clear understanding of the levels of resilience at both the strategic and 
operational levels. This would require a far more detailed research programme than currently 
undertaken, given the number of departments involved. The recommendation would be that it should 
be conducted in a phased sequence, initially focussing on the Infrastructure Manager organisations. 
The second phase should concentrate on the train operators, with the third phase then concentrating 
on the relevant supply chains for the industry. The final phase would then develop the framework in the 
strategic leadership organisations managed at government level. This approach would provide a cross-
industry, multi-level Organisational Resilience framework, aligned to the national standard.  
 
To enable this, a wider programme of research would be required, as the extent of the treatment of 
resilience in this study was focussed on the military methodology and the application to the rail industry 
via two critical functional areas. Although the literature review encompassed cross-industry issues at 
the strategic level, as well as operational disruptive event investigations, it is impossible for the 
researcher to definitively state that the proposed framework would fit seamlessly to all organisations, or 
how much adjustment or modification would be required depending on the role of the business. A future 
phase of this research would be to review organisations within the industry in detail and compare those 
that have few disruptive events to those that have numerous events and try to determine whether or 
not there is a causal link to the difference, and how the staff are managed and developed within the 
organisations. Each of these phases could also increase the maturity of the framework, building on the 
work of McManus, Stephenson and of that which is captured here. 
 
A third work-stream of the ORM3 framework would be the application to community resilience, using 
the existing CCA 2004 documentation as a strategic guidance document to help implementation across 
community organisations and frameworks. In this period of strategic disruption, it may provide an audit 
and assurance framework to assist local councils in the prioritisation of activities and services to 
maintain community resilience, especially given that several observations have been derived from how 
the military sought to rebuild fractured communities within war-torn nation states. While the 
development of resilience within organisations may contribute to more stable communities, the use of 
a similar framework to rebuild and strengthen local councils approaches with their areas of responsibility 





auditable process, providing assurance and guidance, mapped against the national standard, on 
developing greater resilience at organisational and potentially community level. 
 
9.9 THESIS CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this thesis was to identify lessons that industry could learn from the military on building 
Organisational Resilience. This would enable the senior leadership of the organisation to build a 
resilience framework to better survive disruptive events, created through research into how the military 
develops and sustains resilience on operational campaigns. The developed tool and methodology 
would then be used in the rail industry to enhance the resilience capability within that sector, providing 
a potential performance improvement in the preparation for, management of and recovery from 
disruptive events, as well as embedding a lessons learnt and continuous improvement methodology. 
To achieve this, five mutually supporting research work-streams were developed, enabling the 
development of the ORM3 framework. Through the mapping of military activities in a specifically 
designed two-week long live case study, it was possible to clearly identify that an improvement in 
resilience capability through lessons learnt and a continuous improvement approach also delivered a 
performance improvement. This research delivered several benefits to both the military and industry 
sectors, which have been highlighted in section 9.6. Chapter 4 demonstrated the business case for 
investing in an Organisational Resilience framework, while Chapters 7 and 8 articulated the principles 
of the ORM3 framework and how it was developed, based on the research findings.  
 
Chapter 8 discussed in detail the development of the key aspects of the ORM3 framework. The 
framework consists of 28 key elements that interlink, split into six domains. A secondary output of the 
research, aligned to the development of resilience, was the creation of the various academic 
interventions for two separate academic establishments, which the researcher developed to build 
resilience training and education programmes for the military, industry and academic sectors. The 
domains are the result of the detailed literature review into building resilience, as well as how 
organisations learn and develop their staff capabilities, and how they effectively manage disruptive 
change. Within industry, the immediate impact was the development of the incident management 
training framework that provided the organisation the ability to map and audit its current level of staff 
capability, while also planning a development programme to enhance resilience. This is important not 
only for the continued use of the framework but also for inputting clear evidence-based analysis into the 
business case for investing in Organisational Resilience as a critical component of an organisation’s 
long-term strategy. Through a clearly defined tiered approach to developing the staff capability within 
the organisation, the wider latent resilience of the organisation is developed through a better 
understanding of how to prepare, respond and recover from critical incidents and disruptive events. 
 
In the process of developing the ORM3 framework, the research question and the supporting 
hypotheses have been answered. The thesis reviewed how the military developed and maintained 
resilience on operations, how it managed the concept of strategic planning and building the required 





currently, the industry is failing to apply the key lessons of building and maintaining an Organisational 
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This strategy w ould enable the researcher to conduct a large amount of data gathering through the application of a questionnaire 
(either postal, online or completed face to face), structured interview s (telephone, internet, video tele-conferencing (VTC) or face to 
face), analysing documentation or observations. The researcher may choose w ithin the strategy to use a mixture of these methods 
to collect the information. Whereas the case study strategy (see below ) seeks to obtain a sustained amount of know ledge gathered 
over time on a small research group, the survey strategy seeks to obtain information from a w ide research group, but at a specif ic 
point in time.  The information obtained at the snapshot in time can give an impression of the validity of the research through sampling 
processes to determine the accuracy and viability of the research group and the determined results. The survey strategy has certain 
limitations w hen gathering and analysing information, the f irst being the probability of response. Most postal or online research 
questionnaires w ithin the social research domain w ill be lucky to receive as many as 20% completed questionnaires,  and there may 
be a concern about the validity of the information. There is also an issue about the collection of the questionnaires if a dispersed 
approach is taken.
Case Study
This approach w ould result in an in depth analysis of a single event or situation, enabling the researcher to focus on the identif ication 
of specif ic areas w hich may have w ider impact. Different to the Survey approach w hich seeks a mass of information, this approach 
narrow s the research area. The case study strategy seeks to concentrate on the relationships and processes w hich happen w ithin 
the observed party. It seeks to understand the interdependencies of various factors, rather than seeking to identify and observe one 
in isolation. In this approach, the case study strategy results in a holistic approach rather than deal w ith the isolated elements.  As 
this strategy focuses on a desire to obtain a depth of know ledge, it enables the researcher to utilise a number of approaches to 
obtain and analyse the data. The use of the case study strategy does have limitations as it is focussed on a small number of 
research events, leaving the f indings open to vulnerability for criticism. The strategy also suffers from the stigma of often creating 
“soft data” , as it seeks to focus on processes rather than measurable data. Another concern is the ability to limit the scope of 





Participatory Action Research (PAR)aims at the researcher becoming part of the group and becoming involved in the actual practice 
of change. PAR is attributed to the w ork of Kurt Lew in , w hich w as further enhanced by Stephen Corey w ho initiated action 
research in the US shortly after Lew in’s w ork w as published . The act of PAR is the integration of a family of processes, seeking to 
obtain information from multiple sources,  such as action learning, participatory research, classroom action research, action science, 
soft system approaches and industrial action research.   Heavily used in education, PAR has tw o distinct camps. These are:
a.  The traditional British approach w hich tends to view  action research as a means of research w hich is orientated tow ards the 
enhancement of direct practice. As Carr and Kemmis describe in their book Becoming Critical. Education, know ledge and action 
research, published in 1986;
“Action research is simply a form of self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the 
rationality and justice of their own practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are 
carried out . ”
This w ould seem to indicate that the only the direct participants can benefit from the results identif ied by action research 
methodologies, as they must undergo a period of self-reflection to obtain the potential opportunities offered by the conduction of the 
research project. 
b.  Another approach, remarked on by Bogdan and Biklen in their research  identif ied that there w as the ability to utilise the w ealth of 
know ledge obtained during the research phase to stimulate social change.  In this approach the practitioner is actively involved in the 
cause for w hich the research is being developed, thus creating change from w ithin, based on the evidence gathered during the 
research phase of the project.
The use of PAR has risen during the last 20 years due its focus on problem solving, w hich makes it particularly useful to the 
practitioner seeking to solve business orientated problems . PAR is essentially applied research w hich seeks to resolve the problem 





ANNEX B: MILITARY PERSONNEL INTERVIEW RESULTS 











What is your role in the organisation? 
2 How long have you been with the organisation? 
3 Have you had any other employment roles outside of the military? 




How many operational tours have you experienced? 
6. 
Have you received the following training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical Development Course (or equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
7. 
Key Qualities 
What elements do you consider important in your role as an Officer / middle 
management within the organisation? 
8. 
Following on from the attached questionnaire how would you suggest the military build 




In your opinion, what competencies would you say are critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
10. 
In your opinion, what competencies would you say are critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
11. In your opinion, how do you see yourself within the military? 
12. 
If forced to choose 3 qualities of an officer, what three would you say are key for the 




Have you had any formal training / education on the Comprehensive Approach? 
14. 
Have you worked / trained with OGDs / NGOs or civilian organisations in preparation 
for operational deployment? 
15. Have you worked with OGDs / NGOs / Civilian security organisations on operations? 
16. 
In your opinion, were you prepared for the complex environment that you found yourself 





B2 - Interview Profile 1 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 
What is your role in the organisation? Company Commander with A Company - 3 Yorks. I operate at the tactical level, 
providing guidance, support and career development for my staff. I am 
responsible for the tough decisions and demonstrating moral courage when 
making these decisions. It is a requirement to demonstrate values based 
leadership. 
2 
How long have you been with the 
organisation? 
I have been with the organisation since I joined the Army 14 years ago. I initially 
joined on a SSC but converted to an IRC. 
3 
Have you had any other employment 
roles outside of the military? 
None - I went to university and from there, via the OTC, I joined the Army via the 
Selection board at Westbury. I then went to RMAS and Platoon Commander's 
Battle course at Warminster prior to taking up my role within the Battalion. 
4 
How would you describe the position 
that you are currently in? 
It is a middle management role, where I am responsible for the direction of the 
Company and the pastoral care of those under my command. I have to manage 
the resources, training requirements, taskings and personnel development, 
while also mentoring and developing my junior officers, who are my direct 
reports. 
5 
How many operational tours have you 
experienced? 
I have been on a number of tours of Northern Ireland, Balkans and Kosovo. More 
recently I have been involved with operational tours to Iraq and Afghanistan in a 
counter insurgency role. 
6 
Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have not yet attended ACSC or obtained a Masters Degree, though I know that 
you have the opportunity to do a Defence Masters degree on the course. I was 
also given the opportunity to do the Defence Modular Masters programme with 
King's but the time was not available. I have a degree and all the normal officer 
development courses. 
I have not completed LEOC as it is not applicable to me. 
7 
What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an Officer / 
middle management within the 
organisation? 
I think the key roles are setting and demonstrating the organisation's values 
and standards, the development of your direct reports and effective leadership, 
through timely decision making and problem solving. At my level, an 
awareness of the Operational picture and my actions within it is also key. 
8 
Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you suggest 
the military build the capability of the 
officer cadre for today's conflicts? 
I think there is a need for the senior leadership to identify the complexities of the 
current operating environment and the need to invest time and resource into 
the development of the junior officers. The situation is for more complex than 
that of 10 years ago, yet there is less time for individuals to develop due to 
compressed career reporting lines. 
There also needs to be a lot more investment into collaborative working with 
non military organisations, especially during exercises and preparation for 
deployment events. 
9 
In your opinion, what competencies 
would you say are critical to being a 
leader in the military? 
Based on my experience they would be: Building high performance teams, 
building and maintaining trust; effective decision making; evidence based 
analysis; developing others; influencing others; effective communication; 
and the promotion of lateral thinking when faced with complex problems. 
10 
In your opinion, what competencies 
would you say are critical to being a 
manager in the military? 
I think the skill set is slightly different than leading, though there is cross over; 
Managing others / teams; setting goals; stakeholder engagement; setting reporting 
timelines; auditing processes against plans; developing / improving processes and 
effective communication. 
11 
In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I see myself as a department leader, setting direction for my junior officers to 







If forced to choose 3 qualities of an 
officer, what three would you say are 
key for the role in today's 
environment? 
Building trust, developing others, clear effective decision making based on 
evidence based analysis. 
13 
Have you had any formal training / 
education on the Comprehensive 
Approach? 
Very little - we have had a lecture on the concept during ICSC but no formal 
approach to training or considerations into the exercises we run / take part in. 
14 
Have you worked / trained with OGDs 
/ NGOs or civilian organisations in 
preparation for operational 
deployment? 
Not exactly. We have had token military personnel role play individuals, but with 
various levels of realism and effectiveness. 
15 
Have you worked with OGDs / NGOs / 
Civilian security organisations on 
operations? 
Yes, from the PSNI in Northern Ireland to UK and international agencies during 
operations in the Balkans and Middle East. 
16 
In your opinion, were you prepared for 
the complex environment that you 
found yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No, not at all. Most of our lessons are based on historic data from Malaya or 
examples from Northern Ireland. The periods within the Balkans and the Middle 







B3 - Interview Profile 2 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
Company Commander with B Company - 3 Yorks. I operate at the tactical level, 
providing guidance, support, leadership and direction for the staff that work for me. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
14 years within the Regiment, apart from an SO3 role within a brigade 
headquarters. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None, joined military straight from Uni 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
Department leader / manager. I am accountable for 120 personnel and the vehicle 
fleet within the Company. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
2 tours of Iraq, 1 tour of Afghanistan and 1 tour of Northern Ireland 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have completed all junior officer courses required for an Infantry Officer. I am also 
a post ICSC major. I have a 2:1 Hons degree and am currently enrolled on the 
MoD Masters programme through Portsmouth University. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
For a sub unit commander, the following elements are key to doing the role 
effectively: 
Demonstrating the values and standards of the unit, Clear communication, giving 
clear direction, effective decision making, problem solving, building and 
maintaining trust, self confidence and belief and managing the limited resource you 
have to deliver the plan. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Offer better range of courses at all levels - Invest in the potential of officers, rather 
than choose their career stream and potential based on their performance at 
RMAS / Young Officer training. There needs to be greater educational focus for 
junior officers to build conceptual capability for today's complex environment. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
For a sub unit commander, the following I think are key leadership elements, they 
are similar to those I listed previously: 
Demonstrating the values and standards of the unit 
Clear communication, giving clear direction, effective decision making, problem 
solving, building and maintaining trust, self confidence and belief, empowering 
junior staff through development and mentoring, influencing others, both junior and 
senior members. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Clear communication, stakeholder expectation management, risk management, 
managing budgets, setting and achieving personal and team goals, effective 
planning, strategic awareness of the wider plan, resource planning and 
management. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I would say that I am in a middle management role, though I am expected to lead 
more tha manage. Managing is for people who look after resources and follow 
plans; as a sub-unit commander I am required to do the planning, lead the teams 
and give clear direction. I am also, through Mission Command, required to set the 
right image and ensure the values of the British Army are upheld. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Leading by example - Values based leadership; Clear decision making and 
problem solving; clear communication. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
No - ICSC touched on Counter Insurgency but it felt like an after thought. Poor 
awareness on the course of the various implications of Comprehensive Approach 





14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No - There is a tendency by the military not to resource these with key individuals; 
instead they use military support staff in role playing parts. At CAST(S) and CATT 
they do use Afghan role players to simulate host nation personnel, but with very 
limited military experience. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, on a number of occasions. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Not at all - there is still too much focus on general warfighting against a Russian 
style 3rd shock army rolling over the countryside. BATUS needs to be more 
complex, rather than complicated, focussed to help us understand the limitations 







B4 - Interview Profile 3 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
Company Commander with C Company - 3 Yorks. I provide leadership at the 
tactical level, putting into practice the CO's intent. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
14 years - Also an SO3 tour within Bde HQ and an SO2 tour at a training regiment. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
A few minor admin and labour jobs prior to joining the military, but nothing 
significant. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
As a sub-unit commander I am a department leader, responsible for leading the 
department, setting the vision and working in tandem with the senior leadership of 
the unit. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
4 tours in total with the Regiment - 2 x Iraq, NI and Afghanistan. Also a short tour 
within the Balkans with the Bde HQ I was an SO3 with. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have attended all the relevant courses that are required for promotion to Major. I 
have also completed ICSC(L). I have an in-service BA degree and currently 
looking at using my ELC for a Masters' programme. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Decision manking based on clear, evidenced based facts, problem solving, clear 
communication, building and managing high performing teams, mentoring others 
and setting goals and direction. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There needs to be a better structured approach to enabling officers to attend 
conceptual developing programmes earlier in their career. We need a conceptually 
based officer corps to meet the needs of the future conflict. A 3 year distance 
learning course requires stability and planning, which many junior officers do not 
currently receive. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
For the role of a Major within the Army I would say that the ability to build trust, 
both above and below you, is key. To enable this the skills of negotiation, 
communication and evidence based analysis are vital. Being able to build the 
rapport with others to get them to do unpleasant activities while serving under you 
is a sign of good leadership, fostered on trust and understanding. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
I think this is difficult to identify, as what we do as leaders within our role also 
encompasses a number of managerial tasks. Key elements that are present at 
Major rank are resource and people management, data management, stakeholder 
engagement and evidence based analysis. I think this is more about getting things 
done in occordance with a specific direction already given; as a sub unit 
commander I am more used to mission command, knowing the intent but creating 
the methods of delivery myself. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I see myself as a leader of personnel, rather than a manager. I would say that 
Captains and junior officers are the managers within the Army; the Majors and 
above ranks are the leaders, especially in the current situation where sub-units and 






12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Based on what I have already highlighted, building and maintaining trust, evidence 
based decision making, and situational awareness to understand the bigger picture 
and the commander's intent. These three elements provide resilience through 
flexibility and adaptability to the situation. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
I have received a couple of lectures on it at ICSC(L). Unfortunately it is a poorly 
understood and practiced within the Army. There is little understanding of 
structures and operating methods of NGOs and OGDs. We rarely have any 
interaction on exercises and regularly our engagement officer is a Reservist who is 
unable to attend the training events. This is an area we need to understand as it is 
fundamental to the influence campaign planning cycle. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No, they have been unable to attend our events. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, on a number of occasions in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Kosovo. There was 
also options within Iraq, but due to the complex security threat the relevant NGOs 
did not deploy into my AO. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - the training received within ICSC(L) was very limited and poorly executed by 
the military DS; there was more focus on delivering against "the Pink" than actualy 
exploring complex problems. Within the training events there has been scope to 
explore the FCoC and 5 Cs, though this depends on the ingenuity of the exercise 
writing staff. We are still lagging behind the enemy when it comes to the strategic 
influence campaign. There needs to be a change in culture delivered to the UK 







B5 - Interview Profile 4 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
Company Commander with D Company - 3 Yorks 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the unit for 11 years, with a 2 year break at Captain level as I 
worked in an SO3 post within a Bde HQ. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
I was a IT specialist prior to joining the military; it was one of the reasons I joined, 
looking to utilise my skills in an organisation at the front of development and 
technology application. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am a Company commander; I lead the Coy/Sqn Gp on operations, with my 
personnel managed by my Capts and subalterns. I set the direction of travel for the 
task and they execute it through the management of the resources I assign them. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced 2 tours of Bosnia, 1 of Kosovo, 1 of Iraq and this is my second 
Afghanistan. The Kosovo tour was as part of the Bde HQ staff. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I haven't completed the LE course or the ACSC, though all others I have done. 
Regards the education elements, I do possess 2 Masters level qualifications. 1 as 
part of the MMP programme and the other was self funded, though supported 
through the ELC framework. It was in Information Security systems. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Building situational awareness within the team and fostering a close knit 
community, built on trust, information sharing, enabling mission command and faith 
in each other. We knew we were going to Afghanistan 9 months before we 
deployed, so we could focus on the training. Though we knew early on we were 
going, our actual role was not confirmed to much later on. This lack of knowledge 
was troublesome and could affect the resilience of the junior members of the 
Company. By building a supportive organisation, we could limit this impact on the 
resilience of the individual and team. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
I think there is greater need to build the capability of the young officer to manage 
resources, equipment and their people. It is great to build a "Serve to lead" culture, 
but most of their role, about 70%, is managing equipment and people within 
barracks. Sandhurst and YO training fails to prepare them for this. There is also a 
greater need to build an awareness of the three, four or five block war model, 
depending on who you read. In essence, our COIN and Culture / Influence war 
fighting skills are limited within the junior officer cadre and poorly developed at mid 
level. We really need to build a greater training capability towards building a multi-
organisation approach to Operations. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Remaining calm under pressure, evidence based analysis, clear thinking and 
decision making, communication skills and situational awareness are the real big 
ones. Building trust, loyalty both up and down the chain of command, courage both 
moral and physical, and being able to think outside the box. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Seeing the big picture is key to how you manage your resources. Evidence based 
decision making, problem solving and effective communication are key to 
managing the resources at hand. I would caveat this with the fact that as an OC, I 





11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I would see myself as a hybrid of the two. At times I need to set the policy and act 
to build the culture of the team. On operations I am the accountable individual if I 
lose people on operations. Within barracks I am more of a department manager, 
with my junior officers my line managers. I would stress that as an OC, I really do 
have a foot in each camp. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Remaining calm under pressure, clear, evidence based decision making and 
building situational awareness. This is due to being able to share knowledge, build 
trust and promote the atmosphere of being in full command of the situation, even if 
it is all going wrong. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Not formally, though elements of it have been referred to within the Company and 
Battle group table top exercises. It is a simple idea in context, though the 
implementation is far harder due to the different organisations and cultures 
involved. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Not for this deployment. I have worked with other NGOs / OGDs when I have taken 
part in previous deployments, though again this happened quite late within the 
training cycle. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, during my deployment to Kosovo where I worked with aid agencies and US 
organisations conducting investigations within the region. Near the end of the tour 
we were also providing support to the mentoring of the local security forces. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No, though the preparation now is getting better. We focus too much on war 
fighting and combat operations, and too little on the influence building activities. 
There is little co-ordination, rather it is localised best help to make a quick impact, 







B6 - Interview Profile 5 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
Regimental Intelligence Officer - 3 Yorks 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the military for 7 years - the majority spent within the Battalion, 
apart from residential learning / training events required for promotion 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None - finished school and went to university to study. On completing my degree 
with a 2:1 I applied to join the army. I attended AOSB and was selected to begin 
officer training. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the intelligence officer; I am responsible for the collection, analysis and the 
distribution of intelligence assessment to the CO. I have a team of 5 individuals 
who work for me within the intelligence section. There are also addition personnel 
from other organisations who are attached to us for operations and force capability. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have served in Iraq on two tours and a tour of Afghanistan already. I have also 
done a short tour of the Balkans region. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a Captain I am yet to complete the ICSC and MA modules. I have completed 
the required junior officers courses, such as CWC, JOTAC, MK1, special to arm 
training and RMAS. I have also completed the Regimental Intelligence Officer's 
course.  
 
I have a BA(Hons) degree obtained prior to joining the military and I am looking at 
using my ELC credits to obtain a Masters degree while serving. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
I think that as an junior officer you need to build trust, carry out evidence based 
analysis of facts, make decisions based on the facts and communicate them to a 
number of different stakeholders. The assessments must be based on truth, not 
assumption; in intelligence it is critical to be honest and admit if you don't have a 
clear picture. 
Managing your team, giving clear direction and being unafraid to make decisions in 
the heat of battle is also key. As an individual demonstrating and living the values 
and standards of the army is vital, especially trusting others to employ mission 
command during critical moments. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Greater emphasis on collective learning and sharing of experiences; we are 
looking at more and more e-learning, but that doesn't work for a practical based 
profession such as this. A more blended approach, bringing e-learning and 
practical learning, similar to how universities approach blended learning, would be 
a far better approach. Shared / joint courses with government departments, or 
Cabinet Office / Home Office led sessions to build greater awareness of 
Comprehensive Approach activities. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Building trust, clear decision making, evidence based analysis, sense of humour, 
patience, attention to detail, effective communication and self confidence 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Resource management, managing people effectively - key to building high 
performing teams under pressure, clear communications for briefing senior 






11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
Organisation intelligence manager, delivering key information and assessment to 
enable the organisation to make timely critical decisions in order to align resources 
to tasks to obtain maximum strategic impact. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Effective decision making based on clear, factual analysis on factors, ability to 
communicate clearly and building trust within teams. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Very little in formal training, except through my intelligence officer training. This 
was still focussed on large scale warfare with an OpFor based on a Russian / 
Insurgent hybrid approach. Training / education would be far more effective if a 
real understanding of the multiple drivers of conflict was incorporated into these 
training / education events. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No. The only attempt was the use of military personnel to role play government 
officials; unfortunately this was not very effective as they were not fully aware of 
the in depth issues. The intelligence course had more detail on civilian 
organisations, with interactions with government security agencies. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, multinational organisations within a number of areas. We are not prepared for 
the high level of negotiations and interactions required with NGOs / OGDs. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Training and education is very poor at junior level - it did not prepare me to do the 
role of a Pl Comd in managing resources and manpower in a complex 









B7 - Interview Profile 6 
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am one of the Platoon commanders for the 1 Royal Welsh element of Herrick 15 . 
As a Captain I am seen as one of the more senior Pl Comds; that is why I am is 
Support Coy. My role within the Battalion is OC Recce Pl. For the deployment I 
believe I am down to be part of the Police Mentoring and Advisory Group (PMAG), 
which is aimed at building the capability of the Afghan Police Force within Helmand 
Province. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the Battalion for 6 years now. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None, joined the military straight from University. I spent a year at RMAS, then 
went through the Platoon Commander's Battle Course to learn my trade for leading 
my Platoon of 30 soldiers. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
Similar to the initial question. I am the Recce Pl Comd, responsible for providing 
teams to locate and observe the enemy, either for ourselves or other units. For me 
personally I have completed my Captain's Course and am about to start my next 
step of career development through Military Analysis courses and MK2 - an onlne 
military learning course aimed at helping me understand the bigger picture in 
preparation to go to ICSC(L). 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced two operational tours, one of Iraq and one in Afghanistan in the 
past 6 years 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have completed RMAS, JOTAC, Pl Comd's Battle Course, JOLP and MK1. I am 
currently beginning MK2 and my MA courses, as well as looking to attend the 
Captain's Warfare Course. 
 
I also have a BA(Hons) in Business and Management; I find it fascinating the 
things that both the military and business could learn from each other. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Within my position I believe that the important element of my role is the abiltiy to 
make rational decisions and give advice, based on facts and analysis. It is also to 
foster teamwork within my staff, be able to adapt and innovate within difficult 
situations, display courage and have the confidence to back myself and my 
decisions. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
It needs to build a greater awareness of the climate that we are operating in, rather 
than training for the last climate and conflict. Also, as a young officer, we need to 
be prepared better to manage people and resources. RMAS and PCBC teach how 
to lead, the army does not effectively teach us how to manage. There is a distinct 
difference yet it seems RMAS is yet to realise that. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Self confidence is vital for a young Pl comd; belief in yourself and your training. 
Self awareness is also very important. A third trait is the ability to create decisions 
and solve problems based on evidence based analysis. These all build trust within 
the team. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Ability to delegate effectively, supported by effective communication skills. Also the 
capability to build situational awareness by sharing information. These traits are 






11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I would like to say I am a leader, but I think honestly most of my team is as a 
manager of a large team. I follow what the OC develops, implement his intent and 
look after the team and the capability they can bring. If we look at the Company as 
a department, the OC is the department leader, we are his middle management 
team. The SNCOs are the frontline management group. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Building trust, effective decision making and displaying moral and physical 
courage. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Very little, really just a review of JDN 04/05 and a discussion about it on JOTAC 
course. RMAS does not really cover it in detail; it focuses more at the tactical level 
rather than political and strategic. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
None. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
None - on the operational tours there were NGO and OGD elements around but 
they were at a higher level than us. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
We were well prepared for the combat roles and the fighting elements. When it 
came to influence operations, hearts and minds and proper, deep thought COIN 
activity, our preparation was woeful. We need to deliver change; understand how 
to change people's mindsets and culture. The training I have received for this 
deployment has been a lot better, but I still think we need to build greater 







B8 - Interview Profile 7 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am a Company Commander within the 1 Rwelsh Battle-Group. I have under my 
command a grouping of approx 120 individuals. This includes my Pl Comds, Pl 
SNCOs, infantrymen and support staff. Also attached are elements of the Royal 
Artillery, the Royal engineers, AGC and REME units. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the Battalion for 12 years, having joined as a Platoon 
Commander from RMAS. I have spent a total of three years away from the 
Battalion during that period, operating within Bde HQ or on attendance on ICSC(L) 
or other leadership courses 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the Commander of the Force package, pulled from a number of units to 
deliver the best effect on the ground as possible. I am responsible for 
implementing the Commanding Officer's intent through leadership, guidance and 
direction to the soldiers under my command. I am also responsible for the liaison 
with other organisations within my area of responsibility. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have done two tours of Northern Ireland, one tour to the Balkans, a tour in 
Kosovo as part of the Bde HQ and a tour in Iraq 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have attended all the required training for Platoon Commander, Recce Pl Comd 
and as an Armd Infantry Pl Comd. I have also completed MK1 and 2, my MA 
modules and ICSC(L). I am also two thirds through my MSc in Leadership course. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Giving clear direction through leadership and information; building and sharing 
situational awareness to all parties; making sure my teams are fully prepared for 
the tasks ahead by setting the company aims and objectives for the period; and 
developing a culture based on trust and openness to see us through the hard slog. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There is a greater need to understand how to conduct an "influence campaign" 
over a number of years. Our recent history in Afghan is a prime example - we have 
had a number of smash and grab operations lasting six months aimed to disrupt 
the enemy, but few campaigns are linked or mutually supporting the next brigade. 
There seems to be a real lack of strategic vision to reach our end state. To build 
the capability of our officers we need to know what we are being sent to do, the 
end state and how to fight it. Currently our preparation for a political problem that 
requires influence and infrastructure building activities is still built on tactical seek, 
destroy and hold operations, with a bit of SSR thrown in. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Building trust, decisions based on evidence and intelligence, problem solving, 
building situational awareness and innovatitive thinking and moral courage to 
make the tough calls. All these could be summed up in values based leadership, 





10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Seeing the strategic / operational picture is key to managing your resources. 
Effective communication and delegation of tasks are key to managing the 
resources at hand. I would caveat this with the fact that as an OC, I switch 
between manager and leader, given the situation. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I would see me being either a leader, or a manager, depending on the situation at 
the time. Within operations I am without question a leader. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Building trust is key, through being calm under pressure and making key decisions 
based on evidence based analysis. Loyalty, courage both moral and physical, and 
building situational awareness are also key. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Very little - it is a gap within the training and preparation for operations and wider 
staff development. During my time at ACSC in 2008 it was a very misunderstood 
concept within the Directing Staff cohort - they were more focussed on Combined 
and Joint large scale operations, rather than actually building a greater capability 
when it came to understanding how to plan, execute and review an effective COIN 
campaign. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Very little - it is a gap within the training and preparation for operations. When we 
deployed to Northern Ieland, our preparation training involved study days with the 
PSNI and ex UDR / RIR personnel. There is very little of this with deployments to 
Afghanistan. It needs to get better; too much is adhoc preparation at the moment. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, where the ways of working were well 
established. In Iraq there was a distinct lack of co-ordination and it was a more 
adhoc localised approach. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - we need to build a greater capability within the lower ranks to deliver the 
Comprehensive Approach. We need to change our approach and start to inform 
them how their decisions can impact the bigger picture. There also needs to be a 
greater understanding of the various tenets of society, rather than just the basic 







B9 - Interview Profile 8 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am a Sqn Leader within the KRH Battle-Group. I have under my command a 
grouping of approx 120 individuals who operate within light / medium armoured 
vehicles. In general warfare we would provide support to the Heavy Sqns equipped 
with challenger MBTs. This includes my Tp Comds, their vehicle crews and 
support staff. Also attached are elements of the Royal Artillery, the Royal 
Engineers (Armd), AGC and REME units. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the Regiment for 16 years, having joined as a Troop Commander 
from RMAS. I have spent a total of four years away from the Regiment during that 
period, operating within Bde HQ or on attendance on ICSC(L), ACSC and other 
leadership courses 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None -I have been with the military since university 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the Commander of the Coy/Sqn Gp, which is made up from a number of units 
to deliver the best effect on the ground as possible. As the Commander, I am 
responsible for implementing the BG CO's intent through my actions on the 
ground. This requires leadership, guidance and direction to the soldiers under my 
command. Liaison with other organisations within my area of responsibility also 
falls to me to build situational awareness and understanding of the actual situation 
on the ground. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have done 3 tours to the Balkans, including Kosovo as part of IFOR, a tour in Iraq 
and this is my second tour of Afghanistan 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have attended all the required training for an Armoured Tp Commander. I have 
also completed MK1 and 2, my MA modules and ICSC(L). I am one of the few 
majors to have already compelted ACSC and I am a third tour Major.  
 
I have an MA as part of the MoD MMP programme, and MA from ACSC and I am 
also two thirds through my MSc in Leadership course. Ideally I would like to 
complete a MPhil or PhD while serving, similar to the US approach.  
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Giving clear leadership through accurate and timely decision making, based on 
facts and validated information; maintaining situational awareness to all parties; 
making sure my teams are fully prepared for the tasks ahead by setting the 
mission command directives; and developing trust and openness to see us through 
the difficult times. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There is a greater need to understand how to conduct an "influence campaign" 
over a number of years. Our recent history in Afghan is a prime example - we have 
had a number of smash and grab operations lasting six months aimed to disrupt 
the enemy, but few campaigns are linked or mutually supporting the next brigade. 
There seems to be a real lack of strategic vision to reach our end state. To build 
the capability of our officers we need to know what we are being sent to do, the 
end state and how to fight it. Currently our preparation for a political problem that 
requires influence and infrastructure building activities is still built on tactical seek, 





9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
As Sqn Ldr Recce, building trust with the senior command staff is key. They expect 
decisions based on evidence and intelligence, problem solving, building situational 
awareness and innovatitive thinking and moral courage to make the tough calls. All 
these could be summed up in values based leadership, which is trained into us at 
RMAS and ingrained during our time within service. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Seeing the larger picture on the battlefield is key to managing your resources. In 
camp being able to manage your resources to ensure you are ready to deploy and 
forward base any repairs is also critical. Effective communication and early 
assignment of resources to tasks is critical to long term effectiveness. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am a leader, responsible for finding intelligence, making key decisions on behalf 
of the organisation and advising the senior staff. I also give direction my Tp 
Comds, who fight and manage their vehicles on the battlefield. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
In my role, making assessments and decisions in key; therefore it needs to be 
evidence based. Problem solving and decision making is important to enable us to 
move quickly and maintain the edge. Courage both moral and physical is also vital, 
especially when the difficult decisions need to be made in the heat of battle. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Very little - it is a gap within the training and preparation for operations and wider 
staff development. During my time at ACSC in 2008 it was a very misunderstood 
concept within the Directing Staff cohort - they were more focussed on Combined 
and Joint large scale operations, rather than actually building a greater capability 
when it came to understanding how to plan, execute and review an effective COIN 
campaign. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Very little - it is a gap within the training and preparation for operations. When we 
deployed to the Balkans, our preparation training involved study days with 
previously deployed personnel, the review of operational reports and mission logs. 
There is very little of this with deployments to Afghanistan. It needs to get better; 
too much is localised or adhoc preparation. While events such as CAST and CATT 
are very beneficial, we waste too much time with HFT and then MST. We should 
just focus on building capability, and get very good at it. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, in the Balkans, where the ways of working were well established. In Iraq and 
my previous tour in Afghanistan the approach has been adhoc, poorly directed and 
without a long term strategy. There is a lot of doing but without guidance which 
results in a lot of wasted time, effort, money and local engagement. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - we need to build a greater capability within the lower ranks to deliver the 
Comprehensive Approach. With the arrival of the strategic corporal impact, we 
need to inform them how their decisions can impact the bigger picture. There also 
needs to be a greater understanding of the various tenets of society, rather than 







B10 - Interview Profile 9 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am a senior Captain placed in the role of the Stabilisation Officer. I am an 
augmentee to the Battle-Group and have been brought in due to my skills and 
knowledge of working with different agencies in the combat zone. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
With this Battle-Group only a couple of months; I have however been part of the 
military for 15 years. I was a soldier and then commissioned from Sergeant into the 
Officer ranks. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None  
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
Similar to as I said in the previous question, I am the senior advisor within the 
Battle-Group for engaging with the various NGO agencies on the ground. I am 
involved in most of the decision making on how we manage impact projects to 
build support and consent within the population. Unlike my US equivalents, we are 
heavily constrained by limited funds in theatre and in training. At best I get to work 
with Afghan nationals who work in the UK which are paid to come and support the 
training serials to add some realism. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
2 tours of Iraq and 1 tour of Afghanistan. I have also completed a tour of Northern 
Ireland and the Falkland Islands. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a SNCO commissioned into the Officer Corps, I have completed RMAS LEOC 
rather than the full 1 year course. I also have the PSBC, the SNCO version of the 
Pl Commander's course. I have completed JOTAC and JOLP, to help me 
understand the different elements of being an officer. I have also completed MK1 
and 1 of my MA modules. The next step is to attend the Captains' Warfare Course 
and then promotion to Major before heading off to ICSC(L). 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Having seen both sides of the coin, key elements are; Building trust within the 
team; seeing the bigger picture and translating it for the team; situational 
awareness; displaying moral courage; decision making based on fact; and having 
a sense of humour when it all goes wrong. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
We really need to take the influence building elements of COIN seriously and 
resource them during training. We should have a career stream for CIMIC 
personnel and promote the importance of cultural awareness and influence 
campaign planning. Smash and grab activities are short term answers; building 
resilience within communities is what will win us a COIN campaign. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Simialr to what I said previously. Leadership is demonstrated through trust, 
effective decision making based on evidence and fact, effective communication 
and building situational awareness. Being decisive and showing moral courage is 
also key to good leadership. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Resource management, effective communications, understanding what the boss 






11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I see myself as both a manager and a leader, with different skills being needed at 
different times. The ability to manage the resources, finances and staff welfare in 
barracks day to day is a managerial role. The leading of teams during high 
intensity situations, with split second decisions and making life or death choices, 
based on limited information is a leader's role. I do both. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Courage (moral and physical) of your convictions, evidence based decision making 
and situational awareness. These three are key to success when stuck in tight or 
difficult situations. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
No formal training, only what Ihad discovered myself in relation to the military 
docuemnts. I think the Army is still very poor at understanding the concept itself. In 
the Afghanistan context, there seems to be too much institutional focus on combat 
in relation to development. We must focus on the development of the AUP in 
particular if we are to achieve transition effectively and on time. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
None - this is a fundamental flaw within the current level of preparation for military 
units prior to deployment. It is harder for individuals like me who are augmented in 
because of our skills. As individuals, we can get lost in the system and miss a 
number of training events. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, on my previous tours I was working with local law enforcement agents, 
international aid agencies and a UN police support initiative. Unfortunately it was 
more of a "learn on the job" rather than being properly prepared for the taask prior 
to arrival. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No, I don't think I was, and currently don't think we are getting it right yet. I think 
that the Army is too reactive in nature and, whilst we are focussed (rightly so) on 
Afghanistan currently, we must not ignore what happens post 2015. We have a 
generation of soldiers who know nothing other than Afghanistan and we must 
ensure that we are able to rebalance ourselves and develop warfighting skills 
again; not just our combat skills. We must fundamentally deliver changes to how 







B11 - Interview Profile 10 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the senior advisor to the Commanding Officer on the allocation of Joint Fires 
and Influence activities for the Battle-Group. I have a team of 120 mixed personnel 
working under my command for the operational deployment. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been in the military for 15 years and this is my 2nd tour as a major. As a unit 
the battery has been assigned to the Battle-Group since the beginning of HFT, 
which has enabled a good level of integraation and trust to develop. On the flip 
side, due to the level of support required for multiple training and development 
exercises, plus my own Regiment's training requirements, it does result in a lot of 
nights out of bed. This is particularly evident within the Fire Support Teams who 
will always support their relevant sub-units. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None, I have been with the military since university. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the Battery Commander for the Battle-Group. I am responsible for providing 
fire support guidance and control to the commanding Officer as well as how to 
effectively integrate aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and helicopters. I also provide 
forward teams to support local units with Joint Fires advice and guidance. I also 
have under my command the influence team 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced tours in the Balkans, Kosovo, 2 tours of Iraq and a short tour (3 
months) of Afghanistan.  
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a BC I have completed the folowing courses: 
RMAS, JOTES, MK2, MA Modules, ICSC(L). I have also completed Special to 
Arms courses, such as RA Young Officer's Course, Fire Support Team 
Commander Course, RA Captain's Course, Staff Officer's Battle Space 
Management Course, BC Close Support Course and the BC Targeting Course.  
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
The management of the team is important, especially with the amount of demands 
on the limited resources available. Building the bigger picture and maintaining 
situational awareness is crucial for me, as I cannot give support without 
understanding the second and third order impact. Strong, effective 
communications are also critical to enable me to rapidly transmit my direction, 
through voice and data channels. The other critical element is fostering an 
environment which supports mission command, which is built on trust, integrity, 
belief in others and a desire to succeed; this force multiplies the capabiltiy of the 
teams and maintains operational tempo. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There needs to be a greater emphasis on understanding the dynamic environment 
that we are currently operating within. The establishment needs to resource the 
training to be more realistic with regards to the political and cultural framework that 
exists and the complex situation troops find themselves within.  
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Building trust within the team, situational awareness, moral courage, effective 
communications, evidence based decision making, effective problem solving and 





10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Resource management, effective communications, understanding the 
commander's intent, effective planning and problem solving. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I see myself primarily as a leader, directing my teams across the battlefield and 
making critical decisions on how to effectively use my limited resources to achieve 
maximum effect. My decisions can have serious impact to the plan and to the 
safety of the frontline teams and at times I need to make the difficult decision to 
remove resources from people who need them in order to react to the bigger 
picture. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Building and maintaining situational awareness through evidence and intelligence 
analysis, moral and physical courage; and evidence based decision making, 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
No official training, though as part of the Artillery training one element that is 
studied is the imapct of influence operations. Unfortunately these are glossed over 
as an "add on" raher than being built as critical to success for the long game. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Not within training exercises. We have used role players but this does not produce 
the same effect as there is no depth to the actual situation. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, during the deployment to Kosovo and during the second tour in Iraq. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - the focus for us was the use of ground, air and unmanned assets to provide a 
hard effect through the deployment of joint fires. We were not taken through 
enough testing exercises with regards to the political / cultural situation. The 
approach to training and preparation needs to change - innovation and quick 
thinking needs to complement cultural and behavioural analysis. It is time to 








B12 - Interview Profile 11 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am one of the Fire Support Team Commanders working in support of the Battle-
Group. I report to the BC and move around the Battle-Group in accordance to his 
plan. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the military for 8 years, joining from the Officer Training Corps 
which was run at my university. I have been with this Regiment for two years, 
having previously served with a Weapons Locating Unit. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
Apart from some temporary jobs during university to help support my fees, no. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I provide the conduit between the joint fires capability within the Battle-Group and 
the sub unit I am supporting. I also provide planning advice and a communications 
channel for the sub unit commander as the Fires net is encrypted and often has 
greater situational awareness. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have completed a tour of Northern Ireland and 1 Iraq tour.  
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have completed the following courses to date: 
RMAS, RA YO course, JOTAC, JOLP, MK1, RA Captain's Course and RA Close 
Support (FST) Commanders' course. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
In my role, building situational awareness within the team is key. Other key traits 
for me is giving clear direction through leadership and information; and making 
sure my teams are fully prepared for the tasks. A key factor to being successful is 
understanding how to apply mission command; some of my civilian friends would 
call it adaptive or values based leadership. It is the ability for the BC to tell me what 
needs to be done, then letting me decide my own way of achieving it. This concept 
is very important to FST commanders, as we are a very finite resource but bring so 
much resource to support the Sub Unit commander. The Sub Unit commander also 
employs mission command towards myself, asking me to deliver an effect on time 
at a certain location; he does not care how I deliver it, just as long as it is on time, 
accurate and effective. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Build our awareness of the complexity of the situation that we are operating within. 
There is also a need to build greater use of RA FST commanders within the 
decision making processes at the Company Squadron Group. We are used to 
operating at CT 3 - 4 levels long before sub units do. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
In my role, these would be; being able to employ mission command, trust, 
communication skills, integrity, courage, (especially moral), evidence based 
analysis, effective decision making, situational awareness and problem solving. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Managing your resources, having a technical knowledge of your equipment, being 





11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I think I am a hybrid of both. I have a team to manage and resources to control, but 
I have to make life or death decisions based on fire support assets and the bigger 
picture. I need to display moral courage to challenge the sub unit commander's I 
am supporting and be able to direct my team. On operations I am at the front edge 
and my decisions could affect a large number of individuals. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Effectively applying mission command; situational awareness based on intelligence 
analysis; and effective decision making. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
None 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
None - the training as focussed more on kinetic operations in order to build 
capability within the infantry call signs. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
None - normally happens at BC level. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
From my experience, we are still too reliant on the physical effect of the use of 
Joint Fires in support of manoeuvre operations. Ideally we would have a greater 
awareness of soft effects and non kinetic actions to build consent. We also need to 








B13 - Interview Profile 12 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the officer responsible for manning the Battery Command Post, which acts as 
a communicaiton hub for the Joint Fires Cell within Battle-Group HQ. I remain with 
the HQ whem the BC and the FST teams deploy forward during the close battle.  
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I am a Battery Captain within the unit and have been with the Regiment for 6 
years. Previously I was a SNCO, who commissioned as a Late Entry Officer. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None, I joined the Royal Artillery as a junior soldier and have remained with it ever 
since for the last 19 years. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
As I said earlier, I am the BK. It is my role on operations to manage the team 
responsible for the communication networks, Joint Fires resources and provide a 
direct link to the CO and Bde HQ for the Joint Fires Cell. I am also responsible for 
the manning of the Logistic support element for the Bty, with my SNCO who acts 
as my frontline manager. In essence I am the 2IC of the Bty, responsible for the 
management of communications and logistics to support the BC and FST teams. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
Since joining I have served 3 tours in Northern Ireland, 2 in the Balkans, 1 in 
Cyprus, 1 in Kosovo and 1 tour of Iraq. This is my first tour of Afghanistan. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have not completed the Junior Officer courses, I don't need to as I am an LE. I 
have completed the Late Entry Officer's Course (LEOC) and have attended 1 MA 
module. I have yet to attempt MK2, though I need this if I wish to move forward 
onto ICSC(L). 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Key components of my role are building and maintaining situational awareness to 
deliver Joint Fires capability to the battle-group. Another aspect is evidence based 
analysis to inform my decision making. Communication and computer skills are 
also important as we do a lot of information sharing and management.  
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
From the junior officers I have worked with, there is a real gap in resource 
management knowledge and how to manage people. Being taught to lead in battle 
is all well and good, but that is only 30% of the job. There is a greater requirement 
to build management skills, goal setting and identifying key objectives for team 
individuals. Better understanding of the intricacies of counter insurgency would 
also benefit them. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Effective decision making based on evidence; Communication skills; moral 
courage; Situational awareness, motivating others, selflessness, loyalty, building 
trust and a sense of humour. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Managing your people and resources, effective planning, communication skills, 





11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am the BC's senior management element providing key managerial skills around 
the logistics, communication and people management areas. By also being the key 
element within HQ I also manage the data and communication link between the 
BC, CO and Chief Fires. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Thinking big - seeing the operational and strategic picture; promoting the right 
culture and values through demonstrating moral courage, buliding trust and 
motivating others; and effective decision making based on facts and evidence 
based analysis. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
None, though I have read through JDN 04/05 to try and understand what it is. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
There is very little integration of NGO and OGD during training. Within the Northen 
Ireland deployments the PSNI were firmly integrated from an early stage, enabling 
the build up of trust and understanding. This was not the same for the Balkans or 
Iraq. Even simulated with individuals with an understanding of the roles would have 
added some benefit. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
I have worked with a number of agencies within my operational tours. The RUC / 
PSNI were well drilled within Northern Ireland, while the NGOs and aid agencies 
within the Balkans and Kosovo were quite disorganised.  
Iraq was very poorly managed, with little framework for NGO / OGD operations, 
with the military being expected to pick up the slack for poor management. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Not through training and development. I have an advantage from my operational 
experience and service in the ranks. We really need to get better at developing 
training that replicates the actual characteristics of conflict. There is poor 
replication of the pressure caused by the complexity of current operations, with 
training more focussed on war-fighting skills. We are failing our soldiers and young 








B14 - Interview Profile 13 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the TACP Commander responsible for delivering clear air and aviation control 
to the Battle-Group at the front edge of the battle. I report into the BC and provide 
him with trained forward Air Controllers (FACs) to enable the integration of air and 
aviation assets into the close battle.  
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been in the army for 9 years, having served with the Infantry prior to being 
trained as a TACP Officer 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the key air / aviation liaison element for the battle-group at the front end, 
reporting into the Bde Air Cell to manage the use of air and aviation assets. I am 
also trained in directing Joint Fires assets, as are elements of my team. This is 
important as it means that I can provide the BC with extra capability through joining 
members of my team with his FST elements. This means that is essence we can 
create and extra two FST teams that can direct aircraft and aviation assets. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have done 1 tour of Nortern Ireland, 2 tours of Iraq and this is my second tour of 
Afghanistan. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have completed the following courses: 
 
RMAS; PCBC; JOTAC; JOLP; TACP Officer's course; FST Commander's Course; 
Air Land Integration Course; Forward Air Controller's Course; MK 1 and 2; and 1 
MA module. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Within my role the key elements I see are as follows; Ability to plan under 
pressure, situational awareness, effective communication skills over various media 
platforms, evidence based decision making and having the guts (Moral courage I 
guess) to make a tough call. All these elements come together to build trust within 
the team - they see that as the leader you are looking after them, getting the job 
done but unafraid to make the hard calls for the bigger picture. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Building greater awareness of the capabilities available to them on the battlefield; 
better teaching and education around operations within the COIN environment; 
better decision making through using the Combat Estimate and how to utilise air / 
aviation to their advantage. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Decision making based on intelligence and truth, not information. Problem solving 
under pressure, communication skills, thinking outside the box, situational 
awareness, moral courage and building trust within the team. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 





11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am a leader with management requirements. I am responsible for critical 
decisions and advice to the battle-group, though I am autonomous to the Battle 
Group as I am a Brigade Asset. I am also the manager of a small team, 
responsible for the welfare of all members. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Based on my role, the three are; dynamic problem solving, innovative thinking, 
evidence based decision making. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Only a few lectures on the topic, no actual discussions on turning it into effective 
influence operations on the ground. The CAST(S) team have integrated training 
events with this in mind to test our planning and considerations. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No - the TACP party would not normally get involved within this area, unless 
supporting search operations for local government assets. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
No, due to the roles that I have been involved in. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Not through the training that we received - it was more focussed on combat actions 
rather than operating within complex human terrain. Greater complexity within 
training would be beneficial. The recent CAST exercise has gone some way to 







B15 - Interview Profile 14 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the Battle-Group Logistics Officer (BGLO) for the deployment and the 
exercise. Within the organisation I am responsible for the CSS (Combat Service 
Support) or in layman's terms, logistic support, to the Commanding Officer. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the RLC for 13 years, having been in post as the OC within the 
squadron for 15 months. Prior to that I was an OC at a training regiment, 
responsible for the training and development for Phase 1 recruits. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None outside of the military, unless you term part time roles during university. I 
was part of the OTC at uni, which helped me build greater awareness of the 
military and the opportunities within it. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
My current role as the BGLO would be best described as the senior logistics 
planning officer. I am responsible for writing and implementing the BG CSS plan, 
informing the Operations planning team the art of the possible with the current 
logistics chain. I also provide the CSS link back to the Bde team, ensuring the 
planning of 2nd line CSS support for upcoming operations. Although not affiliated 
to my Corps, I am also responsible for the planning of how the BG will use any 
Military Police elements during the campaign. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
This is my fourth operational tour. I have had one in Northern Ireland, 1 in Kosovo 
and 1 in Iraq. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As an OC I have conducted the normal progression courses required. These are: 
RMAS, YO's training, JOTES, MK2, MA modules, RLC Capt's Course and 
ICSC(L). I have not completed JOTAC or JOLP as they are successors to the 
JOTES course that I completed. Likewise, MK1 did not enter until I had promoted 
to Capt. Apart from the above, I have also completed a number of special to arm / 
trade training courses required for RLC supply officers. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
As the CSS Officer, key elements for my role is the ability to make effective plans 
based on evidence and facts, making the tough decisions about who gets what 
resources, and a thorough understanding of the current and potential risks to the 
supply chain. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There needs to be a greater understanding about the importance of 2nd and 3rd 
order support to the frontline forces. Logisitics planning, though not pretty or as 
visible as that of the teeth arms, is just as vital, if not more, to delivering a 
successful campaign. An idea would be to force all young officer to conduct supply 
and resource planning training events to help them get a wider understanding of 
the various factors involved. This knowledge would also benefit them in the current 
COIN environment. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Based on my role; Seeing the bigger picture - situational awareness, effective 
planning and risk management, fact based decision making, delivering values 
based leadership and direction to the team, building trust, integrity and moral 





10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Effective communications, managing the expectations of the various Battle-Group 
leadership team, resource management of my scarce vehicles and people and 
reviewing of the plan and updating it. There is also risk and issue management 
and understanding how it impacts on the CSS plan. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
That is a hard one to call, as I see myself, and the BG CSS Officer role as a blend 
of leader / manager. I am required to set out the plan, direction to my teams who 
are spread over a wider area in support of BG elements. At the same time I need 
to maintain motivation within the team, pastoral care and provide a support 
framework for them. I am also the link back to the Bde CSS chain. Truthfully I am a 
bit off both, but more manager than leader on operations. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Situational awareness, ability to effectively plan based on evidence and manage 
risks; and give direction to teams to enable effective mission command. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Not really -received a presentation on it at CAST (S), but apart from that no real 
introduction to it. Ideally it is something that ICSC(L) and the Captain's courses 
should cover, but they are more focussed on tactics and operational war-fighting, 
rather than building the awareness of the strategic picture. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, but not in Iraq. They were visibly absent 
in Iraq, yet that was the place we needed a Comprehensive Approach the most. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - we focussed more on the complicated issues around planning CSS support 
operations, or the need to conduct high intensity war fighting events. The 
complexity of the political, social and legal interfaces with the frontline actions are 









B16 - Interview Profile 15 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am a Battle Group liasion officer - my role when we deploy is to conduct the 
media engagement, government engagement and the liaision between other units 
and ourselves.  
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with my unit for 8 years, having joined it when I first commissioned, 
though I have spent time away on training courses and a tour at a training 
regiment. I have been part of the Battle-Group for 13 months. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I am the senior liaison officer for the battle-group, responsible for managing the 
engagement with the media and other units who will operate alongside us in 
theatre. As the LO, I will manage the team to develop the right message for the 
right audience.  
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
3 tours in total - 1 of Kosovo and 2 tours of Iraq. This is my first tour of Helmand. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a Captain I have completed the following courses: 
RMAS, Tp Comd's Cse, Vehicle Comd Course, JOTAC, JOLP, MK1, MA module 
A. I have also completed the MoD Media management course as part of my role 
development. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
I think that having an awareness of the wider picture, especially as an engagement 
manager, is key. Good communication skills and evidence based analysis is also 
important in this role. Any comments not based on fact can be easily distorted and 
twisted by others. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
A greater awareness of the importance of a strong, well crafted and supported 
message for influence campaigns. We need to understand the importance of 
culture and non-combat / non-lethal engagement methods to win the population. 
HTA is a skill that is poorly understood but critical to success. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Effective communication, adaptive thinking, values based leadership, 
understanding the wider picture, moral courage and decision making under 
pressure. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Personnel management, time and resource management, communications, 
delegation and stakeholder engagement. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am an information manager, ensuring the key messages get out of the Battle-
Group via the relevant engagement groups. Though I manage a small team, I do 
not think I am in a leadership role; that is the OC who sets the strategy and 





12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Decision making under pressure, Effective communications and stakeholder 
engagement. The problem solving and other stuff can be done by the teams - my 
job is, based on their analysis, to make the decision on what way we go. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
No, though I have read the documentation on it and received an informal guidance 
lecture on it. As a process it does not seem to be well understood across the team; 
however our own planning actions seek to be done collaboratively which civil and 
military personnel, which is the essence of the Comprehensive Approach.  
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No - this is an area where the military training events are very limited. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, mainly contractors who are stationed in theatre helping to manage our 
infrastructure. This has become more obvious as we cut back on our own skilled 
personnel within the military. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
The educational courses that I received within the military did not explore the 
complexity of modern combat is as much detail as I needed to know. The 
exercises tried to replicate the confusion and the many issues, but without proper 
investment into the use of civilian counterparts, they did not fully represent all the 
issues that I met. The complexity of the CAST events, with the political, regional, 
military and civilian elements all colliding at once into the scenario was the closest I 








B17 - Interview Profile 16 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
My role is the Batle Group Engineer - I deliver the advice and direction on key 
engineering tasks, while also supporting the OC Engineers in delivering 
specialised advice and guidance on engineering issues. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the Battle-Group for 9 months; prior to that I was with another 
armoured engineer unit as a senior Troop Commander within an armoured 
engineer squadron. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None - came from university where I studying engineering at BSc level into the 
RMAS to obtain a commission into the Royal Engineers. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
The role is focussed on the ability to deliver specialised information on all engineer 
focussed tasks. Whereas the OC looks after the management of information and 
taskings, my role is more as the engineering specialist, working on behalf of the 
OC to develop ground traces, environmental and physical impacts, contraints and 
issues. My role as the BGE also enables me to provide key information updates on 
the roles and capabilities of the delpoyed units, informing the planning sessions in 
support of the OC. I also delegate and watchkeep during the times we are 
deployed as a Headquarters. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced four operational tours: 1 x NI, 1 x Iraq and 2 x Afghanistan. I 
am currently preparing for my third tour of Afghanistan, though this is the first time 
as HQ staff. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a senior Troop Commander and BGE I have completed all the relevant career 
courses upto ICSC(L). I am yet to attend my MA Module B, though this is in the 
pipeline.  
 
I have conducted by special to arms engineer training and I am explosives trained. 
I completed a BSc at university and I currently exploring the options of a part time 
MSc, funded by the military. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
Within my position the important element of my role is the abiltiy to make rational 
decisions and give advice, based on facts and analysis. As a specialist, trust in my 
judgement and critical analysis, supported by evidence based decision making is 
key. Also being able to adapt to difficult situations and find innovatative answers to 
complex solutions is also key. The final element would be having the courage of 
my convictions to see a decision through. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Building greater awareness of the capabilities available to them from specialists 
that are on the battlefield and how to use them. Better education around 
operations within the COIN environment and a focus on understanding the impact 
of Hybrid forces on the current combat mechanisms. Finally, a better approach to 
decision making through using the Combat Estimate and how to utilise key 
engineering assets to build influence. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Building trust within the team, doing the right thing rather than the easiest thing, 
effective communications, evidence based decision making, effective problem 
solving and building the capability of others, situational awareness and moral 
courage to have the belief in yourself and your decisions. Also humility to accept 





10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Managing resources you have at hand to maximise capability, effective planning, 
ability to see the bigger picture, delegation, effective communication skills in all 
mediums, and information reporting. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
Organisation engineering intelligence manager, delivering key information and 
assessment facilitating the organisation. This will enable it to make timely critical 
decisions in order to align resources to tasks, as well as allowing it to obtain 
maximum strategic impact. In regards to a leader or a manager, I would say I am a 
manager of information and process to enable the leaders to make effective 
decisions. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Based on my current role, these would be: Situational awareness - seeing the 
operational and strategic picture;  
Promoting the right culture of decision making under pressure through 
demonstrating moral courage; and effective decision making based on facts and 
evidence based analysis. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Not officially, though we have had informal briefing sessions as part of our special 
to arm training on how engineers and civil contractors for the MoD can work 
together on operations in support of building influence tasks. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Not during my previous deployments. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Previously on the Iraq and Afghanistan tours I have worked with local and 
international contractors to develop base protection and influence building tasks. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Operationally I think I was, though conceptually no. There was a number of 
influence and cultural areas that I felt very under developed and exposed in. The 
military needs to understand how important the moral component is to the 








B18 - Interview Profile 17 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I arrived with the Bn as 1 of the Companies were preparing to enter into MST to 
support the Bde. I had been working in an SO1 position in Land Forces before 
that. The Bn is a core unit of the Queen's Division and was deploying elements in 
support of the Brigade on Op Herrick. As the CO I attended the training to provide 
the Command and Control for the BG HQ, enabling further training of the BGHQ 
staff.  
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the Regiment for four months, working to develop a tight knit 
planning group for the BGHQ. Though the Battalion is not due to deploy, we have 
a number of elements that will deploy in support of other units. This seemed a 
good option for a run out of the team. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None, apart from my time at university. I have been with the military since then, 
moving between infantry units, the Defence Academy and SO2 / SO1 posts with 
land and joint command. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
As the BGHQ CO, I am the senior representative and the leader of the battle-
group. I am responsible for the delivery of the Bde tactical plan, as well as the co-
ordination and direction of the headquarter staff to deliver mission success. In my 
role all decisions eventually sit with me. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have served on a number of operational tours during my time with the military. I 
have conducted 2 tours of Northern Ireland, 2 of the Balkans, 1 in Kosovo, 2 in Iraq 
and currently 1 tour of Afghanistan. I have also conducted short deployments to 
Falkland Islands, Sierra Leone, Cyprus and the Oman. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a Lt Colonel, I have completed all required courses from ACSC downwards. 
This would include the RMAS, Pl Comd's Battle Course, JOTEs (pre-cursor to 
JOTAC), Captains' Warfare Course, Combined Arms Tactics Course, ICSC(L), 
OC's course, the relevant MA modules, MK2 and then ACSC. I have also explored 
the option of a second masters' degree, having obtained my first during the ACSC. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
In my position, the key role of the Commander is to give direction and build the 
team. Key to this is the development and maintenance of trust within the team; As 
the boss, I need to demonstrate integrity and also need to see the bigger picture 
and translate it into actions and direction for the team. Other key elements are the 
development and sustainment of situational awareness; the displaying moral 
courage by leading through example; decision making based on fact; and when it 
all goes wrong, having a sense of humour to help deal with the situation. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
There needs to be a greater understanding about the importance of co-ordinated 
effort, joint operations and the bigger picture. The battlefield is becoming more 
cluttered, more dense and less open; too many of our conflicts are moving into 
urban or semi urban terrain. A junior officer now needs to understand the 
importance or joint effects, 2nd and 3rd order support to the frontline forces, 
logisitics planning, influence planning and the need for resource management. If 
we wish to be effective in the COE and FOE, we need to adapt to the future, not 





9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
In my role as the BGHQ Commander, I would deem that effective communication, 
adaptive thinking and values based leadership are critical to my success in role. 
This is supported with an understanding the wider picture, moral courage and 
decision making under pressure. Underpinning all this is building trust and respect 
within the team, knowing that everyone will work for each other when the situation 
is difficult. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Communication, resource management, leadership skills, authenticity, willingness 
to listen, planning skills, problem solving, delegation, integrity, trust, self confidence 
and faith in their people. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am both a leader and a manager; it is the role of the Commanding Officer. I lead 
in battle by giving clear direction and making informed decisions. I manage in the 
barracks through my Command Staff and Sub Unit Commanders. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
In my role as the Commander, making clearly defined assessments and 
accountable decisions is critical; therefore it needs to be evidence based and 
analytical in nature. Secondly, problem solving is important to enable us to move 
quickly and maintain the edge against an enemy who is very resourceful and 
unforgiving. Finally, as a Commander, courage both moral and physical is 
required. There will be times, especially in the heat of battle, when tough calls 
need to be made to save the many over the few. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
I have had formal training at ACSC on how to apply the Comprehensive Approach; 
I was lucky to work with Defence personnel at ACSC to develop strategy based on 
a COIN situation. However, I beleive the Comprehensive Approach training comes 
too late - junior officers and Majors should be deeply immersed in it as well to build 
capability at all levels.  
The outcomes so far on Operation HERRICK suggests that when we get to a point 
to make fundamental changes to support an operation then we are willing to do, so 
but do it far too slowly; Op ENTIRETY for example only came into force some six 
to seven years after the operation started. I suspect that we are not predictive 
enough: on operations we have achieved ISTAR dominance happened and 
influence application, but without the training to support and exploit it. This is very 
concerning - there should be a far better level of training and development of the 
teams in the impact of influence operations and cultural awareness. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Yes, worked with contracted civilians for the buildup training for the Balkans. Also 
with the PSNI and local government officials during Northern Ireland preparational 
training. Iraq and Afghanistan training was not as organised; contracted role 
players rather than actual individuals have been in attendence. While good for a 
short term fix, it does not deliver the deep training experience these places require. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, in the Balkans, Northern Ireland and in Iraq where the ways of working were 
well established. In my previous tour in Afghanistan the approach had been more 
adhoc, with activities being very localised, poorly directed and without a long term 
strategy. There was a drive for activity but it felt like there was little long term 
guidance. This caused a lot of wasted time, effort, money and frustration as we lost 
support from the local population. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
When we were doing the training I thought that we were being given an unrealistic 
representation of what we would be facing in theatre. I thought that it was far too 
intense. In reality I was wrong; it was in fact spot on; and we were just sufficiently 
inoculated by the exercise complexity to cope with the reality of combat operations 
within MST. What we were not prepared for was the politics of MST and 
Afghanistan. Neither I nor my subunit commanders were ready for the degree in 
which we would be immersed in Afghan local politics: and the difference between 
the Salisbury Plain (Training Area) Afghans on training and Afghan Afghans for 
example is that Afghan Afghans don’t become compliant after a scripted ten 
minutes of being difficult. The focus in training was still very much on manoeuvre, 
whereas for commanders we would have also benefitted from being trained in 







B19 - Interview Profile 18 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the BG 2IC. In this role I am the CO's right hand man, responsible for the 
management of the Headquarters and the relevant outputs required to enable 
effective planning and execution of the operations. As the 2IC, I direct the daily 
activity of the HQ, enabling the CO and the other Command Staff to conduct the 
planning and evaluation of the issues that the BG may face. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the unit for 17 years, though in this role I have spent periods 
away from the organisation on various tasks. Periods away include ICSC, a tour 
within a Bde HQ and a tour at the Land Warfare School as a senior specialist. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None - I joined the military straight from University. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
If this was a civilian organisation I would be the assistant head of department of a 
large organisation or the COO of a SME of 650 personnel. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have depoloyed to Northern Ireland twice, Balkan regions 3 times (Kosovo x 2, 
Bosnia x 1) Iraq for 2 tours and Afghanistan x 1. This is my second tour of 
Afghanistan. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a senior infanttry major I have attended all the relevant courses, up to and 
including ACSC. Key courses were RMAS, JOTES, PCBC, Combined Arms 
Tactics Course, Warfare course, ICSC(L) and ACSC. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
I consider the folllowig traits as very important in the role of the BG 2IC. Adaptive 
leadership, demonstrating the values you wish others to follow. Integrity; I am the 
CO's right hand man and responsible for the effective running of the HQ. Clear 
direction and decision making for the HQ, along with a high level of communication 
skills. I also need to focus on the needs of the CO, who, if this is was a civilian 
company, would be my senior client. Finally the need to understand the end game; 
seeing the bigger picture and the means to get there. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
The officer cadre of today need to be experienced to coalition operations and the 
concept of Hybrid conflict at an early stage of their career. It needs to be integrated 
into their DNA, not a bolt on. Our preparation cycle is a prime example - 1 year of 
high intensity multi level combat training against a Russian Horde threat, then 1 
year of Middle East COIN specific training. These should be integrated into Hybrid 
warfare training events, not seperate actions. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Decision making, evidence based analysis, problem solving, communication skills, 
innovatitive thinking, optioneering, adaptive thinking, red-teaming / wargaming, 
crisis management, risk management, resource management and strategic 
thinking. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Developing your team, delegating, giving clear direction, clear advice and 
communication skills, information management, effective and timely planning, 





stakeholder engagement - putting your client / customer at the centre of what you 
do. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I am a leader within Barracks and on Operations. In barracks I manage the the day 
to day operations, enabling the CO to strategically guide the unit. In operations, I 
direct, manage and give advice to the Headquarters in order to deliver the required 
outputs to the CO. When the CO deploys forward I take command of main HQ; I 
become responsible for leading the staff in the planning and execution of the 
mission. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
These are what I see, given my experience and current role as a senior officer in 
the BGHQ. The first key element is moral courage, you must be honest and true to 
those you serve and lead. The next is integrity; your word and image is everything 
when dealing with superiors during intelligence and operational briefings. The final 
quality is effective decision making - it is what we are paid to do. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Yes, but not until I had gone to ACSC. There have been a number of study days of 
collaborative working with other agencies, but very little formal direction. This is a 
major over-sight on how we prepare for the COE that we are operating within. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Only when delpoying to Northern Ireland - that was quite well integrated, though it 
had taken us a number of years to get it right. It is a shame we seem to have gone 
backwards when it comes to current operational deployment preparations to the 
Middle East. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, during my service in Nothern Ireland and Iraq. My previous tour of 
Afghanistan I had no direct engagement with civilain organisations. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - our preparation focussed on combat operations and threats, rather than the 
aspects of the modern COE and the political / cultural dynamic. Authors such as 
General Smith, Hammes and Krulak are right; we need to understand the 
environment and tailor our approach. Combinde Arms, working with Coalitions and 









B20 - Interview Profile 19 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
I am the Detachment Commander for the Royal Military Police that would deploy in 
support of the Battle Group on operations to assist with legal advice, traffic 
management, convoy movements and management of captured personnel. As the 
commander, I would be involved in giving advice to the OC Headquarters on how 
best to maximise the limited resource within the RMP detachment. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been serving with the Army for six years and have been with my current unit 
for 18 months. I am due to move to another unit within the next 6 -12months, 
depending on the posting cycle. 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
I think the best way is to describe it as similar to a police inspector role. I manage a 
team of police sergeants and soldiers on a daily basis, managing investigations, 
police support tasks and other requirements given to me by the OC. On operations 
I would be deployed in support of a Battle Group and operate independently of the 
OC, though I would remain under his command, and only be loaned out to the 
Battle Group.  
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced three tours in total. One in the Balkans (Kosovo) and two of 
Iraq. This is my first tour of Afghanistan. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
As a troop commander, I have completed RMAS, my special to arm training, 
JOTAC, JOLP and the MK1 element. I have yet to start doing the Military Analysis 
modules. I have a BSc in Social studies. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
The key elements that are important in my role are as follows: Resource and team 
management, effective planning and giving clear direction and orders to the team. 
As the troop commander I also need to demonstrate the core values of the military 
and have the moral courage to conduct my job as the detachment commander. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
From my own point of view, I found that while I had been extensively trained to 
lead men and women in the field, I had very little understanding of resource 
management, team management or how to develop soldiers' careers. These 
critical management qualities had not been integrated within the RMAS or Special 
to Arm training periods. I had to learn this from my senior staff while on the job. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Moral courage is key for the young commander; it is too easy to get side tracked 
by the senior NCOs into the "way it has always been" mentality. Effective planning 
and decision making. In this role, evidence based analysis is also critical, as our 
decisions need to demonstrate the evidence of the decision making cycle. 
Investing in the development of others is also important as a leader as I am 
responsible for all those under my command. 
10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Team management is a big one, as is resource planning. There is also the ability 
to manage change effectively and at times think outside the box - sometimes the 






11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I see myself as a manager of a small and specialised team of individuals. I am 
responsible for their career development, safety and performance. As the boss it is 
up to me to make sure what we do adds value to the organisation. I am 
responsible for building and maintain the relationship with the Battle Group 
leadership team, ensuring I focus on their operational requirements. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
Moral courage, demonstration of the integral values of the Army and effective 
decision making; this is the role of the Troop Commander. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
None 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
Yes, on regular occassions I have worked with local and international police forces 
while doing my job. 
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
As above, though it is only really the police / justice department agents that I would 
work with, rather than other organisations. 
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
Not at all. The political pressures and social issues that were present on operations 
were nothing we had been prepared for as a Troop Commander. Though the 
activities were similar to that experienced on training, the complexity was far and 








B21 - Interview Profile 20 
 Initial Evidence Gathering Questions 
No. Question Response 
1 What is your role in the 
organisation? 
My role is a Troop Commander of an Armoured Squadron. I am in charge of four 
armoured vehicles and work to the Squardon Leader. As part of the exercise I am 
here as one of the Battle group Liaison Officers. 
2 How long have you been with 
the organisation? 
I have been with the uniy now for just over four years, hence the reason I am a 
Lieutenant. I am soon to enter into my promotion window to Captain. This will 
enable me to look at other roles witihin the military, such as a Phase 1 or Phase 2 
training unit Troop Commander role 
3 Have you had any other 
employment roles outside of the 
military? 
None except university. 
4 How would you describe the 
position that you are currently 
in? 
It is both a junior manager and a leader of men role. I manage the troop when we 
are in camp. Along with my senior ranks, I am responsible for making sure I enable 
the troops to develop their career in line with the squaron Leader's policy and 
development framework. Outside of camp, I am responible for the management of 
the troop vehicles, the teams and leading them effectively during exercise and on 
operations. 
5 How many operational tours 
have you experienced? 
I have experienced one operational tour to date. It was during the last phase of Op 
TELIC (Iraq) where I was one of the Iraqi Army mentors sent out to help develop 
their capability. This will be my first tour of Afghanistan. 
6 Have you received the following 
training / development courses? 
a. ACSC 
b. ICSC 
c. Captain's Warfare Course (or 
equivalent) 
d. Junior Officers Tactical 
Development Course (or 
equivalent) 
e. Junior Officer's Special to Arm 
training 
f. Junior Officer's initial training 
g. Late Entry Officer's Education 
course 
h. Military analysis modules 
i. Masters level education 
j. Degree level education 
I have attended RMAS, Troop Leaders' Course (Special to Arm), JOTAC, MK1 and 
JOLP. On promotion to Captain I will start my Military Analysis modules, MK2 and 
the Captain's Warfare Course. 
 
Regards uni courses, I have a BA in Business management, though that is not 
much use to me as an Armouted Troop Commander at the moment. 
7 What elements do you consider 
important in your role as an 
Officer / middle management 
within the organisation? 
As a Troop Leader the key factors are the clear decision making, problem solving 
(the troops can give you lots of problems to solve), moral courage and 
demonstrating the key values of being an officer. These are ingrained into us at 
Sandhurst and it is what the soldiers expect us to do, The other key role is looking 
after the soldiers; welfare, career and in general helping them develop. 
8 Following on from the attached 
questionnaire how would you 
suggest the military build the 
capability of the officer cadre for 
today's conflicts? 
Although man management and the management of the various vehicles and other 
resources that are within the Troop sits on my head, I had very little prepartion for it 
at RMAS and Special to Arm training. It is one area the Army really lets down the 
junior officer; we have to learn it on the job. Another element where we could get 
better in people centric warfare; coming to CAST(S) was the first time I had really 
be given a clear understanding of what is was, how it impacted on operations and 
the importance of influence campaigns. We can only see the big picture if we are 
taught what to look for. 
9 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a leader in the 
military? 
Moral courage, decision making, demonstrating the values and standards, 
developing trust, problem solving and driving contant improvement to processes 
and methods to make us perform better under pressure. These are key at my level. 





10 In your opinion, what 
competencies would you say are 
critical to being a manager in the 
military? 
Resource and man-management, decsion making, managing change and being 
able to improve the way we do things. Also conducting regular performance 
reviews and auditing the paperwork and management processes. This is what I do 
in my role when managing the Troop within barracks. 
11 In your opinion, how do you see 
yourself within the military? 
I would see myself as a blend of a junior leader with management responsibilities. I 
think tht is how most young officers within the teeth arms would view themselves. 
We have to look after our soldiers, but when the fighting starts we have to lead 
them into the conflict and do what is best for the organisation; values based 
leadership is very difficult in times of conflict. 
12 If forced to choose 3 qualities of 
an officer, what three would you 
say are key for the role in 
today's environment? 
For my role, the three are decision making, showing moral courage and 
demonstratiing the values and standards by looking after the troops. 
13 Have you had any formal 
training / education on the 
Comprehensive Approach? 
Very little and most of it haas been informal. CAST(S) is the first real time we have 
been shown the importance of an Integrated Approach, influence campaigns and 
how stabilisation plays a major factor. 
14 Have you worked / trained with 
OGDs / NGOs or civilian 
organisations in preparation for 
operational deployment? 
No  
15 Have you worked with OGDs / 
NGOs / Civilian security 
organisations on operations? 
Yes, Iraqi security forces and some US police department officials who had been 
embedded with the Iraqi police to help build capability.  
16 In your opinion, were you 
prepared for the complex 
environment that you found 
yourself serving within on 
operations? 
No - I was for the leadership element and the ability to lead and manage the Troop 
in conflict. What I struggled with in Iraq was the politics, cultural issues and the 
various inter tribal / inter agencies hidden agendas which sought to derail almost 
every element of the task. These things are key to building a lasting and resilient 







ANNEX C: DATA EXPLOITATION 


































Effective planning to 
deliver results
1
A Coy Comd 3 Yorks 5 Maj 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
2
B Coy Comd 3 Yorks 4 Maj 1 2 2 2 1 1
3
C Coy Comd 3 Yorks 5 Maj 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
4
Support (D) Coy comd 3 Yorks 5 Maj 1 1 1 2 2
5
Regt Intel Officer 3 Yorks 4 Capt 1 1 1 1 2 2
6 Pl Comd 1 Royal Welch 2 Capt 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
7 B Coy Comd 1 Royal Welch 5 Maj 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
8 Sqn Leader KRH 5 Maj 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
9 Stabilisation Advisor 4 Capt 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
10 Battery Commander 5 Maj 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
11 FST Commander 2 Capt 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
12 Battery Command Post Officer 8 Capt 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
13 TACP Commander 4 Capt 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
14 OC RLC Sqn 3 Maj 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
15 BG Liaison Offr 3 Capt 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
16 BG Engineer 4 Capt 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
17 1 R Ang CO 8 Lt Col 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
18 1 R Ang 2IC 8 Maj 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
19 Tp Comd RMP 3 Capt 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
20 Tp Comd KRH 1 Lt 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
Quality Score 15 6 8 6 24 10 11 11 19 32 28 16 13
Initial Evidence Gathering Questions














department / team 
capabilities
Influence others




Build relationships Develop talent
Improve systems / 
processes
Identify new capabilites
Build and maintain 
quality 
Focus on client needs
1 2 1 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
14 15 20 16 14 11 17 6 15 12


















Thinking strategically 15 
2. Applying innovative responses 6 
3. Promoting lateral thinking 8 
4. Delivering change 6 
5. 
Promoting Integrity and Values 
Demonstrate moral courage 24 
6. Promote military values 10 
7. Demonstrate values based leadership 11 
8. Inspire honesty and integrity 11 
9. 
Effective Leadership 
Promote effective communication 19 
10. Demonstrate sound decision making 32 
11. Use evidence based analysis 28 
12. Demonstrate effective problem solving 16 
13. Effective planning to deliver results 13 
14. 
People Development Focussed 
Understand department / team capabilities 14 
15. Influence others 15 
16. Promote and foster trust 20 
17. Give clear direction to teams 16 
18. Build relationships 14 
19. Develop talent 11 
20. 
Technical Specialism Focussed 
Improve systems / processes 17 
21. Identify new capabilities 6 
22. Build and maintain quality 15 
23. Focus on client needs 12 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ANNEX D: QUESTOINNAIRES 











The level of training at RMAS/Cranwell/Lympstone prepared me for my first position as a 
Junior Officer. 
2 





The level of leadership training within the military throughout my military career is correct. 
4 
The quality of formal leadership training received within the military is at the correct level 
required. 
5 
The level of training and education received at my Young Officers course / LEOC prepared 
me for the role in barracks of managing soldiers and resources. 
6. 
The level of training and education received at my Young Officers course / LEOC prepared 
me for the role of leading soldiers in the field. 
7. 
The level of training received during my military career has always prepared me for my next 
position. 
8. 
The level of professional military education received during my military career has always 




The Army has managed to match my capabilities and experience to a position where it will 
benefit the organisation. 
10. 
My immediate chain of command (Maj - Colonel) understand my requirement for professional 
development and assist me in achieving it. 
11. 
The senior chain of command (Brigadier +) understand my requirement for professional 





The organisation has provided the resources (IT, funding, support staff) to support my 
professional development within the field of leadership and management. 
13. 
The organisation has provided the correct level of time to support my professional 
development within the field of leadership and management. 
14. 
The organisation has provided the resources (IT, funding, support staff) to support my 
continued education throughout my career. 
15. 
The organisation has provided the correct level of time to support my continued education 






The level of PME for junior officers (2nd Lt - Capt) is at the correct level. 
17. The level of PME for mid ranking officers (Maj - Colonel) is at the correct level. 
18. 
An officer still benefits from completing a degree course prior to beginning at the 
RMAS/Cranwell/Lympstone. 
19. 
The organisation would benefit from creating a pool of culturally aware officers through the 
attendance of junior officers on specific country based long university courses. 
20. 
Investing in a 
Comprehensive 
Approach 
I have an acceptable level of knowledge of Other Government Departments to enable me to 
work alongside them on operations. 
21. 
I have had a good level of interaction while serving in the military with Other Government 
Departments which has prepared me to work with them effectively on operations. 
22. 
My current level of professional knowledge ensures that I am comfortable working within a 
Joint (Army, Navy and/or RAF) Headquarters environment. 
23. 
I have a professional awareness of the Comprehensive Approach and understand the 





What is your background? Rank, Operational tours, experience, courses attended, time 
served. 
25. How could the military develop its approach to professional military education? 
26. 









D2 – rail industry Questionnaires 










The level of Resilience training at Network Rail prepared me for my first 
management position in the company 
2 
The level of Resilience education given at Network Rail prepared me for 




The level of Resilience training within Network Rail throughout my 
management career is correct. 
4 
The quality of formal leadership training received within Network Rail is at 
the correct level required for my role. 
5 
The level of Resilience training and education received within Network 
Rail prepared me for the role in managing people and resources. 
6. 
The level of Resilience training and education received within Network 
Rail prepared me for the role of leading personnel during incidents. 
7. 
The level of training received during my career has always prepared me 
for my next position. 
8. 
The level of professional education received during my career has always 




The Company has managed to match my capabilities and experience to 
a position where it will benefit the organisation. 
10. 
My immediate line manager (Band 4-2) understand my requirement for 
professional development and assist me in achieving it. 
11. 
The department head / senior manager (Band 1 +) understands my 
requirement for 





The organisation has provided the resources (IT, funding, support staff) 
to support my professional development within the field of leadership and 
management. 
13. 
The organisation has provided the correct level of time to support my 
professional development within the field of leadership and management. 
14. 
The organisation has provided the resources (IT, funding, support staff) 
to support my continued education throughout my career. 
15. 
The organisation has provided the correct level of time to support my 




The level of Resilience education and training for middle managers (Band 







The level of Resilience education and training for senior ranking 
managers (Band 1+) is at the correct level. 
18. 
A manager would benefit from completing a management Higher 
Education course prior to beginning a management role. 
19. 
have an acceptable level of knowledge of Other rail industry Departments 
to enable me to work alongside them during a major disruptive event. 
20. 
Investing in a 
Collaborative 
Approach 
I have had a good level of interaction while serving in Network Rail with 
Other rail industry Departments which has prepared me to work with them 
effectively during a major disruptive event. 
21. 
My current level of professional knowledge ensures that I am comfortable 
working within a collaborative environment with other rail industry 
elements and the emergency services. 
22. 
I have a professional awareness of a Collaborative Approach and 






What is your background? Operational Experience, courses attended, 
current position. 
24. What is your Band level? 
25. How long have you been employed by Network Rail? 
26 
How could the Company develop its approach to the development of a 
Resilience Culture? 
27 
Have you managed to obtain any of the following accreditation / education 



















My immediate manager (1 position above) supports and understands my personal 
development plan. 
2 
My senior manager (2 positions above, if applicable) supports and understands my 
personal development requirement. 
3 
The company / organisation supports my personal development through financial 
support 
4 
The company / organisation supports my personal development through the allocation 
of specific development time 
5 
I have regular continuous personal development meetings with my manager to help 
manage my career 
6. 
My objectives are set early and regularly reviewed by my manager with me to help 
develop my ability 
7. 
I have regular meetings and discussions with other members of the industry access 




I feel that the organisation empowers me to challenge a decision I feel is not correct 
and will not penalise me for doing so. 
9. 
I feel comfortable in challenging the current planning process based on the 
information that is inputted into the system. 
10. I understand the current cultural climate of the industry 
11. 
I am comfortable working with my fellow industry planning members and believe they 
act professionally 
12. 
I believe my fellow planner across the TOCs/FOCs show a collaborative approach to 
planning. 
13. 
I believe my fellow planners across the contractor domain show a collaborative 
approach to planning 
14. 




I receive information that is critical to my role early which enables me to plan 
effectively 
16. 
My organisation has a well defined and communicated behavioural and cultural 
framework. 
17. I regularly seek feedback from others I work with on my performance and behaviours 
18. 





I am comfortable with taking accountability to develop my own professional development 
within my department 
20. I attend regular competency reassessments to enable me to remain capable within my role 
21. I understand my capability framework for my role 
22. I am comfortable with the current industry access planning process. 
23. Network Rail listens and understands the planning requirements and needs of the industry 
24. 
My team is fully staffed, fully functional and is regularly developed through courses 




25. I feel valued within my team 
26. 
I have the received the right amount of training to enable me to do my job to the 





I believe that the best way to make people want to work harder is to pay them more or award 
larger bonuses 
28 The industry is currently working efficiently and collaboratively 
29 Managers are held accountable for their decisions 




Please indicate what part of the railway industry you are from? 
32 What is your organisation (NR,FOC, TOC or Contractor) and seniority level? 
33 
How long have you been in your current role (in the industry) and what professional training 
have you received to do your role? 
34 
How has your training / education / professional development prepared you for working within 
a collaborative and pressurised cross industry position? 
35 
How has your organisational management supported your professional development within 
the field of leadership and management? 
36 
In what way do you think the industry could develop a more collaborative approach to 
planning? 
37 
In your opinion, what are the current major issues with the industry culture that affects the 





ANNEX E: DATA RESULTS 































































ANNEX F: LIVE EXERCISE BATTLE-GROUP RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SA1 Roles & Responsibilities 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 3
SA2 Hazards & Consequences 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 2
SA3 Connectivity Awareness 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
SA4 Insurance 3 2 1 2 2 2
SA5 Recovery Priorities 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
KV1 Planning 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
KV2 Exercises 3
KV3 Internal Resources 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
KV4 External Resources 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2
KV5 Connectivity 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3
AC1 Silo Mentality Management 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 3 2
AC2 Communications & Relationships 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
AC3 Strategic Vision 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 1
AC4 Information and Knowledge 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
AC5 Leadership & Management 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 3



























































































































































































































































































































































































































2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2
2.28
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 2
2.08
2 1 2 2 1 3 2 2 2
2.11
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1
2.00
2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2
2.10
2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 2
2.20
2 2 2 3 3 1
2.29
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 3 2 2
2.26
2 3 1 3 2 2
2.13
2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 2
2.29
2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2
2.26
2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 2
2.14
2 1 3 2
2.17
2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 2
2.14
2 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 3 3 2
2.25









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SA1 Roles & Responsibilities 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 4
SA2 Hazards & Consequences 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 3
SA3 Connectivity Awareness 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 4
SA4 Insurance 3 3 2 2 3 3
SA5 Recovery Priorities 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3
KV1 Planning 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3
KV2 Exercises 3
KV3 Internal Resources 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3
KV4 External Resources 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3
KV5 Connectivity 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 4
AC1 Silo Mentality Management 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 3
AC2 Communications & Relationships 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3
AC3 Strategic Vision 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
AC4 Information and Knowledge 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3
AC5 Leadership & Management 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 4































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 4 3
2.88
3 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3
2.83
2 2 4 4 3 3
2.94
3 2 2 4 3 3 3
2.77
3 2 2 3 3 3
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3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3
2.84
3 4 3 2 3
3.00




2 2 4 2 3 4 3 3
2.90
3 2 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 3
2.82




2 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3
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2.90
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SA1 Roles & Responsibilities 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 3
SA2 Hazards & Consequences 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2
SA3 Connectivity Awareness 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3
SA4 Insurance 2 2 2 2 2 2
SA5 Recovery Priorities 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 2
KV1 Planning 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 2
KV2 Exercises 3
KV3 Internal Resources 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2
KV4 External Resources 3 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 3 2
KV5 Connectivity 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3
AC1 Silo Mentality Management 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2
AC2 Communications & Relationships 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2
AC3 Strategic Vision 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2
AC4 Information and Knowledge 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2
AC5 Leadership & Management 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
2.41
2 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 2
2.28
3 1 2 3 2 3 2 2 2
2.26
2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2
2.29
2 2 1 3 3 3 2 2
2.30
2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
2.40
2 2 3 2 3 2
2.43
2 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2
2.39
3 3 2 3 2 2
2.31
3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
2.38
2 3 2 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
2.37
3 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
2.27
2 1 3 2
2.33
3 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2
2.31
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2.42
2.34
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SA1 Roles & Responsibilities 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
SA2 Hazards & Consequences 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4
SA3 Connectivity Awareness 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3
SA4 Insurance 3 3 3 3 3 3
SA5 Recovery Priorities 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4
KV1 Planning 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4
KV2 Exercises 4
KV3 Internal Resources 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4
KV4 External Resources 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
KV5 Connectivity 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
AC1 Silo Mentality Management 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
AC2 Communications & Relationships 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4
AC3 Strategic Vision 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3
AC4 Information and Knowledge 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4
AC5 Leadership & Management 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3
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ANNEX G: EXAMPLE OF THE ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT MATURITY MATRIX FRAMEWORK 
G1.1 – Holistic Framework for the Strategic Core Workstream  
Due to the detail in this image, this is best viewed in A3 (if printed) or at 300% (if viewed electronically). This is due to it being part of a larger framework used 









Stage 5 (Optimising - Processes / activities are optimised, with strong leadership and guidance across the 
organisation. Departments are implementing best practice and may be regarded as industry sector leads, 
exporting guidance and direction.
Stage 4 (Predictable - Processes / Activities embedded across the organisation. Processes / activities 
communicated and well managed at all levels)
Stage 3 (Established - Processes established and present within teams. Processes / activities well used and 
documented at local level. Management team have set policy and direction.
Stage 2 (Managed - Simple processes at local / individual level, with isolated learning and 
consolidation)
Stage 1 (Basic - Processes in place but not established) Stage 0 (Processes not evident)





This element is identified through how well the vision is briefed and understood by the members of the 
organisation. This can then be tested through how well company and department objectives align to the 
delivery of the strategic vision. Another indicator is how engaged the staff feel with the strategic vision. 
Corporate vision is aligned to industry and government strategy, with achievable objectives clearly mapped 
out to enable the vision to be delivered. The Corporate vision is also linked to organisational cultural 
framework, social responsibility and presented through business literature, frameworks and activities.
Strategic vision clearly briefed and understood across the company and is also recognised by external 
agencies. Vision statement integrated into business publications, with programme and project activities and 
objectives mapped against the delivery of key outcomes, which in turn are mapped against the vision. All 
critical activity is mapped to the delivery of the end-state. Personal objectives are mapped against critical 
success factors and how they support the achievement of the strategic vision.
The strategic vision is embedded across the organisation at all levels, with programmes, projects and 
activities aligned to achieve the relevant critical success factors. Business publications promote the vision, 
with it clearly understood and bought into at all levels within the organisation. Policy and strategy 
documents are clearly aligned to the achievement of the corporate vision, with personnel conducting 
activities that align with the relevant policy or strategy. Performance measurements are aimed at achieving 
the corporate vision and are regularly reviewed.
Strategic vision and supporting strategies and policies are in place and well communicated across the senior 
leadership and management domains of the organisation. Strategic objectives for the development and 
embedding of resilience are established, with specific measurements aligned against them. Organisational 
activities are mapped to critical success factors, though the frameworks are not established at the lower levels 
of the organisation. Programme, project or personal objectives are not mapped to the strategic objectives or 
the organisational vision.
Limited level of awareness of the strategic vision within the workforce and how their efforts 
and work contribute to the delivery of the vision. While personal and team objectives process 
is formalised, they display little or no alignment to the vision.
Although corporate vision exists, no awareness of it at team level, or how team and 
departmental activities align to its delivery. Few objectives set across the teams and personal 
performance reviews not formalised, with no alignment to the corporate objectives.
No evidence displayed that the element is being utilised or 





This element analyses the level of maturity that the organisation has when it comes to it cultural approach. A 
high performing organisation would aim to develop an open and culturally diverse approach to the 
workplace, supporting personnel from numerous faiths and backgrounds. There would be a drive to build an 
inclusive and just culture, where individuals feel safe to work, free from harassment and blame. A just 
culture will also a safety focussed approach, with individuals comfortable to raise concerns, issues or events 
and seek to address and learn from them. As an organisation, there is an embedded values and standards 
framework, which complement the industry and government frameworks. There is also a strong presence of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, building the organisation's reputation as a fair, just and supportive member 
of the community. Within the organisation there is a culture of learning, with best practice seen as the 
normal standard to seek to achieve, while the industry looks to the organisation as a benchmark.
Clearly identifiable leadership frameworks, with an inclusive and adaptive culture. Organisation operates 
within a networked approach, with business elements empowered to function independently. A light touch 
from the leadership team, with values, standards, policies and direction clearly given and understood. 
Business functions clearly mapped to ISO or BS frameworks. Also, a strong presence of a learning culture. 
Collaborative multi-agency / department operations are the normal way of business, with the organisation 
mentoring others and exporting skills / guidance / best practice across the industry sector.
Policies and cultural activities embedded across the organisation, with key activities directed at the 
promotion of key drivers and motivation behind the drivers. Focus within the organisation is the 
development of a collaborative approach, embedding engagement, direction and strategic objectives into 
outcome focussed activities. Successful application of Lean processes and a strong focus on effective 
management and succession planning across all teams and departments.
Policies in place and in use within elements of the business. Evidence of communication across some areas of 
the business. Strategic priorities for cultural development identified and agreed by the leadership team. Key 
goals and strategy in place to enable the development of the required organisational culture. Cultural approach 
across the organisational is functional, based on achieving key milestones / objectives within defined areas.
Limited level of alignment to government and organisational standards. Few policy 
documents present. Strategy is not properly aligned to policy documents. Staff leadership 
programmes not maximised and managerial posts not properly invested in. Limited 
awareness of multi-agency or collaborative cross-industry operations. Organisational 
response to culture issues is very reactive.
Organisational policy in place, though not widely known / read within the department. No 
formal communication evidenced across the organisation, with minimal collaboration at the 
local team level. No awareness of multi-agency working or benefits of such activity. Cultural is 
very insular and almost tribal amongst teams, with a reactive nature to disruptive events.
No evidence displayed that the element is being utilised or 
systems are in place to support the element framework. Poor 








This element examines the leadership framework and the ability of the organisation to develop and sustain 
its strategy. Within the area there is the analysis of policy and strategy documents to analyse the level of 
direction within the organisation. This also looks at the type of leadership framework, whether it is heavily 
devolved, with flat hierarchies, or hierarchical, with pillars of command and control. Leadership training and 
education programmes, staff development packages, regular leadership table top discussions and a multi-
agency response understanding to promote the organisation as a leader within its industry setting.  This 
element also analyses the depth of leadership capability across the organisation, and whether it is confined 
to a few key decision-makers, or there is a level of devolved leadership, providing an agile element to the 
decision-making within the organisation.
There is strong evidence of a thorough understanding of strategic leadership, demonstrated through policy 
and strategy documents, which are clearly linked to department and function objectives. The leadership 
framework is adaptive to the situation, as well as junior managers being empowered. A strong leadership 
development culture is in place, with informal leaders being identified and supported at all levels. 
Individuals display strong change management, critical thinking and passion for developing their teams. 
They promote authentic leadership methods and are highly influential through the inspiring of others to 
achieve.
There is evidence of transformational leadership activities across the organisation, with leadership 
members promoting the active development and empowerment of junior managers. Individuals in 
leadership roles, at all levels, demonstrate critical thinking and analysis skills, and have in place clear 
succession plans for their team / department. They are results based and are unafraid to delegate 
responsibility while retaining accountability for delivery of activities. There is a culture of adaptive 
leadership within the senior members, promoting lateral thinking and effective change management.
Evidence of transactional leadership activity within teams and departments, with clear objectives and guidance 
set. Evidence of staff development within leadership skills at the higher levels of management, but little 
evidence within the lower tiers. Key individuals within the department are provided with the correct level of 
support to develop their skill sets within critical thinking, communication skills and people management. 
Individuals demonstrate the ability to think at the tactical level, understanding the importance of longer-term 
planning and decision making, though leadership style is still transactional.
Limited levels of delegation and direction given to team. Individuals seeks to maintain an 
authoritarian approach to leadership, unwilling to delegate. Little or no trust given to 
subordinates. Newly promoted people managers receive localised training and some 
support, with mentors available. Organisation still has an autocratic leadership style 
embedded.
Though there is direction on leadership expectation and management, few individuals in 
leadership roles have received formalised training for the role. Organisation suffers several 
grievances due to poor leadership at all levels. Organisation places technical experts into staff 
management roles without correct development frameworks. High turnover of staff present, 
with an autocratic style of leadership present.
No evidence displayed that the element is being utilised or 




















G1.2 – Framework for the Vision Component of the Strategic Core Workstream  
Due to the detail in this image, this is best viewed in A3 (if printed) or at 150% (if viewed electronically). This is due to it being part of a larger framework used 
to deliver the ORM3 database.  
Code Domain Strategic Element Factor Business Vision
Descriptor
Level Industry Organisation Function Localised Ad-hoc Non-existent
Activity
Strategic vision clearly briefed and 
understood across the company and is also 
recognised by external agencies. Vision 
statement integrated into business 
publications, with programme and project 
activities and objectives mapped against 
the delivery of key outcomes, which in turn 
are mapped against the vision. All critical 
activity is mapped to the delivery of the end-
state. Personal objectives are mapped 
against critical success factors and how 
they support the achievement of the 
strategic vision.
The strategic vision is embedded across 
the organisation at all levels, with 
programmes, projects and activities aligned 
to achieve the relevant critical success 
factors. Business publications promote the 
vision, with it clearly understood and 
bought into at all levels within the 
organisation. Policy and strategy 
documents are clearly aligned to the 
achievement of the corporate vision, with 
personnel conducting activities that align 
with the relevant policy or strategy. 
Performance measurements are aimed at 
achieving the corporate vision and are 
regularly reviewed.
Strategic vision and supporting strategies 
and policies are in place and well 
communicated across the senior 
leadership and management domains of 
the organisation. Strategic objectives for 
the development and embedding of 
resilience are established, with specific 
measurements aligned against them. 
Organisational activities are mapped to 
critical success factors, though the 
frameworks are not established at the 
lower levels of the organisation. 
Programme, project or personal objectives 
are not mapped to the strategic objectives 
or the organisational vision.
Limited level of awareness of the strategic 
vision within the workforce and how their 
efforts and work contribute to the delivery 
of the vision. While personal and team 
objectives process is formalised, they 
display little or no alignment to the vision.
Although corporate vision exists, no 
awareness of it at team level, or how 
team and departmental activities align 
to its delivery. Few objectives set 
across the teams and personal 
performance reviews not formalised, 
with no alignment to the corporate 
objectives.
No evidence displayed that the element 
is being utilised or systems are in place 
to support the element framework
Behaviours 
The organisation has a well developed 
inclusive culture that seeks to promote 
learning, capability and tolerance across all 
leveels of the organisation. Staff and 
stakeholders are part of the organisational 
framework, with their views welcomed and 
used to improve the organisation. The 
organisation is recognised as an example 
of cultural best practice and is forward in 
sharing continuous improvement options for 
the better of the industry.
Alternatively, the organisation may be so 
culturally powerful that its influence and 
practices, whether good or bad, may 
permeate across the industry, slowly 
changing the industry approach. If 
detrimental, then this could lead to cultural 
clashes and discord within the industry,
Organisation has a strong identity within 
the industry, with staff feeling a strong 
connection and identity with the 
organisation. Many individuals will have 
"joined for life" because of the culture, with 
a low turnover of staff leaving.  Promotes a 
Just and Questioning culture to build best 
practice.
Across the industry, practices may be 
copied, with the organisation being seen as 
the benchmark.
Alternatively, because of a strong culture, 
the organisation may be in direct 
competition with other industry members, 
unwilling to share practices and methods, 
creating discord. There may be a staff drain 
from other organisations towards this one. 
Other industry members may seek to 
collaborate to force change onto the 
organisation.
Across the function / department there is 
a strong sense of identity and belonging. 
Teams work towards a single goal, with a 
vision and purpose evident in their 
approach. Individuals feel they "belong" to 
the department / function, rather than the 
organisation.
May witness a cultural clash between the 
function / department and the 
organisation, especially when goals are 
different. Often witness a strong 
personality as the Head of Function / 
Department, who has their own methods 
of delivery. Can result in isolation and 
combatative working environment.
Across the organisation there are 
examples of empowerment and 
acceptance of diversity, but these are 
localised and not exploited for the better of 
the wider organisation.
Signs and elements of a resilience and 
learning culture within departments / 
functions.
May witness clashes of sub-cultures, 
focussed on team / individuals identities, 
with limited pesence of a Just, 
Questioning or Collaborative culture.
Culture is rarely consicerd within the 
development of organisational policy 
and activities. Staff feel "done to" 
rather than "done with."
In some areas there may be 
competing sub-cultures, resulting in 
poor operating practices and 
procedures.
Apathetic
Hostile environment to non-organisation 
personnel
Evidence
Cross industry cultural framework 
embedded and communicated.
Company policy in place to encourage 
personnel to promote diverse cultures 
across industry.
Multiple cultural groups supported through 
activities, communications, staff time and 
financial means.
Regular engagement between industry 
cultural groups and organisation.
Bespoke team in place to manage cultural 
frameworks. 
Company personnel encouraged to 
promote diverse cultures across industry.
Multiple cultural groups supported through 
activities, communications, staff time and 
financial means.
Cross-organisation guidelines and 
framework in place to support cultural 
groups.
Personnel support managed through wider 
HR policies and teams.
Cultural events / policy implementation part 
of the KPI structure
Company policy in place to promote 
cultural awareness.
Staff internal support networks in place
Function area supports staff doing localisd 
events to promote an inclusive culture.
Record held of events and feedback from 
staff.
Cultural events (training, outside events) 
captured as part of individual CPD.
Policy document in place and 
communicated across the organisation
Teams / individuls conducting cultural 
briefings within their teams
Localised team events to build awareness
No centralised guidance on developing 
and maintaining an inclusive culture.
Little in the way of documentation or 
staff support.
Indivdual events occurring, organised 
by individuals with no obvious backing 
from organisation.
No evidence present
This element is identified through how well the vision is briefed and understood by the members of the organisation. This can then be tested through how well company and department objectives align to the delivery of the strategic 
vision. Another indicator is how engaged the staff feel with the strategic vision. Corporate vision is aligned to industry and government strategy, with achievable objectives clearly mapped out to enable the vision to be delivered. The 

















1 Hazards and 
consequences P
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Internal and external 




















3 Risk management and 
planning A
G
3 Corporate security 
frameworks P
L











4 Robust processes for 




4 Adaptive decision 
making P
L



















5 Operatiing and licencing 
frameworks S
T
5 Corporate Social 
Responsibility S
D
5 Staff talent and 
succession planning 
frameworks
Strategic Core
Business 
Skills & Development
Business Vision
Organisational Culture 
Adaptive Leadership Framework
Business 
Assurance
Business 
Agility
Business 
Planning
Business 
Governance and 
Structure
